



A DEFENSE OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AGAINST OPPONENTS

Francisco Annato, S.J.

MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE DEFENDED
AGAINST ITS NEW OPPONENTS

MACHINE TRANSLATION
CLAUDE SONNET 3.7

A DEFENSE OF
MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
AGAINST OPPONENTS

SCIENTIA MEDIA CONTRA NOVOS EIVS IMPVGNATORES
DEFENSA + EVGENII PHILADELPHI ROMANI EXERCITATIO
SCHOLASTICA TRIPARTITA.

BY

BY FR. FRANCISCO ANNATO, S.J.

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY & THEOLOGY AT THE
COLLEGE OF HIS ORDER IN TOULOUSE

CONFESSOR OF HIS MAJESTY
LOUIS XIV OF FRANCE 1643-1715

ORIGINAL LATIN PUBLISHED AT PARIS BY SÉBASTIEN
CRAMOISY, ROYAL AND QUEEN'S PRINTER, RUE ST.
JACQUES, BENEATH THE STORKS,

1662.

TO THE MOST HOLY AND IMMACULATE VIRGIN,
QUEEN OF HEAVEN AND SEAT OF WISDOM:
ALL THAT I HAVE, I OFFER UNTO YOU

PREFACE

The Defense of Middle Knowledge published sixteen years ago was immediately met with a new accusation. The case was brought to the supreme tribunal of faith, that is, to the seat of Peter. Innocent X of happy memory was then seated, who committed the book sent to him to the Sacred Congregation of the Roman Inquisition for examination. Examiners were appointed, and adequate time was given for examination. Concerning whether the doctrine should be exempted from censure, the consultation was neither particularly uncertain nor impeded; difficulties were raised regarding the arguments of the questions and the subject matter treated. For it appeared that controversies about Divine Aids and Divine Grace were touched upon, about which publication was repeatedly forbidden after the decree of Paul V by the Supreme Pontiff Urban VIII. But this difficulty also had a precedent by which it could be easily resolved. At that time in Rome, both the Course of the Salamancans and the Commentaries of Father John of St. Thomas on the First Part of St. Thomas were publicly available for sale, in which precisely the same questions that are discussed in this book are treated extensively, with some reproach for our silence and therefore with some provocation to respond. As a result, by the necessary equity of judgments and equality of laws, when the attack on Middle Knowledge was not believed to have touched upon forbidden questions, the defense was also absolved from the same breach. And this was the judgment of the Sacred Congregation expressed in the following decree, the authentic copy of which is in my possession.

PREFACE

Wednesday, the 16th day of May, 1646. In the General Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition held in the Convent of St. Mary above Minerva, before the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church appointed by the Apostolic See against heretical depravity throughout the entire Christian Republic. The Sacred Congregation, having heard multiple reports on the doctrine contained in the Book of Father Francisco Annato of the Society of Jesus entitled "Middle Knowledge," decided that the book may be permitted to be sold in Rome, but with a changed Title Page. John Anthony Thomasius, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition. Place of the † seal.

The change prescribed to be made in the Title Page is none other than the omission of the enumeration of those Authors with whom I dispute. For it seemed inappropriate to unite in a single catalog at the reader's first glance those whom faith and religion distinguish, lest perhaps someone at the very entrance of the book either be deceived while thinking that a heretic agrees with Catholics, or incorrectly interpret the agreement of Catholics with a heretic. The rest remained untouched. The Academy of Toulouse was also pleased to testify with its own endorsement in this cause, as in other doctrinal controversies, the conformity it both professes and maintains with the Roman judges. This was brilliantly provided by the distinguished Professors of the Theological Faculty in the following testimony.

Approval of the Professors of Theology of the University of Toulouse.

We, the undersigned Professors of Theology of the University of Toulouse, testify that we have diligently read and carefully examined the book entitled "Middle Knowledge Against Its New Opponents Defended" advocated by Father Francisco Annato of the Society of Jesus. And nothing in it has been found that does not most properly conform with

PREFACE

sacred scripture and the holy fathers. Given at Toulouse on the seventeenth day of the month of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand six hundred and fifty-six.

Fr. Simplicianus Royal Professor and Dean of the Faculty. Fr. LAUDON Royal Professor, Augustinian. Fr. Frayssinous Royal Professor in Theology. Fr. Antonius Solenne Professor of the Carmelites. The entire Academy subscribed to the judgment of the Theological Faculty in the following decree.

Approval of the University of Toulouse.

Since the Faculty of Theology through its Dean has reported to us that the book entitled "Middle Knowledge Against Its New Opponents Defended" advocated by Father Francisco Annato of the Society of Jesus has been diligently read and examined by them, and nothing has been found in it that does not most properly conform with sacred scripture and the holy fathers, it has pleased the entire Academy to subscribe to the testimony of the sacred Faculty, and by this decree to deem the work worthy of a great Theologian and Royal Confessor. Given at Toulouse, on the seventeenth day of the month of December, in the year one thousand six hundred and fifty-six. Antonius Dadinus, Altesserra Professor of Both Laws and Rector of the University of Toulouse. By mandate of the Lord Rector, Faramon, Secretary. Place of the † seal.

I wished to inform you of these things, excellent Reader, and to place them at the beginning of this Edition of the Defense of Middle Knowledge, so that it might be established as blameless by the judgment of such great authority. But lest it should also seem untimely or superfluous, the desire of many persuaded me, who requested not from one place but even from various regions that this modest work should be made more widely available and more accessible. May God grant that it can help in the knowledge of truth, which alone is the purpose set before me as I write. Farewell. From Fontainebleau, June 20, in the year 1661.

PREFACE

*To the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord
Charles de Montchal, Archbishop of Toulouse.*

I return what I had taken away, Most Illustrious Archbishop, and restore William Twisse to the Library, corrected as you had wished. It was my desire that he should be returned alone, but since it happened that this heretic, in attacking Middle Knowledge, found certain Catholics as helpers in his design, those whom the same cause had joined together could not be separated in the disputation. Therefore Middle Knowledge presents itself to you, assailed at this time with great noise by adversaries of different rites conspiring together, fortified by its Defenders with necessary protections, so that from your judgment it may be understood which is greater, the fairness of this attack or of the defense. It could not have devised a plan for a more secure refuge than by approaching that Judge who possesses both remarkable Wisdom through the possession of Sciences and incorruptible justice through the exercise of great virtues, by the consenting votes of all. For it did not allow the prejudices of the arguments by which it defends itself to seek further favor and grace. Indeed, it believed it would win great favor if there were no place for human favor in this judgment. But even if some favor were to be desired, this fruit of whatever quality comes forth from that House which, being perpetually aided by your kindness, would be ungrateful if it did not acknowledge gratitude. Therefore, Most Illustrious Prelate, if I should desire another Judge, I would not be mindful of my duty unless I think that this testimony of grateful memory and pledge of due respect should be offered to such a great Benefactor. Farewell. Most devoted to Your Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lordship, Francisco Annato.

Summary of the Privilege.

PREFACE

It is secured by the authority of the King that no one in his Kingdom, or in other places subject to his dominion, may print in any character or form, or sell when printed elsewhere, or distribute in any other way, for a period of ten years, counted from the day of the completion of this edition, the book which is entitled: "Middle Knowledge, Defended Against Its New Opponents," championed by Reverend Father Francisco Annato of the Society of Jesus, new edition revised by the author—except for Sebastian Cramoisy, Chief Typographer of the King and Queen, Governor of the Royal Typography, and former Consul of the city. Whoever does otherwise incurs the indicated fine, as is more fully contained in the Royal diploma, Given at Fontainebleau, on the 5th day of July 1666 and signed by mandate of the King. Maboul.

Faculty of the Provincial of the Toulouse Province.

I, Richard Mercier, Provincial Superior in the Toulouse Province of the Society of Jesus, according to the faculty granted to me by the Reverend Father General Mutius Vitelleschi, permit to be printed the Work "On Middle Knowledge Defended Against Its New Opponents," elaborated by Father Francisco Annato, Theologian of the same Society, and examined and approved by three Theologians. In witness of this permission, I have given these letters, signed by my hand and furnished with the seal of my Office, at Toulouse, January 3, 1645. Richard Mercier.

Admonition to the Reader.

Since it must be especially guarded against, lest in these disputations we exceed the limits prescribed by the Roman Pontiff, who has severely prohibited the publication of treatises and disputations on the matter of Aids [Divine Grace]; I thought it necessary to warn the Catholic Reader that I consider myself obedient to the word and obedient to the

PREFACE

Vicar of Christ in this matter, for two reasons. The first is derived from the example of great and pious men. For the Discalced Carmelite Fathers, who published their Commentaries on the First Part after the decree promulgated by Urban VIII of happy memory in May of the year 1625, speak thus: "It should be noted, however, that we have deliberately spoken in this doubt only about the equality of the gratuitous will of God, not about the gratuitous aids which are received in the created will, so that we may not utter even the slightest word about these as far as possible: so that we may be extremely distant from a not so perfect observance of the decree of our Most Holy Lord the Roman Pontiff, by which it is cautioned that treatises and disputations on the efficacy of the aids of divine grace should not be printed." Father John of St. Thomas, who wrote six years after the Discalced Fathers, displays the same reverence, as is evident from these words: "And indeed that it is not permitted in this matter to censure or qualify either position is clear from the mandate of Paul V and Urban VIII; and it is also manifest that it is not permitted to write and print on the matter of divine aids from the edict of the same Pontiff, again strengthened and confirmed by our Most Holy Lord Urban VIII in the Congregation of the General Inquisition on May 22, 1625. Now, however, what can be thought about this Science, etc." It is, moreover, manifest that there is a great number of those who, from both families, both of St. Dominic and of the Discalced Fathers, have approved these counsels and works: so that it cannot be doubted that those questions which have been treated by them could be treated innocently and with impunity, and committed to print. I, therefore, who agitate no difficulty whatsoever in this work that they have not agitated before, either while treating of Middle Knowledge or while treating of divine predefinitions of human acts, cannot but be, by the example of such and so many men, immune from all suspicion of prevarication.

The second reason is derived from the very tenor of the Pontifical Decrees, by which only the publication of treatises is prohibited, in which the matter of Aids is disputed either *ex professo* or even incidental-

PREFACE

ly: or what is the same, concerning Grace and Free Will. There has been no prohibition thus far that Middle Knowledge should not be disputed in writings published to the light. And therefore from almost all parts of the Christian World have come forth works of different Orders, by which Middle Knowledge is either attacked or defended freely, with absolutely no one protesting. Nor does it matter that deduction is easy from the affirmation or negation of Middle Knowledge to the affirmation or negation of the other position in the question of Aids, because it is nowhere prohibited, nor could it easily be prohibited, that principles should not be treated from which those deductions can be made, since there is hardly any part of Theology in which it is not necessary to lay certain foundations which can be of use to either party. Therefore only progress to conclusions is prohibited, from which I also abstain. For I do not dispute about Aids: I nowhere attack Grace physically predetermining: I nowhere assert Grace merely morally exciting: I do not expound the distinction between efficacious and sufficient grace, as the prudent Reader will easily discover. With Twisse the Calvinist I proceed in such a way that after I have responded to the argument to whose solution he had provoked all Jesuits, I in turn press against him those arguments which are now worn and turned over by all in the question of Middle Knowledge. I follow the Anonymous Doctor, the Salamancans, John of St. Thomas in such a way that foot cleaves to foot, nor would I ever turn aside except where they have led.

For concerning the recent decree of Urban VIII, by which it is cautioned that no one should move anything either for or against Janse-
nius; I will only premise this. With that man, since peace cannot exist, a truce certainly has been observed by me most religiously, and he has nowhere been vexed in this work, indeed not even named. That victim was owed to a greater Altar: and perhaps after repeated anathemas against his doctrine, it might seem neither necessary to litigate with a condemned man, nor seemly to insult one struck by lightning. But if some reason should demand otherwise, and there should be free faculty

PREFACE

for such a disputation, things are prepared by which it could be proved that the sentence of the Church which was passed against him was most just, and that the New Augustine is very different from the Ancient.

With this caution premised, the reason which impelled me to write is now evident. Our adversaries interpret our silence differently. The Salamancans had published a new and unexpected narration about the condemnation of Middle Knowledge by thirty Censors, as they themselves count them, to whom the Supreme Pontiffs Clement VIII and Paul V had committed this judgment, also about the private subscription of the same Pontiffs. And although there was an abundant opportunity to refute that narration, we were nevertheless silent for a full six years. Behold for you John of St. Thomas, who, having undertaken to confirm the same narration, speaks thus: "I have heard that this matter is called into suspicion by some, or wished to be regarded as unspoken: which certainly, if it had labored under the vice of falsity, surely sufficient time has elapsed (it is six years since the book was published) that such a testimony and history could be broken or refuted by Adversaries. But it has not been done, therefore the fact Stands." The fact stands if no one resists? Who, therefore, does not see that by a certain right of nature, when silence is harmful, the faculty of speaking has been granted? Nor is the thinking of the Salamancans different: when from the fact that formerly Banez's Commentaries for a full five years were not noted by anyone, not even by Molina himself or another Father of the Society, as containing new, much less dangerous doctrine: and much less were they brought before the Judges of the faith, as Molina's concordia was brought with respect to his knowledge: but rather they were in very frequent use and great approval among Theologians, they conclude that they contained doctrine not new, but flowing perennially from the Ancient Theologians, and received in all Christian Academies. I would very much like to know by what law it has been established that a five-year possession should be deemed sufficient to prescribe the authority of doctrine, when by that law neither Origen against Celsus, nor Cyril against Julian should be heard.

PREFACE

But whatever may be the case, we are sufficiently warned by that usurpation that we must respond to those who knock.

On the English Translation

Readers consulting this translation of *Scientia Media contra Novos eius Impugnatores* should be mindful of the typographical and interpretive challenges involved in rendering a 17th-century Latin theological text into modern English. The original 1662 Paris edition, printed by Sébastien Cramoisy, contains occasional ambiguities in characters, marginal references, and Latin abbreviations—particularly with Roman numerals and ligatures—that may cause minor uncertainties in citation or textual alignment.

This translation was produced with the assistance of Claude Sonnet 3.7, with careful editorial oversight to preserve the precision of Annat's argumentation and terminology. Where exact English equivalents were elusive, modest interpretive latitude was exercised and annotated accordingly. For rigorous scholarly study or philological exactitude, consultation of the original Latin edition remains strongly recommended: *Scientia Media contra Novos eius Impugnatores defensa*, 2nd edition, Paris: Sébastien Cramoisy, 1662. It stands as the definitive witness to Annat's robust Jesuit defense of Middle Knowledge.

CONTENTS

DISPUTATION ONE: WILLIAM TWISSE

Ch. I.	The Purpose and Methodology of William Twisse's Writings	1
Ch. II.	A Refutation of William Twisse's Argument	13
Ch. III.	Hypothetical Future Treachery of the People of Keilah	27
§ I.	Twisse Acknowledges Conditional Decrees, Albeit Unwillingly	27
§ II.	Decrees Concerning Conditionally Future Free Acts	34
§ III.	Repugnance to St. Augustine	37
§ IV.	Foreknowledge Independent of Predefinitions	46
Ch. IV.	Hypothetical Future Repentance of Tyre and Sidon	63
§ I.	Rejection of Antecedent Decree	63
§ II.	Solution Wrongly Attributed to Augustine	65
§ III.	Contrary to Christ's Own Statement	74
§ IV.	Two Other Solutions of Twisse Rejected	87
Ch. V.	No Absolute Foreknowledge Without Middle Knowledge	91
§ I.	Twisse's View on the Permission of Sin	92
§ II.	Refutation of Absolute Predefinition of Evil Acts	98
§ III.	Rejection Based on Church Fathers, Especially Augustine	106

CONTENTS

§ IV.	Can God Be Called Cause but Not Author of Sin?	118
§ V.	Whether God Wills Evil to Occur	124
Ch. VI.	Free Actions Not Predefinable Without Middle Knowledge	134
§ I.	Twisse's Solution Examined	134
§ II.	Necessity Excluded by Free Agency	140
§ III.	On Composite and Divided Sense	148
§ IV.	St. Anselm and Others on Necessity	159

DISPUTATION TWO: ANONYMOUS AUTHORS

Ch. I.	Ten Anonymous Arguments Against Middle Knowledge	180
Ch. II.	Refutation of Attacks on Molina	195
§ I.	Reconciling Free Will with Divine Foreknowledge	195
§ II.	Division of Divine Knowledge	203
§ III.	Causal Basis for Foreknowledge	209
§ IV.	Augustine, Gregory, Aquinas in Agreement	218
§ V.	Defense of Molina and Divine Acts' Order	232
Ch. III.	Examination of Scripture Interpretations	239
Ch. IV.	On the Fathers and Scholastics	257
Ch. V.	Responses to Arguments	267

DISPUTATION THREE: SALAMANCA THEOLOGIAN

Ch. I.	State of the Controversy	293
Ch. II.	Scripture Testimony Resolved	303
Ch. III.	Whether Augustine Opposed Middle Knowledge	319
§ I.	First Testimony of Augustine	320
§ II.	Second Testimony of Augustine	344
Ch. IV.	More Augustine and the Semi-Pelagians	364

CONTENTS

§ I.	First Proposition	365
§ II.	Second Proposition	375
§ III.	Third Proposition	394
§ IV.	Fourth Proposition	402
§ V.	Fifth Proposition	416
Ch. V.	Augustinian Effects and Opposition to Middle Knowledge	431
§ I.	Two Rejected Proof Methods	431
§ II.	On the Non-Antiquity of Middle Knowledge	441

DISPUTATION FOUR: JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Ch. I.	Roman Censors' Judgment	461
Ch. II.	Augustine and Aquinas on Middle Knowledge	483
§ I.	Objections from Augustine	483
§ II.	Aquinas on Middle Knowledge	490
Ch. III.	Arguments Against Middle Knowledge	510
§ I.	Common Argument	511
§ II.	Special Difficulty	519
§ III.	Inconveniences of Middle Knowledge	534
Ch. IV.	Harmony of Free Will and Predestination	556
§ I.	Calvinist View on Doctrinal Agreement	557
§ II.	Catholic Authors on Doctrinal Consensus	568
§ III.	Correct View Determined	576
Epilogue	Summary of Doctrine on Middle Knowledge	603

TRIPARTITE SCHOLASTIC EXERCISE

Ch. I.	On the Errors Concerning Physical Premotions	645
Ch. II.	The Contradictions Determinist	724
Ch. III.	On the Misrepresentation of Authorities	761

CONTENTS

§ I.	Philosophers	762
§ II.	Scholastics: Bonaventure, Henry, Durandus	763
§ III.	Bl. Scotus	766
§ IV.	St. Thomas	772
§ V.	Thomists	779
§ VI.	Sorbonne Scholars	782
§ VII.	St. Augustine and Contarini	783
§ VIII.	Adversaries	790
Epilogue	To the Author of the Work on the Freedom of God and the Creature	811
Appendix	To Camerarius	813

DISPUTATION I.

DISCUSSING WILLIAM TWISSE

This 17th-century Latin text is a polemical work defending the Catholic doctrine of *scientia media* (middle knowledge) against the attacks of William Twisse, a Dutch Calvinist theologian. The author, likely a Jesuit, argues that Twisse wrote against *scientia media* primarily to undermine the Arminians, who had adopted this Catholic teaching to counter strict Calvinist predestination. The text portrays Twisse as an aging, senile scholar whose hatred of the doctrine stems from his recognition that if *scientia media* stands, Calvin's harsh teachings on grace and free will must fall. Throughout, the author employs biting sarcasm and personal attacks against Twisse, while defending prominent Catholic theologians like Gabriel Pennotti and Francisco Suárez, whom Twisse had criticized for providing intellectual ammunition to Calvin's opponents.

CHAPTER I. THE PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF WILLIAM TWISSE'S WRITINGS.

I. From Holland comes William Twisse to bring aid to the opponents of *scientia media*. That such a patron has joined such a cause is a matter about which defenders of the other side should be minimally concerned; rather, they should rejoice that the adversaries' forces have been augmented by this reinforcement. For while in every kind of alliance the loyalty of heretics should rightly be suspected, and one should never safe-

DISPUTATION I

ly trust those men who were unwilling to believe God, in this theological battle their assistance is so dangerous that nothing should be feared more than appearing to be connected with them, either through common cause or alliance of arms. Nor should there be any doubt that it specifically concerns those who attack scientia media to drive away this Twisse and to repel this degenerate wasp which voluntarily mingles with swarms of bees. But neither should we despair that someone might arise from that group who would reject this familiarity with the Allophyli and wash away whatever stains the suspicion of conspiring opinions might have sprinkled. But because this also concerns the public interest, and because Twisse frequently challenges the entire Jesuit nation, I think it worthwhile to deal briefly with this man. Nor shall I disregard the private cause, even when it seems to be connected with the common one. Indeed, this labor will be easier and briefer since I am dealing with an already weakened old man, whose memory falters and mental vigor is failing, and whose intellectual acuity is becoming dull, to such an extent that he asks to be allowed to enjoy the privilege of aging horses, which the poet advises should be released early, for so he himself speaks at the beginning of his second book. But there is no one, I think, so unfair to this adversary as to wish to deprive him of the benefit for horses. Let him certainly enjoy it: not only let him be released, but having been released, let him still enjoy his customary measure of hay and oats. I only wonder how it can happen that one who admits he has been seized by an incurable weakness of memory, intellect, and spirit, nevertheless so youthfully insults the Jesuits that he denies that their entire nation will ever be sufficient to solve or even tolerably weaken one of his arguments. Unless perhaps he either considers them so soft that they would immediately be blown away by even one breath from a decrepit old man, or he wanted to confirm in reality what he was saying: and while not remembering that he who triumphs seems more suitable for a sickbed than for a chariot, and while acting on the same stage both as a decrepit man and as an Olympic victor, he provides a clear demonstration of both his faltering memory and

DISPUTATION I

his waning intellect. Whatever it is, I do not deny that there was a certain providence in that forewarning announcement of his aging intellect and memory, lest any of us think that the man's delusions were premature, but that he became senile at the appropriate time.

II. But come, let us see what is proper to this author, and let us briefly touch upon his plan, method, and manner of writing, soon to test that fearsome machine that is fatal to all Jesuits and defenders of *scientia media*. This William Twisse, as far as can be gathered from his writings, is German by nationality, Dutch by fortune, Calvinist by religion, old in age, with judgment, as we have just seen, declining into childhood, a theologian by wish and desire, but in reality not an inept grammarian and a tolerable poet, as can be conjectured from the end of his second book, which he concluded with heroic verse, to show that he could become frenzied even amid scholastic meditations and in the very heaven of the wise. He, therefore, in order to be enrolled in the senate of scholastics, published a sizable volume against *scientia media*, as the final offspring of his intellect and the most fitting crown of his past studies.

III. He did not have a single purpose, as both domestic and public reasons impelled him. Twisse had not long ago been summoned by the States of Friesland to Leeuwarden to teach theology in that academy, with a generous annual pension and an honorable gift in addition to ease the burden of migration and surety. Lest those expenses be in vain for them, or lest anyone suspect that those stipends were decreed merely for the promise of a beard, he wanted to offer his patrons some outstanding gift not unequal to the benefits received. From this he also obtained a second fruit: namely, that while he attacks Pennotti and Suárez, and generally all Jesuits, throughout that treatise with venal invectives and hired slander, they cannot use the boast, "because they hated me freely."

IV. Through this occasion, the public good was also consulted, and the Calvinist Church was aided. It is known that in recent years it was split in Holland by the secession of the Arminians, who finally awakening to the impious dogmas of Calvin concerning the freedom of will,

DISPUTATION I

the predestination and reprobation of men, the efficacy of divine grace, and also the divine predefinitions of evil acts, were suffused with such shame for such a teacher, struck with such horror of his doctrine, that having renounced Calvin in these controversies, they approached the opinion of the Roman Church to the extent that they departed from him. But since even among Catholics themselves there were parties, one of the Predeterminants, the other of those who philosophize without predeterminations, this latter seemed to the Arminians much more opportune and suitable for breaking the attempts of their adversaries and eluding their attacks. Hence it happened that they more diligently turned over, more intently read, and more willingly approved those Catholic treatises in which such questions are discussed and physical predeterminations are rejected. And because *scientia media* especially has great opportunities for a harmonious agreement of free will with divine grace, the Arminians also began to defend it and convert it to their uses.

Among those authors who have diligently and laudably dealt with this question, two are especially commended. The first is Gabriel Pennotti of Novara from the Order of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine, a most distinguished man, and greater than my praise, who in that golden Bulwark of Human Liberty displayed such riches of intellect, wisdom, and perfect erudition that no one can rightfully deny that he erected an impregnable fortification against all enemies of liberty. The other is Francisco Suárez, whom all Catholic schools celebrate so much that they either desire to follow him as an author or glory in having him as an adversary; who with the same solidity of intellect and abundance of doctrine with which he treated everything else, also embraced this topic in more than one place. From the writings of these men, the Arminians were helped not a little, both in invading the Calvinist camps and in repelling their attack, and they seemed to achieve an easy victory in both situations. How greatly this grieved the Calvinists is sufficiently indicated by Twisse in these words: "The world once marveled that the East was subdued by a drunken emperor, namely Alexander the Great, with a

DISPUTATION I

drunken army: should we not today marvel with greater reason that ecclesiastical affairs in the West, previously well established, can be shaken and undermined anew by such dizzy theologians with their supremely dizzy dissertations? Yet today Pennotti flourishes among us, and this work of his, destined to defend human liberty even against unwilling grace, is handled by many hands."

Concerning Suárez, he speaks thus: "But how I pity the Christian lot, when the students of our academies hope that they can aspire to the heights of things, where progress is possible by natural light, only with such instructors, especially in metaphysical studies. I predict that whoever undertakes the Herculean labor of purging those Suárezian metaphysical disputations as if they were the stable of Augeas will do something worthwhile, especially insofar as they will be found to tend toward ravishing and deflowering theological and sacred truth." See, Reader, how pernicious Twisse thinks Suárez's doctrine is to Calvinism. But what is this? A prostitute fears rape, and an adulteress fears defloration? You make her a virgin, William, who is a she-wolf. Take the opposite advice: let her embrace that Suárezian doctrine and she will become a virgin.

V. What it is, however, that this author thinks he should be especially wary of from Suárez and Pennotti should be heard from himself thus prefacing: "Let the learned reader and student of divine truth know that the question dealt with here is not light, but of the greatest importance. For the adversaries of truth, whether Jesuits or Arminians, realize that unless that doctrine of *scientia media* is kept intact, their opinion concerning grace and free will cannot stand, nor can our opinion opposed to them be undermined; but with that opinion concerning the knowledge of future events, which they call *media*, overthrown, **OUR OPINION CONCERNING GRACE AND FREE WILL REMAINS UNSHAKEN**, and their opinion opposed to ours collapses entirely." And again, "These things, kind Reader, I had to communicate to you in the preface about the purpose of this work, and at the same time to place before your eyes how momentous the discussion of that famous contro-

DISPUTATION I

versy concerning scientia media is." A disciple of Calvin speaks, and indeed one deeply devoted to his master, so that it can now be clear from this that, in this doctor's judgment, Calvin's opinion is so balanced, insofar as it concerns God's grace and man's will, with the assertion of scientia media, that the raising of one is necessarily connected with the ruin of the other, and Calvin stands if the defenders of scientia media perish, or if they can stand, Calvin perishes. Hence that hatred and that detestation of scientia media, which Twisse displays everywhere, calling it a "detestable heresy" and a "dogma more dizzy than any other"; that "there is no opinion more infamous and more convincible of infamy"; that "not even the devil is a partner in that opinion, for not even the angels of darkness have become so stupid as to agree with us." Indeed, we do not seek the votes of demons if they have become stupid, we yield that to you, William, and we allow not unwillingly, that if they cannot walk on their feet into your opinion, at least let them crawl. For the fact that you call scientia media a heresy is an argument for its truth, and a particular commendation that it is considered infamous by you. But certainly it pains you deeply and afflicts you that you understand that if that doctrine concerning scientia media is kept intact, Calvin's opinion collapses, while if that is overthrown, it remains unshaken, as you yourself confess.

VI. This therefore was the reason why Twisse, in order to deprive the Arminians of these aids, armed himself especially against those two champions of scientia media, Pennotti and Suárez. For this Twisse is, as I was saying, particularly devoted to Calvin, whom he calls "holy of God," and in that name condemns Francis of St. Clare of the Order of Friars Minor as guilty of violating Calvin, marked with impudence and the intemperance of an unbridled spirit and tongue. For it is false, he says, what Francis assumed, that Calvin restored the heresy of the Predestinarians, which never existed except what the Semi-Pelagians fabricated; but rather that he recalled and restored to its native integrity the orthodoxy of Augustine, approved through all ages, although miserably deformed by some Pontificals. The tenets of that orthodoxy are known, which even

DISPUTATION I

Calvin himself admits are horrible, but which do not frighten Twisse, evidently a remarkable tamer of monsters, who both by his own nature and by the example of his master has become accustomed to live and play familiarly with them, whether dragons or chimeras.

VII. But this one thing remained for completely defeating the Arminians: that when they protected themselves with both the arms and the authority of certain Pontificals, so also the Calvinists might find those of the same kind whom they could oppose to such assistance. The industry of this man labored in that, his words are: "Meanwhile this refreshes us, that not only Protestants resist this invention, but also the entire family, unless I am mistaken, of the Dominicans, that is, of all Thomists." And when Francis of St. Clare objected that the Puritans following Calvin were restoring the heresy of the Predestinarians, "Do not your Dominicans also," says Twisse, "since it is customary for them to reproach your Jesuits with Calvinism even on this account?" In this, however, he slanders the Jesuits, who no more reproach the Thomists with Calvinism than the Thomists reproach the Jesuits with Pelagianism: both live under the same Catholic roof and are subject to a common Parent and Teacher, by whose edict it is ordered that neither should cast any mark on the opinion of the others. But since both have no doubt that Calvin and Pelagius are equally detestable, in disputing with each other it is required that we prove how much our opinion is distinguished from them. We are so anxious to demonstrate this that the less probable anyone shows himself to be in this, the more he will confess himself to have been inferior in this contest, showing sufficiently by the very sense of his misfortune how unwilling he is to agree with those to whom he regrets seeming similar.

This is also the aim of what he replies to Suárez, who objects that physical determination destroys liberty. For Twisse says against him: "But here we oppose Suárez, with almost the entire family of the Dominicans, who deny that physical predetermination is damaging to the liberty of the creature." And because Suárez said that this had been fully

DISPUTATION I

demonstrated by him in the second book, "we respond briefly, that physical predetermination to act necessarily is indeed hostile to human liberty, but not so physical predetermination to act congruently with human nature, that is, freely and with liberty, although I by no means deny that there is a mystery of divine providence here." He pretends there is a mystery so that he may have some veil for his inexplicable opinion and some asylum to which he can safely flee from the harassment of contrary arguments. Moreover, a large part of this mystery is that question which demands what can be the reason for the divine intellect to know future contingents. When he sought that reason from the eternal will by which future events are decreed, not even excepting sins, he adds: "But you will easily recognize how little that philosophy suits Pennotti's palate. The Dominicans will be able to digest that doctrine much better than with their Jesuits, whose spirit the Novarian breathes entirely." But you are mistaken, William, you are mistaken, while you hope that the Dominicans will digest the same opinions as you, who know well that there is death in Calvin's pot.

Also pleasant and worth knowing is what he says about the efficacy of grace, which when he supposes must be sought either from conditional foreknowledge or from physical predetermination, "since it has now been proven," he says, "that that knowledge which the Jesuits invent is more a mere specter of knowledge than knowledge, and that grace made efficacious through this knowledge is called efficacious only in mockery; even from here it follows, if we were to conclude with no other arguments, that all efficacy of grace emanates from physical efficacy and predetermination of the cause. However, the Jesuits clamor that that mode of efficacy is impossible and contrary to liberty; but the Dominicans clamor to the contrary; and they do not merely clamor" (O shameless old man! but see what oracle he pours forth amid these noises), "but they bring together opposing standards with hostile standards, equal eagles, and spears threatening spears. But why do I say equal eagles, when, as far as Scholastic Theology is concerned, the Jesuits are not even wor-

DISPUTATION I

thy to be named on the same day with the Dominicans." He throws the apple of rivalry, commending the Thomists to the envy of the Jesuits; and he is of such stupidity that he does not understand that by that judgment the Jesuits are exalted, since it is well known to wise men that what Tertullian once proclaimed about Nero, that only some great good could be condemned by him, so there must be something excellent which men of most corrupt sense turn away from and vituperate. Moved by this thought, I pass over in silence other praises of the Thomists, which are scattered throughout Twisse, because I know with certainty that most Catholic men will be offended by the approval and praises of this kind of man.

VIII. And indeed how treacherously Twisse deals with them is shown when he not only deserts them placed in the very crisis of battle, but even pushes them into the precipice. Pennotti pressed an argument against Diego Alvarez to prove that the decree of withdrawing efficacious help is not a sufficient reason for God to foreknow a future sin: for either, he said, given that decree, man necessarily falls into sin, or not: if he does not necessarily fall, then there is no reason why it should be known with certainty that he will sin under such a supposition; if he necessarily falls, then the authority of the Council of Trent collapses, which defines that God does not desert the sinner before being deserted by him. For to decree first that withdrawal from which a fall necessarily follows is to desert first. Twisse dissolves this argument as best he can; but when it comes to the Council of Trent, because he had nothing that he could conveniently respond, "Nor is there any reason at all," he says, "why we should shed tears if from this it happens that the entire argumentation of the Council of Trent falls into destruction. For without doubt we will be able to live without it. Nevertheless, I have already taken pains to show how ludicrous this reasoning of yours is." And when Pennotti then insisted on the same argument, "Whatever may have been," says Twisse, "about that distinction and its accommodation to a legitimate interpretation of the Council of Trent (which Council, or rather conventicle, deserves to be

DISPUTATION I

valued by us as much as the mystery of iniquity), Pennotti's refutation, however, is of no value." But why did you undertake Didacus's defense against Pennotti, if your intention was to desert him in this place? Do you also want him to be able to live without Trent? Is it for him a conventicle and not a Council? And to be valued as much as the mystery of iniquity? Come, speak, William, give glory to God. Either you think that what you believe can be reconciled with the sanctions of Trent, or not: if they can, why do you reject that vote which would benefit your cause more than ten thousand Thomists? If they cannot, what will happen to Diego Alvarez, whose opinion you make your own?

IX. I will add this also, so that it may be more evident how this Author betrays the common cause, while he wants Pennotti to be suspect on the grounds that he is Roman. He had begun his lucubrations in Rome under Paul V, completed them under Gregory XV, from whom he had also obtained permission to publish them after a diligent preliminary discussion; finally, under Urban VIII, still happily reigning, he had published them. But see what Twisse infers from this: "Here, however, having put aside his playacting, Pennotti returned to himself and his own nature, indeed that cunning one unredeemed by any candor from the trickster. For he lived in Rome as the Procurator General of his Order; and it is not surprising if one who lives even in the shadow of the mystery of iniquity savors something of that mystery." And again, after playing on the Roman Pontiff quite ineptly and as befits an unwitty and stupid buffoon, he says of Pennotti, "Nor is it surprising if, under whose shadow he lives, he draws something from his character." But this is that shadow which kills serpents and puts scorpions to flight, and to which it has long been pronounced that no access of perfidy is allowed. And what does Twisse think when he believes those who reflect the shadow and character of the Roman Pontiff are hostile to the Thomists?

X. But there is something you may wonder at more. Having joked in his way about Pennotti and the Jesuits, that is, servilely and without wit and without salt, "That the grace of Christ," he says, "is held by

DISPUTATION I

Pennotti as a fable, is as certain to me as that the Roman Pontiff is the Antichrist, whom Christ will consume daily by the spirit of his mouth, and abolish by his glorious coming." That the grace asserted by Pennotti, that is, through the direction of *scientia media* infallibly connected with effect, is a fable, and that the Roman Pontiff is the Antichrist, are for this Doctor mutually supporting, and both truths dawned on him by the same ray. But I congratulate both myself, and Pennotti, and all who philosophize with us about divine grace, on this testimony from a heretic.

XI. Now what his method is, I will say in one word: what can be expected from a Grammatical Commentator. He transcribes Suárez and Pennotti, and then follows with a perpetual commentary: he quarrels at almost every verse, now accusing the inexperience of the amanuenses, now desiring the diligence of the typographers, now divining the mind of the Writers from the proposed obscurity of the text, now supplementing, now cutting. You would say that Virgil has been proposed to Servius for interpretation, or Homer to Eustathius. He institutes digressions so untimely that the stupor of his failing intellect, which he prefaced, is easily apparent. He had scarcely begun to proceed against Pennotti, when taking occasion from what he said about the coexistence of future events in eternity, he digresses against Diego Alvarez, whose opinion on that question he less approved, and soon against Navarrete; and then on page 85 he returns to Pennotti. But also from Pennotti to Pennotti himself he institutes one digression after another, when he could continue his journey and was dealing with the same argument: so pleasant it is for him to wander, and so difficult and unusual to go straight. He entitles his second book "*On Scientia Media*," in which he says not a word on that argument, since it is entirely about the absolute knowledge of future contingents. Here also he digresses from Suárez to Suárez, also to Gregory of Valencia, again to Navarrete, to Ferrariensis, to Capreolus. I was wondering at this wanderer, when I came upon that place in which he praises Don Quixote; from which I understood that the man, accustomed either to writing or reading Romances, whose art is always to deceive the Read-

DISPUTATION I

er's mind with fortuitous cases and to interrupt thought with unexpected narrations and to defer hope, imitated in scholastic treatment what he had observed in fables.

XII. His manner of writing is the same as Calvin's, and never was one egg more similar to another, whether you consider that perpetual custom of exercising plasticity and fashioning masks suitable for covering both the immensity of their own opinions and the appearance of opposing reasons, or the man's genius prone to slander and invective. It is familiar and daily that he reproaches those with whom he deals with insanity, impudence, derangement, stupidity, imposture, filthiness. When he thunders something higher and more unusual, the Jesuits are for him "the Prime Satellites of the devil, enemies of the efficacious grace of God, which they indeed posit only in word, but in reality take away." They are also guilty of Atheism, because they think something will be independent of predetermining decrees. Pennotti "grunts among pigs," and if a pig does not seem sufficiently infamous, he denies that there is any beast in the universe more impure than Pennotti, and more irrational; and he pretends that while disputing with him, he imitates the Apostle, who fought at Ephesus with beasts. The cause, moreover, which moved this bestial disputant, is in sum this: Pennotti had said that the reason for immutability is not the same in God's intellect and will, if they are compared to a secondary object: for the intellect, because it does not itself act through itself, cannot make its object knowable from being unknowable, and therefore, as far as it is concerned, it always deals with the same object with the same knowledge. But because the reason by which the object of the divine will becomes willable varies, it therefore becomes willing from being unwilling that something happen, not by that change which it receives in itself, but by that which it causes in the object. Because this William whom you see, Guests, could not grasp this, nothing occurred more opportune than to condemn Pennotti to the husks. Sometimes he also leads him to the tavern and reproaches him for drunkenness, the German to the Italian, and the enemy of fasts to the Religious man. But

DISPUTATION I

lest he should seem to be always engaged in mud or among cups, and to know no other metaphors except those suggested by stable-keepers and innkeepers, he sometimes puts forth military eloquence, and what alone is permitted to one positioned at a distance, he nobly reviles. He constitutes Pennotti, namely, as a Captain under whom the devil serves as a soldier. He, indeed, has advanced more in the camps of the adversaries than the Jesuits: for they are only Satellites; he has become the Captain of the devil. I wanted to object that demons would not easily allow leaders of other than their own kind; but it must be conceded to Twisse that he himself should be believed to know better the customs and institutions of the infernal regions. From these things it is now sufficiently clear how much the love of parties has inflamed both his biles, and that conviction worthy to be imprinted on the foreheads of all Academies, that with scientia media overthrown, Calvin's opinion concerning grace and free will remains unshaken.

CHAPTER II. A REFUTATION OF WILLIAM TWISSE'S ARGUMENT.

XIII. I am greatly indebted to Twisse, who has alleviated my long and equally thankless labor by his favor, having condensed his immense and formidable forest of arguments into a single bundle. This is the argument in which he believes all the force of his reasoning rests: to the resolution of which he challenges all Jesuits without exception: which he turns over in all parts of his work so thoroughly that I have sometimes counted it repeated four or five times in full on the same page. You would say he has imitated certain Indian groves planted from a single tree, as he produces a book from a single argument endlessly reproduced. But indeed, it is so clear and evident that it utterly overwhelms all human authority however great—not only that of Thomas, but of all the Scholastics without exception—that might strive against it. And this is the head of the whole matter and the sum of the war. "Behold Rhodes," he says,

DISPUTATION I

"behold the leap." Therefore, we shall pursue this old man in this leap, and if he leaps, the matter will be settled.

That argument is: Everything that has passed from eternity from the condition of being merely possible to the condition of being future, must have presupposed from eternity some cause of that transition; a future event that is called conditional has passed from eternity from the condition of being merely possible to the condition of being future; Therefore, this conditional future must have presupposed from eternity some cause of that transition. But it could not have presupposed any cause other than the divine will, which, however, those who defend middle knowledge do not acknowledge to be the cause of this transition: Therefore, there is no such future, and consequently no knowledge of it. There you have that colossus whose fall is supposed to crush all the Scholastics. But to make the response complete, the Author distinguishes it into three questions, which he wants explained separately.

XIV. 1. Whether any conditional proposition should be called true which is not necessary? 2. Whether something by nature merely possible and indifferently disposed both to futurition and non-futurition can pass from the condition of being merely possible and indifferent to the condition of being a future thing, or to determined futurition, without a cause? 3. Whether any cause of this transition can be conceived other than the determination of the divine will?

These, he says, are those sole articles by whose decision these controversies about the knowledge of future contingents would be most easily settled.

Let us therefore decide these articles, or rather, let us cut them down. But first, I respond to the man himself. Since Twisse calls the doctrine of middle knowledge an execrable heresy, and is himself in the heresy which teaches that every heresy can be effectively refuted by the rule of Scripture alone, excluding the authority of all the Fathers, Councils, and the whole Church, I ask him to show us from which passage of Scripture, whether from the new or old testament, he has derived that

DISPUTATION I

argument. For although he repeats it a thousand times, he has not demonstrated this even once.

XV. Then, to the first article in which he asks, "Whether any conditional proposition should be called true which is not necessary?" I briefly respond that it should be called so (for we are not dealing here with consequent necessity, which the very supposition of a free thing induces), and in turn I ask: Should any absolute proposition be called true which is not necessary? For if there is such a proposition, why could there not also be such a conditional proposition? If there is none, what has the entire community of logicians been dreaming about up to now, when they have so distinguished contingent propositions from necessary ones as not to doubt that they exist, both true and false, according to both the circumstances of their objects and the prudence of those judging? What do you say, I ask, William: Is this statement, "God wants to create the world," a proposition? Is it true? Is it, however, necessary? Similarly, "If God infuses another soul into this body, He wants to justify it by the benefit of baptism," or certainly this one, "He does not want to justify it by the benefit of baptism"—is it true? Is it also necessary? But if divine freedom joins contingency in its propositions with truth, why could not human freedom, if any remains, do the same? For how will there be freedom if nothing is done freely? But what will be done freely if it is not done contingently, and therefore not necessarily? And where have you come from, my man, or what solitude have you inhabited until now, that you do not know things that are not unknown even to elementary philosophers? But you smell of Calvin, and secretly attack free will when you ask whether any proposition is true which is not necessary. Be careful not to contradict yourself when you yourself answer this question by saying that there is none. For you speak thus: "No conditional proposition is true unless it is necessary." And again: "In the same manner, we concede that every conditional statement about conditional futures is necessary." Likewise: "Nor should there be any doubt at all that Christ knew who would resist his preaching, and this through necessary consequence."

DISPUTATION I

Therefore, I admit these statements about conditional knowledge proceed, but through necessary consequence, that is, through true consequence; not through false consequence, which is any consequence that is not necessary, of which kind is that conditional knowledge of yours. And then not only does he confirm that necessity, but further shows where it comes from, when he speaks thus: "Meanwhile, I do not deny that conditional futures must be acknowledged; not such as you imagine according to completely inconsequential consequences. But whenever conditional futures are presented to us according to truly consequential consequences, of which kind there are not a few; so often we attribute knowledge of these to God: not the knowledge which is of vision, but rather of simple intelligence, such as are all those which are said or can be said to be future from the supposition of the determination of the Divine will." From this passage it clearly appears that the necessity which Twisse acknowledges in every proposition that is true is reduced to the determination of the divine will. But see, Reader, the man's head, who does not remember having already denied that physical predetermination hinders liberty, because it is not predetermination to act necessarily but in a manner congruent with human nature, that is, deliberately and freely. Where you see that for this Author these two things are opposed, to act necessarily, and to act in a manner congruent with human nature, that is, deliberately and freely. From which it follows that a proposition which is about a free object can be about an object that is both true and not necessary: since according to Twisse, free is opposed to necessary, and consequently the proposition itself can be both true and not necessary, contrary to what he supposes. It also follows that if futures cannot be true unless they are necessary from the supposition of the determination of the divine will, as he himself says, the determination of the divine will induces that necessity in a future thing, and we are speaking about a free one. Again, if physical predetermination, through which God executes His will, does not determine [one] to act necessarily but in a manner congruent with human nature, that is, deliberately and freely, it follows that from the

DISPUTATION I

supposition of the determination of the divine will, a free future is not necessary. And thus the same action from the same supposition is necessary and is not necessary; and the determination of the divine will both induces and excludes necessity from a free future. Do these things not hang together beautifully? But I will perhaps press this later. Now, because I am taking on the role of defender, I only wish this to be observed: Twisse has produced, as the first foundation of his irrefutable argument, a monstrous opinion, namely, that every true conditional proposition is necessary. This is supported by neither any reason nor proper authority; moreover, it is refuted by manifest instances and repudiated by the calculation of all philosophers.

XVI. Twisse's second postulate is: Whether a thing by nature merely possible, and indifferently disposed both to non-futurition and futurition, can pass from the condition of being merely possible and indifferent to the condition of being a future thing, or to determined futurition, without a cause? I assume first that the question is understood especially about conditional futures, e.g., it is future that if David remains in Keilah, the men of Keilah will deliver him into the hands of Saul. And then I assume again that what is thus said to be future, because it is entirely suspended upon the positing of the condition, is not properly future; but is such that it is not affirmed of it in any other sense, "it will be," than "it would be." What, I say, is expressed as "if David stays with the men of Keilah, he will be handed over into the hands of Saul," has no other meaning than when it is said, "if he were to stay, he would be handed over." But we speak in the former way while the decree concerning the positing of the condition is still pending, or is unknown to us; for when we do not doubt about it, we speak rather in the latter way. And so because we do not doubt that no other world will be created, we more aptly say, "if another world were created, there would be other customs of men in it," than "if another world will be created."

Therefore, concerning these futures, it should not be said so much that they are future, as that they would be: nor in any other sense

DISPUTATION I

that they pass from the condition of the possible to the condition of the future, than that they would pass. And this is Augustine's most clear opinion, when he presses the Pelagians, who said that God is moved by conditionally future good and bad merits, so that of two infants he snatches one away without receiving baptism, the other not except after baptism, with this question: "How will those things be called future which will never be?" Which he himself also signifies elsewhere when he calls these "futures which are not going to be future." And Suárez indicates this same thing somewhere, when he says these propositions abstract from time. For since all time is designated by "is" or "will be" or "was," that of which none of these can be said, or not in any other sense than when only "would be," "would have been," "would be going to be" is said, is rightly said to abstract from time, that is, from our time. For in their own way, those expressions also signify time, namely conditional time. This I explain all the more willingly because I know I am debating with a grammarian, whose job it is to distinguish the tenses of verbs exactly, and the indicative from the optative or subjunctive.

XVII. This being established, since an effect does not require any other mode of existence in its cause than it has in itself, I say it is absurd to require a cause that already is, for an effect that only would be: and it is sufficient if in whatever way the effect is pronounced as future that it would be, in that way the cause is also supposed to be future that it would be. It should not, I say, be asked whether there is now some cause why the men of Keilah would betray David, but whether there would be. And so I respond directly to the proposed postulate: Whether a merely possible thing can pass from the condition of being merely possible to the condition of being future without a cause? I distinguish: without a cause that now exists; it can: without a cause that will be or that would be, it cannot. And I apply Augustine's clear reasoning in reverse. For he thinks that a cause of which it is only said that it would be, is quite absurdly and falsely thought to be the cause of an effect of which it is now said that it is; for example, the bad merits of an infant, of which nothing else can be con-

DISPUTATION I

ceived than that they would be, if he were to live; to be the cause of the accelerated death, which now is, not awaiting baptism; or the good merits of another which similarly would be, if he were permitted to live; to be the cause of death which now is, after baptism was received. But it is, I say, of equally complete absurdity, to demand a cause which now is, for that effect which only would be; that is, a cause existing absolutely, for that effect which exists only conditionally. I am always speaking of an efficient cause, or one which is reduced to an efficient cause, of which kind is a meritorious cause, and one which is the cause through which and why the effect exists. For concerning the final cause for the sake of which the effect exists, one must philosophize differently. It must be admitted that this chain and inference from the present to the future absolutely, and from the absolute future to the conditionally future, is necessary. Namely, just as the present cause of a free effect is a sufficient cause so that both the determined presence of the effect exists and can be affirmed; so the absolutely future cause of the same effect suffices so that both the effect exists and can be affirmed to be determinately future. For what the present cause does, the future cause will do: Therefore if the present gives determined presence to the effect, the future will also give determined presence; and from now on it is true that it will give that presence: therefore also from now on it is true that the effect will receive that presence; but for an effect to be about to receive determined presence is to be determinately future: therefore from now on it is true that the effect is determinately future.

Again, what a free cause that is absolutely future will do, a conditionally future cause would do. For it would be of the same faculty and dominion: Therefore if one absolutely future will give determined presence to the effect, and this is true from now on; one conditionally future would also give determined presence to the effect: and this is true and affirmable from now on. Therefore, just as from the fact that one absolutely future will give such presence, it is truly said that the effect will absolutely accept it, and thus be absolutely future; so from the fact that one

DISPUTATION I

conditionally future would give similarly determined presence to the effect, it can truly be said that the effect would conditionally accept it, and thus be conditionally future. And in this, Twisse shows himself very slow, because he cannot grasp a reason so clear and so obvious, when he himself admits that in the opinion of the Jesuits there is no lack of determination by which contingencies become present, but there is none by which they become future. But the determination which is in present things will be the same in things absolutely future: and would be in things conditionally future: and so with what certainty that determination or determining cause can be affirmed to be absolutely future, or conditionally future, with the same certainty the effect can also be affirmed to be either absolutely or conditionally future. By this very fact, says Twisse, that there is this free will in these circumstances, a cause of determination is given by which it can be said there is such a determined volition and not the opposite, which however can also itself exist; why therefore by this very fact that there will be this free will in these circumstances, because God has decreed to create it, will there not be given a cause of determination, by which it can now be said, there will be such a determined volition and its opposite will not be? And why by this very fact that there would be this will in such circumstances, if God were to decree it, would there not be given a cause of determination by which it can now be said, there would be such a volition and its opposite would not be? When I am asked why the will here and now follows this object rather than flees from it, when it could equally do either, there is not lacking, says Twisse, what I might respond and assign as a cause by saying, "Because it is free"; and if it is asked why it will follow rather than flee, will I not similarly aptly respond, "because it will be free"? Again, if it is asked why it would follow rather than flee, will it not occur to me to say "because it would be free"? And as the present existence of freedom suffices for the cause of the likewise present effect to be assigned, will not the existence of the same freedom absolutely future suffice for the cause of the absolutely future effect to be assigned: and existence suspended from some condition, for the

DISPUTATION I

cause of the future effect to be assigned, but suspended from the same condition? This response is clear; nor has it anything to fear from Twisse.

But that question can be solved in another way as well, and it can be conceded that in reality there is given some cause on account of which that contingent effect is said to be future, which is said to be conditionally future, just as something is given on account of which even a necessary effect is also conditionally future, according to Twisse. For he admits that those propositions are true and legitimate by which, from the hypothesis of necessary causes, effects are stated to be necessarily and conditionally future, e.g., if another sun were produced, there would be other days: for he speaks thus. For it seems that it should be established beyond controversy that things which depend on the condition of necessary causes can be called future just as much as those which depend on the condition of free causes; those are also just as knowable in the category of the future as these are. Therefore, if these necessary things are just as future, they likewise demand some cause of their futurity. I do not contend that the reason for these futures and for free ones is the same in every respect; or that necessary things pass equally from the condition of merely possible and indifferent into the condition of determinately future thing, as free things pass: if this manner of speaking is to be tolerated. I only contend that, since they are equally future, they equally require some cause why they are future. Nor does Twisse, I think, deny this; but he thinks that cause can be easily assigned in necessary futures, whereas it cannot be assigned in free ones. I, on the contrary, say that it can be assigned with the same ease in free ones as in necessary ones. But because this pertains to the solution of the third postulate, it remains for us to set it forth.

XVIII. The third postulate, therefore, is: Whether any cause of this transition can be conceived, other than the determination of the divine will? First of all, the Adversary must be pardoned for acknowledging a transition where there cannot be one. For since there is neither any time nor instant in all eternity in which what is said to be conditionally future was not future, it cannot be said to have passed from the state of merely

DISPUTATION I

possible into the state of future; since it is necessary that what passes from one state to another, if it truly passes, existed earlier under the term "from which" than under the term "to which." Nor can anything else be asked here than, since what is said to be conditionally future, just as from the same hypothesis could be not future, what is the cause why it is future rather than not future? Since, I say, David staying with the men of Keilah, and Saul approaching, it could equally happen that David would not be handed over into the hands of Saul, as that he would be handed over; what is the cause why it is true that he would be handed over rather than not handed over, if one does not resort to the determination of the divine will?

I respond according to the former way of speaking set forth a little before, that a cause which is is not necessary, but one which would be. But that cause would be the hypothesis from which the effect is pronounced to follow. David would be handed over into the hands of Saul, this is the conditionally future effect. But the cause would be the freedom of the men of Keilah having David in their power, tested by the approach of Saul whether by threats or by prayers and promises, not hindered at all by God, but rather assisted by the offering of the concurrence which befits free causes. If that whole hypothesis were to be, it would be the cause why David would be handed over rather than not handed over into the hands of Saul: and from eternity it is true that such a hypothesis would be such a cause. And just as a present hypothesis causes the present determination of a free and contingent effect, and one absolutely future will cause the same: so also one conditionally future would cause similarly. Likewise, just as it is now true that a present hypothesis causes, and after a century that it will have caused, indeed through all subsequent eternity: so it is true that a similar hypothesis will cause absolutely, and before a century and from eternity that same thing was true: and equally true that the same hypothesis would cause that same thing, and this through all time past, present, and future. Nor will the Adversary

DISPUTATION I

ever find anything to oppose to this doctrine, however much he shakes himself.

XIX. I respond in another way. Granted that some cause must now be given for the contingent effect that is conditionally future; I say that it can be rightly assigned excluding the present determination of the divine will, if it is rightly assigned in necessary effects that are also conditionally future: and I ask the Adversary what cause can now be assigned why there would be other days if another Sun were created? And because he does not think that in these futures one must resort to the determination of the divine will, because they are determined in their natural causes, and he always asks for the difficulty of that recourse from the indifference of free causes: this only remains, for him to say that the futuration of those other days has its cause in the possible creation and motion of another sun; so that this, which is from eternity another sun being possible, and another motion of it, is the cause on account of which other days as well are conditionally future.

I say likewise, just as the possibility of a necessary cause which is from eternity is a sufficient reason and cause on account of which a necessary effect is conditionally future; so the possibility of a free cause and of all things necessary for it to act freely, which is also from eternity, is a sufficient reason and cause on account of which its free effect is conditionally future. And let not Twisse rejoice here. For I understand what he is about to object immediately, namely that the reason for each cause is disparate: for the necessary one is determined of itself to the effect, and therefore its possibility infers a determined effect; but the free one is undetermined both to positing and not positing the effect, and therefore from its possibility it no more follows that the effect is future than that it is not future. But excluding the name of inference and consequence, which if they involve any necessity, cannot have a place here; I say only this, that as determined as a necessary cause is to one effect, so self-determining is a free cause to one of those two which it can indistinctly produce. For it is not passively indifferent, such that it must expect its determination from

DISPUTATION I

another; but actively, and from the dominion which it has over either, to posit or suppress the effect; which is to be undetermined with the power of determining itself. From which again I say, by what reason a cause determined of itself to one thing is the cause why that one thing will be future, by that same reason a cause indifferent to two things, but self-determining to one of them, is the cause why one of them will be future. And just as because a cause determined of itself is supposed with all things necessary for acting (for these are always involved), it happens that its eternal possibility is a sufficient reason for saying that its determination to the effect is conditionally future; so from the fact that a self-determining cause is supposed with all things necessary for this, it happens that the eternal possibility of this supposition is a sufficient reason for saying that its determination is conditionally future. For this must also be added, that a self-determining cause ultimately completed is simultaneously a cause determining itself to either alternative: hence if such a cause is truly said and absolutely exists, it is truly said and absolutely determines which of the two exists: and if it is truly said and absolutely will exist, in the same way it is truly said and absolutely will determine which of the two will be: And if it is truly said and conditionally would exist if it pleased God, in the same way it is truly said and conditionally would determine which of the two would be: so that it is the same to suppose a self-determining cause ultimately completed, as to suppose it determining itself or about to determine itself.

From which let the Reader now see what manner of man he is, who can grasp how the supposition of a possible cause determined to one thing is a sufficient reason why an effect is conditionally and determinately future: but cannot grasp how the supposition of a possible cause determining itself, or about to determine itself, is also a sufficient reason why its effect is conditionally and determinately future: as if indeed the supposition of a determined cause were a sufficient cause why there is a determination: and the supposition of a self-determining cause were not.

DISPUTATION I

XX. I do not doubt that Twisse is here at his last gasp, but the old man's final breath must be received. For in this he seems to be perpetually making his point, that a supposition from which an effect can as much follow as not follow, which is the supposition of a completed free cause, cannot be the reason and cause why the effect is to follow rather than not to follow. But it is clear from what has already been said what should be answered. Namely, a supposition from which an effect can equally follow or not follow, if it involves a determinative and determining power for one of them, cannot be the reason and cause why one would be future rather than the other, I deny: if it does not involve such a power, let it be granted. But the supposition of a free cause involves that power, as is clear from its concept. And there is a manifest instance both in the freedom of God, which is a suitable cause or reason why there is said to be a volition of producing the world, although with that same [freedom] posited, there could equally have been a nolition of that thing; and in created freedom according to this Twisse, who thinks that in the opinion of the Jesuits there is no lack of determination by which contingencies become present. As if he were saying, in the freedom of one who sins in the present, there is a sufficient reason why he is said to sin rather than not sin; although with that same freedom supposed he could equally not sin. Therefore it stands, in a hypothesis from which either of two contradictories can follow, there is a sufficient reason and cause why one of them follows determinately. And that is the proper character of a free cause, that although it is equally indifferent to opposites, it is nevertheless of itself the cause why one is posited rather than the other. But if the present and absolute positing of a free cause is such a cause with respect to an effect present in the same way, this will also be its absolute futuration with respect to an absolutely future effect: and its possibility or conditional futuration, with respect to a conditionally future effect.

XXI. And this is that decision of the articles, which Twisse required, by which this entire controversy, as he indeed thinks, is dissolved: which if it pleases to accommodate to the form of the argument pro-

DISPUTATION I

posed before, First, the Major proposition can be distinguished in this way: Everything that has passed from eternity from the condition of being merely possible into the condition of being future, must have presupposed from eternity some cause of that transition, absolutely posited, I deny the major; to be posited in accordance with the nature of the future, I concede the major. But a conditional future has passed from eternity from the condition of being merely possible into the condition of being future; Let the minor be granted, always understanding to have passed into the condition of being conditionally future, and of which it is said only that it would be or would have been. Therefore, this conditional future must have presupposed from eternity some cause of that transition, actually posited or to be posited absolutely, I deny the consequence; to be posited conditionally, that is, in accordance with the nature of the conditional future itself, I concede the consequence. And when it is subsumed, but there is no other suitable cause besides the determination of the divine will; I similarly distinguish: there is none actually posited; let it be granted: there is none to be posited from hypothesis, I deny. For the free cause itself is the cause which from eternity is supposed to be future, if God wishes to posit it, nor is anything else asserted than that if it were posited, it would determinately cause such an effect.

Secondly, it can be answered, let that whole syllogism pass: and to what is subsumed, that there is no other cause, etc. I deny what is subsumed. For there is another cause, namely the possibility of a supposition from which the future is enunciated to follow conditionally, which is the possibility of a free cause ultimately completed, and it is from eternity absolutely; nor is it less sufficient for some effect to be and to be called freely conditionally future, than the possibility of a necessary cause, for an effect to be said to be conditionally and also necessarily future, as has been shown before.

Finally, it can be said that the major and minor of the proposed syllogism imply a contradiction, because they assume that there is given from eternity a transition from the state of being merely possible to the

DISPUTATION I

state of being future, which we have now shown to be impossible. And this is that insuperable mass of argument, by which all human authority and that of Thomas and all the Scholastics was to be overwhelmed. An insane mass, I admit, but also fictile, against which one would not have to batter long for it to shatter into fragments.

CHAPTER III. AN EXAMINATION OF TWISSE'S SOLUTION REGARDING THE HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE TREACHERY OF THE PEOPLE OF KEILAH IN BETRAYING DAVID.

XXII. How great Twisse is in making an attack is evident from what has been said above; what remains is to experience him in defense. From the many arguments with which he attempts to satisfy his opponents, I will select a few: for I have neither the time to pierce the man with all possible weapons, nor should we be without some mercy toward one whose intellect is failing and whose mind is becoming dull.

Let the first argument, then, be that common one taken from the history of Kings, where David consults God: "Will the men of Keilah surrender me and the men who are with me into the hands of Saul?" And the Lord said, "They will surrender you." This interrogation and response concerns a future conditionally free event, which in reality did not occur, but would have occurred if David had waited in Keilah for Saul's arrival. From this it follows that God has knowledge of future conditionally free events.

§ I. TWISSE ACKNOWLEDGES CONDITIONAL DECREES, ALBEIT UNWILLINGLY.

The Adversary resolves this argument in Book 1, and from his solution it is first clear that this conditional was certainly known to God,

DISPUTATION I

for he speaks thus: "We grant that God knew this future event, namely that David would be handed over into Saul's hands if David had remained in Keilah and Saul had descended." Likewise: "No one, as far as I know, denies or doubts that if Saul had descended and David had remained in the city of Keilah, the people of Keilah would have surrendered David into the hands of Saul." And therefore to those who alleged that only conjectural knowledge was attributed to God, if that prophecy were explained as arising from the disposition of causes from which the subsequent effect might be conjectured, he responds thus: "We attribute to God no knowledge that is not certain and infallible; therefore, this refutation strikes neither us nor the Dominicans; let the Jesuits see to this matter." Secondly, it is also clear that the cause of this certainty is attributed by this Author to the divine decree, so that it is true that God knew this would happen because He had decreed that it should be so. This is evident from the cited passage when he says: "But we have by no means said that God foreknows these conditional future events solely by considering the disposition of secondary causes; but the decree of God also comes into consideration, concerning the activation of all secondary causes to act in accordance with their natures." And, regarding conditional propositions in general, he judges: "But we, as has already been said, consider that these conditionals can be determined extrinsically through the will and decree of God. But without the determination of the divine will, I have already demonstrated several times that they have no determinate truth." And again: "We utterly deny that propositions of this kind, explained according to this sense, are true, apart from the determination of the divine will concerning the connection of these elements." And thus far the Adversary makes himself understood; but what remains he has enclosed in a labyrinth, where all is confused by darkness and errors.

For when he says that what is conditionally future becomes future by God's decree, nothing was more appropriate than for us to infer that this man admits conditional decrees in God with respect to the object,

DISPUTATION I

although they exist absolutely—just as that knowledge is called conditional whose existence is by no means suspended, but which is directed toward an object that is suspended by a condition. That proportion, I say, which ought to exist between such a decree and such knowledge, impelled us toward this thought, with the assistance of Twisse himself, who speaks thus: "But setting aside a decree of this kind (which Suárez supposed to be conditional on the part of the object), I freely confess that God cannot have knowledge of conditionals." And earlier: "It is most true that no will of God is conditional, but all are absolute as regards the act of willing; although with respect to the things willed, it can and should be said to be conditional." This can also be demonstrated by other proofs no less illustrious than those used by Bradwardine. But the same Twisse who had previously led us to this thought draws us back from it when he warns: "God's absolute and simple decree establishes in the category of simply future whatever He has simply decreed to happen. But insofar as whatever He has decreed to happen, however simply, through secondary causes, He has decreed to happen only in accordance with these causes: from this arises the denomination of certain future conditionals, namely such as would be future if secondary causes were so arranged that by acting in accordance with their natures, He would effectively move and activate causes only to accomplish such things: **SO THAT THERE IS NO CONDITIONAL DECREE WHATSOEVER IN GOD.**" And in Book 3, when he had cited Suárez reporting the opinion of those who hold that God knows future conditionals in the decree of His will including the same condition in the object—that is, in a decree conditional on the part of the object—he objects: "But I **ACKNOWLEDGE NO CONDITIONAL DECREE**, not even concerning necessary consequences, such as: if more people believed, more would obtain salvation." He adds that conditional statements arise from an absolute decree, and soon after: "Because it cannot happen that God does anything in vain; if He had created more Angels, He would certainly have decreed that they too would do something for the glory of God: yet

DISPUTATION I

no such decree can properly be attributed to God, as if He had established that if certain Angels were created, they would do something for the glory of God." And a little before: "If one imagines a decree of this kind that Peter would sin if placed in such a situation (which kind of decrees I have not yet learned should be attributed to God), if, I say, such a decree is imagined, this hypothetical will be true: if Peter is created in such a situation, he will sin."

XXIII. Here now you may see, Reader, what reason this man has, and compare these three pronouncements: (1) God knows with certainty that conditionally future is the betrayal of David into the hands of Saul, if David remains in Keilah. (2) No conditional decree of God is to be acknowledged. (3) Setting aside such a decree, I freely confess that God cannot have knowledge of conditionals.

Again, compare these two: (1) Conditional statements arise from an absolute decree. This signifies that an absolute decree is sufficient for their truth. (2) What was just stated: setting aside such a decree, about which Suárez was speaking and which he supposed to be directed toward conditional objects, I freely confess that God does not have knowledge of conditionals.

Finally, see also how these two can possibly be reconciled: (1) The will of God with respect to things willed can and should be said to be conditional, which he thinks is proven by demonstrations. (2) There is no conditional decree whatsoever in God. I acknowledge no conditional decree of God; I have not yet learned that decrees of this kind should be attributed to God.

XXIV. Thirdly, although he fights with himself and destroys his own position, neither alive nor dead will he escape admitting that there are in God decrees that are absolute on the part of the act but conditional on the part of the object, according to his own principles. For I argue thus: 1. The will of God cannot be per se the cause why something is future unless it tends toward that thing as its effect, as is known from the terms themselves. But it is the per se and sole cause why the betrayal of

DISPUTATION I

David into the hands of Saul would be future, according to you yourself. Therefore, it tends toward that betrayal as its effect. Again, for the divine will to tend toward something as its effect, it must tend toward it as its object (unless perhaps it is a privilege of Leeuwarden Theology to attribute some external effect per se to the divine will that is not its object, and that is produced by it yet not willed by it). But the divine will tends toward the betrayal of David as its effect. Therefore, it tends toward it as its object. Finally, a will that tends toward an object that is only conditionally future is a will that is conditional on the part of the object, however absolute it may be on the part of the act, according to the Adversary himself. But such is the will of God that deals with the betrayal of David. Therefore, it is conditional in the aforesaid manner: and if it is called a decree, it must be called a conditional decree, just as the knowledge itself about such an object is called conditional.

XXV. 2. The decree that the Adversary places before this knowledge of God concerning the future betrayal of David is a decree to move the people of Keilah to act according to their disposition in betraying David. For he himself speaks thus. Therefore, this decree expressly tends toward the betrayal of David as the end toward which the people of Keilah were to be moved by God. But both that moving and that betrayal were only conditionally future. Therefore, what the divine decree expresses is only conditionally future. Therefore, it is a conditional volition just as the knowledge is. And he confirms this very thing when he requires that the divine determination, which he requires for the truth of conditionals, be about the connection of the consequent with the antecedent. For that connection is only conditionally future. Therefore, he requires that the divine determination be about something only conditionally future, and thus that it be itself conditional.

XXVI. 3. How, William, do you want conditionally true statements to arise from an absolute decree? Through necessary consequence, you say. But will that consequence which does not escape you escape God? But if God foreknows when He absolutely decrees something

DISPUTATION I

whatever will follow from such a decree, why do you deny that He comprehends it by volition just as He comprehends it by knowledge, and why do you think that the volition of that which is explicitly known is implicit? God, you say, wills to move the people of Keilah according to their disposition. Very well. And because if David remains among them when Saul arrives, they will be disposed to betray him, it follows that this conditional is true: they will be moved to betray him, and thus will betray him, if David remains among them. But does that conditional follow without God's express foreknowledge? Why, therefore, do you think it follows without God's express volition? When, I say, a motion that is future on a hypothesis no more detracts from the divine will than a motion that is absolutely future, why, just as divine foreknowledge extends to that motion, does divine volition not extend to the same? Is it not fitting for God to will what He wills as perfectly as He knows what He knows? Why, therefore, do you want Him to will only confusedly what He knows most distinctly?

XXVII. 4. But as I see, you have this in common with the Brahmins, that you paint God with your own colors. We who are humans of finite and modest understanding grasp all things and individual things by distinct acts: and when we wish, for example, to give alms to all the poor, we are not yet considered to have expressed Lazarus specifically. You attribute this very defect to God when you deny that particular events are expressed by His universal decree. But the appearance of Anthropomorphism must be cast off, and it must be considered that for God it is the same to conceive of humans as to conceive of these and those most distinctly, and thus of the people of Keilah; and to conceive of the future disposition of humans is the same as to conceive of this and that disposition, and thus the one that the people of Keilah would have; and to conceive of a motion is the same as to conceive of a motion toward this and that affection of mind, and thus toward the betrayal of David. It is indeed our task to infer one thing from another and to deduce the particular from the general, but whatever is consequent for us is antecedent for

DISPUTATION I

God, and what we deduce through inferences is contained expressly in God's first proposition. Therefore, God's decree will have expressed both the people of Keilah and their future disposition and the motion appropriate to that disposition; and because it cannot be otherwise, given this expression, it will have been, on that part, most formally a conditional decree with respect to the object. But I suppose you had not accepted an annual pension from the States of Friesland to know these things.

XXVIII. 5. Since from His moving God understands that David will certainly be betrayed by the people of Keilah, but the motion itself comes from a decree to move them in a way accommodated to their future disposition, as indeed you think, from where does He understand that future disposition? Again, you will say, from the absolute decree by which He established that, according to the ratio of concurrent causes and the variety of circumstances and objects, various dispositions would be taken up by humans. But there is no such universal decree of this kind, which I prove from your doctrine when you say: It is in God's power, besides that concurrence of causes and objects, either to strike with dizziness, or to suggest sounder and never-before-thought-of counsels, or to expose to diabolical illusions, or to keep immune from diabolical tricks, or even, with the face of external things suddenly changed, to supply material for conceiving new counsels. Therefore, that future disposition cannot be reduced to some common and absolute decree. Therefore, it is necessary that there be a particular decree by which God has established either to induce a disposition beyond the order of causes and circumstances, if they did not bear it, or if they did bear it, to change or impede nothing, but rather to concur. Choose which you prefer. For the first decree will necessarily be conceived thus: I will that if David remains among the people of Keilah, the people of Keilah will be disposed to betrayal, although the state of things demands something else. The second, however, in this way: I will that if David remains among the people of Keilah, natural causes and circumstances will maintain their course and have their proper effect in disposing their minds. But both of these

DISPUTATION I

decrees are most properly conditional. Therefore, whether you want to or not, you must admit a decree that is most properly conditional.

XXIX. 6. Finally, when you assert that God by an absolute decree wills to move humans according to their disposition, I ask which disposition you understand? Is it only that which is absolutely future, so that the sense is, to move them only according to the disposition that they will have? Or also that which is conditionally future, so that the sense is, to move them according to the disposition which they either will have or would have if something else happened? If the first, nothing follows from it about the future betrayal by the people of Keilah, because their disposition to betray David was absolutely none, nor was it absolutely future. For as long as David remained among them, they were well-disposed toward him, both because of the recent benefit of liberation from the Philistines and because of the duty of kinship, since they were members of the same tribe. And you yourself acknowledge this when you say: I cannot suspect that the habitual disposition of the people of Keilah toward David was hostile, especially since that city was situated in the tribe of Judah, and David had recently earned their favor with outstanding services. You claim, therefore, that this disposition would have been changed if Saul had approached. But if God's decree supposes this, which was the second option, do you not see that it must be conceived as conditional, since it can be nothing other than, I will move men according to the disposition that they would have, that is, I will that if they are disposed differently, they are to be moved differently?

§ II. DECREES CONCERNING CONDITIONALLY FUTURE FREE ACTS. REPUGNANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY FATHERS.

XXX. PERHAPS someone will wonder why Twisse avoided what so evidently followed from his given premises and concessions, which those whose position he follows freely admit when they say that

DISPUTATION I

conditional knowledge presupposes an equally conditional decree, and therefore is not middle knowledge, since this, to use his term, is imagined to precede such a decree. But I recognize in this some providence of the old man. For he saw that if this were conceded, the path would be closed to accusing middle knowledge of novelty. For who can justly accuse one who cannot deny it except by introducing a doctrine equally or more novel?

Come now, I say, we are presented with this passage from Scripture: "Will the men of Keilah deliver me into the hands of Saul?" and the Lord answered, "They will deliver you." You yourself interpret this as supposing a decree and expressing the will of God in these or similar words: "I will that if David remains in Keilah, the men of Keilah shall deliver him into the hands of Saul." And thus you imagine a will prior to that knowledge. I defend knowledge as prior to will. You object to me the novelty of my position; demonstrate the antiquity of yours. Who before Molina, you ask, recognized such knowledge in God preceding the divine will? But who also, before Molina's contemporaries, recognized in God that will preceding divine knowledge? Recent, they say, is the recognition of conditional future events. How ancient is the volition of conditional future events? Could you indicate in which Olympiad it first appeared? Is it not most unfair to accuse others of the very thing of which you yourself are guilty, and to hold others to a standard that you yourself have broken?

XXXI. However, I do not concede to you that we are on equal footing in this matter, since I myself read my position in Scripture simply, with nothing added or subtracted. For see if this is not a genuine and naturally flowing reasoning: I ask only one favor of you: do not think so poorly of the blessed God as to suppose He does not know what He says. If you can grant me this grace, or at least grant it to God, I argue thus: God knows what He says; But He says that if David remains in Keilah, he will be delivered into the hands of Saul; Therefore God knows this. I attribute the major premise to your generosity; the minor is sacred Scrip-

DISPUTATION I

ture itself; Aristotle and every rational being claims the conclusion for itself; the conclusion is precisely conditional knowledge without a preceding decree.

What will you do to read therein conditional knowledge following from a decree? You will argue thus: Whatever future thing God declares, He has predefined this to be future; But He declares it future that if David remains in Keilah, he will be delivered into the hands of Saul; Therefore He has predefined that if he remains, he will be delivered.

By what right do you assume the major premise? Does Scripture give you authority for it? Namely in all those passages which indicate that future human sins are not of the divine will, though they are of divine prediction and foreknowledge. The Fathers, then? Justin, evidently, who while giving an account of the Christian faith to the Emperor, admits fate, and indeed an inescapable one, by which the rewards and punishments of those who have lived well or badly are determined; but denies that anyone is destined to be good or bad. Which is the same as admitting a will predefining the reward and punishment of foreknown virtue and vice, but denying a will predefining virtue or vice itself, though their foreknowledge is not denied.

Athenagoras, who denies in his Embassy to the Emperor that it is God's role to move toward things that are contrary to nature, and consequently to decree them, though it is His role to foreknow them?

Minutius Felix in Octavius, who with Justin also admits fate as subsequent to the foreknowledge of merits? "What," he says, "is fate but what God has spoken concerning each of us? who, since He can foreknow material, determines also the fates according to the merits and qualities of individuals." Therefore these fates or determinations, that is, predefinitions, do not precede foreknowledge.

Tatianus, who while acknowledging in his Oration to the Greeks that the Word foreknew what was to come, nevertheless denies that it foreknew them from fate, or otherwise than from the free choice of those choosing, and consequently not from decree?

DISPUTATION I

Arnobius, who calls that persuasion wicked and monstrous by which one thinks that God has ordained, commanded, and decreed by His constitution to flow forth the very acts by which human life is conducted and celebrated? Does God, therefore, foreknow those acts because He has predefined them?

Origen, who perpetually asserts the reason why divine foreknowledge does not harm freedom, because free acts are not future because they are foreknown, but they are foreknown because they are future? Which reason would be ridiculous if free acts were future because they are predefined. Moreover, he expressly denies to Celsus that all things are dispensed by God's will, and that evils proceed from divine providence. Will he concede that they proceed from divine predefinition?

Eusebius of Caesarea, Chrysostom, Epiphanius, Damascene, who say and think the same things as Origen?

Theodoret, who holds that one must fight in every way against Plato, lest God, who is good, be said to be the cause of evils? Who denies that evils were produced to serve good, but that whenever they happen to occur, God uses them for good? Would he admit that God predefines those things that are evil, while nevertheless admitting that He foreknows them?

§ III. THAT THOSE DECREES ARE ALSO REPUGNANT TO SAINT AUGUSTINE.

XXXIII. BUT this may perhaps seem to be an empty contention if we consider Twisse alone, who freely admits that the Fathers thought as we wish, easily conceding that all things are foreknown by God, but not that all things are decreed—even Augustine, before the Pelagian heresy sharpened him. Let us therefore examine Augustine, whose voice is primary. "Nowhere do we read 'there is no will except from God,' and therefore it is not written, because it is not true." Does he deny that God knows the will which he denies is from God? And yet in that book he was already being sharpened against the Pelagians. He was being sharpened

DISPUTATION I

also in his Letter to Honoratus, when he says that God predicts men's sins, but does not cause them. And lest anyone think that sins in any way pertain to God's will, he excludes this entirely when he denies that they pertain either to one who threatens or to one who promises. "Although," he says, "He brings in evils—evils not sins but punishments—yet He threatens these rather than promises them. All beneficial things He bestows and foreknows; He threatens punishments; He promises benefits." Nor was his discernment dull in the books of *The City of God*, in which it is wonderful how many things occur that show that not everything that is foreknown is predefined by God. I will produce a few of many:

"As God is the Creator of all natures, so He is the giver of all powers, but not of all wills. For evil wills are not from Him, since they are contrary to nature, which is from Him." How are evil wills not from Him if He predefined that they should exist? Yet they are foreknown.

This other passage looks in the same direction: "As God is the best Creator of good natures, so He is the most just ordainer of evil wills, so that when they use good natures badly, He Himself uses even evil wills well." The ordering of evil wills is far removed from predefinition, which precedes them, since ordering presupposes evil wills and those using good natures badly, as Augustine says in this passage, and explains more clearly in his commentary on the Psalms, where concerning the blindness of heretics in interpreting the Scriptures, which happens to them only by divine providence disposing it, he says, "Not because it makes them sinners, but because it orders them when they have sinned." Therefore, even here there is foreknowledge without predefinition.

This is also decisive: "Nor does man sin because God foreknew that he would sin; rather, it is beyond doubt that he himself sins when he sins, because He whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived foreknew NOT FATE, NOT FORTUNE, NOT SOMETHING ELSE, but that he would sin." Did God not foreknow something else, if predefinition was for Him the reason for foreknowing future sin?

DISPUTATION I

And this also: "The soul is not deserted so that it might desert; but it deserts so that it might be deserted. For to its evil, its own will is prior; but to its good, the will of its creator is prior, whether to make it, which was nothing, or to remake it, which had fallen and perished." If there was a predefinition of the evil act which was foreknown, it is most evident both that the will was deserted before it itself deserted, and that it is not prior with respect to evil, since it presupposes predefinition, which is a certain will of God. Nor should this be omitted: "Good will is the work of God, since man was made by Him with it; but the first evil will, because it preceded all evil works in man, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works, than any work."

In what sense Augustine denies that evil will is a work of God can be gathered from the book on the Predestination of the Saints, when he says: "When God promised Abraham the faith of the nations in his seed... He did not promise it on the basis of the power of our will, but on the basis of His predestination. For He promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men were going to do. For even if men do good things that pertain to the worship of God, HE MAKES THEM DO what He commands; they do not make Him do what He promised." From this passage it is evident that this is considered the work of God, which God makes men do, and therefore what He predefines and to which He moves, so that to deny that the first evil will is the work of God is the same as denying that it is predefined and excited by God's motion, while it is nevertheless foreknown.

What he retorts to Porphyry, who said that Christ fatally implicated Christians in errors, has the same force here against those predefining evil acts. "If," he says, "God gave Christians an implication of error fatally, did He give it willingly or unwillingly? If willingly, how is He just? If unwillingly, how is He blessed?" I will say similarly, If God predefines acts which are known to be necessarily evil, He either predefines them willingly or unwillingly; if willingly, how is He just? If unwillingly, how is

DISPUTATION I

He blessed and omnipotent? Let it stand, therefore, that if Augustine is to be believed, not everything of which there is foreknowledge is predefined.

And lest there be any room for doubting on this matter, his opinion is most clear in the book on the Predestination of the Saints, which runs thus: "Predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge, but foreknowledge can exist without predestination. For by predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do; wherefore it was said, 'He made the things that are to be'; but He can foreknow even those things which He Himself does not do, such as whatever sins."

XXXIII. But Twisse responds that Augustine denies the predestination of some acts, but not their predefinition. For he speaks thus: "Although knowledge exceeds predestination in the aforesaid manner, nevertheless it by no means follows from this that it exceeds every decree of God, as if it were founded on no decree of God. Neither Thomas, nor Augustine, nor Damascene says that the free acts of the created will are not predefined by God, but what they pronounce in part, they pronounce concerning predestination, and this according to the proper and strict proceeding signification of this word according to Aquinas, but not concerning predefinition."

First, I will oppose Twisse to Twisse, so that the reader may see the man's failing memory and stupefied mind. A little before, he presented to himself Pennot's objection, which runs thus: "Thirdly, this proposition can be proved by innumerable authorities of the Fathers saying that God foreknows many things which He neither predefines nor predestines, but that He predefines or predestines nothing which He has not foreknown." To this Twisse says, "I acknowledge that this is so." Now he acknowledges that, according to the Fathers' usage, some things are foreknown which are neither predestined nor predefined; now he acknowledges that some things are foreknown which are not predestined, but none which are not predefined. But the ravings of this old man appear more in what he says thus: "What else is it to be predestined to life than to be destined from eternity to life according to the phraseology of the

DISPUTATION I

ancients? And they recognized predestination not only to eternal life, but also to eternal death. I acknowledge that the ancients thus distinguished between foreknowledge and predestination, so that they said that all things are foreknown by God, even evil things, but not predestined. Hence I also confess that it has become customary in the Schools for the 'foreknown' to be commonly used for the reprobate. Indeed, since names are by institution, they wanted to extend predestination only to those things which God Himself was at some time going to do, but not to those things which He was going to permit." He acknowledges that according to the Fathers' opinion, predestination pertains not only to eternal life but also to eternal death, and therefore to the reprobate; and at the same time he acknowledges that, from the fact that the Fathers extended the name of foreknowledge more broadly than the name of predestination, it came about that the reprobate, to whom predestination did not extend as did foreknowledge, were commonly called the foreknown. When I read these things, I thought that the passage was corrupted either by the fault of the copyists or the printers; but since it is established that this page was properly reviewed by the author, and that something else rather trivial was corrected in it, it remains for me to say that these are the usual cracks of a failing intellect. Especially since in another place, as if he wanted to correct that custom and manner of speaking of the Ancient Fathers, he roundly pronounces: "It is certain by faith that whatever happens has been predestined by God to happen," and it is clear that he also includes evils. And again, "We say, and truly, that not a few are destined to damnation before they are born," as if he wanted it to be certain by faith that Augustine lied when he denies that some things are predestined which nevertheless happen.

Secondly, since, setting aside the Fathers' usage, predestination and predefining something are the same, it is evident that we cannot with reason assert that Augustine used the name of predestination more narrowly than predefinition, unless it is established that in his work the predestination of some things is denied, whose predefinition is nevertheless

DISPUTATION I

affirmed. But not even a trace exists in Augustine from which it could be gathered that he allows things to be called predefined which cannot be called predestined. This is confirmed even from that very passage which Twisse repeatedly brings up to prove this: "Nothing happens unless the Omnipotent wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen or by Himself doing it," which is clearly evident that it cannot be said, except by one divested of all shame and professing ignorance, that the will allowing something to happen is its predefinition.

XXXV. Thirdly, it is established that Augustine extends the word predestination to all those things which God Himself is going to do. For he himself speaks thus: "By predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do, but He can foreknow even those things which He Himself does not do." Therefore, for the acceptance of predefinition to be broader, it must also embrace those things which God Himself is not going to do. Again, it is established from the same Augustine that among those things which God is said to do Himself are included those things which men also do, if God makes them do them. For these are his words: "For He promised what He Himself was going to do, not what men were going to do. For even if men do good things that pertain to the worship of God, He makes them do what He commands; they do not make Him do what He promised." Therefore, if there are some things not predestined, and yet predefined, they must be done by men in such a way that God cannot be said to make them do them. But this is contradictory. For what else is it to predefine something than antecedently and efficaciously to will that it should happen, and consequently to preempt its causes by making them act? It is therefore manifest that in Augustine these things coincide, and one who contends that things are predefined which are denied to be predestined wanders in gratuitous and voluntary error.

These other words pertain to the same thing: "But Abraham did not believe thus, but believed giving glory to God, because He who promised is also able to perform. He does not say to predict, he does not

DISPUTATION I

say to foreknow (for He can predict and foreknow even others' actions), but he says is able to perform; and through this not others' actions but His own." What, pray, are those others' actions which are both foreknown and predicted? Are they predefined? If they are not, then there is something both foreknown and not predefined; if they are, how are they called others' actions? Is predefinition less an action of God than predestination? Is it less antecedent? Is it less efficacious? Why then is that which follows from it not called God's action, just as that which follows from predestination?

XXXVI. Fourthly, this is confirmed even from that passage of St. Thomas from which Twisse attempted to steal authority. For since St. Thomas also denies that whatever things are foreknown are predestined, and therefore distinguishes the prophecy of predestination from the prophecy of foreknowledge, by which those things are predicted in which foreknowledge exceeds predestination, he gives the cause of that distinction from Damascene: "Because those things which God predestines are not in us, hence predestination is called a kind of preparation by God; but someone prepares what he himself is going to do, not what another is going to do." From this passage, in the first place, it is clear that the reason for that restriction by which predestination extends less broadly than foreknowledge is not sought from the peculiar usage of the Fathers, but from the common institution and acceptance of the words themselves, when he says, "hence predestination is called a kind of preparation by God; but someone prepares, etc." Then it is clear that the same reason is common to predestination and predefinition, and that one is no more exceeded by foreknowledge than the other. For what reason does this statement have, "those things which God predestines are not in us," more than this, "those things which God predefines are not in us"? And this, "Predestination is called a kind of preparation by God," more than this, "Predefinition is called a kind of preparation"? Likewise this, "Someone predestines what he himself is going to do, not what another is going to do," more than this, "Someone predefines what he himself is going to do,

DISPUTATION I

not what another is going to do"? Who does not see that with predefinition substituted in place of predestination, the force of the statement and the strength of the meaning are entirely the same? With what probability, therefore, will it be said that one is exceeded by God's foreknowledge, but not the other?

XXXVII. Fifthly, to make it clear that this is not merely a question of names, and that Augustine denies not only the word predestination to all things foreknown by God, but also the thing itself—that is, the antecedent and absolute and efficacious will of God, in a word, predefinition—that passage from the book on the gift of perseverance must be examined, where that personification of the Massilienses is reported, by which they tried to traduce Augustine's doctrine, by introducing an orator who would thus preach: "The definite sentence of God concerning predestination is such that some of you have come from infidelity to faith, but the rest of you who remain in the delight of sins have not yet risen up because the help of merciful grace has not yet raised you; and if any of you have obeyed, if you are predestined to be rejected, the strength to obey will be withdrawn from you, so that you will cease to obey." Here first of all it must be considered that these Massilienses, who were both learned and still living in the communion of the Church, as far as can be conjectured from the letter of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, and who were familiar with Augustine's books and doctrine, and had commerce with Prosper and Hilary and other students of Augustine, could not, any more than Twisse, be ignorant of what the accepted usage of predestination was, and what the difference between it and predefinition was; nor were they so incautious that, when the word preordination or predefinition would have served their purpose equally well, they nevertheless preferred to use the word predestination contrary to custom, when they say, "if you are predestined to be rejected," and this in a speech in which they thought they would represent Augustine's genuine opinion. This, I say, shows sufficiently that they were by no means mistaken about the word, but about the thing itself, when they attributed to Augustine that opinion

DISPUTATION I

which was not really his—namely, an antecedent and positive will of God concerning those things which are evil. And Augustine himself shows this sufficiently when he passes over in silence this very abuse of the word, and so reforms that whole speech, which was thought to be Augustinian, that he seems rather to deny the thing signified by that word. For when he does not want those words to be directed to the listeners themselves in the second person, but in the third person of the verb, so that, as he himself says, speech may be made to them about others, not about themselves to themselves, he himself exhibits the form of that change in such a way that those words which were to follow, "if they are predestined to be rejected," which signify a positive and antecedent reprobation, he changed with most wise providence into these others, which signify only a negative one, "if they are not predestined to his kingdom and glory," and thus exhibited the whole sentence, "cutting off what is false and tempering what is true," as Prosper says to the Excerpta of the Genoese: "If any obey, but are not predestined to his kingdom and glory, they are temporary, and will not persevere in the same obedience to the end."

XXXVIII. Sixthly, that passage must be examined in which Augustine refutes the calumny of those who falsely claimed that he was an asserter of fate. Among other reasons, he refutes it thus: "Moreover, the asserters of fate attribute both the good and evil of men to fate; but God in the evils of men pursues their merits with due retribution, but bestows good things through undeserved grace by a merciful will, doing both not through the temporal consortium of stars, but through the eternal and deep counsel of His severity and goodness." If men's evil actions were preceded by an eternal decree of God just as good ones are preceded, what would it profit to dilute the calumny of fate by objecting that fate pertains to both good and evil, when Augustine would likewise say that that decree, which seemed fatalistic to the Pelagians, predefines actions which are both good and evil? What would that distinction of God's eternal counsel, by which God pursues in evil men's merits which He precedes by His grace in good men, also help? Does He only pursue and

DISPUTATION I

not also precede men's evil merits, if they could neither exist nor be fore-known except in an antecedent decree by which they were predefined? Who would not manifestly conclude from this that these decrees are unknown to Augustine, and that he denies not only the name of predestination to those acts which are evil, but the thing itself?

XXXIX. To this refer what we produced a little before: That there is some will which is not from God; Some which can pertain neither to God's threats nor to His promises; Some of which God is neither the creator nor the giver, but only the ordainer; Some which is imputed to fault because, when it was foreknown to be future, nothing else was fore-known than that it itself would be future; Some to which God's will is not prior; Some which is not the work of God. For who could be so blind as to believe these and other things of this kind to be compatible with the eternal and predefining will of God concerning men's evil acts, so as to think that it is not denied that they are antecedently decreed, while it is denied that they are predestined?

§ IV. THE CHURCH FATHERS AFTER SAINT AUGUSTINE ACKNOWLEDGED FOREKNOWLEDGE INDEPENDENT OF PREDEFINITIONS.

XL. BUT we must inquire what Augustine's position was from Prosper of Aquitaine and Fulgentius of Africa: the former of whom encountered Augustine in his final years, while the latter followed shortly after. Both vigorously defended his name and doctrine in the continuing battle against the Pelagians and their remnants. Therefore, Prosper affirms in many places the same thing that Augustine does, namely that there are some things foreknown, yet not predestined by God. For he states this in his responses to the chapters of the Gauls when he speaks thus: "There can be foreknowledge without predestination; but predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge." And again: "In our evil works, only the foreknowledge of God is to be understood; because just

DISPUTATION I

as He foreknew and predestined what He Himself does and gave us to do, so He only foreknew, but did not predestine, what He neither did Himself nor required us to do." Hence also that statement: "Predestination of God is always for good," and "Predestination is never beyond goodness, never beyond justice." Now we must see whether he distinguishes between predestination and predefinition in such a way that what he denies to predestination, he nevertheless concedes to predefinition. And first we encounter what we have already cited, that in our evil works only foreknowledge is to be understood, because predestination cannot be understood in them. This statement would be absurd if predestination did not encompass every antecedent and absolute will, and therefore predefinition. For unless this is granted, it is clear that excluding predestination does not entail what Prosper assumes—that only foreknowledge remains concerning evil works—since predefinition could still remain. 2. This is supported by what appears in response 12 to the chapters of the Gauls: "If God overthrows an obedient man from piety, and causes one who is running well to fall, then He returns evil for good and unjustly punishes what He Himself compels to happen. What could be said or thought more perverse, more insane? But those who think that in all matters God's foreknowledge is the same as His will are drawn into such an understanding, since His will never wills anything except good, whereas foreknowledge, etc." Here you see what that predestination is which Prosper denies is equivalent to foreknowledge: namely, it is that will of God which is never directed except toward good. Thus for Prosper, to say that "God's predestination is always for good" or "never beyond goodness" is the same as saying "God's will is always for good, never beyond goodness." What then becomes of that predefinition or decree, which is also a certain will of God, and is said to be equivalent to foreknowledge, even conditional foreknowledge? 3. I add his 14th judgment, which states: "Whoever says that those who do not believe the evangelical preaching do not believe because of God's predestination, and that God has defined that whoever does not believe does not believe by His own

DISPUTATION I

constitution, is not Catholic. For just as faith working through love is God's gift, so unbelief is not God's constitution." Here also, who does not see that the predestination which Prosper denies extends to foreknowledge is so interchangeable with divine definition and constitution that where predestination is denied, both definition and constitution are denied? Where then is predefinition, that inseparable companion of foreknowledge? Companion? It would be more appropriate to call it the leader, if we believe Twisse. 4. I also add response 14 from the Vincentian articles, that is, to the ninth article falsely attributed to Augustine. The objection states: "That all those faithful and saints who are predestined to eternal death, when they relapse to their vomit, appear to do this by their own fault; but the cause of this fault is divine predestination, which secretly withdraws good wills from them." From this you can see that Augustine's opponents interpreted predestination differently. Prosper responds thus: "The same spirit of blasphemies persists." He calls the predestination of evils blasphemy, and he soon explains what this predestination is when he says: "If someone falls away from justice and piety, he is carried headlong by his own will, drawn by his own desire, deceived by his own persuasion. The Father does nothing there, the Son does nothing, the Holy Spirit does NOTHING; DIVINE WILL DOES NOT INTERVENE IN SUCH A MATTER; through whose work we know many have been kept from falling, but none compelled to fall." This is indeed what it means for human falls not to be predestined—that divine will does not intervene in these matters at all. And this is the blasphemy that Prosper detests: to find any divine will in these cases. What then will those say who nevertheless contend that divine predefinition intervenes? Is that not something of divine will? And what will those do who maintain these things are foreknown because they were decreed beforehand?

XLI. But I think these points suffice for Twisse to understand that Prosper was against him; let us see if he can expect any light from Fulgentius. Fulgentius repeats the same things as Augustine, which Prosper also states, from the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "Fore-

DISPUTATION I

knowledge of God can exist without predestination, but predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge." Thus he states both in other places and especially in chapter 29 of the first book to Monimus; and this question is the sole argument of that book. For when Fulgentius had taught both the true position and St. Augustine's view, which confines predestination within the sphere of good things, while foreknowledge extends even to evil things, Monimus objected with a passage from the commentary on Psalm 14, where Augustine says some are predestined to destruction. But Fulgentius both resolved that objection and confirmed the proposed position throughout the entire book. He therefore distinguishes two kinds of destruction: one of punishment, the other of sin; and two deaths of the soul: the first in which infants are born or into which sinners fall back, and the second which these same persons must necessarily suffer as retribution from the most just judge. He teaches that there is no predestination of the first destruction and first death, but only foreknowledge, which being established, there is also predestination of the second destruction and second death. His words are: "Therefore it is fitting for the faithful to believe and confess that God, good and just, indeed foreknew that men would sin, because nothing of the future could be hidden from Him (nor indeed would they be future if they were not in His foreknowledge), yet He did not predestine any man to sin.... Therefore those whom God foreknew would end this life in sin, He predestined to be punished with interminable punishment. In this matter, just as the foreknowledge of human iniquity is not to be blamed, so the predestination of most just retribution is to be praised; that it may be acknowledged that God did not predestine man to any sin whom He predestined to be punished by the merit of sin." And again: "Therefore, God showing what He foreknew should be returned and what should be given, predestined to punishment those whom He foreknew would depart from Him through the fault of their evil will, and predestined to the kingdom those whom He foreknew would return to Him through the aid of His preventing mercy and would remain in Him through the aid of His subsequent mer-

DISPUTATION I

cy." And again: "Therefore such a distinction was not made in vain by Him between those to be punished and those to be glorified, that He called the former vessels of wrath, but the latter vessels of mercy, except to show that in both the vessels of wrath and the vessels of mercy, their own iniquity preceded.... But God would never render destruction to the vessels of wrath if man were not found to have voluntary sin, because God would not bring wrath upon sinful man if man had fallen into sin through God's predestination.... Therefore, this wrath renders destruction to such vessels because it found in them the merit of voluntary iniquity." And again: "Therefore the first death of the soul, which man brought upon himself, is the cause of the second death; and the second death, which God renders to man, is the punishment of the first death.... Therefore, God indeed foreknew all future sins of men in sinners; and because He did not predestine them to be done, He predestined by just judgment that they be punished." And he infers this from the words of Augustine cited by Monimus, which give the reason for predestination to destruction: "Because upon this," that is, upon those not doing good, "God's foreknowledge looked, and pronounced sentence." "Indeed," says Fulgentius, "he showed sufficiently and evidently by these words that God saw men's sins by foreknowledge, to which He dictated the sentence of predestination.... But one is justly predestined to punishment by divine equity who is foreknown as a sinner by divine knowledge, insofar as one who was going to commit iniquity by his own will, to which he was not predestined by God, so that in whom God's foreknowledge saw future unjust work, for him through the sentence of predestination He prepared just punishment." And at the beginning of the second book, where he summarizes the doctrine of the first book, he says that only those things pertain to divine predestination in which some rationale of either mercy or justice can be found; and because in sins neither mercy nor justice is found, therefore every evil will of the wicked by which they sin is foreknown, but not predestined by God; but because it is foreknown, it has found a prepared punishment of just retribution. I have chosen to relate

DISPUTATION I

these things to note in passing how alien to Augustine and those ancient Augustinian Fathers is that terrible doctrine of Calvin, more fitting for a Phalaris than for the Most Good God, concerning positive reprobation that precedes the foreknowledge of sins. One thing now remains: to see whether Fulgentius, who so explicitly denies the predestination of evil wills, denied only the name of predestination, while admitting the reality, that is, an antecedent, absolute, and efficacious decree even concerning evil wills; or whether he denied this very decree. And he is proven to deny this decree, first from the fact that for him, to deny this predestination is the same as denying God's will. This is clear from chapter 20, when he says: "For this purpose, that is, for inordinate love of created things, the rational creature was not predestined by God. For His predestination is nothing other than the eternal preparation of His future works, in which no cause of evil can be found, BECAUSE THE ORIGIN OF SIN NEVER PROCEEDED FROM THE WILL OF GOD." Do you not see that sin is denied to proceed from predestination to the same extent that it is denied to proceed from will, and thus will and this predestination are held to be the same? It is proven secondly from chapter 30, where he contends that Augustine was defended in orthodox faith by Prosper in his responses to the chapters of the Gauls, and relates objection 14: "That those who do not believe the evangelical preaching do not believe because of God's predestination, and that God has defined that whoever does not believe does not believe by His own constitution," which he calls a perversity attributed to the words of Blessed Augustine not from truth but from spite, and adds Prosper's words saying that the unbelief of non-believers pertains not to the CONSTITUTION of God but to foreknowledge. From this it is clear that predestination, definition, and divine constitution are used as the same thing, so that those who admit there are some things according to Augustine's view that are not predestined, but are nevertheless predefined and decreed, must blush—unless perhaps they quibble that they concede things are not defined but not that they are not predefined, or that they are not constituted but not that they are

DISPUTATION I

not decreed. If this is so, we appeal to the judgment of grammarians! It is proven thirdly from the reasons by which Fulgentius is led to deny the predestination of evil wills. These in no way attack this name but rather the reality signified by that name, and therefore they equally exclude predefinition itself. Fulgentius denies there can be any cause of predestination to sins, and that those who admit it would have nothing to answer. Who does not see that if this were only a question of terminology, they would have an easy answer: namely, that this is an ancient and commonly confirmed institution of words, which is unjustly restricted by the private authority of some when it is said that only the will of those things which are good should be called predestination? He denies that the wicked can be said to be predestined by God, if not mercifully, at least justly operating, to become evil from good; and he maintains that the statement attributing the cause of any sin to divine equity is intolerable to Christian ears. But who among Christians is so delicate that they cannot bear something to be called predestined that they themselves admit is predestined? And why is the cause of sin attributed to God more when that eternal and antecedent will concerning men's evil actions is called predestination rather than predefinition? He thinks divine justice is blamed if God is said to have predestined a man to become evil from good; will it then be praised if He is said to have predefined this very thing? He believes that by such predestination, divine justice is said not to have found the accused guilty, but to have made him so; does this not follow equally from predefinition? He exclaims that the retribution of punishment to a fallen man would be unjust if God had predestined the standing man to ruin; will it be just and innocent if God predefined the same ruin? What evil is there in these names, that the same will of God, if called predestination, is unjust and detestable, but if called predefinition, suddenly appears holy and adorable? But it is worth examining the beginning of chapter 23 to finally prove this same point. "I ask," says Fulgentius, "why He could have predestined the first man, whom, as it is written, the Lord made upright, to sin: that is, to an evil will, which is the origin of all sin.

DISPUTATION I

This will must be believed to have been either attributed by God to man not yet sinning, or returned to the sinner. If therefore He attributed it to man not yet sinning, He Himself—which is abhorrent—became the author of iniquity, who gave an evil will to a good man, through which, by sinning, he deserves to be punished with eternal punishment. And where is it stated that God did not make death? And that there is no iniquity with God? And that the Lord is just and loved justice, His countenance saw equity? But if He did not attribute the beginning of evil will to sinful man, but returned it, etc." No reason occurs to Fulgentius why God could have predestined Adam to that first evil will which he had; why then would there not be some reason why He could have predefined the same will? He thinks that by predestination, God would be justly said to have attributed this will to him; why would this not also be the case through predefinition? From that predestination, according to Fulgentius, it follows that God was the author of iniquity for man; why would this not also follow from predefinition? Scripture stands against this; but how is it against? And why is it more against predestination than against predefinition? Was it not necessary for Twisse to be carried away in some whirlwind when he spoke thus and introduced that fictitious distinction?

XLII. It would be lengthy to relate what was the view of those who followed those Fathers. The Council of Orange detests with anathema those who wish to say that some are predestined by divine power to evil. The sense in which this was said can be understood from the previous canon, where it defines that men act by their own will, not God's, when they do what displeases God. For this is to equally deny both predestination and predefinition of those things which displease God. The Third Council of Valence agrees very well with Orange and with other older Fathers, whose faith it also professes to embrace. In it, however, it distinguishes foreknowledge, by which God foreknew the good would be good, from that by which He foreknew the evil would be evil: because God foreknew absolutely that the good would be good through His grace, but the evil He foreknew would be evil through their own malice. But

DISPUTATION I

why did God foreknow the good would be good through His grace, if not because it was necessary that the predestination of grace should precede that foreknowledge? But also, according to the adversaries' hypothesis, it was necessary that the predefinition of the evil act should precede human malice: why therefore would human malice not be said to be foreknown through it? Or if, despite the necessity of that predefinition, the evil are said to be foreknown as evil by their own malice, why, even with the necessity of preventing grace granted, could not the good be said to be foreknown as good through their own goodness or freedom? To the same end pertains what it adds: that His foreknowledge "imposed no necessity on any evil person so that he could not be otherwise; but what that person would be of his own will, God foreknew from His omnipotence and immutable majesty; and no one is condemned by God's prejudgment, but by the merit of his own iniquity." Suppose an act that is evil is predefined, with all the circumstances from which malice is inseparable, by an antecedent and inescapable decree: and all those words become meaningless. For how does an inescapable decree not impose necessity? How, likewise, does foreknowledge not impose it, because it only foreknows what that person will be of his own will, if that will itself is not foreknown except from predefinition and predetermination? How, finally, are we condemned by the merit of our own iniquity and not by prejudgment, if there is neither merit nor iniquity that was not preceded by the sentence of divine predefinition? But neither can those things that follow cohere: "in the election of those to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit; but in the damnation of those who will perish, evil merit precedes the just judgment of God." What? Is not evil merit connected by insurmountable necessity with the antecedent decree of God predefining an act that is evil with all the circumstances prerequisite for malice? Why, then, is evil merit said to be prior to God's judgment, rather than that decree which is both prior to and necessary for evil merit itself? And why are we deluded when it is said that God's mercy is prior to good merit, as if there were not also some cause on God's part that was prior to evil

DISPUTATION I

merit, and indeed such that the connection of the latter with the former is indissoluble?

XLIII. To these add Leo the Great, who distinguishes in Christ's passion what was foreknown from the malignity of the Jews and what was arranged by God, and places different principles of the will to kill, which belonged to the Jews, and the will to die, which belonged to Christ. The Lord did not send but permitted the impious hands of the raging, etc. Add Eucherius of Lyons, when he pronounces that in the blinding of the Jews, divine foreknowledge should be acknowledged, not predestination, because God does not compel one to sin, nor can He harden by helping, but only by abandoning. Add Leo IX, who testifies to his faith in these words: "I believe that God predestined only good things but foreknew both good and evil." Add again John Damascene, when he distinguishes a twofold will in God: one preceding and which is from Himself, by which He wills all men to be saved, deeming it unworthy to create some to be punished; the other following and permissive, which is the will to punish, existing because of our cause. So it is easy to understand what he means when he denies that God predefines (προορίζεις) everything, even if He foreknows everything. He excludes that antecedent will, which does not arise from our cause, or to which our freedom's merit provides no motive.

XLIV. Add Anselm, who says there is no other reason for the devil's fall than that he himself willed it, and denies that this will had any other cause that might impel or attract him in any way; but "he himself," he says, "was the efficient cause for himself, if effect can be said." And soon, while explaining how the devil's will itself in falling, which was the substrate of malice, was from God, he says: "A person has from God not only what God gives spontaneously, but also what he unjustly seizes with God permitting; and just as God is said to do what He permits to be done, SO HE IS SAID TO GIVE WHAT HE PERMITS TO BE SEIZED. Therefore, since with God permitting, the evil angel used the power freely given by God, he had the use of it from God, which is noth-

DISPUTATION I

ing other than willing itself; for willing is nothing other than using the power of willing, just as speaking is using the power of speaking." No statement could ever be more effective in confirming these three points. First, there is no predefinition of the will which is evil, since he says the devil willed to fall for no other reason than that he willed, nor was there anything by which he might be impelled or attracted. Consider whether he could have believed there was something by which he was premoved and predetermined. And this is confirmed when he denies that God spontaneously gives that willing, which is far from predefinition; hence the Second point is also clear: that those who assert the reason why God is not the cause or author of sin is because He does not contribute to the act that is evil from His own determination and inclination toward such an act, but from the general principle by which He wills, as befits His providence, not to deny the concurrence of the first cause to secondary causes requiring it in accordance with their natures, are philosophizing most correctly and entirely according to Anselm's mind. For this is precisely the force of saying God does not spontaneously give that willing, because God concurs with that willing in a manner more similar to one who pays a necessary debt than to one who gives something freely. The Third point is also clearly gathered from this: namely, that God exhibits His concurrence for acts that are evil in such an indifferent manner that it is in the power of the creature to use it or not, though God would prefer the creature not to use it. For what else is it that God does not spontaneously give that concurrence, and that man and angel seize it when they sin, with Him permitting? For that is said to be seized which is taken from an unwilling person; and because God so exhibits concurrence to a free cause for an act that is evil that its use displeases Him, while its non-use is rather desired, when the will uses it, it takes what God withdraws, insofar as the necessity of accommodating Himself to the creature's freedom allows; and therefore the creature's will seizes it, while God is more like one who is unwilling and permitting than one who decrees from Himself. Now compare with those thoughts of Anselm this notion: that God by an

DISPUTATION I

eternal, absolute, efficacious, and immutable decree preempts the created will, which as yet is thinking nothing evil; and in execution of such a decree, efficaciously excites, premoves, and predetermines it to elicit freely an act which He knows is evil, and in all those circumstances from which He knows it is impossible for malice to be absent, with such a great necessity to do what is evil imposed that to combine the suspension of the evil act with that antecedent decree and impulse must be reckoned among impossibilities; and you will see that there is not as much distance between the two poles as there is between the position of Anselm and that of Twisse. But so that it may also be clear how Anselm blows away those trifles of Twisse, who thinks that what is denied by the holy Fathers to be predestined is nevertheless predefined by God, we must present that passage of Anselm in which he gives the notion of predestination, when he says: "Predestination seems to be the same as preordination or preestablishment; and therefore what God is said to predestine is understood to be preordained, **WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH THAT SOMETHING WILL BE.**" If a definition is convertible with what is defined, just as to predestine is the same as to preestablish, preordain, establish that something will be, will not also this preestablishing, preordaining, establishing that something will be, be the same as predestining? And since to predefine is this very thing, does it not follow that for Anselm, to predefine is the same as to predestine? This is confirmed by what he later adds, when he teaches both that predestination more broadly taken can also be applied to evils, and that the predestination of evils consists only in the fact that they are permitted. For just as God is said to harden when He does not soften, to lead into temptation when He does not deliver, so also to predestine the evil when He does not correct them. See whether Anselm thinks there is any predefinition of evils, and if there were, whether he would deny the name of predestination to one who grants it even to permission.

XIV. Add the Master of the Sentences when he says: "Evil things, indeed, God knows and foreknows before they happen, but BY

DISPUTATION I

KNOWLEDGE ALONE, NOT BY GOOD PLEASURE; for God foreknows and foretells even what He Himself will not do, just as He foreknew and foretold the unbelief of the Jews, but did not cause it; nor did He compel them to the sin of unbelief because He foreknew it; nor would He have foreknown or foretold their evils unless they were going to have them," and then, "He foreknew those things by knowledge alone, but not by the good pleasure of authority." Anyone who is not a novice among the Scholastics knows that predefinition should be referred to the will of good pleasure, insofar as it is distinguished from the will of sign. Therefore, when the Master denies the will of good pleasure concerning evils, it is clear that predefinition is denied by him. This is also confirmed when he admits only knowledge concerning them, while concerning good things he admits both good pleasure and, as he indicated a little earlier, disposition. For when he called that good pleasure "the good pleasure of authority," he merely expressed what good pleasure implies: namely, that God is and is believed to be the Author of those things of which He has the will of good pleasure, and can be said to be the cause why they exist, while of other things He is only the cause without which they would not exist, as he said earlier, in evils God's foreknowledge is only the cause without which they would not exist.

XLVI. Finally, St. Thomas must be added to the Master, from whom comes what we have already cited, that divine foreknowledge exceeds predestination in certain matters. Light will be shed on this opinion by what he teaches in the first book of the Sentences. For first, he approves the teaching of the Master already mentioned, when he denies that God's knowledge has the perfect nature of causality, except insofar as it is joined with the will: and therefore it is said in the text that the knowledge of good pleasure is the cause of things. Then he acknowledges this difference between necessary and contingent effects: that necessary effects can be known in their causes, but contingent effects that could go either way cannot be. This is the reason why he attributes the basis for knowing these effects to the existence and presence they have in themselves for

DISPUTATION I

some difference in time: hence it comes about that for God, for whom nothing can be future or past, they are present from eternity, and therefore knowable. It is appropriate to quote his words: "There are certain causes from which effects necessarily follow, which cannot be impeded: and in these causes the effect has certain and determined being; to the extent that it can be known demonstratively, as in the rising of the sun and eclipses and such things... But there are certain causes which can go either way: and in these causes, future effects have no certainty or determination: and therefore contingent events that could go either way cannot be known in any manner. But when they are already brought about in the nature of things, then they have determined being in themselves: and therefore when they exist in act, they are known with certainty, as is evident in one who sees Socrates running; because it is necessary that Socrates runs while he is running, and one can have certain knowledge of this. I say therefore that the divine intellect sees from eternity each contingent thing, not only as it is in its causes, but as it is in its determined being, and moreover. Because God's knowledge is measured by eternity, which remaining the same is present to all time; therefore He sees each contingent thing as it is in its act."

From these words I argue in this way: When St. Thomas concedes that necessary effects can be foreknown in their causes as future, he either separates such causes from the divine will and decree of concurring with them in a manner appropriate to their nature, or he does not. If the first, it is false that those effects can be known in their causes, since without such a decree they will accomplish nothing. If the second, therefore when contingent effects are denied the ability to be known similarly in their causes, these too must be taken as subject to the divine will and decree of concurring according to their nature (For it would be ridiculous to distinguish necessary causes from contingent ones in this way, that the former joined to the divine decree manifest their effect, while the latter separated from the divine decree do not manifest it). Therefore that will and decree pertaining to contingent causes does not involve any predefin-

DISPUTATION I

ition of the future act: which is most evident in such causes, since when joined with God's antecedent predefinition, the predefined effect can most certainly be known as future.

Furthermore, how the liberty and contingency of contingent events is not violated by the necessity and infallibility of divine foreknowledge, St. Thomas explains in no other way than because the act of divine knowledge passes over the contingent even if it is future now, "JUST AS OUR SIGHT PASSES OVER IT WHILE IT EXISTS." And because everything that is, when it is, necessarily is, which nevertheless is not absolutely necessary; therefore it is said that considered in itself it is contingent; but related to God's knowledge it is necessary: because it is not referred to this knowledge except according to its actual being: and so it is similar to if I were to see Socrates presently running. Hence the distinction between the necessity of consequence and the necessity of the consequent, conditional not absolute, is good. But isn't that comparison between divine knowledge and our sight false and illusory if there is any predefinition that draws divine knowledge? Does knowledge to which a decree made a bridge pass over the contingent in the same way as sight, which relies only on the presence of the object? What weight has the argument by which the object is denied to lose its contingency, because even if it becomes necessary when referred to divine foreknowledge, it is nevertheless not referred except according to what it is in actual being: and because, without injury to contingency, everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be? For if this is the first root of that necessity, because everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be, so that it can be called a necessity which the very existence and presence of the thing makes, well and good: but then there is no place for predefinition. But if that is not the first principle of this necessity, nor is the thing called contingent necessary only because it is; but because it is antecedently and efficaciously predefined that it should be, by an insuperable decree; how will contingency be saved? And on what basis will it be said not to be referred to divine knowledge except according to what it is in actual being, when it is

DISPUTATION I

also referred according to what it is in being willed antecedently and pre-defined? And what does this have in common with the sight by which I see Socrates presently running? Finally, how is this not a necessity of the consequent, and not only of consequence, if the consequent does not make it, but draws it from an antecedent which is independent of it, namely from predefinition?

St. Thomas explains this further in the solution to the fourth argument, where he always supposes that the necessity which a future thing derives from the necessity of foreknowledge is based on the actual existence and presence of the thing itself: and therefore does not remove contingency. "And so," he says, "it must be said otherwise, that the antecedent is absolutely necessary, namely God foreknows that Socrates will run, both from the immobility of the act and also from the order to what is known: because this thing is not placed under divine knowledge, except while it is in act according to which it has determination and certainty. For it is necessary that it exists, while it exists: and therefore a similar necessity is to be inferred in the consequent, Therefore he runs, such that namely what is Socrates running is taken according to what it is in act: and thus it has determination and necessity. From which it is clear that if Socrates running is taken according to what follows from the antecedent, it has necessity. For it does not follow from the antecedent except according as it is subject to divine knowledge, to which it is subjected as it is considered presently in its actual being: whence the consequent must also be taken in this way: whereby it is clear that the consequent is necessary. For it is necessary that Socrates runs while he is running." These words clearly give this meaning: Any thing, e.g., Socrates running, while it actually exists, has certainty and determination, because everything that is, when it is, necessarily is: from this it happens that its foreknowledge is equally necessary in that intellect from which nothing that exists in any difference of time can ever be hidden: Therefore it is necessary that Socrates' running be foreknown. Again, because from the necessity and truth of knowledge necessarily follows the truth and a certain necessity of the

DISPUTATION I

thing known, from the same source it necessarily follows that Socrates runs: and the consequence is good when it is said, if it is foreknown that Socrates runs, he runs: And yet this running does not cease to have contingency: because this necessity returns as if in a certain circle from the same to the same. For foreknowledge returns to Socrates' running which is inferred from it only that necessity which it received from it, or which it supposed in it; because it was necessary to foreknow Socrates' running only because it is necessary that he runs, while he runs. This is the most genuine opinion of St. Thomas, which wholly manifestly supposes that there is no predefinition in which it is necessary that a future thing be foreknown. This can be confirmed from other places as well. And it is to be noted what Twisse says; that Diego Alvarez in proposing St. Thomas's opinion, distorted it, and suffered something human: although out of his goodwill toward that Author, he would rather ascribe this lapse to memory than to faith: which he himself, as if to prove friendship in imitating his limping, followed with a similar lapse. For he denies that Pennot noticed this blemish in Alvarez; whom nevertheless he later reports as saying, "All the passages which are adduced from St. Thomas to prove that God knows future events by virtue of predefinition or predetermination are corrupted."

And from these it is now clear that from the earliest age of Christianity up to the time of the Scholastics it was believed that there is foreknowledge of future events independent of their predefinition: so that it is necessary that the opinion which teaches that even conditional future events are known by God because they are defined by him, and for that reason the defection of the men of Keilah to Saul predicted by David, is exotic, and foreign to the ancient sense of Christians, which was especially to be proved. It remained to exclude also that cavil, when they say that the Fathers do not deny that things which are evil are predefined by God; but only that they are predefined as evil; but this will be accomplished more opportunely later.

DISPUTATION I

CHAPTER IV. THE SECOND ARGUMENT ABOUT THE HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE REPENTANCE OF THE PEOPLE OF TYRE AND SIDON IS PROPOSED.

XLVII. THE SECOND argument for middle knowledge is usually taken from those words of Christ: "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." In this passage, since Christ asserts the future repentance of the people of Tyre and Sidon which never actually occurred, it follows that it was only conditionally future: and thus foreknown by means of middle knowledge. This is also indicated concerning a certain future repentance of the Sodomites, when it is said to Capernaum: "For if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Sodom, perhaps they would have remained until this day."

§ I. THE FIRST SOLUTION, CONCERNING AN ANTECEDENT DECREE FOR THAT CONDITIONALLY FUTURE REPENTANCE, IS REJECTED.

Having set aside the responses of those who deny that these words signify repentance truly conditionally future, but only some greater disposition in the people of Tyre and Sidon, as well as in the Sodomites, toward repentance; or that this is a figurative expression, and that Christ speaks in the manner of humans to exaggerate the present obstinacy of the Jews; or that these are merely conjectural statements, which do not so much assert what would truly happen as what can more aptly be surmised—responses in which Twisse indicates he does not acquiesce—setting these aside, I say, he himself proposes three others.

XLVIII. The first is that there is some divine decree about giving repentance to the people of Tyre and Sidon, by reason of which that re-

DISPUTATION I

penance is both certainly future under the hypothesis and knowable by God. But this knowledge is not middle knowledge, because although conditional futures are known through it, they are not known antecedently to that divine decree, which middle knowledge excludes. Twisse explains this solution in the first book, where, having cited these words of Pennot, "it can be said that Christ knew they would have done penance by the decree by which he had decided to predetermine them," he adds, "Indeed, I say, not only can this be said, but with Pennot it can be said that Christ could not have known that they, the people of Tyre and Sidon, would have done penance except at least in a decree as in a partial cause. For Pennot himself has already professed that a divine decree is the reason without which all contingent futures cannot be known, whether they depend on the divine will alone, or on other causes." He adds that this same thing can be said not only with Pennot, but also with Augustine, when he says no one comes to Christ unless it has been given to him by God. "For how," says Twisse, "would God know his future gifts, if not from the decree of conferring his gifts?"

I attack this solution first as contradicting Twisse's own opinion, in which he denies that there is in God any decree conditionally qualified on the part of the object, as we reported earlier in the solution to the previous argument. For this decree, concerning giving efficacious grace to the people of Tyre, cannot be anything other, as is self-evident, than one conditionally qualified on the part of the object.

Secondly, I attack it as imputing to Pennot not only what he never said, but even the contrary of what he always and indeed openly said. For when Pennot says that a divine decree is the reason without which all contingent futures cannot be known, he speaks only of absolute futures, and of that knowledge which is called the knowledge of vision. For these are his words in the third book, chapter 22, where he had not yet begun to deal with conditional futures, about which he begins to dispute only in chapter 25, and he himself explicitly explains his own meaning in that chapter 23, when he says: "Thus, with the same decree removed, no con-

DISPUTATION I

tingent future could have the character of an intelligible object THROUGH THE KNOWLEDGE OF VISION, which is what our question is about now." And then in chapter 28: "Second proposition: The knowledge of conditional contingent futures does not suppose in God a free decree of physically predetermining their contingent causes for the production of such futures, but it is prior to every such decree, and whatever other free decree actually existing in God." Who would not marvel here at the audacity of Twisse? For that the reason is not the same in this respect for absolutely and conditionally future free acts; nor does it follow that if a decree is required for absolute futures, it is also necessary for conditional futures; one would have to be blind to doubt. For there is no absolute future that does not presuppose a cause either absolutely existing or future; nor is there any such cause which either is not from God alone, or is not reducible to something that is from God alone. But what depends on God in this way must necessarily be decreed by his efficacious and absolute will. Otherwise, just as it cannot exist, so it cannot be known absolutely. But what is conditionally future presupposes only a conditionally future cause. And because for a cause to be conditionally future is scarcely anything other than to be possible (for it is the same to say that it is possible for such a will to be created by God and placed in such circumstances, and to say that it will be, if it pleases God, that such a will be created and placed in such circumstances), therefore nothing else is required for the hypothetical futurity of that cause than what is required for its possibility. But no actually existing decree is required for possibility; therefore, neither for that hypothetical futurity.

§ II. THAT SOLUTION IS WRONGLY ATTRIBUTED TO AUGUSTINE.

XLIX. WITH THE SAME fraud or ignorance, our Adversary attributes this solution to Augustine, because he says no one comes to Christ unless it has been given to him by God; and when dealing with the

DISPUTATION I

people of Tyre and Sidon, "For they hear these things," he says, "and do them, to whom it has been given; but they do not do them, whether they hear or do not hear, to whom it has not been given." These words, in Twisse's judgment, signify that God has this decree: "I will that if the Gospel, confirmed by miracles, is proposed to the people of Tyre and Sidon, they consent." But away with such a shameless interpreter! For what is so perverse and so alien from the truth that could not be inferred from Augustine in this way? And what trace, I ask, of this decree appears in those words? Surely, says Twisse, because Augustine indicates that the cause of the future repentance of the people of Tyre is the gift of God, when he says, "they hear these things and do them, to whom it has been given"; and God cannot foreknow his own gifts except from the decree of conferring them. He therefore means that "to whom it has been given" applies to the people of Tyre; and consequently the decree of giving, from which their conditional future repentance is foreknown, also applies to them. But what if, according to Augustine, that "to whom it has been given" in no way applies to the people of Tyre, but rather its opposite? Here is Augustine's mind expressed in clear words in this very place: "This predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which whoever is liberated is most certainly liberated. As for the rest, where are they left except in the mass of perdition by God's just judgment? There the people of Tyre and Sidon were left; who could also have believed, if they had seen those wonderful signs of Christ. But because IT WAS NOT GIVEN TO THEM TO BELIEVE, EVEN WHAT WOULD MAKE THEM BELIEVE WAS DENIED." Do you see that, according to Augustine, both things were denied to the people of Tyre: both to believe and the means to believe? And therefore if it is argued from the mere fact that something was given, that this very thing was decreed, no argument for such a decree remains. The repentance of the people of Tyre, he says, was future; and it could not be future except from the gift of God; nor could this gift exist unless there were a decree to give it. The repentance of the

DISPUTATION I

people of Tyre was conditionally future, I concede; and it could not be thus future except from a gift and decree of God that was present and actually and absolutely existing, I deny; from a possible gift and decree to be posited according to God's freedom, I concede. For it has already often been said that an absolute future requires a cause either absolutely existing or future; but a conditional future requires only a cause either possible or only conditionally future, so that it is affirmed that something will follow from its hypothesis.

Yet I do not understand this in such a way that I think a predefining decree for what is said to follow is involved in the hypothesis from which something is said to be conditionally future. For in that way, the repentance of the Jews would be said to be conditionally future just as much as that of the people of Tyre. Just as true from eternity, I say, was this conditional statement, "If the Gospel confirmed by miracles is proposed to the Jews, with a predefinition of their repentance, such repentance will be future," as this other one, "If it is similarly proposed to the people of Tyre with a similar predefinition of repentance, this repentance will be future." Hence, for what is said to be future in the people of Tyre not to be future in the Jews, it is necessary that the hypothesis from whose condition something is said to be future does not involve a decree predefining what is future. Therefore, the decree that must be supposed is a decree of placing a free cause in certain circumstances, and indeed if it concerns a supernatural act, of giving it a similarly supernatural grace, and of exhibiting a concurrence accommodated to its exigency. All of that is involved in the antecedent of the conditional proposition by which something is announced to be future, and with that posited it is future in one case; and with that same thing posited again, it is not future in another case. The future repentance of the people of Tyre, I say, follows from this antecedent: if God decrees that miracles be done before the people of Tyre in confirmation of the faith, and also decrees to offer them his concurrence in a manner accommodated to their freedom, it will happen that they repent of their sins. But the non-future repentance

DISPUTATION I

of the Jews supposes this very antecedent: if God decrees that miracles be done before the Jews in confirmation of the faith, and also decrees to offer them his concurrence in a manner accommodated to their freedom, it will happen that they do not repent of their sins. And thus what is said to be future, if indeed it pertains to salvation, is always said to follow from a decree of God and from a gift or grace; but in one way or another. For if it is only conditionally future, it is asserted to follow from a decree and gift or grace that would exist; but if it is absolutely future, it is asserted to follow from a decree that does exist, and from a gift and grace that either also exists, or will exist absolutely.

L. And in this, the double error of the Semi-Pelagians concerning the use of middle knowledge is manifestly apparent, from which both St. Augustine and today's Assertors of middle knowledge are far removed. For first, those merits which were said by the Semi-Pelagians to be conditionally future were not said to be future under the condition of grace; since grace was not involved in the supposition from which the merits were said to follow. For it is evident both from other places, and especially from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, and from Augustine's response to the same letters in the books *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, that they differed from Pelagius in that they preached that grace was necessary for completing the work of salvation, but not for beginning it; for that grace was preceded by certain beginnings of faith, and by some effort and desire of our will, for which nature itself was sufficient by itself. And because the instance of infants was immediately opposed, some of whom are saved without any previous exercise of the will, and therefore without merit, while others are left in the mass of damnation, they resorted to the foreknowledge of what they would have done if they had been allowed to live—that is, to conditionally future good and bad merits. "And when," says Prosper, "the multitude of countless infants is objected to them, who surely under original sin, under which all men are similarly born in the condemnation of the first man, having as yet no wills, no actions of their

DISPUTATION I

own, are not separated without God's judgment: so that before the discernment of good and evil, some are taken away from the use of this life and are assumed through regeneration among the heirs of the heavenly kingdom; others without baptism pass among the debtors of perpetual death—they say that such are lost and such are saved, as divine knowledge has foreseen they would have been in later years, if they had been preserved to the age of active life." But this recourse would be ridiculous if they had not thought that those conditionally future good merits in those who are overtaken by death were as independent of God's help as they thought they were in those who receive the time of free will, as the same Prosper says. And this is confirmed by what Augustine says in his Letter to Sixtus: "It is amazing, however, when they are constrained by these difficulties, into what precipices they throw themselves, fearing the nets of truth. 'Therefore,' they say, 'he hated the one not yet born and loved the other, because he foresaw their future works.'" Who would not marvel that this most acute insight was lacking to the Apostle? And soon after: "Where now are the merits? Where are the works, either past or future, AS IF FULFILLED OR TO BE FULFILLED BY THE POWERS OF FREE WILL?" Has not the Apostle openly pronounced a judgment on the commendation of gratuitous grace, that is, true grace? You see how those merits of the Semi-Pelagians, which were foreseen to be only conditionally future, would have arisen from the powers of free will, not from grace? This is also evident from the book On the Predestination of the Saints: "Therefore," says Pelagius, "he foreknew who would be holy and immaculate THROUGH THE CHOICE OF FREE WILL, and therefore he chose them before the foundation of the world in his very foreknowledge, by which he foreknew that they would be such." For since the Semi-Pelagians differed from Pelagius only in that what he said about the whole business of salvation, they thought true at least about the beginning, it must be admitted that the foreknowledge of merits which they alleged was a foreknowledge of merits dependent on the choice of free will, with grace excluded. And Augustine refutes this error by com-

DISPUTATION I

mon principles, by which it is proven that there is no good in us which contributes to salvation, except from the gift and grace of God.

LI. The second error of the Semi-Pelagians was that those merits, only conditionally future, moved God to the actual granting of grace—which means that a cause never absolutely existing demands and produces an effect that exists absolutely. Because not even the elements of philosophy allow this to be said, Augustine rejects it as absurd: "But how men whose intelligence your letters indicate is not to be despised could have come to the opinion that anyone is to be judged not only according to the merits he had when he was in the body, but also according to the merits he would have had if he had been longer in the body, I am amazed and stupefied to discover, nor would I dare to believe it if I dared not to believe you," and later, "But because the future things of men which will not be future are undoubtedly no merits at all, and this is very easy to see, therefore not even the Pelagians could say this, and much more these should not have said it." To this reason Augustine adds authority, and opposes an instance from the conditionally foreknown repentance of the people of Tyre and Sidon, in which one can discern that cause of the absolute giving of grace which the Semi-Pelagians alleged, yet deprived of its effect: so that from this it appears that it is by no means a suitable cause of this effect. And he presses this argument in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*: "But can we say that even the people of Tyre and Sidon were unwilling to believe or would not have believed when such mighty works were done among them, since the Lord himself attests that they would have performed the penance of great humility, if those signs of divine power had been done among them? And yet they will be punished on the day of judgment... Furthermore, if men are judged even according to the deeds they would have done if they had lived, certainly because these, the people of Tyre, would have been faithful if the Gospel had been preached to them with such great miracles, they are certainly not to be punished. But they will be punished." And then: "No good person is judged according to the good or evil things he

DISPUTATION I

would have done if he had not died; otherwise the people of Tyre and Sidon would not suffer punishments according to what they did, but rather according to what they would have done, if those evangelical powers had been done among them, they would have attained salvation through great repentance and through faith in Christ."

Augustine therefore means that, supposing that conditional foreknowledge of good or bad merits, God is entirely free to decide about the things themselves, and thus to posit or not to posit absolutely the condition from which they were foreknown to follow. And because this is free, God in that freedom absolutely denied to the people of Tyre the hypothesis by which he knew they would be led to repentance, but absolutely granted the same to the Jews, although he knew they would not be led to it. "If we are asked," he says, "why such great miracles were done among those who, seeing them, would not believe, and why they were not done among those who would believe if they saw them, what shall we answer?" And he shows that the answer which he himself had used for six questions from the pagans, when he said that the Gospel was promulgated where and when God foreknew there were those who would believe, but was not promulgated where none were foreknown to believe, is not valid here. "Certainly," he says, "we cannot say this about Tyre and Sidon; and in them we recognize that these divine judgments pertain to those causes of predestination, without prejudging which hidden causes I said then that I was answering this." He thinks it should be ascribed to God's hidden, but nevertheless just, judgment that the condition from which their repentance was to follow was absolutely denied to the people of Tyre, as he explains soon after when he says: "But as for the rest, where are they left except in the mass of perdition by the just judgment of God? There the people of Tyre and Sidon were left... But because it was not given to them to believe, even what would make them believe was denied." But he indicates that this pertains to mercy as well as to judgment, in that the same condition is absolutely decreed in favor of those whom it is foreknown to benefit, for he adds: "From which it appears that some have in

DISPUTATION I

their very nature a divine gift of intelligence, by which they may be moved to faith, if they hear words or see signs congruent with their minds. And yet if by God's higher judgment they are not separated from the mass of perdition by the predestination of grace, neither are those divine words or deeds applied to them, through which they could believe if they were to hear or see such things." See how the decree of positing the hypothesis which through conditional knowledge is foreknown to be efficacious for eliciting faith is called by Augustine the predestination of grace—namely, because in this way men are given the means to believe, and this is given because by God's predestination, that is, by his efficacious intention, it is given to them that they should believe. As Augustine indicated a little earlier in these words: "because it was not given to them to believe, even what would make them believe was denied." For here the argument from the contrary is valid, and what is denied to the people of Tyre, according to Augustine, is that benefit which is conferred on the predestined. Since, therefore, with the knowledge of those things that would be salutary for the people of Tyre supposed, they were given neither to believe by a decree predefining their faith, nor the means to believe by a decree establishing the position of those things from which that faith would follow, it remains that this is the benefit of the predestined, and also of those who are efficaciously called to faith, that with the knowledge of those things by which they are infallibly to be led to faith supposed, they are both given to believe by a will predefining faith, and the means to believe by a will executing that predefinition through those means which are conditionally foreknown to be efficacious. From this it is clear both that there was some use of conditional knowledge in Augustine's treatment of the doctrine of predestination and grace, and that Suárez's teaching on this pinnacle of theology is so conformable to Augustine's that it can be called Augustinian. Now from this it can easily be gathered—which is why we have discussed these things—that while there is indeed found in Augustine a negative decree about not positing the means by which the people of Tyre were foreknown to be induced to

DISPUTATION I

faith and repentance, an affirmative decree by which that faith and repentance would be conditionally future is nowhere read in him.

LII. This is further confirmed. Because since the Semi-Pelagians had no other reason for resorting to those conditionally future merits than to have something to put before divine grace in infants who are overtaken by death fresh from the sanctification of baptism, nothing was more obvious for Augustine than to object that not even those merits were independent of God's present grace, since they could not otherwise be even conditionally future except by virtue of a present decree which would be both gratuitous and salutary. But this thought never occurred to Augustine, because such a decree was entirely unknown to him.

LIII. And this is finally confirmed from what Augustine infers from that future repentance of the people of Tyre and Sidon, when he says: "From which it appears that some have in their very nature a divine gift of intelligence, by which they may be moved to faith, if they hear words or see signs congruent with their minds." For that deduction would be absurd if the repentance of the people of Tyre would not have been future except by virtue of a present decree. For why would you attribute to their docility what they would do only by God's efficacious decree? And why are only some said to be naturally docile in this way, when there are none who, similarly preceded by such a decree, would not similarly obey? Why, finally, is that condition added, "if they hear congruent things, etc.," when it cannot happen that whatever things are adapted to that decree are not congruent?

You say the decree of God presupposed a peculiar disposition of the people of Tyre. But do you not perceive that by divining and rashly asserting that for which there is no conjecture, you are falling back into the very opinion you most wish to avoid, and you smell of Semi-Pelagianism when you say that there is some natural disposition in men to which decrees of giving or denying grace ought to conform?

DISPUTATION I

§ III. THE SAME SOLUTION IS CONTRARY TO CHRIST'S OWN STATEMENT

LIV. There remains one final argument against the present decree concerning the future conditional repentance of the Tyrians and Sidonians; it is clearly deduced from Christ's own statement expressed in the words, "Woe to you, Chorazin," etc. This statement is evidently a reproach against the present obstinacy of the Jews, compared with the future obedience of the Tyrians and Sidonians. It is obvious that such reproaches would be absurd and unreasonable unless one assumes equal capacity in those who produce different results. For what tyrant would dare to rebuke a shackled man for not matching the speed of one who is unbound? Who would scold the dim-sighted for being surpassed by Lynceus in distinguishing visual forms? Who would reproach the solitary worker for not matching the output of one who has a companion and helper? Yet God would have done this if, by His decree, He had made the Tyrians' repentance a future reality. The true and genuine interpretation of His reproach would then be: "Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida, because I decreed that the Tyrians would repent if this teaching of mine, which you reject, were presented to them confirmed by the same miracles." Who does not understand that the Jews would have a most justified excuse if they replied that they too would have been led to repentance if it had been predefined by a similar decree? How unfair and completely alien, not only to divinity but also to humanity itself, to reproach them for not performing the same act as those who, compared to them, were assisted by an omnipotent decree?

LV. And any response claiming that the Jews remain inexcusable because they had impeded, through their previous sins, that divine benefit which was to be conferred on the Tyrians, is not accepted even by Twisse himself when he says: "Let those who imagine that the Jews placed greater impediments in the way of divine grace than the Tyrians be pleased with their own fiction; I certainly do not envy them, but rather

DISPUTATION I

marvel that some learned men applaud such feeble speculations." I indeed praise this man's candor, and cannot deny that he sometimes speaks both truthfully and consistently. For by what appearance of truth could the Jews' sins be called greater than those of the Tyrians, who were immersed in the depths of idolatry and were driven to all manner of licentiousness by the very religion of their deities—namely, the worshippers of Venus, to whom Cyprian's words would apply: "Religious transgressions are committed even by the wretched"? And even if the Jews were supposed to be worse than the Tyrians before their defiance against Christ, were they also worse than the Sodomites, whose future repentance Christ also reproaches them with? Moreover, the fabricators of these decrees should remember that they are said to precede the foreknowledge of good or evil use of free will, lest there be any cause of divine grace on the part of humans. Therefore, our adversaries must seek another solution.

LVI. But Twisse contends that we too must seek another solution, turning the argument against the view that teaches the distribution of congruous and incongruous grace according to God's will; namely, that the Jews would protest that they were denied the congruous grace that the Tyrians would have received. But Twisse is fighting the air because he does not understand what we think about congruous grace, insofar as it is equivalent to efficacious grace. We deny that any grace is congruous independently of the free use of the will, at least as foreseen conditionally. Therefore, room is left for reproaching the Jews in comparison with the Tyrians, and this is the true interpretation: "Woe to you, Chorazin, because by your voluntary obstinacy you render inefficacious and incongruous those means which, had they been granted to Tyre and Sidon, they would have freely made congruous and efficacious."

LVII. And if anyone should object that we attribute some role to created freedom in establishing the congruity of divine grace, let them appeal to Augustine, whose words to Simplicianus are: "That we should will, He has made both His own and ours—His by calling, OURS BY FOLLOWING." And those in the book *On Nature and Grace*: "One

DISPUTATION I

who follows Christ, when asked why he wanted to be a Christian, may answer, 'IT SEEMED GOOD TO ME,' which when he says it, he does not deny that it seemed good to God." And those to Boniface: "It is written, 'it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God's mercy,' not because there is no willing or running on man's part," or as some manuscripts have it, "cooperation, but because one can do nothing unless He shows mercy." Likewise, "The Apostle said, 'not I, but the grace of God with me,' not because he himself did nothing good, but because he would do nothing if that grace did not help." And those in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*: "Both are ours, to believe and to do good works, because of the freedom of the will, and yet both are given through the Spirit of faith and charity. Again, both are His because He prepares the will, and both are ours because they do not happen unless we will them." And those in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*: "God acts by persuasion of things, whether external or internal... But to consent or dissent is the property of one's own will." Again, "Indeed, God works in man even the will to believe, and in all things His mercy precedes us; but to consent to God's call or to dissent from it is, as I said, the property of one's own will. This fact not only does not weaken what was said, 'What do you have that you did not receive?' but actually confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and have the gifts about which it hears unless by consenting." And those on Psalm 45: "In God I will praise my words. If in God, why mine? Both in God and mine. In God because they are from Him; mine because I received them." And those about two equally tempted and equally aided persons: "What else appears but that one was willing and the other unwilling to fall from chastity? Whence but from their own will?" And those in the book *On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins*: "Nevertheless, this matter should not be dealt with by words alone, without also bringing in the effectiveness of our will through effort. For God is called our Helper; but one cannot be helped who does not make some effort of his own accord. For salvation is not worked in us by God as in senseless stones, or in those in whom He has not created rational nature and will."

DISPUTATION I

And those from the book *On Grace and Free Will*: "Where it is said 'do not do this' or 'do not do that,' and where in divine admonitions the work of the will is required to do or not do something, free will is sufficiently demonstrated. Therefore, let no one blame God in his heart, but let each one impute it to himself when he sins. And when someone does something according to God, let him not separate this from his own will." And those in the *Epistle of John*: "When you join your will to God, you sanctify yourself—not from yourself, but from Him who comes to dwell in you. Yet because you do something there by your will, something is attributed to you." And those from the book of 50 Homilies: "God has placed in your choice to whom you give place, to God or to the devil; when you have prepared, he who possesses will rule." Augustine's is also that comparison of the eye and light with the will and grace, which if Pelagius would admit, he would be tolerable when he says [in chapter 6] that we have strong and firm free will for not sinning.

From all these and similar passages, since it is clearly established that the created will is a cause of why the effect of grace follows—I do not say the sole cause; I do not say the principal cause; but nevertheless, since it is clearly established that it is some cause of this matter, and it cannot be denied that everything which is a cause of why grace has an effect contributes to the congruity I mentioned—it follows that it cannot be denied that the created will, by its freedom, contributes something to the efficacious congruity of grace, to the extent that it can deservedly be attributed in some way both that grace is sometimes congruous and that it is sometimes incongruous. And in this way, Twisse's attempt to turn back upon us the proposed argument concerning the reproach of the Jews collapses.

LVIII. But he adds another response, namely, stopping our mouths and warning us not to press the proposed argument because the Apostle said, "O man, who are you to answer back to God?"—which has also been frequently emphasized by Augustine. But this is nothing else than seeking asylum in ignorance, shall I say, or in error, or in the license

DISPUTATION I

to blaspheme God? For who, after attributing tyranny and insanity to Him, would not think himself safe in that refuge, since he could always oppose those who resist with, "O man, who are you to answer back to God?" But we sincerely confess that no one can answer back to the God of Paul and Augustine, that is, to the true and best God, because one can raise nothing against Him that is not confirmed by all reason and justice. But who would not answer back to the God whom the Calvinists carve out, that is, to a foolish and absurd God, when he has objected to something that neither reason nor wisdom allow to be objected? For what wisdom and equity is it to demand that a lesser faculty equal a greater one, and that one unequally aided perform equally with the stronger? What? Can nothing be conceived so unworthy of God that, when someone has thought it about Him, he cannot also defend it by throwing in, "O man, who are you to answer back to God?" But certainly, it was fitting for Twisse to consult the common cause of the Calvinists, for whom it is expedient that those who complain that God pursues with flames the very crimes which He decreed should happen; that He invites to eternal life those whom He previously excluded from it by an insurmountable will; that He demands that they direct their steps and never stumble or turn from the way, those whom He previously blinded, and indeed in such a way that the effectiveness of their error emanated from Him—it is expedient for them, I say, to be content with this solution: "O man, who are you to answer back to God?" But neither Paul nor Augustine ever used that response except to stop the mouths of those who think God is bound by some right when He dispenses what is not owed. And that question is properly dealt with by Paul: Why, from the same mass, which is itself apt only for forming vessels of dishonor, does God, according to His will and power, form one vessel for honor and another for dishonor? The Apostle contends that this is done without injustice and responds to objectors, "O man, who are you to answer back to God?"

LIX. Augustine, indeed, generally turns this same argument against those who complain that grace which is foreknown to be effica-

DISPUTATION I

cious is given to one person but denied to another; that one person is taken away lest wickedness change his understanding, while another is left in life until he falls; that baptism is provided for one infant, while another dies unbaptized and becomes a participant in hereditary damnation, and similar complaints. He always presupposes that what one demands from God is unowed, while what one suffers and complains about being given to them is owed. But even in that very question which the Apostle treats, Augustine not obscurely indicates that there would be injustice with God if that mass from which vessels are formed for dishonor were of some middle quality, not more apt for ignominy than for the honor of vessels to be formed from it. For he speaks thus: "If this mass were so intermediate that just as it deserves nothing good, it likewise deserves nothing evil, it would not be without reason to see injustice in making vessels for dishonor from it." By this example, he sufficiently warns us that we should philosophize in such a way that, just as when there is no doubt that God decrees something, it follows that we should say it is fair and just, whatever opposing reasons may present themselves; so when there is no doubt that something is unjust and contrary to reason, it follows that we should consider it unworthy of God and most alien to His will. But it is obvious that such is what is represented in this form: "Woe to you, because if your companion had had the same grace that you yourself have, and in addition another one which I had decreed to give him, more efficacious than yours, he would have done what you do not do."

LX. Having disputed these points with Twisse, we must add the response of certain recent authors, by which they do not so much solve the proposed difficulty as evade it—namely, that this question is the one which St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Prosper prefer to rebuke rather than solve, deeming that the reason being sought should both be adored in silence and meanwhile be accepted with an equable mind as unknown; so that the confidence of those who promise to unravel this knot after so long a time, by benefit of middle knowledge, seems excessive. Moreover, they claim that this middle knowledge is considerably weakened by the

DISPUTATION I

argument that it renders so easy the exposition of this mystery, whose depth was long ago foretold by the Holy Spirit.

But I have already said, and I say again, that the argument pressed here was never proposed to St. Paul, St. Augustine, or Prosper; and that in which they demand faith and obedience from human intellect, while the reason remains unknown, is far different from what we object to the assertors of conditional knowledge dependent on a decree. Indeed, this very thing is still unexplained and inexplicable to the authors of middle knowledge, who maintain modesty here themselves and exhibit that obedience which the Apostle requires. The argument we press against conditional knowledge dependent on a decree is that a rebuke would seem foolish and ridiculous by which someone says to another, "Woe to you, because I decreed that if the same aids which were given to you in vain had also been given to him, another would also be given, by which he would be effectively moved to the repentance to which you are not moved." Let them show where on earth anything like this was proposed to the Apostle, or Augustine, or Prosper. "But," you say, "both this and what was proposed to them amount to the same thing." But this is explicitly denied. For these two questions, which we can imagine being asked by Chorazin, are very different. The first is: "Why do you reproach me for rendering these means ineffective on the grounds that the same means in Tyre, with certain other and indeed more efficacious ones to be given by special decree, would not have been useless; when it is most true that neither would Tyre have done anything different from what I am doing if it had no other aid than what has been given to me, nor would I do less than Tyre would do if the same aid had been decreed for me as for it?" The second is: "Since you could decree that to those aids which you have already given, another more efficacious one would be added, by which I would be moved to repentance just as Tyre would be moved if it received that very thing, why did you not decree that this should happen? Or, since you could so arrange all things that both the means you suggest to me would be efficacious and those you suggest to another would not

DISPUTATION I

be, why did you prefer to prescribe this order for things rather than that one?" The former question proceeds from the opinion of an unjust reproach; the latter from the opinion of an unjust arrangement. The former rests on a reason that cannot be solved unless one denies what it assumes, namely, that there is a special decree concerning the conditionally future repentance of the Tyrians, and some special aid to follow from that decree. The latter does not rest on reason; rather, it strongly conflicts with reason because it subjects God to human rights and takes away His freedom to arrange things as He wills. The former is neither proposed nor ever solved in Augustine or Prosper, nor in the Apostle; and therefore if our adversaries order us to be content with their solution, they order us to be content with no solution. The latter is both proposed equivalently and solved, in the manner most suitable to human audacity, when it is said, "O man, who are you to answer back to God? Can the potter not...?" And similar to this second question is that complaint which Tyre could form if it said, "Since you had in your hands that hypothesis from which you saw my repentance would follow, why did you not posit it?" To which it would similarly be said, "Who are you?" For here human temerity must submit its authority and allow that God alone has and knows the cause of this matter.

LXI. The assertors of middle knowledge feel and proclaim nothing else. For although they can respond to one asking why efficacious grace was not given to them, "It was made merely sufficient by your freedom; it would have been efficacious if there had been a different future use of your freedom," one can still insist: "Just as there are certain graces which I, by my freedom, render useless, so there are also some which I would make useful; and just as there are some which these elect render efficacious, so there are others which they would frustrate with effect just as I do. Why, then, are they preferred to me in that an arrangement of things which was foreknown to be salutary for them but useless for me was established rather than one which was foreknown to be either salutary for both, or useless for both, or useless for them but salutary for me?"

DISPUTATION I

This, I say, is the same as asking why from the same mass this vessel is made for honor and that for dishonor, rather than the reverse. To this difficulty, those who defend middle knowledge have nothing to respond except this one thing: that the counsels of divine wisdom are to be adored, and "O the depth of the riches!" and "Who are you to answer back to God?" and "Am I not allowed to do what I want?"

And this is that depth of the question which Prosper denies can be solved through the willing or not willing of free will. For why this arrangement of things exists rather than another in no way depends on the willing or not willing of free will. Likewise, this is that gift of God and operation the lack of which, according to the same author, prevented both the Tyrians and the Jews from being led to repentance: namely, the positioning of those circumstances under which the Tyrians were fore-known to convert, and also of those under which the Jews were known not to convert. Augustine also holds this same view in his work *On the Gift of Perseverance*, where he clearly indicates, as we reported earlier, that the cause of the positioning or non-positioning of that hypothesis from which the repentance of the Tyrians was foreknown to follow is that which God keeps hidden from the human mind in the inner sanctum of His counsels.

LXII. To this response, the aforementioned recent authors add another by which they try to refute this objection that we press. That is, they imitate what they accuse, and after so much time they attempt to untangle that difficulty which the Apostle and the Holy Fathers, as they themselves think, wanted to rebuke rather than solve; so that by that indication their doctrine too might be considerably weakened. They say, therefore, that the Jews were either equal or superior to the Tyrians in terms of sufficient aid, even if they were inferior in terms of efficacious aid. Since sufficient aid gives the power to act, while efficacious aid gives only the application, the Jews could believe just as much as the Tyrians. And because that power induces the obligation to believe, while application induces only the execution or actual exercise of faith, they were

DISPUTATION I

equally obligated. From this it follows that they should be reproached for not believing, but culpably rejecting faith sufficiently proposed; indeed, that by their obstinacy and blindness they placed an impediment to that gift of efficacious aid. For even if that grace is prevenient and antecedent, nevertheless because of the concomitant fault, which precedes in the genus of material cause and presents an impediment to grace, God rightly complains about the one who does not consent. This is also true in the first sin, or in the denial of the first efficacious aid: for on the part of God and the efficient cause, denial concurs; on our part, however, the impediment of concomitant fault or inconsideration concurs in the genus of dispositive and material cause. However, the Jews are not reproached for past crimes, but for present obstinacy. This is nearly the summary of what is found in Father John of St. Thomas; whether these things satisfy the present difficulty is now to be seen.

LXIII. And here I do not wish to pursue verbal complexities and a peculiar and voluntary manner of speaking, which is no more suitable for common disputations than private and provincial currencies are for the commerce of nations. Let it be said that efficacious aid does not pertain to the power and ability to act, but is merely application, although some have included it under the name of "virtuous motion," and St. Thomas, as our adversaries claim, speaks of it when he says it is compared to the power of art which is transiently in the instrument of the artist, and adds that it is a certain force; and Diego Alvarez says universally that premotion confers on a power a certain force by which it operates to the being and ultimate actuality of the effect, and attributes some virtue of operating, not indeed by way of first act, but by way of complement; and it is distinguished from the operation of the secondary cause, and is something prior, because the cause is both prior and distinct from its effect; and Francisco Cumel says that premotion makes one principle with the premoved cause, and by it the cause is helped; the dependence of free action is compared to it as to a principle; and a premotion is necessary by way of a principle from which the operation of the sec-

DISPUTATION I

ondary cause begins; and now that distinction is common and daily, by which it is said that by the defect of premotion the secondary cause cannot act in the composite sense, although it can in the divided sense, from which it follows that by its presence the secondary cause is given that ability in the composite sense. But even so, let this aid not pertain to establishing power and ability, even if it gives ability, even if it is a certain force, even if it is required by way of a principle, even if it enjoys the privilege of cause so that it is said to be prior to operation, on the grounds that a cause is prior, even if it helps the cause itself; yet it will not be denied, I think, what has been granted so many times, that it is the complement of the first act and the ultimate perfection independent of the action of the secondary cause, and consequently that the power and ability to act equipped with this aid is antecedently more perfect and more complete, which suffices for the purpose.

Then I do not dispute at this point—in which neither would there be dangerous contention for one who resists, nor very uncertain victory—whether there can be any merely sufficient grace if that efficacious aid is required for acting? I allow even this to be assumed. For what, pray, follows from that? "The Jews," they say, "are to be reproached, who, having received the power to believe and sufficient grace, nevertheless did not believe."

But in this way, as I was saying, the difficulty is not solved but evaded. For the question now is not whether the Jews were deservedly to be reproached, but whether they were to be reproached in preference to the Tyrians, as if not using those means which the Tyrians would have used. For as long as it is true that neither would the Tyrians have believed if they had received no other means than what the Jews received, and the Jews would have believed if they had received the same means that the Tyrians would have received, it is evident that that comparative mode of reproach is inept. And if Christ says what is the case, his reproach must have this sense: "Woe to you, Chorazin, because if I had given to Tyre what I gave to you and something else besides, it would have done what

DISPUTATION I

you do not do." Or, "Woe to you, Chorazin, because after I decreed that if the grace which was conferred on you were conferred on Tyre, it would become more complete and more perfect by the addition of efficacious aid, it would show the faith which you do not show." Or, "Woe to you, Chorazin, because if Tyre had received, like you, the grace which induces the obligation to believe, and moreover that which induces the actual execution of that obligation, which I had decreed would be conferred on it, and which you have not received, it would have believed in reality." Which of these is not inept and unworthy of God? And to what good is mention of the Tyrians made in the reproach of the Jews, as long as it cannot be said that the Tyrians would have done otherwise with precisely that power and faculty which the Jews received?

LXIV. "But," you will say, "the Jews by their obstinacy impeded the efficacious aid to be given to the Tyrians, whence there is place for a reproach, the suitable form of which is: 'Woe to you, Chorazin, because by your obstinacy you impede the efficacious aid which I decreed would be given to the Tyrians on the supposition that the Gospel would be proposed to them.'"

But this solution produces a forest of difficulties. I briefly oppose first that which the author whom I have already praised says, when he says, "God complains because we reject sufficient aids. For efficacious aid is rejected by no hard heart, as Augustine says." How this can be reconciled with what he had said a little before, that the Jews are accused because by their obstinacy and blindness they placed an impediment to that gift of efficacious aid, let him see for himself. For I do not sufficiently understand how much difference there is between impeding divine aid and rejecting it, or what reason there can be for conceding one while denying the other; or when not wanting to elicit faith is to reject it, why not wanting to receive grace is not also to reject it? Then I ask how the Jews place this impediment—necessarily or freely? If necessarily, this does nothing to accuse them. If freely, then man concurs in the genus of efficient cause to impede grace, since what is done freely pertains only to this genus of

DISPUTATION I

cause. What help, then, is it that this author says that concomitant fault precedes the withdrawal of grace only in the genus of material cause? For since the efficient cause is simply prior to its effect, and man is the free cause of impeded grace, consequently man will be prior to impeded grace in the genus of free cause, that is, efficient and not material only.

But neither is this easily understood: what relation of disposition can man's fault itself have to impeding divine aid, other than moral and demeritorious, insofar as by its unworthiness it moves God to that denial? But this also is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

Moreover, since that in which one is preferred to another, and which is objected in reproach, ought to be free to both—and the reproach would be inept if, for example, an adult rejecting the grace of baptism were reproached and an infant who does not reject were preferred, or one resisting divine love were compared to a blessed one who necessarily loves—it follows that in impeding or not impeding efficacious aid, both are free: both the Jew who impedes and the Tyrian who does not impede, so that there can be a suitable sense of reproach: "Woe to you, Jew, who uses your freedom worse in impeding grace than the Tyrian uses his." But if this is so, our adversaries fall into what they try to avoid, and by their own admission, some flesh will be able to boast before God—namely, the Tyrian in preference to the Jew, because by his freedom he made himself more apt to receive the aids of grace.

Finally, either there is some decree in God from which it follows that the Jew will freely impede the aid of efficacious grace and the Tyrian will not impede it, or there is not. If the first, the difficulty remains intact, and there is no place for reproach, which would be ridiculous in this sense: "Woe to you, Jew, because from the time I preempted the Tyrian by my decree, lest he resist the efficacious aid for believing, when the preaching was proposed; truly he would not resist, while you, however, resist, who are not prevented by a similar decree, but rather by a contrary one." If the second, then the futurity of the resistance of the Jews and the futurity of the non-resistance of the Tyrians is not from God's decree, nor

DISPUTATION I

consequently from His foreknowledge. And thus a conditional knowledge of future things is given that is independent of the decree, which was to be proved. Leave aside verbal battles and that complicated way of speaking, where it is said that concomitant fault precedes the withdrawal of grace. For how does it precede, if it is concomitant? And since it is so in the middle between God's decree predefining the act which is evil and the withdrawal of grace, that it follows the former and precedes the latter, what remains by reason of which it can deservedly be called concomitant?

§ IV. TWO OTHER SOLUTIONS OF TWISSE ARE REJECTED.

LXV. Twisse proposed the above solution concerning God's present decree about the future conditional repentance of the Tyrians, lest he should appear disrespectful toward Augustine, whom he considers the author of this view. However, since Augustine said that what was stated about Tyre and Sidon could perhaps be understood in some other way, Twisse believes another response more probable than the former one has been indicated, and he offers his own effort to extract it for the benevolent Reader, prefacing his attempt with an appeal for indulgence. Let us therefore hear this hitherto unknown solution and appreciate the interpreter revealing Augustine's hidden meanings. "This statement," he says, "about the Tyrians and Sidonians was made according to the ordinary administration of the means to faith and repentance. For God does not customarily delegate to His Prophets and Apostles the ministry of preaching His word to any nation, and to make His power manifest through signs and miracles to attract the souls of men, unless He has among that nation some elect who are to be gathered into the bosom of His Church." The meaning is that there exists a divine decree that ordinarily the Gospel and miracles are not proposed to any nation except where there are certain elect who will believe; and thus by virtue of such

DISPUTATION I

a decree, Christ knew that if such a proposition were made to the Tyrians and Sidonians, some of them would believe. From this it is evident that what he produced with such great effort is this: from a general decree, absolute even on the part of the object, conditional truths arise—which has been refuted many times before and here presents its own difficulty.

LXVI. Consider, then, on one side are presented two cities, Chorazin and Bethsaida; likewise on the other side, two cities, namely Tyre and Sidon. God knows with certainty that if miracles are presented to these latter two, it will happen that some will be converted. But why does He know this? "Because," he says, "there is a decree that such a presentation should not be made except where some are elect and consequently will make good use of that grace." But, I say, if the matter is thus: therefore there are also some elect, and consequently some who make good use of the same grace in the other two cities, since the Gospel is actually proposed to them; and consequently those cities are equal to these, and all grounds for reproach cease. What will you say to this? Will you raise that quibble, added by you, "according to the ordinary administration," as if God were dealing with the people of Chorazin and Bethsaida in an extraordinary manner? But if this is so, do you not see that the same difficulty always recurs, that the rebuke of the Jews in comparison with the Tyrians is inappropriate, if God acted in one way with the former and would have acted in another way with the latter?

LXVII. "This," he says, "is one sense." A second sense follows. "For it may be that these statements do not refer to the salvific and spiritual repentance which, according to Augustine against the Pelagian Julian (Book 5, Chapter 3), is proper to the Predestined, but to the kind of repentance which either Ahab performed (1 Kings 10) or even the Ninevites at the warning of the Prophet Jonah (Jonah 3)." He adds that Christ could have judged the Tyrians to be more inclined to repentance from the unusual sight of miracles than the Jews who were accustomed to such prodigies. And because it is decreed to administer human affairs ordinarily in such a way that they are moved in accordance with their

DISPUTATION I

natures, it follows that the repentance of the Tyrians, moved according to their inclination, would have been conditionally future; so that always God's decree, and according to His decree the administration of all things, has a place in establishing the certainty of the knowledge of future things.

Whether that repentance of the Tyrians would have been spiritual or corporeal is irrelevant to the present question, in which we inquire only whether it was known with certainty as conditionally future. Since our Adversary concedes this, and attributes that certainty to an absolute decree on the part of the object—namely, of moving creatures in accordance with their inclinations—it follows that this sense, as regards the solution of the proposed difficulty, is not different from the immediately preceding one. And consequently, when Twisse makes two senses out of one, he experiences what happens to those who see lamps doubled. Moreover, he is to be ridiculed in this also, that the decree which he supposes is a decree of ordinarily administering human affairs in this way; as if he would have God sometimes act differently and extraordinarily. But if this is so, it is manifest that God cannot have certain knowledge of the conditionally future repentance of the Tyrians unless these two decrees concur: both to move men ordinarily according to their inclination, and not to use extraordinary motion with the Tyrians. This second decree, however, cannot but be a decree formally conditioned on the part of the object, since it must necessarily be conceived in such a way as this: that if the Gospel and miracles are proposed to the Tyrians, they will be moved in no other way than the ordinary.

But this still does not remove the difficulty which we have so often raised, namely, that the fairness of that rebuke by which the Tyrians are preferred to the Jews is not established. For since the whole difference is attributed to their different disposition, by which some are imagined to be more and others less inclined to repentance; and since this disposition is not free, because it is supposed to follow from the very nature of things (and because if it were free, we would ask how and by what knowledge it

DISPUTATION I

would be known in the Tyrians); it follows that this is condemned in the Jews and this is preferred in the Tyrians, the cause of which is by no means free to them. And thus Christ's statement would have to be conceived as follows: "Woe to you, Chorazin, which by your disposition impede the motion which Tyre by its disposition would rather require, and by which it would be impelled to repentance." But Chorazin would say: "Neither did Tyre make that disposition for itself, nor did I make it for myself; it arose from elsewhere, beyond the will of either of us."

LXVIII. Finally, what was said by Augustine about the spiritual and salvific repentance of the Predestined, Twisse, in his customary bad faith, distorts into the opinion of Calvin. Since Calvin maintains that the grace of justification is inamissible, he consequently denies that the repentance or righteousness of those who will eventually fall away is ever true. But Augustine does not deny that the repentance of the reprobate is spiritual and salvific as if it were not both true and supernatural; but because it is not in fact connected with salvation, which is proper only to the repentance that is final. That this is Augustine's opinion is proven throughout the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, *On Correction and Grace*, and in a thousand other places, from which it is clear that according to Augustine, nothing was lacking in the repentance and righteousness of the reprobate for their salvation except constancy and perseverance to the end. But an untrue righteousness and a non-spiritual—that is, non-supernatural—repentance, however much it might persevere, would never lead to salvation. But to pursue that discussion belongs to another occasion. Twisse has a neighbor by whom he could be healed, unless he should prove himself incurable. Let him hear Vossius, Book 6 of the *Pelagian History*, Thesis 12, 13, 14, page 558..

DISPUTATION I

CHAPTER V. WITHOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, THERE REMAINS IN GOD NO ABSOLUTE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE SINS.

LXIX. WITH middle knowledge established, we immediately understand how God foreknows any sin as absolutely future, namely through the decree of the divine will by which He absolutely decides to establish that condition under which He knew through middle knowledge that the sin would occur. When, I say, God knew through middle knowledge that, on the hypothesis that an Angel would be created and placed in such circumstances, with divine concurrence accommodated to his freedom, he would sin; by the very fact that He decrees to do all these things, what was conditionally future passes into the absolute: and to the knowledge by which it was foreknown as conditionally future, there necessarily follows knowledge by which it is foreknown as absolutely future. This explanation of such foreknowledge is most straightforward and not at all complex or intricate.

Nor should you say that even without middle knowledge, once the will to create the Angel in that manner is established, his sin immediately becomes absolutely future and consequently knowable as such. For this involves a contradiction. Because from the supposition that the sin is absolutely future given such a will or such a decree, even if that decree is not established, it necessarily follows that this conditional is true and knowable: if such a decree and such a condition were established, sin would follow. But this is knowable only through middle knowledge, hence it is contradictory to exclude middle knowledge from the absolute foreknowledge of future sin. These two propositions, I assert, are necessarily connected, one following from the other: "The Angel to be created in such circumstances will sin" and "If the Angel were created in such circumstances, he would sin." Hence, similarly, the cognitions corresponding

DISPUTATION I

to these are connected: absolute future and its cognition without conditional future and its cognition is an impossible supposition.

§ I. TWISSE'S VIEW ON THE PERMISSION OF SIN

LXX. AND in this way also it is easy to understand how there exists in God a decree to permit sin, and how there is a reason for understanding it as future. It is agreed, of course, between us and our Adversaries that the decree to permit sin, if we speak properly, is said only of sin that will actually follow. For one who resists temptation is not said to be permitted to fall into adultery, or theft, or something similar, although he had full indifference to falling, but only he is said to be permitted to fall who has fallen. From this it follows that there must be some kind of necessary connection between that decree and the real existence of sin: and consequently that the actual and absolute decree to permit sin, if we speak properly, is an infallible reason for knowing it as absolutely future. Therefore, since we have established that some hypothesis is possible from which would follow that an Angel, for example, would sin by his own freedom, God by this very fact decrees to permit sin when He decrees to establish that hypothesis and not to prevent what will follow. Indeed, by the very fact precisely that He decrees to establish that hypothesis. Because if He were to decree to prevent the sin that would follow, it would no longer be that hypothesis but would be another. By virtue of this decree, as necessarily connected with future sin—with a necessity that cannot harm freedom since it takes its origin from freedom itself—God understands that the Angel will absolutely sin.

Without middle knowledge, however, there is such difficulty in explaining this kind of decree, while preserving both human freedom and God's goodness, that this may seem to be one of the desperate difficulties. And Twisse concedes that in this argument we are carried by a favorable current and, as it were, navigate in a peaceful sea; as if he wanted to warn us to expect nothing else from him than what can be expected from

DISPUTATION I

a man who rows against the current, or who, tossed by a storm, when clouds take away the sky and the daylight, is driven onto shoals and sandbanks. Nevertheless, he boasts that besides the protection of Scripture, he has Catholic Doctors as companions in danger. "However," he says, "if the contest were solely by the authority of recent Scholastics, what, I ask, is there that Jesuits can despise in Dominicans, from whom they are as distant as disposition is from habit, as far as erudition and Scholastic method are concerned?" But William, we do not follow your apple, nor do we value at all the judgment of Paris and the injury of despised doctrine. We by no means despise those Fathers, but we laugh at you who wish to be covered by their cloak so as not to blush at Calvin. They will speak for themselves, do not doubt it, and will show how empty this refuge of yours is. In the meantime, how do you explain to us the absolute foreknowledge of future sin?

LXXI. He shuddered to present the whole opinion in one place, and scattered pronouncements must be gathered from here and there so that the complete picture may be brought to light. For not even a chimera is a monster when it appears only partly; it is only a goat, or a dragon, or some such animal. How, then, does God foreknow the sin of an Angel as absolutely future? In His will, he says. For God does not contemplate His future object anywhere else than in the determination of His will. But with a distinction. "God's knowledge with respect to goods of whatever kind is the knowledge of an artisan and of one decreeing to work as an artisan, and God's knowledge with respect to evils is not the knowledge of an artisan; but rather it is the knowledge of God not decreeing to work as an artisan." From this you can easily gather that this will of God is only a will to permit sin, since it is the will of one not decreeing to work.

And this can be confirmed by what he says elsewhere: "The Divine decree is only a permissive principle, not an effective one of evils, but only of goods." And then, "if sin always and infallibly follows the permission of sin, what prevents God from being said to foreknow sin in the decree to permit sin?" Likewise, "Whatever difficulty presents itself

DISPUTATION I

here, if only it is conceded that man infallibly falls when God has decreed to withdraw His help from him, it clearly follows from this that God's decree to withdraw His help and assistance from man is a sufficient reason for knowing that some sin will be future." According to Twisse, therefore, the decree to permit the sin of the Angel is a sufficient reason for knowing that it will be future.

LXXII. But this is further asked: how is such a decree infallibly connected with future sin without middle knowledge? Because, he says, it is the will not to prevent sin. We insist, however, and ask again: how is it known that the will not to prevent the sin of the Angel is infallibly connected with that same sin? Or, since both the Angel who persevered in grace could have fallen, and the Angel who fell could have persevered, why is God not said, before He absolutely foreknew that the one would persevere and the other would fall, to have decided not to prevent the one who had full capacity to fall from falling; and to prevent the one who had most sufficient grace for standing from falling? He decided, Twisse says, to help one more than the other. But, I say, both the one who was helped more, since he was completely able to sin, can be said not to have been prevented from sinning; and the one who was helped less, since he had most sufficient help for not sinning, why should he not be said to have been prevented from sinning as much as necessary? And when help was decreed for him by which he would be able to do either, to sin or not to sin, why by virtue of such a decree was he foreknown as going to sin rather than not going to sin? For we easily answer that question: it was decreed to give one Angel help with which he was known through middle knowledge not to be going to sin by his own freedom; but to the other, help with which he was known to be going to sin, also by his own freedom. And thus one decree was a decree of preventing or permitting, but the other was a decree of not preventing or permitting. But in the contrary opinion nothing of the sort can be said, and thus one may argue. Either the decree not to prevent the Angel's sin is a decree not to add anything to that supposition of cause from which sin is known to follow,

DISPUTATION I

by which it would be precluded; or it is a decree only not to add anything to that supposition of cause from which sin is only known to be able to follow. If the first, it leads to our opinion, and middle knowledge independent of the decree is admitted. If the second, then there was a decree not to prevent even the sin of the standing Angel, because there was a certain hypothesis from which sin could follow, to which nothing was added to preclude it; or certainly there was a decree to prevent even the sin of the falling Angel, because that supposition also involved something added by God to prevent sin, just as did the supposition of the standing Angel. In a word, for God to know something as future by virtue of a decree, it is necessary that what is decreed either be the thing itself which is said to be future, or be something certainly connected with that thing, as is evident *per se*. Therefore, in order to know by virtue of a decree that sin will be future, He must either decree sin itself, or something certainly connected with it, which we ask what it could be, excluding middle knowledge.

LXXIII. Indeed, here physical premotion is to be invoked for help, and it must be candidly confessed that there was in God a decree to premove one Angel to persevere and not similarly to premove the other. So says Twisse. "Again we say," he says, "that efficacious help, by the negation of which the permission of sin is defined, is physical predetermination, not moral, although joined with moral excitation." But besides the common difficulties against that opinion, there still remains here to be explained how, with physical premotion to perseverance removed, the Angel is known infallibly to fall, so that God can be said, by the very fact that He decided not to premove him to persevere, to decree the permission of his fall. Since excluding premotion, He still leaves full power to persevere: how then does God foreknow that the will, which has full freedom to persevere or not to persevere, and which therefore is indifferent to either, will not persevere rather than persevere? Because, he says, that is how it is. But this is precisely what I am asking: since it could be otherwise, how does it happen that it is this way and not otherwise? For this

DISPUTATION I

cannot be attributed to God's decree. For I argue thus: A decree that leaves a cause completely able to do this or that cannot be the reason why the cause does this rather than that; but such is the decree not to predetermine the Angel who sins to persevere, so that he nevertheless remains completely able to persevere or not to persevere. Therefore, that decree cannot be the reason why he does not persevere rather than persevere, nor consequently why one is known rather than the other.

Indeed, we can also argue thus: God, decreeing not to premove the Angel who fell, either knew he would fall without that determination, or knew only that he could fall; the second is not sufficient for it to be called a decree not to prevent the fall, as has already been shown; but the first admits the knowledge of a conditional future independent of an actual and absolute decree: therefore, the mere negation of physical premotion is not sufficient.

Therefore, it always remains to be asked, since it follows from that doctrine that the Angel will fall if he is not predetermined to persevere, abstracting from any free decree of God actually established, what is the cause of this being future. And since it is not only future, but universally and always future in every imaginable supposition (for this is what the Adversaries contend), what could be the cause of that perpetuity and constancy? And since this is true apart from, as I said, any free decree of God, what remains except to attribute it to the freedom of the created cause? But how can invariability and immutability of effect be attributed to a principle so variable and changeable? I add that the sin of the Angel was not a sin of omission but of commission: nor can it be said that he sinned because he did not persevere; but rather that he did not persevere because he was envious, for example, or proud or rebellious against divine dominion: and in order to know that he would not persevere, certain such future sins had to be known, not conversely that in order to know those sins, he had to be known as not going to persevere. What, then, was the cause why the pride of the Angel, for example, was known to be future from eternity? The decree, you will say, not to prede-

DISPUTATION I

termine him to submission and humility. But neither could this decree be a sufficient reason for foreknowing pride, especially in the more probable opinion that admits the possibility of a pure free omission. For it follows from this that there could have been in the Angel a pure omission of humble subjection.

LXXIV. Therefore, something else must be added to the withdrawal of premotion, so that a future sin of commission may be foreknown, by which the perseverance of the falling Angel is prevented. Nor was Twisse ignorant of this: and therefore he admitted not only the withdrawal of premotion to good, but moreover a positive predefinition of that act which is evil. From here now one may discern the chimera emerging from the swaddling clothes in which it was wrapped. For first, he candidly concedes that God is the Author of the act underlying sin: Likewise, that God wills and does all those things of which He is the Author. This will, he says, is an antecedent decree from which the malice of sin follows necessarily and infallibly: And this is a modal necessity in this form: given that God has decreed that such an act be done freely according to the substance of the act, which nevertheless is not in conformity with God's law, it is necessary that such an act be done. Likewise, although this act is joined with the power to act otherwise or not to act at all, nevertheless, given God's decree about determining the human will to the substance of this act, which is not in conformity, it cannot happen that either another act is produced for that instant, or that this one is not produced. And finally, in that passage which we cited a little earlier, where he explains the permission of sin through the subtraction of physical predetermination, see what he adds: "Again we say that efficacious help, the negation of which defines the permission of sin, is physical predetermination, not moral, although joined with moral excitation.... Nor, however, does this determination prejudice freedom in any way, such as belongs to creatures: since it determines the created will to act freely.... But if physical predetermination does not impede freedom at all; it clearly follows that it does not impede imputation of it to fault." In this pas-

DISPUTATION I

sage, the crafty way of arguing of this old man appears clearly enough, who cautiously passes from the subtraction of predetermination to a good act, to the position of predetermination to an evil act. For he begins thus: "Again we say, etc." to which statement it would be consistent to subjoin this: "Nor, however, does freedom... suffer any prejudice from this subtraction of determination." But cleverly he substituted: "this determination."

And from this now one may perceive what, according to Twisse, the permission of sin, or the decree of permission, is. Namely, it is an antecedent and efficacious decree, by which God wills the act underlying malice under the aspect of free, and with all the circumstances from which malice is inseparable: and to that end He premoves the will to that act, for all these things are gathered from his above words scattered here and there. This doctrine must now be refuted.

§ II. THE ABSOLUTE AND ANTECEDENT PREDEFINITION OF EVIL ACTS IS REFUTED.

LXXV. First, I leave it to the Reader to consider whether Twisse is not an exceptional sculptor and a particularly noble craftsman of masks, who so skillfully covers up that mode of God's acting concerning evil acts, and that decree which even Calvin himself confesses to be horrible, by introducing the soft and easy name of permission. God occupied the Angel with His decree antecedently and efficaciously, when the Angel was thinking of no such thing, nor yet having any propensity toward evil: and He willed that the Angel would elicit an act which He knew was contrary to his obligation, with all the circumstances in which it implied that it was most formally evil, and most worthy of damnation: and to that end He added to the Angel a force, not just any force, but one imposing the necessity of eliciting it; that is, this is, says this William, the most gentle and kindly interpreter of evil things, God only permitted the Angel to elicit such an act. And tell me, please, if He did not wish to permit only,

DISPUTATION I

what more would He do? God acts in this matter upon the Angel, and acts from His own determination and intention and mere good pleasure, with no preexisting title on the Angel's part that would demand that He act in this way rather than another: from that action, the act of the Angel and its freedom with other circumstances prerequisite for malice follow efficaciously and necessarily, whether these can be reconciled or not, which I do not now dispute: from this, malice follows so necessarily that it implies a contradiction for it to be suspended or suppressed: hence it happens from first to last, that from God's action and determination and influx upon the Angel, sin follows efficaciously and necessarily; and what results from such great action of God is only permitted by God? O Christians, your faith!

LXXVI. Secondly, I oppose to this Calvinist the candor of Calvin, so that it may be clear that such a father could beget a more unfortunate offspring. For although Calvin held the same views about God's concurrence in evil acts, he nevertheless believed the word permission to be inadequate for that thought, and therefore what Catholics interpret about Absalom's incest, about Pharaoh's hardening, about the Jews' deicide and other such crimes, that scriptures which seem to signify some ordination and efficacy of God should be understood only about permission; he now calls this frivolous, now frigid, elsewhere a subterfuge, trifles, a delusion. Namely because since God is supposed to act so efficaciously in such events, and from Himself, invited by no extrinsic demand, He must be considered to have the role not so much of one permitting as of an Author.

LXXVII. Thirdly, he must also solve the common argument that by that predefinition the freedom necessary for evil acts is removed, namely by introducing into the will an antecedent necessity independent of its own choice. But since this will be pressed later, now I only present Twisse's solution, who speaks thus: "Just as given the decree that certain things happen contingently, it is necessary that they not only happen, but also happen contingently... So also from the decree of permitting sins,

DISPUTATION I

sins will both occur and occur contingently, with the possibility of not occurring: so that whoever sins can avoid sinning." Consider, Friendly Reader, those words, "it is necessary that they not only happen, but also happen contingently, and with the possibility of not occurring, so that whoever sins can avoid sinning." For this is: it is necessary that they happen without necessity. And since there is no other definition of "necessary" than "what cannot be otherwise," and of "contingent" than "what can be otherwise," whoever says it is necessary that this happens, and happens contingently, says this: It cannot be otherwise than that this is in such a way that it can be otherwise.

He expresses this more clearly in the following words: "If it is necessary that some man produce an act underlying malice, it is necessary that he sin. For whoever culpably produces a sinful act, sins: and whoever produces an act underlying sin produces a sinful act: therefore if it is necessary that he produce an act underlying sin, it is necessary that he sin; that he sin, I say, not necessarily, but contingently and freely." Consider this also: "it is necessary that he sin, not however necessarily." For since it is clear that in a modal proposition the modal term can be changed into an adverb in this way: "It is probable that the enemies will be overcome, the enemies will probably be overcome." Likewise, "It is true that I promised, I truly promised." And "It is necessary that fire be lit, fire is necessarily lit." Since, I say, that way of forming and changing modal propositions is legitimate among all mortals who know more than infants, if it is used in Twisse's proposition, "It is necessary that he sin, not however necessarily," see what emerges: "He sins or will sin necessarily, not however necessarily." Again, since conversely an adverb can be changed into a modal term, as when it is said, for example, "It will rain, not however in such a way that it is necessary," if this is maintained in the same proposition of Twisse, "It is necessary that he sin, not however necessarily," it will be rendered thus: "It is necessary that he sin, not however in such a way that it is necessary." Thus goat-stags are painted at Leeuwarden: and nothing is lacking from this painting except that it be

DISPUTATION I

inscribed according to custom with the usual epigraph, "William Twisse was making this."

LXXVIII. Fourthly, since in this matter there is said to be something of which God must be considered the Author, something of which He must not: something which is done by Him, something which is only permitted; let us distinguish, please, what God only permits from what He does. What, then, does God only permit in the sin of the Angel? There is the act underlying malice, there is its freedom, there is the prohibition, there is the malice. What does God only permit? Is it that there be an act? But He predefines it, and effects it by an antecedent and concomitant concurrence, and in every way He is its Author. That it be free? This itself is procured by God in the same way. That it be prohibited? He alone establishes and intimates the prohibition. That it be evil? Namely after God has decreed and effected that there be an act, and that it be free, and that there be its prohibition, He permits besides that it be evil. For He can prevent it—what are you saying, William, most acute of all mortals?

LXXIX. Fifthly, whenever a superior cause is proposed as permitting something to happen, an inferior cause must be assigned that executes what the superior only permits. What cause, then, in evil acts executes what God permits? You easily answer that it is the creature, the Angel, for example, who sins. But how does the sinning Angel execute what God permits, and what does he do? He makes the act underlying malice, and God also makes it and makes it more than the Angel does. He makes it free; this also God predefines efficaciously that it be done. He makes it prohibited; God more than the Angel makes not only the act, but also the prohibition, whence more than the Angel He makes the act prohibited. He makes it evil, you say, and God only permits this to the Angel. But since an evil act says nothing beyond the entity of the act and the malice, whoever makes evil does so by doing one of these two: But the entity of the act is made no more by the Angel than by God; it remains, therefore, that he alone makes the malice. But how does the Angel make malice?

DISPUTATION I

For it is not something that can be made *per se*. Nor does Twisse deny this when he says: "Whoever culpably produces a sinful act, sins. And if it is necessary that some man produce an act underlying malice, it is necessary that he sin." For this is to say that malice is not produced otherwise than by the production of the act that underlies it. Which he signified even more clearly a little earlier in these words: "We deny absolutely that the divine decree determines in any way to attaching malice to the act, but neither does any such thing fall to the decree of man.... Thus the malice of the act in a sin of commission requires no determination of the cause for producing it, besides the determination of the cause for producing the very substance of the act." From which I argue thus: The determination of the cause to produce the substance of the act is that very thing which alone malice requires for its production: The determination of the cause to produce the substance of the act is from God: Therefore, the determination which is from God is what malice alone requires for its production: Therefore, God either more or certainly no less produces malice than the sinning Angel himself.

Hence again I ask: What, then, does the sinning Angel execute that God permitting does not also execute? He may think he has answered when he said that malice is produced by him who culpably produces the act underlying malice; so that he wants there to be two producers, God and the Angel, with God inculpably producing permitting the Angel to produce culpably. But do you not see, William, that you are using a circle either through inculpable stupidity or culpable craftiness? For to act culpably is to be the principle of action and fault: and the Angel is not otherwise the principle of fault than because he is the determinative principle of action: But God is this very thing, even more than the Angel: why, therefore, is He not the principle and cause of fault, just as the Angel is? I do not say of fault by which God Himself is culpable, but of fault by which the Angel is culpable. That is: Why is God not said to be the cause of the Angel's fault? But if He is, and if God executes the Angel's fault, what then does He permit him?

DISPUTATION I

LXXX. Perhaps he would like to throw this dart back at us and ask what God permits to the sinning Angel, who also in our opinion makes the act underlying malice with the Angel? But I briefly respond that He permits to him even the act which He executes with him, insofar as He executes it indifferently, giving the Angel's freedom the capacity to determine itself. For that is true permission. That is, with concurrence offered so indifferently that it is as much offered to the one who does not sin as to the one who sins: and God is only a cause without which not, but the Angel is the cause why there is a sinful act rather than no act. In a word, God permits His own action to the Angel, when He wills it to be in his power that it either exists or does not exist. And we must recall what we reported earlier from Anselm, that God does not spontaneously give, but the Angel unjustly wishes to seize from Him that which underlies sin.

And hence it happens, moreover, that God has no other causal relation to malice than that of one permitting. Because malice cannot be attributed to whatever cause concurs with the substance of the act, but only to that which freely determines itself to it: but only the Angel does this, God does not: therefore God only permits malice, but the Angel executes it. Nor is it any obstacle that God also produces the Angel's determination to the evil act. For this is not sufficient for Him to be considered to determine the Angel. Because, as I said, He produces it only as a cause without which not, not as a cause why it is produced: Or, because He produces it indifferently, and in such a way that it is in the Angel's power to suspend or not to suspend that production, and God is of Himself more inclined to non-production than to production, which He also prohibits. But what He produces in that way, He does not, properly speaking, determine, and should be said rather to permit the determination than to execute it. With the sun and man concurring indivisibly in the same action, it cannot be denied that the sun makes the determination of man to produce a man: and yet the sun is not said to determine man to the production of man, but rather to be determined by him.

DISPUTATION I

LXXXI. Nor should anyone think that this is a recent notion fresh from the anvil of modern Scholastics. It is that ancient sense of Christianity, propagated by the Fathers Clement of Alexandria, Nazianzen, Theodoret, who give no other reason why God is not the cause of evil, than that the fault belongs only to him whose is the choice. But choice in this context can be nothing other than the determination whether the evil act should be elicited or not. They want, therefore, this determination to belong only to the sinner, when they attribute choice to him alone; and therefore he alone is the cause of sin, not God.

LXXXII. Sixthly, I will not omit to consider this also, what a God this craftsman carves for us, more deceitful than any circus performer, more cruel than any tyrant; pushing with one hand, pulling back with the other; impeding by a hidden will what He demands by an open one, predefining that those things be done which imply that those things which He prohibits, and which He had decreed would be done, are also done, and pursuing with flames. For take the evil act of the Angel in whatever way you wish, materially, formally, specifically, reduplicatively; take, I say, what in such an act is predefined by God, take also what is prohibited by Him; and explain to us, by what means can what is predefined be done, without what is prohibited being done? And since you cannot provide this, see what kind of God this is who says to the Angel, "I do not want you to elicit that act, and if you elicit it, eternal damnation awaits you," but says to Himself, "I want him to elicit that act freely and in those circumstances in which it implies that it is not damnable, and I will this efficaciously and infallibly, and with omnipotent will, to which I do not want the will of the Angel to resist." "Come," He says to sinners, "all who labor, etc.," but to Himself: "I do not want them to come, and I have decided to prevent them from coming by an insuperable decree, namely by denying the motion necessary for coming, but imposing one for remaining in their infidelity." Who would not resist to the face this God saying, "Your destruction is from yourself, but only from Me is your help"? What? is not the act by which I am lost predefined by Him? And

DISPUTATION I

was that predefinition help for not falling, so that this God can boast, "but only from Me is your help"? But what instance does the Demon have to convince Him who says that He hates nothing of what He has made? Did this God love him when He predefined the act which He knew was bound by an indissoluble knot with his damnation? But why does He boast that He is not a tempter of evils, who not only by persuading, not only by commanding, not only by asking, but by impelling with insuperable force one who is thinking of no such thing and, as it were, placed in equilibrium, moves him to an act which He knows cannot be other than sacrilegious? And may it not be permitted here again to exclaim, O Christians, your faith?

But what does God demand from the falling Angel, and why does He rage against him? Because he elicits the act underlying malice? But He had occupied him with His predefinition to elicit it. Because he elicits it freely? This too He predefined. Because it is prohibited? He alone is the cause why there is both the prohibition and it is known to the transgressor. Hence, since He both predefines the act and adds the prohibition, He cannot will it not to be prohibited. But given that there is both the entity of the act, and freedom, and the prohibition intimated to the one performing it, what else does He require from the Angel? That it not be evil? But it implies that it is not. And yet for this reason to thunder, for this reason to use lightning, for this reason to prepare all tortures, and condemn to everlasting flames? Again and again, O Christians, your faith!

LXXXIII. Seventhly, finally must be added the unanimous consensus of the Holy Fathers when they deny that evil acts are predefined by God, as we have shown earlier.

DISPUTATION I

§ III. THE OBJECTION CONCERNING THE PREDEFINITION OF AN ACT WHICH IS EVIL, AND AS IT IS EVIL, IS REJECTED BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY FATHERS, ESPECIALLY AUGUSTINE.

LXXXIV. But they respond that the Fathers reject only the predefinition of malice, not of the act which underlies the malice; or they reject the predefinition of an act as evil, but not according to its absolute and physical being. Indeed, unless the Holy Fathers return to the School and accommodate themselves to the recent entanglements of the Academics, and repeatedly emphasize "materially and formally," "specifically and reduplicatively," no method will remain by which they themselves might reveal their meaning to us. But I consider it clear that they deny the predefinitions of those acts which both are and are known to be both free and evil, under those circumstances from which it is impossible for malice to be absent. This is clearly deduced both from that from which they themselves deduce it, and from that which they infer from it: that their reasoning is equally valid when only the predefinition of evil acts taken materially and specifically is admitted. And this can be proven by induction. And to begin from the latter points.

LXXXV. St. Thomas admits only that foreknowledge of free acts, especially evil ones, from which no necessity follows except that by which it is said that what is, when it is, must necessarily be, which is a necessity consequent upon the thing's existence itself. From this we rightly infer that he acknowledges mere foreknowledge of such acts without predefinition: nor is the predefinition of an evil act as it is evil reduplicatively excluded any more than the act which is evil specifically. For from the predefinition of one as much as the other, it follows that malice would be necessary, not only by consequent necessity, by which it is said that what is, when it is, must necessarily be; but also by antecedent necessity. For predefinition makes necessary both the act which is evil and whatever is necessarily and inseparably connected with it, such as malice, as we sup-

DISPUTATION I

pose: because it is evident that by whatever necessity the antecedent is necessary, by the same necessity the consequent, which is connected to it by an indissoluble bond, is necessary.

In what sense would the Master of the Sentences affirm that God foreknew evils solely by knowledge and not by good pleasure, if that knowledge necessarily presupposed good pleasure predefining the act with which and from which malice necessarily results? Why would he say specifically about evils that God would neither have foreknown nor predicted their evils unless they were going to have them, if there were some prior predefinition of those acts to which malice necessarily adheres, by which evils would become knowable to God? Or why would he not say the same about good things, namely that God would not have foreknown them unless men were going to have them? On what basis, finally, would he assert that God's foreknowledge is only a cause without which evils do not happen, but not a cause why they happen, if foreknowledge presupposed or involved predefinition? Since the latter cannot be denied to be a cause, and indeed the primary cause why the predefined act happens, that is, the act which is known to be evil; it also cannot be denied to be a cause why whatever it necessarily entails exists, and therefore a cause why malice itself exists.

Anselm clearly distinguishes in the Angel's sin the Angel's willing itself from injustice, or the defect of justice in which he places the nature of evil or malice. For he speaks of that evil which is not any essence, Which is impossible to exist, Which therefore can neither come nor depart, because it is nothing, Which is only the departure from justice; and supposing that distinction, he concedes that the willing itself which underlies such evil, and which is an evil act specifically taken, is from God; from God, I say, not freely giving, but permitting it to be seized. Does not one freely give who freely predefines, and that absolutely and effectively?

Damascene takes evil specifically as referring to the act which is evil. For he calls evil that which presents some appearance of absurdity. Likewise, An action which has an appearance of absurdity, which is to

DISPUTATION I

speak specifically. Moreover, he indicates that this action pertains only to God's permission, and he distinguishes this permission from God's favorable will, when he says that by God's favorable will those things happen which are good beyond controversy; but by permission, those things which present some appearance of absurdity. He also distinguishes it from antecedent will and good pleasure when he says the former, Antecedent will or good pleasure is said to come from Him, but the second following will and permission, takes its origin from our vice. Indeed, he even adds that permission, insofar as it pertains to evils, belongs neither to God's primary nor secondary will. For thus he speaks: Among those things which depend on our free will, those which are good God primarily wills and takes pleasure in; evil things, on the contrary, neither primarily nor secondarily: but He permits them to free will. Is there any predefinition which belongs neither to God's favorable will, nor to His antecedent will, nor to His good pleasure, nor to His secondary will? Therefore there is none concerning evil. Concerning evil, I say, which is permitted to free will: nor is any other evil permitted to free will than evil taken specifically and materially. Indeed, formal evil, or malice, has no freedom except by reason of the material act to which it adheres. And it would be ridiculous for one who had predefined an act which is evil with all the circumstances required for freedom and malice, to wish to permit it to be evil, since this implies that it could be prevented. From this you may understand what Damascene means at the beginning of the following chapter when he says that God foreknows evils but does not predefine them, but a command joined to foreknowledge constitutes predefinition. He clearly excludes from evils both favorable will, and antecedent will, and good pleasure, and primary, and secondary, and that absolute and effective will which is typical of one commanding, so that one would have to be deaf who, aroused by so many voices, does not hear that the predefinition of evil acts, even specifically and materially taken, is far from Damascene's opinion.

DISPUTATION I

Leo the Ninth, when in his confession of faith which he sent to Peter of Antioch, says that he believes that God predestined only good things, but foreknew both good and evil things, takes good and evil in the same sense. Hence, just as having predestined good things is not only in the formal sense, but also in the specific and material sense, as in having predestined those things which are good, and not only goodness itself, so when he says that God only foreknew evil things, that is, did not predestine them, he is to be understood as referring to that which is evil, and not only to malice itself.

Eucherius's argument, by which he denies that the unbelief of the Jews pertains to predestination, but only to foreknowledge, Namely because God does not impel to sin nor hardens by helping, but only by abandoning; is equally valid for opposing the predefinition of an act which is known to be evil under those circumstances in which it is necessarily evil, as it is for opposing the predefinition of malice, or of an act as evil. For by one reason man is neither more nor less compelled or helped to sin than by another.

The will to kill Christ, which the Jews had, what else was it but the material of sin? And yet St. Leo denies that it pertains to God's disposition; granted, it pertained to His foreknowledge: and that its principle in God was different from that of the will to die which Christ had. How, however, would it not pertain to God's disposition, and why would its principle be different, if both had been predefined?

From the Council of Valencia, if the negation of predefinition is well inferred, certainly the negation of predefinition tending toward the material of sin, or toward the act underlying malice, is inferred. Because, as has already often been shown, the necessity of sinning follows as much from the predefinition of an act which is evil, under those circumstances in which it cannot but be evil, as from the predefinition of malice itself: and with either predefinition supposed, it is equally false what the Council indicates, that foreknowledge does not impose necessity because God only foreknows what men will freely do. Likewise, it is equally false what

DISPUTATION I

it says, that in this the election of those to be saved is distinguished from the damnation of those who will perish, in that in the former, God's mercy precedes good merit: in the latter, evil merit precedes God's judgment.

What displeases God is the material of sin, and this very thing is what the Council of Orange denies is from God's will, when it defines that men in doing this do not do God's will, but their own. Here too, man's very will, which is the act subject to malice, since it is opposed to God's will, is clearly enough shown not to be predefined by Him. From this it is clear what that execration pertains to, which is added, against those who say that some are predestined to evil.

Fulgentius speaks not of malice, but of the evil will of the first man, when he so explicitly denies that it is predefined by God. And if all the reasons by which he is led to deny the predestination of evils are examined, it is evident that either they prove nothing, or they equally prove that no predefinition of an evil act, even materially and specifically taken, is to be admitted, as will be clear to anyone considering each point adduced before.

This same thing is evident in Prosper when he denies that our evil works are predefined, and admits only their foreknowledge. For an evil work either is, or necessarily includes, the material of sin, of which there cannot be only foreknowledge if there is, moreover, predefinition, which such foreknowledge necessarily presupposes. And it is manifest that the absurdity which Prosper objects against the predefinition of evils, that it would follow that God makes one who is running well fall, and punishes what He impels to happen; has the same force against the predefinition of an act which necessarily entails malice, as is self-evident. And what interpretation can there be of what he says in response to the 13th Vincentian objection concerning the fall of men: The Father does nothing there, the Son does nothing, the Holy Spirit does nothing: nor does anything of the divine will intervene in such a business, by whose work we know many have been held back from falling; but none impelled to fall. What? To impel an Angel into an act which necessarily entails malice, is

DISPUTATION I

this not to impel into a fall? And to predefine that impulse, and by such predefinition to preoccupy the Angel's will, is this indeed doing nothing, and nothing of the divine will intervening in such a business? And yet all this is admitted when the predefinition of the act which underlies malice is admitted, under those circumstances in which it both is and is necessarily known to underlie it, for whatever good end it may be predefined. For a good end can only excuse the predefiner, not remove the effect of the predefinition, which is the impulse into an act which is evil, and by necessary consequence, into malice itself.

I could in the same way go through the other Fathers, and show that the predefinition or antecedent will of God concerning evils which they deny is by no means to be understood as referring only to malice, but also to the act to which malice is necessarily connected. But since we have already heard Twisse concede that these predefinitions were unknown to the other Fathers, and were first asserted by Augustine, and that he had already become wiser from his encounter with the enemies of divine grace, let us stop with Augustine, and see whether he denies an antecedent and decisive will of God only concerning malice, or also concerning the act itself to which malice is necessarily connected.

LXXXVI. An evil will is not malice, but is an act to which malice is connected. But does not Augustine deny that an evil will is predefined when he says, Nowhere do we read there is no will except from God: and therefore it is not written, because it is not true: And, God is the giver of all powers, not of all wills? At this point, if someone should cavil and say that God is not denied to be the giver of a will which is evil, but only of a will as it is evil; it is clear that in the same way power must also be distinguished, and it must be said that God is not the giver of power as it is for evil, but only of that which is for evil: Therefore since He is not the giver of will in the same way as of power; it follows from Augustine that He is denied to be the giver of will, not only as it is evil reduplicatively, but also which is evil specifically.

DISPUTATION I

And if there is an antecedent will concerning the material of sin, which is also the reason for foreknowing it as future, what can be the meaning of those words by which it is said that therefore one does not doubt that a man sins when he sins, because God foreknew not fate, not fortune, not anything else: but that he himself would sin? If there is something else which is also the reason for foreknowing future sin, namely the predefinition of an act which is evil, does God not know this? Does He not foreknow this?

And if there is a prior will of God concerning an act which necessarily brings malice with it, with what faith can the will of man or Angel be said to be prior to evil?

And if that act which is known to necessarily bring malice with it is predefined by God, is it not most truly said that God makes man or Angel elicit it, for whatever good end He may do this? But if God makes man elicit an act which entails malice even then, when it necessarily entails it; what, therefore, can be that work, concerning which Augustine denies that God makes men do it, and which he calls an alien deed?

And what is that alien deed? Malice, you say. But malice is neither a work nor a deed; but rather a defect of work and deed. Since it is impossible for this defect to have any other cause than that which is the cause why there is such a work and such a deed; what reason remains for denying that God, who is called the first and principal cause of this thing, also makes man do malice, if it is permissible to speak thus. For this argument is evident. For man to do malice is nothing other than to do an act which he knows to have malice annexed to it: But God by His predefinition makes man do an act which He knows to have malice annexed to it: Therefore God by His predefinition makes man do malice, in the way in which it can be done: Therefore since this is God's work and deed, according to Augustine, which God makes men do; an evil act will be God's work and deed according to the same reason according to which it is man's work and deed.

DISPUTATION I

And what will be the meaning of what is said, The soul was not deserted so that it might desert, but it deserted so that it might be deserted. For if the will of those deserting is prevented by an antecedent decree effectively operating the act by which they desert God, in those circumstances in which it is impossible for it not to be deserting, what does the will have which could be said to be prior to such preoccupation, so that it might therefore be judged to have deserted so that it might be deserted, especially if we recur to the sin of the Angels or Adam? And that from question 2 to Simplicianus, book 1: Nothing is inflicted by God by which man becomes worse, but only that by which he becomes better is not bestowed, can this stand with the opposite opinion? Is an act which necessarily has malice annexed to it not something? Does not man become worse by it? Is it not inflicted by God predefining?

And that by which he extensively proves that God does not, even through creatures already inclined to this of their own accord, much less through Himself, impel to that which is evil: and that it was only for this reason that God commanded the Israelites, or rather, according to their desire permitted, that they should ask from the Egyptians the golden and silver vessels which they still coveted with earthly desire, and receive as if to return them, though not intending to return them. That God does through Himself those things which are worthy of Him alone, and which are fitting to Him alone, such as illuminating souls, and by offering Himself to them for enjoyment, making them wise and blessed; other things through the creation serving Him, ordered by most perfect laws according to merits, commanding some of them, permitting others. These things, I say, how will they accord with an antecedent will to the Angel's sin, and with that predefinition from which followed an act which could not but be evil? Did God not do this through Himself? Did He use some other creature to impel the Angel in no way yet inclined to evil? But this is to illuminate souls and offer Himself to them for enjoyment, the kind of actions worthy of God alone? Let therefore the useless distinction in this place of an evil act formally and reduplicatively, or materially and

DISPUTATION I

specifically taken, depart: which can do nothing to elude the weight of such authority, which will soon be exploded again.

Finally, here should be referred whatever is said by the Fathers and drawn from the sacred pages, to persuade us that God is not the cause or Author of sin. For it follows from this that He cannot predefine an evil act antecedently. For how can one deny that he is both cause and Author of that thing, which he effectively anticipates by his definition of its production; so that he even excites every other cause of it?

LXXXVII. Here recurs the previous distinction concerning an evil act as it is evil reduplicatively, and concerning an act which is evil specifically. And because it can be denied that God predefines an act as it is evil, consequently it must be denied that God by His predefinition becomes the cause or Author of sin. But the same difficulties always recur. For we ask what it is to predefine an act as it is evil? Is it to intend malice itself? But this is not necessary to constitute an Author or cause of sin. For not even man himself intends it: and it is enough for him to be considered the cause and author of his sin, that in the operation, which he can intend even for a good and honest end, he knows there is malice. Why, therefore, would this not suffice for God to be the cause and author of sin?

LXXXVIII. Or is it to so predefine an evil act that from it both the predefinition itself, and the one who predefines, contract malice? But this too is in vain. For we do not contend that God becomes the cause and author of some sin of His own, which He Himself contracts; but only of another's, and which is contracted by the Angel or by man. And for one to be the cause or author of another's sin does not consist in being a participant in that malice and sinning with him: hence, not everyone who sins with another is called the author of another's sin, if, for instance, he does this by command, or deceived by him, or induced; but there is a certain way of relating to another's sin by impelling and moving, which, even if it were harmless, would nevertheless constitute one as the author of sin. Just as the author of some good work is also said to be

DISPUTATION I

one who contracts no goodness from it, because by hypothesis he is moved by a perverse intention to persuade that which he foresees will be carried out honestly and laudably by another: as if a brother were to impel his brother to the religious state in the hope of obtaining an inheritance. Why similarly would not one be the author of an evil thing, who would impel to it in such a way; even if he would derive no malice from it to himself? But what is that way of relating to another's sin? It is not to ask, not to persuade, not to command, not only to give counsel, but it is something common to all these: namely, in whatever way to impel another knowingly and freely, so that it can truly be said that his sin followed from it. But does not God so impel when He predefines the Angel's evil act even specifically and materially taken? Does He not will that it be produced, and that it be freely produced, and that it be produced in those circumstances in which He knows it is prohibited? And is that predefinition not the first root why that act exists, and why it is free, and why it is such in circumstances in which it is prohibited? With this supposed, can it be that malice does not follow? Will God not, therefore, cease to be the author of sin, although in the sense which has been stated, He does not predefine an evil act as evil?

LXXXIX. And therefore it is asked thirdly in what other sense God could be said not to predefine an evil act as it is evil? Is it in that sense that malice which is in such an act, since it is a certain defect, does not express a relation to the first cause predefining, but only to the second: which alone is a deficient cause? But this sense coincides with the former, and is similarly rejected. Because this is not necessary for God to be constituted the author of sin. For is He not the author and cause for man of a vital act, of vision, for example, of intellection, of volition? And yet man's vital act is not said to be vital in relation to God. For God does not live through man's vital act, nor does He see through his vision: nor does He understand through his intellection: nor does He will through his volition. But because He is the first cause why there follows an act (I always mean an act that is neither free nor evil): which is vital to man and

DISPUTATION I

vivifies him, and constitutes him seeing, understanding, willing; therefore God is said to be the cause and author of such acts for man. Why, therefore, if He is also the cause why there follows an act which is evil to man, and taints him and constitutes him a sinner; even if it is not evil to God, is He not said to be the cause and author of sin for man? For it is clear that an artist is the cause and author of the equality of one quantity with another, even if that equality is not a relation to the artist himself, but to another quantity: but by that very fact alone, that he is the cause of that from which equality results: And a painter is the cause and author of the similarity by which a picture represents the prototype; although that similarity is in no way referred to the painter, but by that very fact alone, that the painter is the cause and author of all those things from which similarity arises: But God is the cause and author for the Angel of all those things from which necessarily arises the respect of malice and that defection, by which the nature of sin is defined by hypothesis: Therefore He should be considered the cause and author for the Angel of malice itself and defection, even if it is not referred to God.

This is confirmed, because even the Angel himself when sinning, is not the cause of malice insofar as it is the terminus ad quem to which it is referred: for the terminus of a relation, under that aspect is not its cause: but the Angel is the cause of malice, insofar as he effects all those things from which malice necessarily springs forth: But God by His predefinition is also the cause and author of all those things from which malice springs forth, by the hypothesis of the contrary opinion: Therefore there is no reason why He should be denied to be the cause and author of malice for the Angel, from the same hypothesis.

XC. Hence, fourthly, I ask in what other sense they deny that God predefines an evil act, as it is evil? Is it because He does not predefine that from which He sees malice necessarily follows? But this is false in the contrary opinion. For by His predefinition, God wills that there be an act, and that it be free: but of prohibition God alone is properly the author. Now from those three things, being an act, being free, and being

DISPUTATION I

prohibited, it follows as necessarily that it is evil, as necessarily as from one and two follow three. Therefore if this is for God to predefine an evil act as it is evil; it must truly be conceded that He does so predefine it.

This is confirmed. Because one who commands, who persuades, who asks another to do a thing which he knows to be evil, by the very fact precisely that he knows it to be evil, and that it cannot be done by another except evilly, for whatever good end he may be moved, nevertheless is considered to impel to an evil act as it is evil, as much as suffices for him to be said to be the cause and author of another's sin: but one who predefines the same act with the same foresight of malice infallibly to follow, for whatever good end he may do it, by that very fact contributes more to the evil act than one who either commands, or persuades, or asks, for the former moves only morally, the latter also physically: and the moral necessity of acting evilly, which one induces, is less than the physical necessity which is introduced by the other: Therefore one who so predefines, a fortiori should be considered to impel to an evil act as it is evil, as much as can be required, that he be said to be the author and cause of another's sin: or if this is denied; it cannot be denied due to a defect, as if it does not attain that reason; but due to excess, because it surpasses and is more than an Author.

Again, this is confirmed. Because there is no one who does not think that God would be the author of sin, if He gave counsel or a precept, e.g., of perjury, or of worshipping an idol, whatever good He might intend from such an action, although that action would be taken materially according to its physical being, by the very fact alone that He would know that, given freedom, it could not be anything but evil: But it is more to predefine that action, than to command or persuade it, for the reason just adduced, and because more certainly and effectively that action follows from predefinition, than from counsel or precept: and consequently more certainly and effectively malice follows from it. What reason is there, therefore, why such a precept or counsel should be said to tend

DISPUTATION I

necessarily to an evil act as it is evil; but the same should not be said about the predefinition of the same act?

§ IV. IS IT TOLERABLE TO CALL GOD THE CAUSE OF SIN WHEN HE CANNOT BE CALLED ITS AUTHOR?

XCI. What was established by the previous arguments, Twisse partly concedes and partly denies: he concedes that God is the cause of sin, but an inculpable one; however, he denies that God can be called its author. I present his words from the second book where he asserts, "Just as man believes not because God foreknew he would believe, but because He predefined it; so Pontius Pilate and Herod did what they did not because God foreknew it, but because He predefined it." "Meanwhile," he says, "we distinguish between culpable and non-culpable cause. God's will is the cause of all things that happen, but not a culpable one; man is the cause of all evils done by him, and a culpable cause: because he not only acts disorderly and improperly in whatever he does, but also freely.... IT CANNOT BE DENIED AT ALL THAT GOD'S WILL IS THE CAUSE of all things He wills to happen: and nothing exists unless God wills it to happen, WHETHER GOOD OR EVIL, as Augustine most explicitly professed." From which it follows that God is the cause of both good and evil. And then: "Again we distinguish and say that although God's will is the cause of all things, it should by no means be called the author of all things." And lest anyone think it should not be called so because it sounds bad to grammarians, he adds: "He is only the author of all things which He wills to happen by His own doing: but He should not be called the author of those things which He wills to happen merely by His permission." By this manner of speech, you see, Reader, how God's will, to be more robust in causing evil, is made masculine by this Author. But that sin belongs to another tribunal. I only insist on this: that God can be called the Cause of sin, namely an inculpable one, but cannot be called its Author.

DISPUTATION I

But what rationale does this have? And why can't "author of sin" be distinguished so that one is culpable and another inculpable, just as "cause" is distinguished? What, I ask, is this discrimination of sin, that it can avoid defiling its cause, allowing it to be inculpable, but cannot avoid defiling its author? For we are dealing with an intelligent and free cause, which if supposed to be involved with evil with such intention and manner that it is glorious to be the cause of sin; why couldn't it also be possible that it is not indecorous to be called its author? And if common usage and established speaking customs are considered, there are even more reasons to deny God the attribute of cause with respect to sin than that of author.

XCII. Augustine seeks the cause of evil, certain that it must be sought outside of God. "I did not understand," he says, "an explicit and clear cause of evil. Whatever it might be, I saw that it should be sought in such a way that I would not be compelled to believe that the immutable God is mutable, lest I become what I believed." O slow Augustine, unless Twisse is stupid: Why does he fear being forced to make God mutable, from good to evil, if he says God causes evil; when he can both say this and deny that, by asserting God is the cause of evil, but a holy and inculpable one? He continues, "And so I sought it securely, and certain that what they (the Manicheans) said was not true, which I fled from with all my soul, because I saw that in seeking the origin of evil, they were filled with malice, since they thought that your substance suffered evil rather than that their own did evil. And I focused to discern what I had heard, that free will of choice is the cause of our doing evil." That security was false and that certainty doubtful: nor should the cause of evil be sought by moving from God to free will; rather, both should be joined, saying that God is the primary and inculpable cause of evil, free will the secondary and culpable one. But Augustine had to be ignorant of these things, which were reserved for better times to be learned from the Calvinists' Gospel. That reason which Augustine finally found to deny that God is the cause of evil—that evil is not some substance; that what-

DISPUTATION I

ever exists is good, and therefore because God makes only what exists, He has made only good things, and thus evil cannot find a place among His effects—is futile and cannot prevent God from being called the cause of evil according to Twisse.

But what shall we say to a hundred other statements of Augustine in which he denies that God is the cause of evil? In *City of God* 15, he says, "Attribute to no one but yourself that you sin." Why not to God too? Is it not permitted to attribute to each cause its effect? In *Epistle* 120: "He could foreknow men's sins, not cause them." You say He could also cause them. But in what kind of cause? I think not other than efficient: therefore He could effect them. In *Psalm* 7: "This arrangement must be attributed to divine providence: not because it makes sinners, but because it orders them after they have sinned." And in *Psalm* 9: "Divine providence both makes and orders light: but darkness it only orders." Yet as you yourself confess, it also causes both sinners and these darknesses: and it causes only efficiently. He repeats the same in *Psalm* 44: "You are an unjust man, I said two names, man, unjust: in these two names one is nature, the other fault, one God makes for you, the other you have made: love what God makes, hate what you have made." Does God not cause fault either; even if inculpably? And if it is permitted to love what God causes, according to Augustine; embrace your disgraceful acts, William. In *Psalm* 29: "When men are permitted to harm us, not the will to harm, but the power is given from above. For each evil person has within himself the will to harm." Is what is caused from above not given from above? And is the will to harm not caused from above? And how does one have within himself what he receives by divine predefinition and causality?

Add those things we reported earlier. "Nowhere do we read, 'there is no will except from God': and therefore it is not written, because it is not true." Is not from God what God causes? And that, "God is the giver of all powers, not of wills." That is to say, He does not give what He willingly causes? But what alienated act would exist in relation to God, as

DISPUTATION I

Augustine supposes? Can there be any act alienated from its cause? Hear also this from City of God 12: "Who would be so foolish as to say that a good will makes an evil will?" How far, I ask, is there between making and causing? And if one who says God makes is foolish according to Augustine, will Twisse who says God causes seem wise?

There are also other passages which show that for Augustine "cause of sin" and "author of sin" are synonymous, as can be seen in his book of 83 Questions, when he says: "Therefore God is the cause of good only: and for this reason He is the highest good. Therefore He who is the author of all things that exist is not the author of evil." Do you see how Augustine uses cause and Author of evil indistinguishably? In On Merit and Remission of Sins 2: "You should not refer the CAUSE of any human fault to God." And soon after: "It is wrong to say that an evil will should be referred to God as its AUTHOR." In Psalm 91, he inveighs against those who make God the AUTHOR of sins, even though He punishes them; and adds, "It cannot be that God punishes what HE DOES"—this therefore is for God to be the author of sin, namely to do it, which is to cause it: and then he presents two ways in which the impious refer their sins to God as author, namely either mediately through the intervention of other causes, or immediately. "Sometimes," he says, "having sent away all others, they go directly to God, and when they sin they say, 'God willed this, if God did not will it I would not sin.'" This, which is for God to will it, is sufficient for Augustine to consider Him made the author of sin: but to cause is for God to will: Therefore this, which is to cause, will be sufficient for Augustine for God to be the author of sin: Therefore there is no distinction for him between author and cause. In Psalm 104, while explaining the passage "He turned their heart to hate His people," he asks, "Should it be understood or believed that God turns the heart of man to do evil?.... Is God the author of such grave sins, who is not the author of even the slightest sin?" Why does that turning of the heart to hatred prove God to be the author of sin, if not because it proves Him to be the cause? And therefore when Augustine interprets it in such

DISPUTATION I

a way as to remove the title of author, he also removes the name of cause. For he continues: "Therefore, in that He multiplied His people by His kindness, He turned the wicked to envy.... Not by MAKING their heart evil; but by doing good to His people, He turned their heart which was spontaneously evil to hatred. For He did not pervert a right heart; but turned a spontaneously perverted heart to hatred of His people, whereby He would use that evil well: not by MAKING them evil; but by bestowing on these good things which the evil could easily envy." O pre-definition which works in the hearts of the iniquitous, where are you! God worked nothing in the hearts of the Egyptians by which they might become evil; but He worked in the very object of that hatred: and He worked only what was good: as if Augustine's fear, that God would become the author of sin, could not be avoided in any other way than by denying that He is the cause.

XCIII. And Tertullian had already done this same thing when he denied that God is the author of evil because He is not the effector: and among all the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, the concepts of Author of evil and cause of evil are so connected that there is a perpetual inference: God is not the Author because He is not the cause; or He does not cause because He would be the author: nor do they ever use other words, nor indeed can they, when they deny that evils proceed from God, than those that signify causality, such as to make, to work, to create, to sow, etc. But all these are futile for one who admits that God causes inculpably. Among the Greek Fathers, while disputation against heretics about the principle of evil is very frequent, you will scarcely ever find them denying that God is the author of evil under any other names than those which signify only cause, such as αἷτιος ["aitios"] and ποιητής ["poietes"]. Thus Justin, Clement, Eusebius from Origen and also from Philo, Athanasius, Basil, Cyril of Alexandria.

XCIV. It is but the dream of one who is awake, what Twisse thought, that God can be called the cause of sin, but an inculpable one, for it is as contradictory to be a cause that is not culpable as to be called

DISPUTATION I

culpable one who is not a cause. The Greeks also seem to have held this view, when they signified fault with the same word as cause, and likewise both one who is not a cause and one who is not culpable: so that you do not know which they prefer in the subject matter when they say ἀναίτιον ["anaitios"]. These concepts are indeed connected and inseparable, which Clement of Alexandria without doubt expressed in the previously cited passage. For when he had said αἰτία ἐλομένου, Θεὸς ἀναίτιος ["the cause belongs to the one choosing, God is without cause/fault"], he adds κακῶν γὰρ Θεὸς οὐποτε αἷτιος ["for God is never the cause of evils"], which reasoning would be ridiculous if there were not an opposition of things as well as of names: and if one could in any way be called ἀναίτιος ["without cause/fault"] and inculpable, who can be called αἷτιος ["a cause"] or causing. And the sense of the remaining Fathers is the same, when they are moved by this reason to refer evils to some other principle, because God is good. Athanasius denies that evil comes from good, and asserts that God would have a nature mixed with evil if He were the cause of evil; αἷτιον γινόμενον κακῶν ["becoming the cause of evils"]. Basil: εἰ κακῶν αἷτιος, οὐκ ἀγαθός ["if the cause of evils, not good"]. Cyril of Alexandria: εἴτα πῶς ὁ φιλάγαθος οὕτω Θεός, τὴν τῶν ἡθῶν διαστροφὴν εἰργάσατο ["then how could God, who so loves good, have worked the perversion of character?"]. Theodoret embraces that saying of Plato: Κακῶν δὲ αἷτιον φάναι τὸν Θεὸν, ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχητέον παντὶ τρόπῳ ["To say that God, who is good, is the cause of evils, must be fought against in every way"]. Ambrose: "How much more serious than the sin itself, to refer to God what you have done: and to transfer the odium of your guilt to the Author, not of crime, but of innocence?" Augustine: "Vice was not contracted from an inculpable craftsman; but from original sin which was committed by free will." And: "Therefore God is the cause of good only, and for this reason He is the highest good. Therefore He is not the Author of evil, who is the Author of all things that exist, because insofar as they exist, they are good." Fulgentius: "An evil will does not pertain to the best Creator." He adds that any work in which He

DISPUTATION I

can be found neither merciful nor just should not be ascribed to God. Prosper: "If God throws down a man who is obedient to Him from piety, and makes one who is living well to fall; therefore He returns evil for good: and unjustly punishes what He impels to happen. What can be said or thought more perverse? What more insane?"

Many other similar examples can be found among both Greek and Latin Fathers. From these one may argue thus: If these things can be reconciled—to be the cause of evil and to be inculpable—it is foolish to deny that God is the cause of evil because He is good, because He is just, because He loves good and justice, because He is the Author of innocence, and similar reasons; since all these can stand with the fact that God is the cause of evil. But according to Twisse, these can be reconciled: to be the cause of evil and to be inculpable. Therefore it is foolish to deny that God is the cause of evil because He is good, because He is just, etc. Yet the Fathers do deny it for this reason; and both Latin and Greek agree in this reasoning, as has been shown. Therefore, according to Twisse, the Fathers are foolish and imprudent and unskilled in refuting heretics, because they did not know how to concede to them that God is the cause of evil, and yet deny that He is culpable. But we shall take care to think better of the Fathers than of Twisse; and rather laugh at him who, both contrary to all reason and without precedent, devised a non-culpable cause of evil, than at those who, both with manifest reason leading the way and with the authority of the wise compelling, absolutely deny that one who cannot be called culpable can be called the cause of evil.

§ V. WHETHER GOD SHOULD BE SAID TO WILL THAT EVIL OCCURS

XCv. Another paradox of Twisse is that God wills evil to occur: "whether you wish it or not, you must necessarily concede that GOD WILLS EVIL AS MUCH AS GOOD." Moreover, he thinks this neces-

DISPUTATION I

sarily follows from the Jesuits' doctrine concerning the distribution of graces which are foreknown to be congruent or incongruent. "Here," he says, "I appeal to all sober people: does it not manifestly follow that God equally wills that these people neither believe nor repent, but are condemned because of their infidelity and impenitence; just as He wills that the elect believe and repent, and are crowned with eternal life according to their faith and repentance?" Since God distributes to some those graces which He knows they will use well, for the purpose that they might use them well, Twisse thinks it follows that God also distributes to others those graces which He knows they will, by their freedom, use badly (although they could use them well), for the purpose that they might use them badly. And he adds this reasoning: "If I will something from which I certainly know another thing will follow, is it not necessary that I certainly will that consequence as well?" And this seems so obvious to him that he appeals to all sober people, though inadvisedly, for perhaps the intoxicated would have agreed with him. What? Is it impossible that God does not intend the perverse connections that depraved men make with divine benefits by their own free will? And are those not sober who think that God can foreknow something will follow apart from His intention? Are all those intoxicated who assert that God sincerely calls to salvation those whom He knows will abuse such a calling? And by this reasoning, must we condemn the entire tradition, along with St. Paul, who asserts that "God desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth"? Let the prudent reader judge whether this William was sober himself when he denied that anyone who philosophized differently could be sober. When God is said to will something, which necessarily and intrinsically causes something else to follow, I admit it can hardly be understood how God does not will this consequence as well. Hence the difficulty for those who predetermine without the use of middle knowledge: when they assert that God absolutely wills an act that is evil, similarly wills that it be free, and also wills that it be prohibited, they can scarcely deny that He also wills the malice that necessarily follows from those

DISPUTATION I

three things absolutely willed by God, and indeed by an insurmountable necessity. But who in their right mind would affirm that what follows from an object absolutely willed by God in such a way that human freedom adds it, with full power to add the opposite, is also necessarily willed and intended by God? If I give money I owe to a man, though I do not doubt he will waste it on gambling, am I therefore unable to give it without willing and intending that he gamble it away? Or if I can do this, cannot God? Away with such crude philosophy.

XCVI. But Twisse continues to reveal his mind: "I will demonstrate conclusively that sin can be foreknown as future in no other way than through the determination of the divine will, which from eternity decreed that sin would occur." He adds: "Although something can be said to be foreknown by man as future which is not willed by him, this cannot be said of God; the contrary opinion is a monstrous one." To this man, doves appear as monsters, while he plays daily with the hydra. But let us see how he tempers the horror of his position. "Meanwhile, although God decrees His own works so that they occur by His own doing, this does not prevent Him from also decreeing our sins so that they occur by His permission." And again, "The will," he says, "by which God wills sin to occur, but in what way? Not that He wills sin to occur by God effecting it, but that He wills sin to occur by Himself permitting it. For He becomes the Author of good only by doing and willing good to occur by His own doing. Therefore, He would become the Author of evil only by willing and making evil occur by His own doing." Also: "Certainly it would be sinful to affirm that God wills evil to occur by His own doing; but for evil to occur with God permitting it is good, not only according to Augustine but also according to Bellarmine. And shall we be ashamed to affirm that whatever is good happens by God's willing?"

Here first Augustine and Bellarmine must be freed from calumny. I easily acknowledge those words of Augustine: "Nothing happens unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by allowing it or by doing it Himself." But I say this was spoken with no other intention than to make us

DISPUTATION I

understand that nothing happens unless God either wills to do it Himself or permits another to do it. Consequently, God's will, insofar as it concerns evil, is only a will of permission; insofar as it concerns good, it is a will of operation and effecting the good itself. That this is Augustine's meaning is clear not only from a thousand passages in which he attributes to God only permission regarding sins, but from this very passage where he says shortly after: "The sinning angel did NOT WHAT HE [God] WILLED, but what the angel himself willed," and "Through the creature's will, by which was done WHAT THE CREATOR DID NOT WILL, was fulfilled what He did will." Also: "The sinner preferred to do his own will RATHER THAN GOD'S WILL." If God directly and properly willed the angel or man to sin, how could they not be doing what God wills? And why would they not be said to be doing God's will as much as their own, if God willed them to will what they will? But this is proven from Augustine's statement itself, whose division into "doing" and "allowing" would be ridiculous if God were thought to will sin to occur. Since this is understood by Twisse to be an absolute and efficacious will, who also thinks it is predefinitive, and since it is impossible for God to will something efficaciously without thereby willing to bring about its existence (for these are synonymous), it follows that God, who in this way wills sin to occur, effects its occurrence. And so this would be Augustine's meaning: "Nothing happens which God does not will to happen, either by doing it Himself or by causing it to happen." Such a thought may be worthy of Twisse, but not of Augustine.

XCVII. Bellarmine quotes from Augustine these words: "Although things that are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, nevertheless, it is good that there should be not only things that are good, but also things that are evil." He similarly interprets this so that the phrase "it is good that they be" means nothing other than "it is good that they be permitted." This is good only accidentally, because it is connected with something that is good in itself. "Therefore," he says, "it is not so much good that sins exist as it is good that they be ordered after they exist by

DISPUTATION I

God's permission." See how nicely he deduces from Bellarmine that God wills sin to occur! That this interpretation aligns with Augustine's intention is proven in the same way, namely, because otherwise his words would contain a ridiculous and contradictory statement, unless it is expressed in this way: "Although it is evil for evil to exist insofar as it is evil, nevertheless it is good for evil to exist insofar as some good can follow from it on that occasion." Which means that the good is not in the evil itself, but in seizing the opportunity for good from it.

Hence it follows that God's will, which is concerned with this kind of good, should not tend toward evil, but only toward that good which can be gathered from evil once it is permitted and presupposed. And from this it is clear how we should understand what Augustine repeatedly emphasizes, that the wicked fulfill God's will while fighting against it. God's will is twofold: one concerning the existence of sin itself, the other concerning some fruit to be gathered from sin. Sinners fulfill this second will, by which God wills, given the presupposition of sin, to illustrate either His mercy by pardoning or His justice by punishing. They resist the first will, by which the existence of sin displeases God; and although He grants the creature the opportunity to sin, because this befits its freedom, He nevertheless sufficiently prevents sin by prohibiting it, threatening, and inspiring the sense of this prohibition and these threats.

XCVIII. Now let us examine the rest of Twisse's argument. First, what do these evil statements mean: "God becomes the Author of good by doing and willing good to occur by His own doing; God would become the Author of evil by willing and making evil occur by His own doing"? What, I ask, are these absurdities and circular verbal formulations, "by doing and willing it to occur by His doing"? Might one doubt whether Twisse was entangled in nets when he wrote these things? I am mistaken if his intention is not this: God wills something to happen through Himself, and wills something to happen through another; He wills and effects through Himself what is good, but wills and effects through another what is evil. Therefore, He does not sin Himself but

DISPUTATION I

causes another to sin. Let us revisit all those statements: God is the cause of sin but not culpably; He wills the creature to sin; He wills this absolutely, and antecedently, and efficaciously decrees this; He predefines this, yet does not will or make sin occur by His own doing, but wills and makes it occur only by His permission. I say the genuine appearance of this position is as follows: God does not will to sin through Himself, but He does will and cause another to sin, thus extracting, as they say, the chestnut from the burning coals with someone else's hand. But what is it for God to be the Author of another's sin if not this? I would certainly marvel at the man's stupidity if it were not already familiar and known through long experience, that he would deny God is the Author of evil while conceding He is the cause, since he already confesses that God conducts Himself in a way that better fits the description of an Author than a cause. For it is proper to a cause, if it is truly a cause, to influence by itself the effect of which it is called the cause; since Twisse denies this applies to God with respect to evil, he could also deny that God is the cause. But the proper definition of an Author remains intact even in one who does not himself do what he is called the Author of, but impels and moves another to do it; and therefore one who merely commands, or exhorts, or gives advice is truly and properly called an Author. Therefore, why should God, who—although He does not sin Himself—nevertheless wills, and efficaciously wills, another to sin, and thereby effects that the other sins, not be called the Author of sin for another rather than the cause?

You object that all of Christianity protests against this. Christianity, you say? Add all philosophy, and not only philosophy, but whatever reason and sense exist in the entire human race. But what does it protest against? Against the words only, or against the meaning expressed by the words? What do you think those who so strongly abhor calling God the Author of sin recoil from? Do you hope that by removing this name, they will nevertheless become accustomed to this image, in which you depict God decreeing, predefining, willing antecedently and efficaciously, and therefore causing the angel to sin and be damned? Do you also hope they

DISPUTATION I

will believe that God remains harmless and innocent, who wills something to be done by another, yet forbids it to be done, and threatens, and thunders, and avenges with eternal fires and interminable punishment those who transgress, that is, weak and infirm creatures who do not resist the insurmountable will of the Creator? O wretched man, if you can believe this, impious too if you pretend to believe it and invite others to believe it!

XCIX. But come now. (1) What, I ask, do you mean when you deny that God wills evil to occur by His own doing? If He does not do it Himself, who does? The creature, you say. But what does the creature do that God does not do? The creature performs the act, makes it free, and creates the prohibition, and malice occurs only through the effecting of these three things, as you yourself also maintain. Therefore, God wills sin to occur not only by His permission, but also by His causing whatever man does in committing it, and even something that man does not do, namely the prohibition and its signification. (2) Again, I ask what you mean when you say that God wills sin to occur only by His permission. He wills it to occur by His causing the act, causing it to be free, and causing and announcing the prohibition. With these in place, what is it that He wills to occur only by His permission? The malice, you say. But on the contrary, where nothing remains to be done by someone, nothing also remains to be permitted, because permission applies only to what someone can or should do. But once the act and its freedom and the prohibition are posited by man, nothing remains to be done by him for malice to exist, as you yourself previously conceded. Therefore, nothing remains to be permitted to him. It is as if I said: For man to perform a free act, given its prohibition, is for man to create malice, according to you yourself. God wills for man to perform a free act, given its prohibition, not only by permitting but by causing it. Therefore, God wills malice to be created not only by His permission but also by His causing. (3) But does God will this very thing, that malice should follow from a free and prohibited act? These are your words: "If I will something from which I certainly know

DISPUTATION I

another thing will follow, is it not necessary that I also will that consequence?" Therefore, it is necessary that God wills malice to follow from a free and prohibited act. Thus, malice follows by God's willing it to follow, and by His willing it efficaciously and absolutely. Do you affirm that what follows from God's efficacious and absolute will follows only by God's permission? Doesn't permission stand opposed to an absolute and efficacious will that what is permitted should occur? You will efficaciously and absolutely that Titius should kill your enemy. This is, you say, merely permitting? An operation of something that someone is said to permit is more compatible with permission itself than is a determined and absolute will that it occur. For one who so lends his operation to another that by his own will he is no more inclined to its use than to its non-use, and would rather have either determined by another than by himself, can very rightly be said to permit his action to another, and to do permissively what he does. But who in their right mind has ever dreamed that one by whose absolute and efficacious will something occurs merely permits it to occur? (4) Come now, if God commanded it, would you say He merely permits it? And does not His absolute will, which cannot possibly be frustrated in its effect, influence the effect more efficaciously and powerfully than a command which often lacks effect? What is wrong with your brain, that you say something occurs merely by His permission, which occurs by His absolute will, when you would not affirm the same if it occurred by His command? (5) I think you want to say that whatever God's will may be, nevertheless, what He Himself cannot be said to do must be said to be merely permitted by Him; and because God, while willing the angel to sin, does not Himself sin in such an action, as you believe, therefore it must be said that He merely permits the angel to sin. But God also does not understand through that knowledge which is elicited by the angel; will you therefore think that God wills the angel to know merely by His permission, and that He is no more the Author of angelic knowledge than of sin, or that He is as much the Author of sin as of knowledge? (6) Remember that a little earlier you attributed the cause of sin to God.

DISPUTATION I

Therefore, God causes sin, even if not culpably, He still causes it; and causing it willingly, He therefore wills sin to occur by His voluntarily causing it. In what category of cause? When you have gone through all of them, you will have to settle on the category of efficient cause. Therefore, God wills sin to occur by His efficiently causing it. So revisit your distinction and say that God wills sin to occur not by His doing it, but by His efficiently causing it. Oh, you! (7) Twisse's words from book 1 should also be reconsidered here: "The cause of this futurity must be sought in God, and in God there is nothing except His will that makes a merely possible thing advance into the condition of future things." In this passage, he argues with Pennoto about those sins which God foreknew would occur both among the Jews if the body of Moses were not hidden, and among those young men who are said to have been "taken away lest wickedness should alter their understanding." These and other things of this kind, he denies, are future unless God's will makes them pass from the condition of merely possible things into the condition of future things. Therefore, God's will makes a future sin be future. Thus, God wills sin to be future by His will making it so. Therefore, not merely by His permission. (8) This reasoning needs to be explained more fully here, and at the same time that machine which he rotates through all the pages of his work must be shaken, against whose impact he challenges all Jesuits, as we have seen, when he says that what is future passes from eternity from the condition of a merely possible thing into the condition of a future thing. Therefore, a cause must be assigned from eternity for that transition, and no cause can be assigned except the divine will, by which alone whatever is future from eternity becomes future, whether it is good or evil. This reasoning, I say, conflicts with the proposition we are now examining, namely, that God wills evil to occur not by His doing it, but by His permitting it. For I ask, when God's will is said to be the cause why sin passes from the condition of a merely possible thing into the condition of a future thing, is it a cause merely permitting that transition, or is it a cause effecting it? If it is a cause merely permitting, then assign a

DISPUTATION I

cause from eternity executing what God permits. For whenever there is a cause merely permitting something, there must be another cause that does what the first is said to permit. For what happens necessarily happens through some agent cause. Since a cause that is merely permitting is distinguished from a cause that effects, it evidently follows that what happens, besides having a cause that merely permits, must have another cause that effects. But from eternity there is no cause why sin will be future except the divine will, as is supposed by the Adversary. But if he also concedes that God's will is the cause that makes sin be future from eternity, then God wills sin to be future not only by His permitting, but also by His making it be future. Nothing remains except for him to say that God wills sin to become future by His making it be future, but does not will it to become present by His making it be present, but only by His permitting it. Thoughts of this kind, I do not doubt, are fruitful in Twisse's school at Leeuwarden, but they do not easily arise elsewhere.

C. I conclude this entire argument about the necessity of middle knowledge for the absolute foreknowledge of future sins in the decree to permit them, by warning those theologians who say that the object of the divine will is also evil, insofar as it becomes good as a means, to note that they have found a follower of this doctrine among the Dutch Calvinists, among whom they could also have many more authors. But those who teach that God predefines the material aspect of sin, or the act underlying malice, should also be warned to see what reason they give for this. For if they think God does this for the purpose of showing the riches either of His mercy toward those whom He spares, or of His justice toward those with whom He is angry, as they themselves sometimes admit, they must also necessarily admit that God wills the act underlying malice under that aspect in which it is a suitable means either for exciting mercy or for provoking justice. But it cannot contribute to this except under the aspect of evil, since without malice there can be neither room for pardon nor for vengeance. Therefore, God must will it under the aspect of evil.

DISPUTATION I

But this is to will it as it is evil, which is what we were just now arguing against in Twisse.

CHAPTER VI. WITHOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, GOD CANNOT PREDEFINE THE FREE ACTIONS OF CREATED WILL.

CI. I will press this fourth and final argument against Twisse, so that it may be evident how successfully he extricates himself from this snare.

§ I. TWISSE'S SOLUTION TO THE PROPOSED ARGUMENT IS EXAMINED

Having admitted middle knowledge, it is not difficult to understand how God can predefine a free act without injuring its freedom. For since He knows that there is either one or several combinations of circumstances which, if they are put in place, will infallibly result in the created will performing this or that act with full freedom, He can efficaciously and absolutely will that it performs the act, and performs it freely. This is because the entire efficacy of the divine will is applied to the created will only through the establishment of those circumstances which are already known neither to impose necessity nor yet to be infallibly connected with the predefined effect. Since, I say, God does not wish to execute His predefinitive will in any other way than through a means already foreknown to be efficacious—and this means is not foreknown to be efficacious through any special power of determining the will in such a way that it would no longer be able to suspend its action even in the composed sense, that is, by combining non-action with such a means—the consequence is that by predefining, He indeed makes the effect necessarily and absolutely future, but only with that necessity which follows the

DISPUTATION I

free determination of the will foreknown under a condition. And thus that predefinition stands between the determination of the created will that is future under a condition, and the same determination as absolutely future: obviously posterior to the former, but prior to the latter.

However, without middle knowledge, how divine predefinition can be compatible with the freedom of the predefined act is so difficult to grasp that this is also one of the greatest struggles for our Adversaries. For there cannot be a predefinition from which the predefined effect does not follow with some necessity, since it is impossible for that predefinition to be frustrated of its effect. And since "that which cannot be otherwise" is the definition of necessity, it follows that predefinition, which cannot be frustrated of its effect, is **NECESSARILY** connected with it by some necessity. Moreover, this necessity, whatever it may be and by whatever name it may be called, has an antecedent cause that is independent of the free consent of the will, namely the predefinition itself. Hence, it is not a necessity created by the free determination of the will, but a necessity from which that determination follows. And since every necessity of action which is not created by the free will, but to which it is rather subjected, seems to conflict with the very freedom of the action, we ask how these nevertheless do not conflict, and what means there is to reconcile them. And there are some Authors who, not having the use of middle knowledge, and yet wishing to retain predefinitions of free acts, succumb to this question; as can be seen in Cajetan, whose words I will later cite from his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.

CII. But Twisse, who thinks somewhat better of the powers of his own genius, even if it is dumbfounded and weakened by old age, conducts himself rather confidently in the solution of this argument. But he solves it in such a way that he keeps to his usual method, using circular reasoning and a manifest begging of the question, with an astonishing conflict of words and statements. The summary of his solution is: The act predefined by God is free, because God's will is most omnipotent, and not only does what it wills, but also how it wills; and therefore when He

DISPUTATION I

will be by predefining not only that man's act be done, but also that it be done freely, both that such an act will follow and that it will follow freely—this is what St. Thomas teaches.

Nor does he notice that we not only do not deny any of these things, but also assume them to be most true and certain. We contend only that these things, which are true for us and should be true for everyone, are false only in his view. His view should therefore be judged to involve a contradiction, because according to it the predefined act is both free and not free. It is free, because the Adversary assumes this; but it is not free, because predefinition, by bringing about necessity in the predefined operation, by that very fact destroys its freedom. But to say that it does not remove freedom because it is a predefinition of an act as free, is to beg the question and to reason in a circle. For one must show either that necessity of the predefined action does not follow from predefinition, or at least not such necessity as conflicts with freedom.

CIII. But Twisse also tries to accomplish this, though how cleverly he does so will be for you, Excellent Reader, to judge. For he speaks as follows: "As regards the first point, we also confess that the divine decree and divine foreknowledge impose NO necessity on human acts. Indeed, with Aquinas, we profess that it is to be attributed to the efficacy of the divine will that things which are necessary are produced necessarily; things which are contingent happen contingently and freely. Again, we say with Waldensis that the divine will is by no means the whole cause of human acts, but we acknowledge the human will to be their cause inasmuch as it is free." Here now, to alleviate the Reader's boredom and to relax his mind after long and difficult meditation, he mixes in jokes and proves himself to be a Comic, at least, if anyone might deny he is a Theologian. "I do not say," he says, "that it is changeable. For a man, even against his will, is capable of being changed, namely one standing on steps and halted to the cross. And so changeability, if you please, may go to the cross. We say that the freedom of man is in no way injured by

DISPUTATION I

the divine decree, but rather is confirmed by it, especially since God has decreed that human acts are performed by the human will only freely."

I do not know whether this William is haltered, but he certainly proves himself so changeable to every breeze in this passage that all that changeability, which he wished to go to the cross, seems to have jumped onto his head. You have already seen, Friendly Reader, how when motivated by fear of losing freedom, he professed that no necessity is brought in by divine predefinition. But look how, when motivated by equal fear of depriving that same predefinition of its efficacy, certainty, and infallibility, he professes that every kind of necessity is brought in by it. Meanwhile, we freely admit that neither man nor Angel is as free as God is, nor is in command of his action as God is of His; also that God NECESSITATES the will to act freely whatever it does. And a little later: "We defend the antecedent decree of God. We say that, given the antecedent decree of God, the malice of sin follows NECESSARILY and infallibly with NECESSITY FROM A HYPOTHESIS, that is, NECESSITY IN A QUALIFIED SENSE and MODAL NECESSITY, in this form: Given that God has decreed that such an act be done freely according to the substance of the act, which nevertheless is not in conformity with God's law, it is NECESSARY that such an act be done." And then: "There is therefore, I admit, such a necessity from supposition, and indeed from the supposition of a cause; yet not such as would weaken created freedom, but rather confirms it, since God wills not only that it be done, but that it be done contingently and freely. Whence we say it is necessary, and this with ANTECEDENT and CAUSAL NECESSITY, that what is done by a rational creature not only be done, but also be done contingently and freely." From these statements, you have from this Author that the divine decree imposes no necessity on human acts, and yet it imposes antecedent, causal, modal, hypothetical, and qualified necessity.

CIV. Now since, when he calls this necessity modal, hypothetical, and qualified, he seems to soften what he said about it being causal and antecedent, he destroys this very softening elsewhere by introducing abso-

DISPUTATION I

lute necessity. I present his words from book 2: "But I say that by equal reason not only a proposition about the present, but also about the future (namely, 'Antichrist will be'), even stated simply, is ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. For it is ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT God knows whatever is knowable, in whatever genre it may be knowable, both in the genre of the future and in the genre of the present or past: and consequently also that proposition about the future, according to Aquinas, is ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, and this for a most just reason. For just as whatever is past, it is absolutely necessary that it be past; so also whatever is present, it is absolutely necessary that it be present; again, whatever is future, IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY that it be future. Meanwhile, nothing prevents it from being either necessarily or contingently future." One must keep in mind this Doctor's perpetual principle, which is that a future thing has no knowability, nor certainty, nor therefore any necessity, except what it derives from the prior decree of God, by which alone that transition of the future thing from the condition of merely possible to the condition of future is made from eternity. Therefore, if whatever is future, it is absolutely necessary that it be future, that absolute necessity is established solely by God's decree, or what is the same thing, by predefinition; and thus God's predefinition communicates absolute necessity to the future. To the same end pertains what he says: "But is it less freely done because God absolutely and irresistibly wills something to be done freely by man?" Absolutely necessary and simply necessary coincide according to this Doctor, as is clear from the cited passage in book 2.

From these statements it is evident that, according to Twisse, divine predefinition both introduces no necessity into the predefined act, and introduces necessity in the simple, absolute, antecedent, causal, modal, hypothetical, and qualified sense. I remember once seeing a jester in the court of a nobleman, who when asked whether he was a Huguenot, answered, "Not at all." "A Catholic, then?" "Yes," he said. But when immediately pressed with the inquiry reversed, whether he was a Catholic, he said, "Not at all." "A Huguenot, then?" "That's right." See,

DISPUTATION I

Reader, how little this Huguenot of Leeuwarden differs from him. If I ask him whether any decree of God other than that which preserves their freedom should be admitted regarding free acts, he says, "It should not." Therefore, this decree should not impose any necessity. He answers, "None." Again I ask whether this decree can be uncertain and fallible. He says it cannot. "Therefore," I say, "it imposes some necessity?" He answers, "It also imposes multiple necessities." Furthermore, is that necessity accommodated and congruent with created freedom? "Absolutely," he says, "and that is why it is a modal necessity." But perhaps that mode will diminish the power of the divine will. "It is a mode," he says, "which is called 'irresistibly'." Does he wish to accommodate the freedom of the creature? It is a hypothetical and conditional necessity. Does he not wish to? It is absolute. If it pleases and is convenient, it is a qualified necessity; if otherwise, it will be necessity in the simple sense. In short, Twisse, a man of no ill intent, as befits an apostle of the new law, has become all things to all men, to make a mockery of all.

CV. It is worthwhile to further report how he briefly summarizes the entire harmony of divine predefinition with the freedom of the creature. "You will say: But given such a decree or divine determination, IT IS NECESSARY that man believe and repent. Certainly IT WILL BE NECESSARY that he believe. But how? NOT NECESSARILY, but freely." Also: "God decrees not only that such an act be done, but also that it be done in such a way. Also NOT NECESSARILY BUT CONTINGENTLY AND FREELY. Hence it follows that IT IS NECESSARY that it not only be done, but also that it be done freely." This statement, with the phrase "necessary" changed to the adverb "necessarily," as I showed earlier can be done, yields this: "Given the divine decree, a free act happens necessarily, yet not necessarily." With the adverb again changed to a noun in both places, it yields this: "It is necessary that a free act be done, so that this is not necessary." Changed again from concrete to abstract, it follows: "A free act happens by necessity, without necessity for it to happen." And with the definition of necessity and the definition

DISPUTATION I

of contingency substituted in place of the defined, that statement, "It is necessary that an act happen but contingently," will produce this: "It cannot be otherwise than that an act happen, but in such a way that it can be otherwise." I have chosen to explain these points in detail so that the Reader may see that if this William is not haltered, he certainly has a head most suited for a halter.

§ II. WHAT KIND OF NECESSITY IS EXCLUDED BY THE CONCEPT OF A FREE AGENT.

CVI. However, since those who maintain predefinitions while excluding middle knowledge cannot deny that there is some kind of necessity incompatible with free acts—since by the common sense of all mortals who can reason, a free agent is distinguished from a necessary one—and yet they teach that some necessity is introduced by the predefinitive decree, which they think is not incompatible with freedom, the whole question comes down to showing how the necessity introduced by such a predefinition is not the same as that which is incompatible with the freedom of acts. Or what one has less than the other, whereby it is judged compatible with freedom.

And first, consequent necessity must be excluded, concerning which there is no doubt that it does not harm freedom in any way, since it is itself free, being created by freedom itself. Specifically, that a man cannot avoid sinning, supposing that he sins, and thus sins necessarily from the supposition that he sins, does not hinder his freedom. This freedom is not the faculty to combine two opposites, namely to sin and not to sin, but only to posit either one. And since not to sin, supposing that one sins, is to combine those two opposites or contradictories, therefore when the will is denied the ability to do this, nothing is denied that would be repugnant to it. And since it freely posits sinning, which makes it impossible to join non-sinning to it, therefore this inability not to sin signifies only that impotence which freedom itself creates. Thus it makes itself impo-

DISPUTATION I

tent, and does so freely; and therefore this impotence does not harm it at all, since it is impossible for an effect to destroy the cause which it presupposes.

Therefore, with that necessity excluded, two other kinds must be distinguished, of which no one doubts that the freedom of choice is destroyed by one, while it is denied to be destroyed by the other according to the Asserters of predefinitions who deny middle knowledge. Since this necessity is not created by created freedom, but rather is undergone by it from uncreated predefining freedom, and is subjected to it, it cannot be called consequent necessity, but rather should be called antecedent and causal necessity, as Twisse also calls it.

CVII. Therefore, proceed, and from those two antecedent necessities prior to the use of freedom, show how that which destroys such use differs from that which does not destroy it, so that one is considered to destroy rather than the other. This is truly a troublesome question, in the resolution of which two most certain rules must be kept in mind. The first is that these necessities are not sufficiently distinguished by the fact that one arises from God's free decree, but not the other. For both can arise from it. For when it is attributed to divine providence that it does not impose on a free agent necessity repugnant to freedom, it is supposed that God can do this. For things which cannot possibly be otherwise are not usually attributed to providence, such as, for example, that a man is not a neighing animal. It is supposed, therefore, that a decree by which such necessity is induced is not repugnant. Given this, that necessity would both arise from God's decree and destroy freedom. And this is confirmed by the principle of the Adversaries, who think it necessary that the most omnipotent will, such as the divine will, should be able not only to predefine that things happen, but also that they happen in this or that way; i.e., that free acts happen freely, and non-free acts non-freely. It follows, therefore, from the predefinition of the former, a necessity that does not destroy freedom, but from the predefinition of the latter, a necessity that does destroy it; and both will be similar in that they follow from

DISPUTATION I

God's will. I add that even if there were different causes and different principles for both of these necessities, and one followed from God's decree, the other from elsewhere, one could still inquire what is that difference between them whereby one is repugnant to freedom, not the other. For since similar effects can nevertheless have dissimilar causes, it would have to be shown that this does not occur in this dual necessity, by looking at them from wherever they come, and saying what one has less than the other, so that it can rightly be said not to take away freedom to the same extent. Indeed, this should be considered from the relation to the free power to which one necessity is more accommodated and adapted than the other, rather than from the relation to the cause or to God's will. For what God wills should shine forth in the effect itself that is willed; hence if He wills that there be some necessity of acting which does not impede freedom, this should be present in that necessity; and if He similarly wills that there be some necessity which does impede freedom, this too should be found in it.

Therefore, we look at both, and ask: What is their inequality or difference, and what does one have less than the other such that it is said to stand with the freedom of the predefined act? For if nothing else is said than this very thing, namely that one has over the other that it stands with freedom, or that God wills that notwithstanding one necessity, the act is free—for He disposes all things gently and acts congruously with the natures of things, etc.—these are words which contain a circular discourse and beg the question. For the dispute is with those men who think that on the hypothesis that both necessities are antecedent to the free operation, both causal and independent of freedom, one cannot stand with freedom any more than the other; and consequently God cannot any more will that, notwithstanding one necessity, an act is free, than He can will that it is so, notwithstanding the other. Hence whoever says that they differ in that one does not destroy freedom while the other does, and that God by His most omnipotent will wills that one stands with freedom, but not the other, begs the question and uses circularity. The dissimilarity and

DISPUTATION I

diversity of both of those necessities should be understood first, before the diversity of the divine decree concerning their concord or discord with the freedom of choice is understood.

CVIII. Therefore, another entirely certain rule seems to be followed. Namely, one should see what the concept of a free agent is. For if it does not stand with some necessity, it is a sign that such necessity, whatever it may be and wherever it may come from, should be judged to impede freedom; any other necessity does not impede it.

Now, the concept of a free agent is that common one by which it is said that, when all prerequisites for acting are posited, it can act or not act. Since it is manifest that every antecedent necessity, or one that has an antecedent cause independent of freedom, is incompatible with this, it follows that every such necessity is destructive of freedom. I say, moreover, that the incompatibility is manifest, which is clear from the first explanation of the terms. For there can be no necessity of acting by which the agent cannot be said to be necessitated to act; and of anything of which it is said that it is necessitated to act, it is also said that it cannot not act. For just as the definition of the necessary is that which cannot be otherwise, so the definition of an agent having necessity to act, or being necessitated, should be none other than that it cannot not act. Hence, since the concept of a free agent includes being able not to act, it follows that 'not being able' must be excluded, and consequently 'being necessitated to act' and 'having necessity to act', whatever that may be, since there is none from which 'not being able not to act' does not follow. From this it is clear that every predefinition of a free act by which such necessity is introduced is rendered impossible.

CIX. But to evade this argument, that definition of a free agent began to be called into doubt, first by Diego Alvarez, then by Gibieuf, whose suspicion Twisse eagerly embraced. Hear the man reasoning thus: "When he adds that it is of the nature of a free cause that with all things in place, etc., Alvarez responds that such a definition of a free cause is attributed to the Nominalists, which Gibieuf, a French writer, openly pro-

DISPUTATION I

fesses to displease him. Even Thomas of Bradwardine, although he admits it, nevertheless restricts these prerequisites to secondary causes, and by no means thinks it should be extended to the operation of the first cause; as if divine motion were among such prerequisites that leave the created will indifferent. Indeed, otherwise the second cause would be as free in its operation as the first is in its operation. Meanwhile, the will always remains indifferent insofar as it is never determined in its operation to the mode of natural agents; for it always retains the power both to refrain from acting and to do something else."

In this speech, one cannot conceal how ridiculous is what Twisse attributes to Bradwardine, namely that in the given definition, when it is said "with all prerequisites for acting in place, etc.," this should be understood of prerequisites on the part of the secondary cause, and not on the part of the primary cause, and therefore divine motion is not involved among those prerequisites. Come now, express in words what you imply and say: "A free agent is that which, with all prerequisites for acting in place on the part of the secondary cause, but not on the part of the primary cause, can act and not act." What do you think? Can any agent, even a free one, act without the prerequisites on the part of the primary cause, and thus without divine motion? Is that definition suitable in your judgment, which cannot be affirmed of what is defined without falsity and lying? But let the Reader see the prudence of this Theologian. Since in that definition of a free agent two things are affirmed, namely, being able to act, and being able not to act, when Twisse saw that the second, namely, being able not to act, would be false if the prerequisites for acting contained divine motion, he excluded it. Nor did he notice that with it excluded, conversely, the first also becomes false, namely, being able to act, since it is certain that without those things which are prerequisites on the part of the primary cause, among which divine motion is placed, no secondary cause can act. In this matter, he is similar to one who would seem to himself sufficiently energetic and diligent while leaving one sheep to the wolf in order to snatch the other from the bear.

DISPUTATION I

CX. Moreover, that definition of a free agent, which is undeservedly attributed to the Nominalists alone, is rather owed to the Parisian School, from which it has been propagated to other Academies in such a way that there is no nation or sect that does not readily admit it. Nor should this seem surprising, since whatever other definition may be offered, if indeed it is legitimate and expresses the proper difference of a free agent from a necessary one, it coincides with this one and differs only in words, so that whoever denies this one must deny all of them. This is what I want to show even in Twisse himself, in the very passage that I have set forth, where he distinguishes a free agent from a natural one, in that the free agent "is so determined to act that it nevertheless retains the power both to refrain from acting and to do something else." With these words, he shows that this concept of a free agent entirely pleases him, namely that it is that which is so determined to act that it nevertheless retains the power to refrain from acting or to do something else. But to retain the power to refrain from action or to do something else is the same as being able not to act or to act contrarily. Therefore, substitute these words in place of those, and this description will emerge: A free agent is that which is not so determined to act that it cannot not act or act contrarily. You suppose, therefore, that it is determined to act in the way that befits its freedom; nor can it be conceived to be so determined otherwise than through the positing of all those things which are prerequisite to action, both on the part of the primary cause and on the part of the secondary cause. These prerequisites are therefore supposed, and with them posited, there is no doubt that the agent can act, as you admit; you also admit that it retains the power not to act, which is being able not to act. Therefore, whether you like it or not, you must also admit that a free agent is that which, with all prerequisites for acting in place, both on the part of the primary cause and on the part of the secondary cause, is so determined to act that it can act and not act, or act contrarily. But this is that earlier definition which you reject.

DISPUTATION I

CXI. But neither can Diego himself avoid slipping back into the same definition that he seems to want to reject, when he himself defines: "Free choice is a faculty of the will and reason to act or not act either way, and to do one thing or another." He says this definition is legitimate. But it is manifest that a faculty to act and not act is a faculty that can act and not act. Likewise, it is manifest that free choice is not a faculty to act, or able to act, with the necessities for action excluded; therefore, these must be presupposed. Therefore, free choice is a faculty which, presupposing those things which are necessary for acting, can act and not act, or act contrarily, which is the prior definition.

CXII. Gibieuf, who thinks that the phrases "preserving the order of the end" should be added to that definition, if he interprets them according to the mind of St. Thomas from whom they are taken, dissents from the others only in that he gratuitously restricts the definition and does not want it to encompass every free agent, even one that can sin. And this is entirely contrary to the mind of St. Thomas, who in that passage intends nothing other than that there are certain objects regarding which one may act in contradictory ways while still remaining within the order of the end. That is, in such a way that the will is always directed to the ultimate end, whichever of the opposites it chooses, such as can be the case for the blessed angels in moving somewhere or not moving, sharing this thought with that person or not sharing it. Therefore, regarding these objects, the blessed angels are said to have free choice because in them the whole definition of a free agent applies, since with all prerequisites for acting in place, they can act or not act; and therefore neither of those opposites, to act or not to act, suffers antecedent necessity, whether from predefinition or from elsewhere, which is all we intend. But this Author is mistaken in two ways here. First, because he acknowledges only this mode of true freedom, as if that is not also true freedom by which one can either remain within the order of the end or deviate from it. St. Thomas says only that the former freedom is greater or more perfect, which does not prevent the latter from also being true freedom, any more

DISPUTATION I

than it prevents a horse from being a true animal because man is a nobler animal. Second, he errs in that he distorts this doctrine of St. Thomas into that opinion by which he thinks that the necessity of adhering to God and using the means required to acquire possession of Him, for the time in which they are required and necessary, although so great that it removes the power not to use them, is the most perfect freedom of choice. If this were true, there would have been no other controversy between Calvin and the Council of Trent than that Calvin defended the true freedom of choice, which Trent opposed, with a spurious one substituted in its place. But Eugenius Philadelphus discusses these matters more fully; consult him.

CXIII. Now concerning the other Fathers or Scholastics who have expressed the notion of free choice with their own particular character, I say that there is none whose view does not align with the same thought as that which corresponds to that definition: A free agent is that which with all things in place, etc. For they always admit in free choice the power for opposites, and this is what the Fathers intend when they say that a free cause can "incline to both sides," as Justin says in his Apology to the Senate, a statement which Twisse crucifies, as we have seen. For that phrase "to both sides" is nothing other than to act and not to act. Or to be "master of its own act," as Clement of Alexandria and Basil say—which mastery is nothing other than the power to elicit an act or to suppress it. Or to be "self-determined," as is found in Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, and others generally, to which also pertains Clement's statement that free choice is "the power of impulse or non-impulse," and it corresponds to the view of St. Augustine, who perpetually indicates that free is that which is "in our power," as when he says: "Those converted to Christ have it **IN THEIR POWER** not to commit iniquity." And: "Satan does not compel the unwilling; **IT IS IN YOUR POWER** to consent or not to consent." And: "Since through God's help **IT IS IN YOUR POWER** to consent to the devil, why do you not desire to obey God rather than him?" And: "This is **IN OUR POWER** which we do when we want to."

DISPUTATION I

And: "It is IN OUR POWER either to be grafted into God's goodness or to be cut off by His severity." And they think this pertains to the concept of a free agent and its proper difference from a non-free one.

The Scholastics also intend the same thing when they say that a free agent is one that is not determined to one thing. For the sense is, to produce one thing. And it is not determined to produce one thing for no other reason than that it can either refrain from producing that one thing or produce the contrary. Therefore, they all suppose that it properly belongs to free choice that it can act and not act, or act contrarily. But this is either affirmed with all prerequisites for acting supposed, or not: if the first, then the freedom of choice consists in the fact that, with all prerequisites for acting in place, it can act and not act, or act contrarily, which is what we intend; if the second, then that definition is falsely affirmed of what it defines, since there is no faculty of which it can be truly said that, without all prerequisites for acting in place, it can act or not act.

It would be a ridiculous thought if someone were to think that a free agent is that which, with prerequisites in place, can act, and with them or some of them removed, cannot act, since this also applies to a necessary agent. But a fuller discussion of this matter belongs elsewhere. Now I contend only that, from whatever source there is a necessity of acting which cannot be reconciled with that concept of a free agent whereby it is said to be able not to act in the same circumstances in which it is also said to be able to act, by the consent of all it should be judged to be repugnant to freedom. This has now been sufficiently proven.

§ III. ON THE COMPOSITE AND DIVIDED SENSE.

CXIV. This teaching is, however, evaded by that customary distinction between the composite sense and the divided sense. The response is that a free agent affected by the necessity that is brought about by pre-definition can nevertheless not act in the divided sense, even if it cannot do so in the composite sense. That it can not act in the divided sense is

DISPUTATION I

said to be sufficient for freedom. Since this distinction tends to have multiple meanings, I accept the very one that Diego Alvarez approves and in which he acquiesces, whose words are these: "The will premoved in the composite sense cannot dissent" does not have this meaning, that the will at the time when there is premotion cannot dissent; but rather that it cannot compose actual resistance with premotion. Likewise those things which we have already mentioned: "It pertains to free choice that with all prerequisites for acting, a twofold power is compounded: namely, the power of assenting and the power of dissenting." Likewise: "It is not part of the nature or definition of free choice that with all prerequisites for acting it can compound either operation or its suspension: therefore these two are impossible, namely that in free choice at some instant there are all antecedently prerequisite things, and the act is not produced, but rather a contrary act is produced." Many similar things occur in this author.

CXV. From these it is evident that when it is conceded that a free agent, with predefinition and the necessity that follows from it presupposed, cannot not act in the composite sense, the meaning is that the agent cannot make it so that a non-act is compounded or coexists with predefinition. For this is what Alvarez means when he says these two things are simultaneously impossible, namely that in free choice at some instant of time there are all things antecedently prerequisite for the production of an act, and that it does not produce the act. Indeed, the power of acting and not acting can be composite and coexistent with those prerequisites, just as the power of seeing is compounded and coexists simultaneously with darkness, which example Alvarez uses elsewhere, and the power of running is compounded and coexists simultaneously with fetters or with gout. But just as that visual power which is compounded and coexists simultaneously with darkness cannot, however, make it so that actual vision is compounded and simultaneously coexists with those same shadows; nor can the power of running make it so that actual running is equally compounded and simultaneously coexists with

DISPUTATION I

fetters or gout, with which nevertheless the power itself is compounded and simultaneously exists; likewise neither can the power of acting and not acting, which is compounded and simultaneously exists with predefinition, nevertheless itself make it so that with that same predefinition is compounded and simultaneously exists the alternative, namely the not acting itself.

I have always understood that distinction in this matter according to this interpretation which, as is evident, is that of Alvarez himself, and I have argued against it; so that some have complained without justification that we proceeded from a false understanding of the composite and divided sense. I show therefore that it is required for freedom that with all prerequisites one can compound non-action, and make it so that they exist simultaneously; and consequently, if the predefinition of a free act infers that necessity which prevents the free agent from being able to do this, it prevents it from being free. This, moreover, is proven.

CXVI. 1. Because a free agent as such, with prerequisites for acting presupposed, can act in the composite sense; therefore it can also not act in the composite sense. The consequence is proven from the common understanding of authors, who when they say that a free agent is that which can act and not act, undoubtedly think that it can do both in the same way, and some even express this, as Clement of Alexandria when he says that it can do both equally. "That," he says, "is in our power OF WHICH WE ARE EQUALLY MASTERS, ALONG WITH ITS OPPOSITE; such as to philosophize and not to philosophize, to believe and not to believe." And others everywhere when they say that it can do both indifferently, like St. Thomas. But if it is said that a free agent is that which, having all things necessary for operating, can operate in the composite sense, and can also not operate, but only in the divided sense; it can do neither equally nor indifferently, as is evident, and that concept of freedom vanishes. Nor is anything affirmed about the free cause that cannot also be said about the necessary cause. For even fire equipped with all things necessary for heating can heat in the composite sense and

DISPUTATION I

not heat in the divided sense, since this is no less true: that fire having whatever is required for heating can not heat, than that something white can become black, which nevertheless no one denies in the divided sense.

This is confirmed. Because that power of the free agent is a dominative power, by which it is given the option of action or non-action. But what kind of dominion is that, and what kind of option for acting and not acting, if when it is said to be able to act, it is not understood to be able not to act in any other way than in the way that a visual power which is in darkness is said to be able to see? Indeed, in order for that dominion and faculty of choosing action or non-action to exist, the dominating agent must be able to combine non-action with those circumstances with which it combines action. Otherwise, it does not combine action from dominion but from necessity. Nor can it be said, except most absurdly, that it is given the option of which it combines, where the combination of action is necessary and the combination of non-action is impossible. Therefore, it should not be attributed to its power that it combines action, when it does not have the power of not combining, or, what is the same, of combining non-action. It does not pertain, I say, to the dominion of a free agent to posit or not posit those circumstances, nor likewise with those posited from elsewhere to combine action rather than non-action, after the combination of non-action is impossible. What kind of dominion is this? And what does Augustine mean when he says, "By God's help it is in our power whether we consent to the devil," when rather by God's help that option of either is impeded, after non-consent cannot be combined with that help from God? How, I ask, do we have power for either option through God's help, if it is contradictory for the alternative to exist with God's help? Therefore, one contradictory must be able to be compounded with prerequisites just as much as the other.

CXVII. 2. For a free agent to act is for a free agent to compound its action with prerequisites for acting; therefore for a free agent to be able not to act is the same as to be able absolutely not to compound its action with prerequisites for acting. Again, for a free agent to compound

DISPUTATION I

its action with prerequisites for acting, according to Diego, is to make it so that for the same instant of time there are simultaneously in free choice both prerequisites for action and the action itself. But a free agent can, speaking absolutely, not compound its action with prerequisites for acting. Therefore, speaking absolutely, it can make it so that for the same instant of time there are prerequisites and there is not an action. Finally, for prerequisites for acting to be in free choice for the same instant of time, and for there not to be an action, is for non-action to be compounded with prerequisites for acting; but a free agent, speaking absolutely, can do the first; therefore it can also do the second. This, moreover, is to be able not to act in the composite sense, signifying the composition of non-action with prerequisites for acting; a free agent can therefore do this, and whatever necessity prevents it from being able to do this prevents it from being free.

CXVIII. 3. A free agent must be able to do that which it is sometimes obliged to do; but it is sometimes obliged to compound non-action with all prerequisites for acting. Therefore it must be able to do this. Twisse will perhaps deny the major premise, in order to defend that Calvinist doctrine of the impossibility of the commandments. But let him allow us to follow in this not only the guidance of faith, but also of natural reason, by which this is implanted in the hearts of all mortals, that one does not sin in what one cannot avoid; especially since even the Calvinists themselves, in order to somehow cover their error, defend that the inability to keep the commandments which they imagine in us is voluntary and free, as supposedly contracted by the free sin of the first man. Therefore, both he at that time, and also the angel, were able to do that to which they were obligated; but they were obligated to compound non-sin with all prerequisites for sinning, which is the minor premise of the proposed syllogism, which is evidently proven. Because to compound non-sin with prerequisites for sinning is nothing other than to make it so that at the same instant that those prerequisites exist, non-sin also exists, or sin does not exist. But they were obligated to make it so that for the same instant

DISPUTATION I

of time at which those prerequisites existed, non-sin existed; otherwise they would not have sinned at that instant, for one does not sin when one cannot act otherwise. Therefore they were obligated to compound those two things. Therefore, if any necessity made that composition of non-sin with prerequisites impossible, it removed the freedom necessary for sinning.

CXIX. 4. This which is "not to act," placed in the definition of a free agent, is stated differently in the sacred Scriptures and Councils: to refuse, to reject, to dissent, to resist, hence that statement "I called and you refused," and "you rejected my words," etc., and what the Council of Trent has: free choice can dissent from God when He calls, by which it is openly signified that it is in the free power of the agent to compound with prerequisites for acting the very not acting. For what, I ask, is to dissent, for example, if not to place dissent? It is, moreover, of the nature of dissent that it is placed for the same instant for which one is moved and invited to consent; and thus that it is compounded with the motion itself and invitation to consent. For no one is said to dissent before being moved, nor after having been moved and having obeyed the motion. Therefore, to be able to dissent is to be able to place dissent for that instant in which there is motion, and thus to compound dissent with motion; if indeed this is to be compounded as we have accepted from Diego: to be one for the same instant of time at which the other is. Therefore, whatever necessity prevents this composition prevents freedom.

CXX. 5. We demand of our adversaries that they explain the other member of the distinction, when they deny that the will, with prerequisites for acting posited, can not act in the composite sense, yet say nevertheless that it can not act in the divided sense. What, I ask, is it for the will to be able not to act in the divided sense? Surely the opposite of what it is to be able not to act in the composite sense must be taken. For the members of distinctions must be opposed. And because to be able not to act in the composite sense, as Diego has taught us, is to be able to make it so that for the same instant of time prerequisites and non-action

DISPUTATION I

are simultaneously present; consequently, to be able not to act in the divided sense will be nothing other than to be able to make it so that for another instant of time, when the prerequisites are not present, non-action is present. And thus the definition of a free agent will have this meaning: a free agent is that which has the power of acting for the time when there are prerequisites for acting, and simultaneously also has the power of not acting, but for the time when those prerequisites will not be present. As if there were any agent so necessary about which it is not permitted to affirm this very thing, namely that its power of acting, which with prerequisites posits action, is also a power of not acting for the time when prerequisites will be absent.

But, you will say, in necessary causes this is not so much a power of not acting as an impotence of acting, when prerequisites are not present. But I reverse this very thing and say that even that power of not acting of the free agent is not so much a power of not acting as an impotence of acting; nor in the contrary opinion can any reason for a disparity be given. For there is no other reason why the power of a free agent is attributed can not act, than because it is free to it for that instant of time at which it combines action with prerequisites for acting, to combine also non-action. But if it cannot combine non-action with prerequisites for it, but only with their defect, why is non-action attributed to its power of not acting, rather than to its impotence of acting? You say, a free agent can combine non-action with things sufficient for acting, which a necessary agent cannot do. But let those who say this see whether things that have a defect of some prerequisite for action are to be said to be sufficient for acting, which I do not wish to press now. I contend only this, if the power of not acting is impeded, as it is in this supposition by necessity arising from predefinition, and cannot compound non-action with that impediment of its own, but can only place it, or rather suppress it, for another instant when that will be removed; it cannot be said to be a power of not acting, of the kind required for the freedom of action. Because it is entirely similar to the power of falling which a stone has that is bound up

DISPUTATION I

above and hangs from a chain, and the power of seeing which someone has who lies in darkness deprived of all external light. But if someone thinks this is sufficient for freedom, and wishes to impute to the stone that it does not fall, or to the person placed in darkness and lacking external light that he does not see, let him be well. For with him there is no longer any need to dispute about free choice, since it has already been destroyed.

CXXI. Augustine certainly argues to the contrary, when he attacks that distinction of Pelagius who said that to be able to see is not in our power, but to see is, thus: "How is it in our power to see if we wish, when even with the integrity of our body and eyes preserved, we cannot see if we wish: either because of night when lights, which are applied from outside, are taken away; or if someone shuts us up in some dark place?" These words will not easily be reconciled with those of Diego: "It must be supposed with Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and M. Medina that free choice can produce some act through some help in two ways. In the first way absolutely and simply, that is, without qualification, just as when we assert that man through visual power can see; because indeed, as far as is on the part of the power by which he is constituted in first act toward seeing, it is not required for him to be truly said to be able to see, that some other power or virtue be superadded to him giving him in first act the ability itself to see; although beyond visual power many other things are required for one to actually see... In the second way that can be understood of the principle or help by which one can completely operate, so that not only does one have the principle but also has the complement." But Augustine speaks simply and absolutely when he says that we, "even with the integrity of our body and eyes preserved, do not have it in our power to see," and "even those who are seeing cannot see if external light is lacking." Indeed, because for Augustine it is the same to have something in one's power and to be able to do it, which for Diego is to be able completely. But that distinction had to be used, lest sufficient grace be openly denied, when that which is incompletely active is nevertheless said to be sufficiently active, as much as is enough for it to be im-

DISPUTATION I

puted to it that it does not act. We with Augustine prefer to say that a man to whom external light is lacking cannot see; nor can one not act whose power of not acting is constrained by that necessity, with which non-action can no more be joined than vision with the defect of light. And just as the fact that something has that virtue which suffices for seeing for that instant of time when darkness has departed, is not enough for it to be said to have vision in its power when it is in darkness; so the fact that someone has that virtue by which he can suspend action for that instant of time when he will be released from the bond of predefinition, can in no way be sufficient for him to be considered to have non-action in his power, even when there is predefinition. Therefore it is necessary that with that predefinition he can compound non-action, so that he can not act in the way that is required for freedom.

CXXII. 6. The doctrine of our adversaries is reduced to this, that it is said to be sufficient for this, that non-action be imputed to the will, that the power which is prevented by the necessity of acting from not acting, is nevertheless that very one which for another instant of time, when it will be released from such an impediment, will be able not to act, and even to compound with things sufficient for acting the non-action itself. Granted it cannot compound non-action with that necessity of acting. But if this is true, it follows that that is false about which nevertheless we agree, that the love of the blessed which follows from vision is not free. For the will which is subject to the necessity of loving arising from vision, is that very one which for another instant of time when there would not be vision, could suspend that love, compounding also non-love with things sufficient for loving; just as when it is subject to the necessity of predefinition, it is that very one which for another instant of time would not elicit the act which is now predefined, compounding non-act with things sufficient for eliciting it. But if that is enough for it to be truly said that, notwithstanding predefinition, it nevertheless has the power of not acting which is required for the freedom of action, why will that not suf-

DISPUTATION I

fice so that, notwithstanding vision, it is considered to be the power of not loving, which is also required for the freedom of love?

You will say, because when there is vision there is not the indifference of judgment which is required for the power of loving and not loving. Against this: this is nothing other than that while there is vision there is cognition necessitating to love, which I concede. But I say that with vision removed there is predefinition equally necessitating, and I ask why one is said not to leave in the will the power of not loving, while the other is said to leave it?

The power, you say, of not loving is a certain concrete thing coalescing from the indifference of judgment and the will, whence with one of them lacking the nature of such a power fails. Against this: this is only to say that that power coalesces from the will and cognition, under that aspect by which cognition is not necessitating; which is to form the nature of that power from the will and the lack of necessitating cognition. And I still ask why the power of not loving is formed from the will and the lack of non-necessitating cognition, and is not also formed from the will and the lack of non-necessitating predefinition? Since it seems manifestly that with one conceded the other is denied without reason. Indifferent cognition is required only under the aspect of indifferent; and to be required under the aspect of indifferent is to be required under the aspect of excluding cognition necessarily determining to one; and that exclusion is especially required, and is that which especially compounds with the will the power of not doing what it does. Why, then, is the exclusion of predefinition, which more efficaciously and more necessarily determines the will, not equally required, than any cognition would do?

And this is confirmed by the given hypothesis, which is not at all repugnant, that along with vision there is simultaneously some other cognition of the divine goodness, either obscure or manifest, which would otherwise suffice for loving freely; because from the supposition of vision, it will no longer suffice, even if it has from itself that very indifference which it would have if there were no vision. For this shows that the ab-

DISPUTATION I

sence of vision, insofar as it is only the absence of cognition inducing necessity, is part of that concrete which is called the power of not loving; and cognition from itself indifferent does not sufficiently constitute such a power, unless that absence is presupposed. But why is this absence or lack more presupposed than the absence of any other cause equally rendering that indifference of cognition useless, because it equally induces the necessity of acting? And what does it help that vision does not induce that necessity, if another cause is not lacking which also induces it, such as predefinition? Hence:

CXXIII. 7. This is confirmed again and the intent is proven. Because either there can be or there can be conceived some necessity extrinsically imposed, which destroys freedom; and yet there is none which, when supposed, does not always leave in the will the faculty of not acting in the divided sense. Therefore, the faculty of not acting in the divided sense is not sufficient for freedom, unless there is also the faculty of not acting in the composite sense. The antecedent is clear, even from the very confession of our adversaries, who are accustomed to say that God therefore does not take away freedom by predefining, because He does not compel. As if they were confessing that if this necessity were coercive, there would not be freedom. But even with coercion supposed, whether it is possible or not, it would always remain that the coerced will could not act in the divided sense, just as a bound man can not run. Therefore it is required for freedom that it be able to do this also in the composite sense.

CXXIV. 8. Finally, a free agent complete for acting, speaking properly, simply, and absolutely, is said to be able not to act: for thus all express its notion and difference from the necessary. Therefore it should not have just any power of not acting, but that which suffices for the denomination of being able not to act, speaking simply and absolutely. But a power impeded by an insuperable impediment is not sufficient. Therefore, etc. I prove the assumption. Because a power joined and compounded with the impossibility of its effect, as long as it is such, is not sufficient for conferring the absolute denomination of being able to place

DISPUTATION I

that effect; otherwise one would be said to be absolutely able to do the impossible. But a power joined and compounded with the insuperable impediment of its effect is a power joined and compounded with the impossibility of the same effect. For that impossibility is necessarily joined with the insuperable impediment; and consequently what is compounded with such an impediment must be considered compounded with the impossibility of the effect. Therefore that power is not sufficient for denominating the agent simply and absolutely able to place such an effect. Therefore it is required that there be no impediment with which it cannot compound that effect, which is to act or not act in the composite sense. And since it is now established that necessity arising from predefinition prevents this, the consequence is that the same is considered to prevent the exercise of freedom, which is to implicate it, as was said before.

§ IV. THE VIEW OF ST. ANSELM AND OTHER CHURCH FATHERS ON PRECEDING AND CONSEQUENT NECESSITY.

CXXV. From what has been said, it follows that Anselm's doctrine, which teaches that preceding necessity removes freedom but consequent necessity does not, must be understood universally; that is, that every necessity which is both insurmountable and independent of the will is considered to impede its freedom. This is proven by the matter itself, by the authority of other Church Fathers, and by the mind and intention of Anselm himself.

Indeed, that the matter itself proves this is shown. For if the entire reason why one antecedent necessity removes freedom is also found in every other necessity, it must be admitted that every other necessity also removes freedom. But the entire reason why one removes freedom is found in every other: Therefore, every other necessity also removes freedom. I prove the minor premise. For there can be no reason why some antecedent necessity removes freedom, except that it is both insurmount-

DISPUTATION I

able and independent of the will. This is clear because if this alone were removed by possibility or impossibility, and anything else remained, there would be no necessity that could not easily be reconciled with freedom. Take the necessity that is called coercion, either it is not an invincible necessity, or it depends on the will; and it will immediately be understood that it does not obstruct freedom. Hence it evidently follows that freedom is impeded precisely because necessity neither depends on nor can be overcome by the will. Therefore, any necessity that has this characteristic impedes freedom. And there is no antecedent necessity that does not have this characteristic, especially that which is induced by God's predefinition apart from middle knowledge, which TWillius himself calls irresistible: Therefore, both every antecedent necessity, and that one specifically, impedes freedom.

CXXVI. Nor should anyone suspect that Anselm's distinction is not sufficiently ancient. It has been a long time since Clement of Alexandria said that even antecedent necessity, προηγμένην [proēgeumenēn], prevents human actions from being attributed to praise or blame. But you say he calls it φυσικὴν [physikēn] as if to designate the natural necessity by which, for example, heavy things are carried downward and light things upward. I admit he calls it that, but not in that sense. Because he supposes that necessity is induced by the one who can do all things: namely to show that he is not speaking only of necessity arising from natural inclination, but also of that imposed by God operating above nature. And therefore he conflates this necessity with that which arises from an external cause, ὑπὸ τῆς ἑξωθεν αἰτίας [hypo tēs exōthen aitiās], by which words it is clear that he excepts only that necessity which the will itself creates. And in this Clement harmonizes admirably with Dionysius, who rejects ἀπειροκίνητων ἀνάγκην [apeirokeōn anagkēn] (immovable necessity) from free will. Therefore when he called it natural, he only wanted to distinguish it from moral necessity that depends on freedom itself.

DISPUTATION I

St. Basil excluded all necessity from free will, when for this reason he said that human life is λελυμένην πάσης ἀνάγκης [lelymenēn pasēs anagkēs] (freed from all necessity). Theodoret also excluded all necessity when he denied that men would be condemned by God if they sinned compelled by some necessity, and when he supposed that human laws presuppose that there is no necessity either of nature or fate.

Augustine also excluded it when he left only that necessity which is in our power. "If," he says, "our necessity is to be defined as that which is not in our power, it is manifest that our wills, by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such necessity." Hence you may understand that other Fathers also, when they remove necessity from human acts and oppose free to necessary, which they do very often, exclude every necessity whatsoever that is not voluntary. For a negation distributes the term to which it is prefixed and does not allow it to be taken indefinitely: and therefore one who denies that a man acts necessarily denies every necessity which is not in his power, because even one alone suffices for it to be falsely said that he does not act necessarily.

CXXVII. Nor does it help our Adversaries to occasionally indicate that they reject necessity which compels or exerts force: as if they did not disapprove of any other kind. For it is clear that they do not understand proper coercion, and proper force or violence inflicted on the will. First, because they attribute to divine providence that it does not compel our wills, which cannot be understood of proper coercion: since it is commonly said to be impossible with respect to the will. Second, because they would reason very poorly when, in response to questions about why God does not save everyone or allows some to perish or fall into sins, they give the reason that it does not befit His providence to compel people or drag them unwillingly. As if beyond coercion strictly taken and violence properly inflicted, there were not some intermediate necessity; that which follows from predefinition, by which no force is exerted upon anyone and yet is most sufficient for ensuring that everyone lives well. Therefore they understand coercion more broadly as any involuntary necessity: which

DISPUTATION I

because it is not connatural to a free agent, they think coercion and force is suffered if subjected to it. This is what St. Ambrose expressed clearly in these words: "God wants to provoke you to repentance, wants indulgence to be hoped for from Him, wants to demonstrate by your confession that He is not the Author of malice. For those who refer their sin to some necessity of decree or work, like the pagans, seem to accuse the divine, as if the power of the gods were the cause of sin. For whoever kills having been compelled by some necessity, kills as if unwillingly." Here you see that it is customary to take as the same thing, to do something by necessity, and to do it unwillingly and to suffer force.

This is also evident from Clement of Alexandria when he says: "God does not compel anyone to receive salvation from Him: He is both savior and lord; savior indeed of those who have believed, because they wished to know; but lord of those who refused to believe: He came for the salvation of all. **FOR FAITH IS COMMON TO THOSE WHO CHOOSE.**" Here you see that for Clement, not to compel is the same as to offer salvation to human choice. Which he then signifies more clearly, when he says the freedom of man in acquiring holiness and of God in conferring grace is reciprocal, "For," he says, "ὁ θεὸς ἄκων ἀγαθὸς ὄν ζῶπον τὸ πυρ θερμαιτικόν [ho theos akōn agathos hon tropon to pyr thermaïtikon]." For what does it mean for God not to be unwilling when He is good to man, just as fire is not unwilling when it heats? Or what does it mean for fire to be unwilling in heating, except to be necessarily heating? This therefore is, God does not draw the unwilling, meaning He does not draw necessarily: but he adds "ὅτε μὴν ἄκων σωθήσεται ὁ στοζόμενος [hote mēn akōn sōthēsetai ho stozomenos]." And soon after "ἐκὼν ὁ θεὸς ἀνάδκη ἀγαθοποιεῖ [hekōn ho theos anadkē agathopoiei]."

It is also evident from Anselm when he says: "For the violence of natural condition compels the heavens to revolve; but no necessity makes you speak." Here you see that both coercion and violence are taken for that necessity to which the subject in no way resists: rather, it naturally accommodates itself to it. The same in the book on the concordance of

DISPUTATION I

foreknowledge and free will says that the work of the will to which it is given that what it wills is, and what it does not will is not, is necessary in two ways: because it is compelled to happen by the will: and because the same thing cannot both happen and not happen. Here by the work of the will he understands the act commanded by it, whether internal or external, which both has an antecedent necessity arising from the commanding act; and a consequent necessity from the general principle that what is, when it is, must necessarily be. And although there is no violence properly so called or coercion in such a work; nevertheless that work is said to be compelled, precisely because it is subject to that antecedent necessity from the commanding will.

CXXVIII. But because TWillius corrupts Anselm's doctrine, when he denies that such a necessity follows from predefinition as Anselm thinks should be removed from free acts; the words of this holy Doctor must be quoted, if perhaps the Theologian of Leeuwarden can blush when he denies that the sun shines at noon. Thus therefore speaks Anselm: "But if you are again troubled because I said it was necessary that Christ should die from the hypothesis of foreknowledge and prophecies; remember that the truth of the virgin's faith, to whom this was revealed, was not the cause of his dying voluntarily; but because this was to be, the faith was true. Wherefore if it is said, it was necessary that he die by will alone, because the faith or prophecy which had preceded about this was true, it is nothing other than if you say, it was necessary for it to be thus in the future, because it was to be thus in the future. A necessity of this sort DOES NOT COMPEL THE THING TO BE; BUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE THING MAKES THE NECESSITY TO BE. For there is a preceding necessity, WHICH IS THE CAUSE WHY THE THING IS: and there is a following necessity WHICH THE THING MAKES. Preceding and efficient necessity is when it is said, the heaven revolves, because it is necessary that it revolve: but the following WHICH EFFECTS NOTHING, but is so when I say you speak of necessity because you speak. Not that anything compels you to speak. For the vio-

DISPUTATION I

lence of natural condition compels the heaven to revolve: but no necessity makes you speak. But wherever there is preceding necessity, there is also following; but not where following, there immediately also preceding. For we can say, it is necessary for the heaven to revolve because it revolves; but it is not similarly true, that you speak because it is necessary that you speak... **BY THIS FOLLOWING AND EFFECTING NOTHING NECESSITY** because the faith and prophecy about Christ were true, because he was going to die by will not by necessity; it was necessary that it be so."

In the book on the concordance of predestination with free will, after showing that foreknowledge does not impede the freedom of foreknown acts; he infers the same should also be said of predestination: that no preceding necessity follows from it either. "Equally," he says, "although it is necessary for those things to happen which are foreknown and which are predestined; yet some foreknown and predestined things do not come about by that necessity **WHICH PRECEDES THE THING AND MAKES IT**, but by that **WHICH FOLLOWS THE THING**, as we said above. For God does not make those things which He predestines by compelling the will, or by resisting the will; but by leaving it in its own power."

He adds that there is a difference between a sedition that is to happen tomorrow, and the rising of the sun that is also to happen. For the future rising of the sun is necessary by a double necessity, preceding, namely, which makes the thing to be: and following, which compels nothing to be: But a sedition that is to happen tomorrow is necessary by only one necessity, the following one, namely. But he continues: "In this consideration, it is clear that without any repugnance both God foreknows all things: and many things happen from free will, which before they are can be such that they never are: and yet they are in a certain way by necessity, **WHICH NECESSITY AS I said DESCENDS FROM FREE WILL**."

CXXIX. From this doctrine it is first clear that necessity is divided in two ways; so that one is preceding, which does not stand with free-

DISPUTATION I

dom; the other following, which stands with it. Which division cannot be denied without injury to its Author whom TWillius also calls the Captain of Scholastic Theology, that it is legitimate and therefore adequate; so that there can be no necessity which is not referred to either of the two heads, namely preceding or following. Hence it follows evidently that the necessity which divine predefinition brings into predefined acts is also one of these in the mind of Anselm. It remains therefore for us to see which one it is from the specific characteristics of each necessity designated by Anselm. But it is clear, secondly, that preceding necessity is said to be that which is the cause why the thing is, Which is efficient: Which precedes the thing and makes it: Which compels the thing to be taking compulsion broadly, as it also applies to movement that is not at all violent, such as the movement of heaven: Also it is that which we understand when saying, not only is it necessary for something to be because it is; but also therefore something is, because it is necessary that it be, which coincides with what has already been said, to be the necessity which is the cause why the thing is.

It is clear thirdly that following necessity is called by Anselm that which the thing makes: Which effects nothing: Which does not compel the thing to be in the sense he has already mentioned: Which descends from free will: Which is only understood when we say: It is necessary for something to be, because it is: not conversely, therefore it is because it is necessary that it be.

CXXX. Let us now hear TWillius responding to Anselm. "We deny either according to truth, or according to Anselm, that every supposition antecedent to the use of freedom prejudices the freedom of the creature, even though it was the TRUE CAUSE of the subsequent act, and such that with it posited the act follows infallibly and INEVITABLY. Inevitably, I say, from supposition, that is not simply, but in a certain respect." Also: "The antecedent necessity hostile to freedom, according to Anselm, is no other than that by which the heavens are said to be necessarily moved. This however is purely natural necessity, by which natural

DISPUTATION I

agents are determined intrinsically to act. Cyrus was not so determined by God's decree, etc." And finally after extensively quoting Bradwardine's words, he concludes thus: "In these excerpts scattered in Bradwardine and conducive to elucidating Anselm's opinion, which I have collected in one place, I have been more elaborate, in order to stop the mouth of that Jesuit, who besides the authority of Anselm at first sight and according to a superficial consideration only propitious to him, has nothing by which he may preoccupy the credulous Reader, and make him more inclined to his side. There is therefore, I admit, a necessity of this kind from supposition, and indeed from SUPPOSITION OF A CAUSE: yet not such as would weaken created freedom; but rather confirm it. Since God not only wills that it happen; but that it happen contingently and freely. Whence we say it is necessary, and indeed by antecedent and causal Necessity, that what is done by a rational creature not only happen; but also happen contingently and freely." To these should be added also this other point: "But because God absolutely wills irresistibly that something be done freely by man, will it therefore be done less freely?" Which he later also repeats when he says that "contingency is irresistibly established by God's decree. Since whatever God wills to happen contingently and freely, it is necessary that it happen contingently and freely, otherwise God would be dethroned from the citadel of His omnipotence."

CXXXI. From which you understand, Excellent Reader, that the necessity which TWillius thinks follows from God's predefinition is Antecedent, Causal, Which is the true cause of the subsequent act, and such that with it posited the effect follows inevitably, and irresistibly: and by reason of which we truly say not only that it is necessary for something to happen, because it happens; but it happens because it is necessary that it happen after God wills it to happen, otherwise He would have to be dethroned from the citadel of His omnipotence; this necessity, I say, according to TWillius is that which stands with freedom: and this entirely according to the mind of Anselm. Compare therefore this necessity with both members of Anselm's distinction, and see whether it is contained in

DISPUTATION I

that by which necessity that does not obstruct freedom is said to be that which the thing makes: Which effects nothing: Which does not compel the thing to be: Which descends from free will: By which it is only necessary for something to be, because it is. See, I say, whether antecedent necessity is following necessity? Whether that which is the true cause of the act, is that which the act makes? Whether that which is causal, is that which effects nothing? Whether that which inevitably and irresistibly makes the thing to be, is that which does not compel the thing to be? Finally whether that which arises from God's decree alone and from the citadel of omnipotence, is that which descends from free will? Now compare it with the other necessity by which Anselm says freedom is destroyed: and see, whether there is anything in Anselm's necessity that does not agree with this TWillisian necessity. That precedes the thing; this antecedes: That makes, or effects; this causes: That is said to be the cause why the thing is; this also is called the true cause: That compels the thing to be; this for that end summons irresistible force from the citadel of omnipotence: By reason of that it is true, not only therefore is it necessary for something to happen because it happens, but therefore it happens because it is necessary that it happen; by reason of this the same is true in that act which TWillius calls free, namely not only is it necessary for such an act to happen because it happens; but therefore it happens because it is necessary that it happen, from the supposition of the divine decree. And since it is clearer than the sun that this TWillisian necessity is the very one which Anselm rejects from free acts; who would not deservedly laugh at this most vain braggart, who claims here to stop the Jesuits' mouth; and while he openly spreads into every contingent act that necessity which Anselm denies constrains either speech or sedition, by which examples any other similarly free operation is designated, he still wants to be seen as having philosophized according to the mind of Anselm?

CXXXII. The necessity, you say, which I admit is only necessity from supposition and conditional. But tell me please from what supposition? From the supposition of free consent or of some cause dependent

DISPUTATION I

on it? By no means. For you make it antecedent. From what supposition then? Namely from the supposition of the divine decree. But you are a Theologian of admirable and recondite wisdom, who to one asking how predefinition which brings necessity does not remove the freedom of the predefined act; denies it removes it for this reason, because it is necessity from the supposition of predefinition, that is from the supposition of its cause: But whatever other necessity, is also from the supposition of the cause from which it proceeds. Is not coactive necessity from the supposition of the cause inflicting force? Is not natural necessity from the supposition of the form which communicates natural inclination? But this is what you had to explain, how necessity which is from the supposition of a cause antecedent to the use of freedom and independent of it, whatever that cause may be, would not destroy the freedom of the operation itself. For Anselm indicates that it destroys precisely because it is a preceding cause and one which makes the thing to be.

CXXXIII. Anselm, you say, calls preceding necessity only that which is natural, as shown by the example he uses when he says preceding and efficient necessity is, when it is said, the heaven revolves. What? Do you also want violent necessity by which a stone is thrown upward to be excluded by Anselm, because he did not add its example? Was it necessary for him to give examples of all the necessities which precede and destroy freedom? I will similarly infer, from Aristotle that there is not a power of local motion in reptiles, if perhaps he, while expressing it, gave examples only of quadrupeds. The reasoning is simple and not at all involved. Necessity which makes the thing to be, and which is the cause why the thing is, is preceding necessity and inimical to freedom, according to Anselm: Necessity which follows from predefinition makes the thing to be, and is the cause why the thing is, as you yourself concede: Therefore it is preceding necessity and inimical to freedom, according to the mind of Anselm. Also. Following necessity and that which does not harm freedom is not, according to Anselm, other than that which the thing makes: that which effects nothing: that which descends from free

DISPUTATION I

will. But necessity which predefinition infers is not that which the thing makes: nor that which effects nothing; nor that which descends from free will: Therefore necessity which predefinition infers is not necessity which according to Anselm is called following, and which does not harm freedom. But if it cannot be contained under the second member of the tradition distinction; it remains that it be reduced to the first, and be believed to be necessity both preceding and harmful to freedom; or let Anselm be condemned along with his distinction. And it can never be proven that there is a better reason why one necessity should remove freedom than another, if both are equally antecedent, and independent of the free consent of the will.

CXXXIV. Predefinition, you say, adds a condition to the predefined act, because it is not directed at it in just any way, but as to be elicited freely and contingently, and therefore should be thought to establish rather than remove freedom. But you always turn head over heels, and repeat the same contradiction. You cannot deny that God by predefining wills that to be which follows from His predefinition: but necessity for the predefined thing to be follows from predefinition: Therefore God wills that necessity to be: Therefore He wills it to be necessary for the thing to happen. You add, for it to be necessary for the thing to happen contingently. After therefore you join these, substitute the proper rationales of each, of necessary itself I say and of contingent itself: And because necessary is said to be that which cannot be otherwise, but contingent that which can be otherwise, say that God wills the predefined act to follow in such a way, that it cannot be otherwise: and at the same time also in such a way that it can be otherwise: and therefore that God wills the same thing both to be and not to be at the same time.

And do not here obtrude the quibble of different respects. Unless you are so subtle that you understand that in different respects it can happen that some animal in itself is truly both rational and not rational at the same time: likewise some subject is both white and not white at the same time.

DISPUTATION I

And this is the supreme contradiction which the predefinition of a free act involves, which does not presuppose middle knowledge. Because, to predefine a free act, is to predefine an act which does not draw the necessity of being from an antecedent cause independent of the will of that one to whom it is said to be free. But for an act to be predefined, is to draw the necessity of being from such a cause: Therefore to predefine a free act, is to predefine an act which is not predefined which implies contradiction. Or. To predefine that an act be free, is to predefine that it be without a cause from which it draws antecedent and independent necessity from the will to which it is free: But predefinition is such a cause: Therefore to predefine an act to be free, is to predefine that it be an act without predefinition. The Adversaries do not distinguish between, to predefine that there not be necessity of a free operation, and to predefine that there be a free operation without necessity, which nevertheless are very far apart. For the first does not contravene, and is included in the decree of concurring with free causes. The second involves the contradiction I spoke of. And the reason is. Because the first only removes the necessity of free operation, but does not necessarily posit the operation itself: Whence its negation can be composed with such predefinition. But the second, both necessarily removes necessity that the operation be, and necessarily posits the same operation, which is to remove the same thing and posit it. For God wills through that act both that there not be necessity in the operation of the creature, and that the operation itself be: and both He wills efficaciously and absolutely, and irresistibly: whence as certainly and as necessarily as that decree operates that there not be necessity of the predefined operation, so certainly and so necessarily it operates that the same operation be. Therefore that decree operates both that the predefined operation necessarily exist, and that it not have necessity of existing, which implies contradiction.

CXXXV. Nothing else remains, except to say that which from the words quoted from Bradwardine TWillius seems to collect, that Anselm excludes necessity which precedes the divine will, which is the

DISPUTATION I

first root of the contingency and freedom of our acts: which therefore will not cease to be free and contingent derivatively from that will of God, just as acts commanded by our will whether internal or external are free, although they draw the necessity of being, even antecedent, from the act commanding from the will itself elicited. But if it is so, and the created will itself with respect to God is not otherwise free per se, than in the way the motive faculty is free with respect to the created will to which it is subject, it is all over for the freedom of the creature, and for that dominion and power of acting and not acting which hitherto both natural reason to Philosophers: and divine instruction to Theologians, and to the Fathers and finally to the universal Church has persuaded.

That he produces Bradwardine, TWillius does so in vain, because he can obtain nothing other, than that we concede that he is not the only bad interpreter of Anselm. And while he insists that he was a Pontifical; he will also obtain this, that we confess not all Pontificals are what the Pontiff is, namely infallible in defining controversies of faith. For it is manifest from what has already been said, that there can be no difference in what is now being asked about antecedent necessity, according to the mind of Anselm; but every necessity whatsoever which is plainly antecedent, and which the will in no way makes, destroys its freedom in acting. It is pleasing to add three words of Scotus, that it may appear how rashly TWillius has alleged him, as though he were a patron of his opinion about the predefinitions of free acts, when nevertheless Scotus has nothing that can agree with TWillius. For thus says Scotus: "If there were necessity previous to the will, and the will were understood to fall under necessity, as if impelling to act and fixing in act; the will would be acted upon and would not act: nor would freedom stand in the act." See whether this is to admit a decree from which follows antecedent necessity which irresistibly and inevitably moves the created will to act. Again Scotus: "When freedom is compatible with necessity, then necessity **FALLS UNDER THE WILL**, so that the will because of the firmness of its freedom, **IMPOSES NECESSITY ON ITSELF**, both in eliciting the act and

DISPUTATION I

in persevering or fixing itself in it." Is this not the following necessity which the will makes according to Anselm; and which therefore alone is reconciled with its freedom? It should also be added what he has in the 4th Book of Sentences, "Never can a second cause preempted by a superior cause acting towards one of the opposites, by proximate power go forth into the other opposite." From which places it is manifest that Scotus agrees with Anselm, concerning the opposition of antecedent necessity which the will does not make, with freedom: and concerning the harmony of following necessity, and which the will makes, with the same freedom. I could also produce very many testimonies of St. Thomas in the same opinion, if this had not already been done excellently by a most erudite man and one who has deserved very well of all Philosophy and Theology, Fr. Peter of St. Joseph, Cistercian, in his own work, entitled Defense of St. Thomas.

CXXXVI. From these it is now easy to understand, how much should be made of what some respond, that divine predefinition is indeed antecedent to the predefined acts, but nevertheless this does not make the necessity by which the predefined act follows also antecedent: and therefore not to be excluded from the rationale of a free act. This, I say, is sufficiently rejected from what has been said. For Anselm does not leave some middle necessity between antecedent and consequent: and therefore if that which is born from predefinition is not antecedent, it remains to be called consequent. But it is not consequent according to Anselm unless it is made by the free agent or which descends from free will as he himself speaks: and it is manifest that that which arises from predefinition, is neither made by the free agent, nor descends from free will: Therefore it is wrongly called consequent.

But this also seems absurd, to deny that a necessity whose cause is antecedent is antecedent; since it is established among all, that any necessity whatsoever follows the condition of its cause and is denominated from it. And thus natural is called the necessity which has a natural cause; violent, which has force externally inflicted; absolute, which has an abso-

DISPUTATION I

lutely existing and operating cause; conditional, which is suspended from some condition either in existing, or in operating. Now in what sense or with what probability will that necessity whose cause is antecedent be called consequent? And that which is called antecedent, why is it so called, unless because it is from an antecedent cause? But lest we seem to quarrel in vain about words, The necessity which a free agent abhors is that, whose cause it can neither impede, nor overcome: The necessity of acting which follows from predefinition apart from middle knowledge, is of this sort: Therefore it is that which a free agent abhors. And this argument needs not proof but meditation.

The doctrine of Diego Alvarez is simpler and more candid, when he said, necessity from the supposition of the divine will precedes indeed the second cause, but does not precede the first cause. But we also do not fight for the freedom of the first cause, but for the freedom of the second cause, which we contend is violated according to Anselm by that necessity which precedes it.

CXXXVII. The same must be said about another subterfuge that Calvin also employed, as I will discuss later. Namely, that this necessity arising from predefinition is a necessity of consequence, not of the consequent. For since there is absolutely no necessity by which one thing is connected with another that cannot be called a necessity of consequence, that necessity is customarily said to be only a necessity of consequence, and not to remove the freedom of the consequent, when its antecedent either is not the cause of the consequent, or somehow presupposes its freedom. And thus from divine foreknowledge, Judas is said to sin necessarily while preserving the contingency and freedom of his sin, because foreknowledge is not the cause why he will sin, as the Fathers so often emphasize, but rather the opposite. Similarly, given divine predefinition based on middle knowledge, the performance of the predefined act necessarily follows, equally preserving its contingency and freedom, because that predefinition presupposes middle knowledge, and middle knowledge presupposes that act as conditionally future. But when the

DISPUTATION I

antecedent of that necessary consequence is the cause of the consequent independent of freedom, no one can doubt that it is not only a necessity of consequence, but also of the consequent, as can be seen in the consequence of beatific love from the vision of God, and of a violently coerced act from the coercing force. Since, therefore, divine predefinition, when middle knowledge is excluded, neither depends on our freedom nor presupposes it, and connects the realization of the predefined act to itself as indissolubly as the beatific vision connects to beatific love, or as coercive force connects to the coerced action, why is it said to be only a necessity of consequence and not also of the consequent? Because, you say, it allows the consequent to be free. But this is precisely what I am asking: why is predefinition, which makes the predefined act follow from our will with as much or even greater necessity than the love of one seeing God follows from that vision, nevertheless said to preserve freedom in that act, which vision does not preserve in love? And if you answer that it is because predefinition entails the mode of freedom, I counter: Vision does not entail the mode of freedom precisely insofar as it entails the mode of necessity independent of freedom. But predefinition similarly entails this necessity. Therefore, it should similarly be denied that it entails the mode of freedom. And the same question always returns in a circle when it is asked: Why is the necessity that predefinition imposes said to be only of consequence and to leave the consequent free, when it arises from an antecedent cause that is independent of freedom; yet the same is not said of the necessity imposed by either vision or coercive force?

CXXXVIII. Our opponents should not hope to easily deceive us with words. What is here called the necessity of consequence between the predefined act and predefinition is an objective necessity by which, according to real being, the act follows from predefinition as from a cause, such that necessity affects that consequence or real emanation. It is not merely a formal or intentional necessity of consequence, by which the knowledge of one thing, even as a cause, is inferred through intellect from the knowledge of another thing, even its effect. Indeed, by that first

DISPUTATION I

necessity, it is not only necessary that one be known if the other is known, but also that one be actually realized if the other is realized; and it is only necessary to be known because it is necessary to be actually realized. Therefore, these are all synonymous: that there is a real necessity of consequence, that there is a necessary consequence, and that one necessarily follows from another according to real being; and what is the same, that one is necessarily caused by another by real necessity. Now, by whatever necessity something is caused, by that same necessity it exists. But the predefined act is caused by predefinition with real necessity. Therefore, the predefined act exists with real necessity. Hence, I finally argue thus: That necessity by which not only is the inference of the consequent from the antecedent necessary, but also the consequent itself necessarily exists, is not merely a necessity of consequence but also of the consequent. But the necessity by which the predefined effect follows from predefinition is such that not only is the inference of the consequent from the antecedent necessary, but also the consequent itself, which is the predefined act, necessarily exists, as is evident from what has been said. Therefore, it is not merely a necessity of consequence, but also of the consequent. But this, even according to our opponents, is incompatible with freedom; therefore, so is the former.

CXXXIX. From this you may gather how convoluted Diego's thought is when he says, "That consequent, 'I will do this in particular,' is necessary by necessity of consequence, as it stands under that antecedent, namely, 'God wills that I do this.'" For by the very fact that the consequent is said to be necessary, the necessity of the consequent must be admitted. Therefore, to say that the consequent is necessary by necessity of consequence is to play with words, affirming and denying the same thing. For the necessity of consequence is so called to exclude the necessity of the consequent; hence, for the consequent to be necessary by necessity of consequence is nothing other than to say that the necessity of consequence in the subject matter is also the necessity of the consequent, even though the former is so named precisely to exclude the latter. The

DISPUTATION I

consequence that is here called necessary is material, consisting in the real connection of the act with predefinition as its cause, by which it becomes necessary both that the act occurs and that it exists dependently on predefinition. But who could rightly say that what has a necessity of existing dependent on something that is independent of my freedom is nevertheless free for me?

CXL. Hence it is readily apparent how important it is for our opponents to deny that their predefinition is independent of the free agent. This seems to be what someone intended when saying that it [predefinition] "is in our hands": not indeed as an effect proceeding from our freedom, but as a cause of our freedom. And it suffices for something to be said to be in our power either that it is an effect of freedom, or that freedom is its effect; and it is as if something were in my power because it is the cause why the act or effect is in my power. Whoever can easily grasp the meaning of these words, I think no part of the Apocalypse will be obscure to him. For what else, I ask, is it for something to be in my power than for its existence to be free to me? But how can the existence of that thing be free to me which in reality depends on me in no way and in no genus of causality? And how can something depend on me when by its existence it preoccupies and anticipates all my power, faculty, and action? But see, reader, where these arguments lead. If it can be truly said that the positing of predefinition is in my power, and thus is free to me, since it follows that whatever depends on predefinition is also free to me, the result is that the positing and existence of all prevenient graces, which God operates in us without us, must be said to be free to me. What will those say who cannot understand how freedom, which does not exist, can nevertheless be the reason why God knows from eternity that something will be future, and who therefore think that a decree must necessarily precede all foreknowledge, when they now say that predefinition, existing from eternity, is in the power of freedom existing after eternity—which means that a thing which is, is free to that which is not? And where have they read, and by what right do they demand that we concede without

DISPUTATION I

witness and without proof, that it suffices for something to be said to be in my power that my freedom is its effect? Is that thought sufficiently philosophical, by which a cause necessarily prerequisite is thought to be in the power of its effect? And since that which is said to be in another's hand or power is by that very fact supposed to have in itself some indifference to existing or not existing, but to be determined by that in whose hand or power it is said to be—according to Ecclesiasticus: "God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel," the meaning of which words he soon explains when he says, "He has set before you fire and water; stretch forth your hand to whichever you will"—and according to Augustine: "That is in our power which we do when we will"; and thus to be in our power either to be grafted in by God's goodness or to be cut off by His severity—since, I say, that which is in someone's hand or power is said to be such that it is or is not according to his will, do they admit that God's eternal and predefining will is so in the power of the created will that it is itself in turn determined by the will it antecedently determines, to be or not to be? Will they here admit that circular causality by which it could be said both that predefinition is the cause why this exercise of my freedom exists rather than not, and that this exercise of my freedom is the cause why predefinition exists or does not exist? Certainly a circle of thoughts cannot be avoided here, when to the question of why the operation of my will is in my power, the answer is given: because predefinition, which itself is in my power, prescribes this mode for it; and again, to the question of why predefinition is said to be in my power, the answer is given: because my operation, with which it is necessarily connected, is in my power. Hence I say again that this way of philosophizing contains an inexplicable position.

CXLI. The same confusion afflicts what they add: that we have antecedent power to remove or posit the supposition of predefinition, or to join with it the negation of the predefined act. This is frankly to admit that there is a power for the impossible, and that our will, which throughout all eternity is not, can nevertheless throughout all eternity impede

DISPUTATION I

something independent of it, and to whose existence it is in no way presupposed. But all these things sufficiently show what difficulties constrain those who, having removed middle knowledge, wish to maintain absolute predefinitions of free acts. I add the condemnation of this view from Alvarez when he says, "The determination of the divine will as it is in God, and as it is His immanent action, is not in our power, BUT ONLY IN THE POWER OF GOD ALONE."

CXLII. And these things suffice both to prove the necessity of middle knowledge and to enervate all the efforts of William Twisse, on whose account we had digressed. Since he professes that he has not previously devoted, nor will hereafter devote, more elaborate effort to this, he might seem unfortunate and worthy of commiseration for not having been rewarded for his effort. He should also be accused and brought before Apollo and the Muses for rashly thrusting his sickle into the harvest of the Scholastics, abandoning Poetry, which if he had continued to cultivate as a Teutonic Poet, he could have hoped for both ivy and wine.

DISPUTATION II.
ANONYMOUS AUTHOR OF THE BOOK ON
ORDER AND ON PRIOR AND POSTERIOR

I. We must deal more humanely with this Doctor, since he professes friendship, which he also regrets had to be set aside for truth according to the prescription of the Philosopher and by example. Yet it is our right and duty of friendship both to sympathize with him and to be indignant on our own behalf. For who would not grieve, if he were truly a friend, that his disputation against middle knowledge occurred at that time when William Twisse was attacking the same, so that an eminently Catholic man came forward to receive a Calvinist and to join his forces with him? But who would not think it right to be indignant with him for believing that out of the entire circle of friends, he alone was set apart as one to whom truth would show itself, while all others remained blind? There was also something remarkably presumptuous in him: though there were only two sides in this controversy, he abandoned one so completely that he exceeded the other; for while he attacks the common doctrine of Jesuits, he does not even stand with the Thomists, so that something similar might be said of him as was once said of one who was said to have lost a Senator and not made a Monk. For both formerly and to-day, almost all Thomists, as far as one can conjecture from Fr. John of St. Thomas, reject middle knowledge in such a way that they nevertheless admit they are compelled to retain conditional knowledge, and they differ from Jesuits only in that what the latter say is known by God indepen-

DISPUTATION II

dently of any decree, the former contend is known dependently on a decree, though equally conditional. But the Anonymous Doctor rejects both the conditional decree and the knowledge that follows from it, and sets out to lead his own separate family, which will undoubtedly be rarer and less numerous for this reason. Nevertheless, this should be pardoned, and his effort praised, which love of truth has drawn forth. Since he wished to share its rays with friends, here we are, ready to test the new light and to apply eyes that are not indocile. For who would wish to rebel against the light? But while he, out of his humanity, grants us the abundance of this thing, in the meantime we shall take care to distinguish smoke from fire.

CHAPTER I. TEN ANONYMOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE EXAMINED.

II. He has arranged ten arguments against Middle Knowledge. These, as he indeed thinks, are most firm: although they are deduced neither from scripture, nor from councils, nor from the Holy Fathers, nor from those common sources from which a theological conclusion ought to be drawn, so that I may respond to what he pronounces about us—in Latin indeed and elegantly, but with insufficient theological rigor.

The first argument, by which he claims to clearly demonstrate the impossibility of middle knowledge, that is, knowledge of future conditionals, is as follows: if such a future were known, it would be known either in itself according to what actually exists, or in its cause. Neither can be maintained. Therefore, etc. Briefly, I deny the major premise, and I say that a conditional future is known neither in its cause, nor in itself according to what actually exists, but according to what would exist; because this alone is asserted about that future—not that it is, but that it would be if the condition were fulfilled. Therefore, the truth of that knowledge does not require something that is, but something that would be under the hypothesis. But, he says, that major premise is from St. Thomas, who teaches that a future contingent (whether absolute or con-

DISPUTATION II

ditional) can be considered in only two ways. I counter this Doctor against himself when he speaks thus. But I contend that none of these, nor any other before Molina, ever even dreamed of God's middle knowledge, nor have they anywhere either presupposed it or applied it to resolve any difficulty either of Sacred Scripture or Scholastic Theology. St. Thomas is included in this number, therefore not even in his dreams did he ever think about middle knowledge, and consequently not about the knowledge of conditional futures, which according to our Anonymous author is convertible with middle knowledge. Therefore, when he says that the future can be known in only two ways, he does not mean the future whether absolute or conditional as our Anonymous wants, but only the absolute, since he did not even dream about the knowledge of conditionals.

I add that the exclusive particle "only" is not in St. Thomas, nor does he say that a future contingent is considered and known in only two ways. His words are: "For the evidence of this, it must be considered that a contingent can be considered in two ways: one way in itself, according as it is already in act, and thus it is not considered as future, but as present... In another way, a contingent can be considered as it is in its cause, etc." In this statement, there is nothing that prohibits anyone from also considering a contingent in a third and a fourth way, namely either as it is in act absolutely, or as it is in act from a hypothesis, or as it is in a cause that sometime exists absolutely, or as it would be in a merely possible cause, if that were to exist.

III. But because we are neither compelled to grant this, nor is it true that St. Thomas never thought about conditional futures, I say that this fourfold manner of consideration is not multiplied by addition to those two that have been mentioned, but by their division. For when he says that a future can be considered in itself according as it is already in act, this can be understood concerning an act that is either posited absolutely, or is suspended only by the positing of a condition, such that when it is posited, it will infallibly be posited. Similarly, when he says that a fu-

DISPUTATION II

ture can be considered in its cause, this is to be interpreted concerning a cause that either exists at some time, or would exist if God so willed. And thus one is free either to deny that major premise absolutely, or to distinguish it according to this interpretation, so that nothing can be concluded against the knowledge of conditional futures.

IV. The Anonymous insists: What is future to us must be present to God in order to be known by Him; a conditional future cannot be present to God. I respond: First, a proof called Manifest, as this is said to be, should not have been tied to a most obscure principle, such as is that one, that the reason for understanding future contingents is the presence they have in the eternity of God—concerning the proper understanding of which even the Thomists themselves are divided. Next, I say that what is future to us must be present to God in order to be understood, in the manner in which it is future to us, not in another way. Since, therefore, a conditional future is future to us in such a way that its futurity is suspended from a condition, it must also be present to God in such a way that its presence is suspended from the same condition. And this is what God must know, if He is omniscient, namely, that nothing else is required than that such a condition be posited, so that such an effect becomes really present to His eternity: nothing else, I say, is required for the repentance of the Tyrians, for example, to follow from their free will, and when they want to speak thus, to be really presented to eternity, than that such grace with such circumstances precede. Nor is it consequently the case that, just as that real presence of the conditional future is suspended, so also is the objective presence and existence of the knowledge by which it is known suspended; since it is evident that there can be both knowledge and volition of a conditional object that exists absolutely, no less than there can be both knowledge and volition of an object that is either future or past; I add also spiritual knowledge of a corporeal object, and accidental knowledge of a substantial object. For knowledge does not imitate the mode of the object regarding its own existence and entity, but only regarding representation, insofar as it does not represent except what is, and thus what

DISPUTATION II

is future as future, what is present as present. And just as it is not necessary that that contingent whose knowledge coexists with eternity totally and adequately, or rather is itself eternal per se, coexist with the same eternity totally and adequately, as the Anonymous admits, so neither is it necessary that that which has knowledge existing absolutely also have itself either absolute existence or presence. The Antichrist, for example, although he does not coexist totally and adequately with the eternity of God according to real presence, nevertheless his knowledge, and consequently his objective presence by reason of such knowledge, is no less ancient than God Himself. Similarly, although the repentance of the Tyrians has a suspended presence, that is, a real existence from a possible condition of calling and miracles, nevertheless its knowledge in the divine mind exists absolutely, and consequently also its objective presence by reason of such knowledge is absolute and minimally suspended. For as God knows successive things simultaneously, composite things simply, many things unitively, so He also knows conditional things absolutely. And thus the first of the most certain and manifest arguments is dissolved.

V. The second is of no moment, and ends in a question about terms. Conditional knowledge, he says, essentially implies imperfection. But this is denied. He proves it by induction. But in what will this induction be made? I suppose in created things. But by the same induction it will be established that every knowledge whatsoever is an accidental form, and therefore none is in God. Let us therefore worship a stump, since all knowledge is imperfect and unworthy of God. But, he says, the particle "If" is a conjunction, and a mark of mental conjunction. Is not the word "is" also a copula and a mark of mental composition? Let us therefore deny that God knows what is signified by this proposition "man is an animal," lest He be thought to have composite knowledge, when for the same danger it is denied that He knows that the Tyrians would be converted if called.

DISPUTATION II

The same particle, he says, signifies mental inference. But this is precisely denied; for it signifies only the concomitance of two propositions, with a dependence of one upon the other that is either free or necessary. This is so true that not even the Thomists oppose it, who besides the illative sense of the consequent from the antecedent corresponding to a hypothetical proposition, distinguish another, non-illative sense, about which one can see Diego Alvarez.

And when the Anonymous insists that if we intend nothing else than that God understands what we enunciate conditionally, this is not to posit conditional knowledge in God, any more than discursive knowledge from the fact that, etc. I respond that we intend absolutely nothing else than that God, in His own way, that is, the most perfect and divine, knows the very same thing that we know in a more imperfect manner when we say, for example, that the Tyrians would be converted if called. But if one does not want knowledge of this kind in God to be called conditional, let him see what he calls it, provided he does not deny that it exists. Nevertheless, usage of language is ours and in our possession; nor is it necessary that conditional knowledge take its name from the mode of knowing rather than from the object.

VI. The third argument: The truth of conditional knowledge is the truth of the connection of the antecedent and the consequent; but no knowledge of God consists of an antecedent and a consequent; therefore none can be true with that truth. This argument was included in the previous one, by which it was denied that there is conditional knowledge in God, because it is illative. I respond: I deny the major, because in it the truth of conditional knowledge is badly described, which is nothing other than its conformity with its object, that is, with the objective concomitance and free and contingent consequence of a free effect from its cause. I say that this can also be called, with respect to God, a connection of antecedent and consequent, provided these names are said of the objects, not of the knowledge itself, and the connection is understood to be free, not necessary.

DISPUTATION II

VII. The fourth consists of various questions. First, why do we establish a third kind of knowledge for conditional futures, rather than for present or past things? I respond: Let the Anonymous concede to us that God knows what we call a conditional future, for example, that the conversion of the Tyrians would freely follow from the hypothesis of their being called; for afterwards we will easily permit him to reduce knowledge of this kind to whatever genus he prefers; if not to a third, at least to a second, if not to a first; we give him the choice of a more convenient place. But when he adds that the conversion of the Tyrians under that hypothesis is a conditional past, he solves the proposed objection and question. For since it is clear that the foreknowledge of that conversion is reduced by us to the genus of middle knowledge, consequently we do not establish a third kind of knowledge for conditional futures, rather than for past things. I would say the same if he had produced an example of a conditional present. Indeed, we call a conditional future not only that which is such that the occasion and time for positing the condition from which it is pronounced to follow is still understood to be pending and future, but that whose condition is not understood to be posited, whether the time for positing it has passed or not. And thus, although the time for calling the Tyrians has passed, nevertheless, because the calling is not understood to be posited, we say that their repentance is future from the hypothesis of the calling; and we leave it free for this to be signified by words of the past, or present, or future tense. In this way: "if this had been, that would have been," "if this is posited, that is posited," "if this will be posited, that also," as seems more apt and opportune to grammarians.

The second question is: Why is that knowledge rather of free conditional futures, than of necessary ones? The answer is easy: because free things are not necessary, nor necessary things free. But if he still asks why a special kind of knowledge is not admitted for necessary conditionals, I respond: Because the knowledge of simple intelligence is necessarily also knowledge of a necessary conditional future. Since it is impossible to

DISPUTATION II

know the sun to be necessarily shining, and not to know that there will be light if the Sun is produced; whence it happens that to know that the sun can be created is to know that there will be light from the hypothesis of creation. But because it is possible for the Tyrians not to consent if they are called, therefore to know that they can be called is not to know that they will consent from the hypothesis of the calling.

The third question: Why is that conditional knowledge rather concerning conditional futures that will never be, as some asserters of the aforesaid knowledge want, than concerning those that will be or have been? I respond: If there are any who philosophize so badly that they do not think conditional knowledge precedes the divine will even concerning those things which, either by God's action or permission, become absolute from conditionals, and exist in some difference of time, let them see what they will respond. I neither have nor want to have a commission to defend that opinion.

VIII. The fifth argument is that knowledge in God is not to be multiplied without necessity, which is not present here. Since knowledge of a conditional future is reduced to the knowledge of vision, if such a future with its condition exists in some difference of time; and if it never exists, to the knowledge of simple intelligence. I respond as above: Let us agree that God is said to know with certainty that the Tyrians, for example, would be converted from the hypothesis of calling and miracles, and similarly for other cases, and afterward we will see under which genus this knowledge is to be placed. I add: If the Anonymous wants that knowledge to be reduced to the knowledge of simple intelligence, because both the calling and the conversion of the Tyrians neither ever was, nor is, nor will be, he will have to obtain from the republic of theologians that something contingent, and whose contradiction can be known absolutely, is said to pertain to the knowledge of simple intelligence. For it is absolutely possible that the conversion of the Tyrians, even from the hypothesis of calling, will not be future; whence it happens that, absolutely speaking, it can be known not to be future, as well as future, and yet in reality it is

DISPUTATION II

known only to be future from that hypothesis, and is not known not to be future, which is contingent. Similarly, if he wants the knowledge of St. Augustine's conversion from the hypothesis of the calling he received in that garden where he was with Alypius, to pertain to the knowledge of vision, because both such a calling and such a conversion really is to follow, and passed into something that exists absolutely, he will have to obtain permission to say that knowledge of a thing that abstracts from the absolute existence of its object can be reduced to the knowledge of vision. For, setting aside the absolute decree of God concerning the calling of Augustine, and consequently setting aside the absolute existence of both Augustine's calling and conversion, we understand God knowing that Augustine's conversion would follow from such a calling, just as the Tyrians' would follow from another such calling. But we, because we do not want to be troublesome to theologians, who exclude from the knowledge of simple intelligence contingent things about which something else is asserted than that they are possible, and from the knowledge of vision things that absolutely exist nowhere, have found a middle place in which to put the knowledge of conditional futures. The Anonymous adds that he will afterwards demonstrate that the knowledge of vision is the cause of all things and prior to them; we will await that demonstration, and at the same time examine whether the freedom of created agents can really stand comfortably with divine decrees if middle knowledge is rejected.

IX. The sixth argument: It is false, he says, what they say that this middle knowledge is prior to the knowledge of vision, for by what priority? Not of duration, not of causality, etc. I do not want to weave other questions out of others, nor to call to examination the whole lucubration of the Anonymous concerning the prior and the posterior. Let him speak as he pleases; let him concede to us that there is some knowledge in God which illuminates His will (he concedes this even under that term in chapter 34, number 6), or if the term "illuminates" displeases him, which at least constitutes God in the nature of a free agent most completely, and which nevertheless abstracts from the absolute and actual existence of the

DISPUTATION II

free effect. If he does not want to concede that there is knowledge of this kind in God, I ask: does not God freely abstain from producing another Angel? He will not deny this, I suppose. But if He freely abstains, therefore He abstains with all knowledge necessary for this, so that He can will to create it. Therefore, the knowledge by which He can will to create it also abstracts, even by real abstraction, from such creation, and therefore also from the knowledge of vision of such an Angel, which would be if God willed to create it. Again I ask: If God willed to create that Angel, which He freely does not create, would such knowledge perish? I think not; for it is unheard of that what is required for something should be destroyed by its supposition. Therefore that knowledge would still exist with the will to create, and consequently would exist with the knowledge of vision, from which it now abstracts. Again and a third time I ask: How, therefore, would that knowledge be related to the knowledge of vision? Would it be prior, or posterior? And what the Anonymous will respond, let him take for himself. For thus we say middle knowledge is related to the knowledge of vision, when the object of both is the same, which passes from conditional to absolute, such as is, for example, the conversion of Augustine, which from being conditionally future became absolutely future; as that by which God is ultimately completed so that He can freely create or not create an Angel is related to that by which He sees the same Angel while it becomes existing from possible, as far as concerns the nature of prior and posterior. And whether he wishes it or not, the Anonymous must concede that here is found priority in the consequence of subsistence; likewise that which, preserving real identity, can be conceived between divine knowledge exhibiting an object to volition, and the volition of the object thus known. For that the order which is found between the operation of the intellect and the created will is also found between the knowledge and will of God, as far as real identity and simplicity permit, both the common sense of the wise confesses, and the divine processions confirm. For what do you more aptly answer to one asking why the Holy Spirit is not the second person, who with the Father gener-

DISPUTATION II

ates the Son in no way spirated by him, than because intellection is prior to volition in some respect which is founded in their very nature; whence it happens that what proceeds from intellection must be the principle of that which proceeds from volition, rather than conversely, and this from the nature of the thing?

X. The seventh argument: None of us is so foolish as to conceive hypothetical judgments simultaneously with absolute ones about the same thing. For who, he says, seeing the moon shining would say, "If the moon were shining, I would see it"; or holding or reading a breviary, "If I had a breviary, I would read it," etc. [I respond:] None of us should be so foolish as to deny that hypothetical syllogisms are suitable, in which from the positing of the antecedent one proceeds to the positing of the consequent, as when I say: "If the sun shines, it is day; but the sun shines; therefore it is day." But in syllogisms of this kind, it is necessary that hypothetical judgments be conceived simultaneously with absolute ones about the same thing, as is clear in this example, in which "it is day" is judged absolutely in the conclusion, and hypothetically in the major premise. Therefore, etc. The examples that are proposed by the Anonymous are absurd for this reason: because in them absolute and experiential judgment is presupposed to the hypothetical; for the moon is first seen, and the breviary is first held, which being posited, it is absurd to conceive a hypothetical proposition, that conditional one connected by the particle "If," because the intellect is signified to be still suspended concerning the absolute judgment. But it is not absurd, even with that experiential and absolute judgment posited, to still conceive a causal judgment by which it is said: "Because the moon shines, I see it," and, "Because I have a breviary, I read it." Whence it always remains that a hypothetical judgment stands with an absolute one about the same thing. Indeed, these causal propositions are contained under hypothetical ones, as is clear from St. Thomas.

Now when a hypothetical judgment, even a conditional one, is presupposed to an absolute one, that both are simultaneously in the same

DISPUTATION II

intellect and about the same thing, whoever denies this would be foolish. For this happens commonly when we use a hypothetical syllogism, as has already been said; but we use it, or should use it, when we act deliberately. For what? Is it not of great wisdom, before you conclude anything, to judge thus with yourself: "If I want this, that follows"? But if then the will substitutes, as it were, a minor premise, "but I want this," is there not room for an absolute judgment by which you say, "Therefore that follows"? This is indeed how the matter stands in the divine intellect, with imperfections removed. For God knows, independently of any absolute decree, "If Stephen is moved to pray for Paul, he will pray for him." To this knowledge He joins a decree by which He decides to move Stephen to this, and from this follows the vision of Stephen's prayer, and another decree, by which, in view of the prayer seen, He decides to call Paul.

And when the Anonymous says that this is to think unworthily of God, he should beware lest he give occasion to anyone to think of him otherwise than friends would wish. For if there is something absurd in what he represents, it is the fault of the one representing, who did not want to apply a suitable color when he easily could. Nor should anything else be required of him than that he correct his representations; for it will happen immediately that he neither thinks unworthily of God, nor considers a conditional judgment to exclude an absolute one about the same thing.

XI. The eighth argument: Of the conditional futures that are brought forward, very many are not future, because neither they themselves nor their conditions are ever to be posited. Likewise, because what is future is called future with respect to something present or past. Likewise, it will sometime be present or past, which does not apply to these conditionals, at least to very many of them; they are therefore only possible, as possible is opposed to the actual impossible. I respond: Very many of the conditional futures are not absolutely future, nor such that it can be said of them, "They will be," but only, "They would be if the condition were posited." So what? Let this alone be conceded to us, that it can

DISPUTATION II

be truly said of them, "If this were, that also would be," and we are content. But neither Augustine nor Prosper denies this when they call those things future which are not future. And when the Anonymous says that what is future is called future with respect to something present or past, this is true in the sense that it should not coexist with the present or past, and this especially applies to those conditionals of which it is only said that they would be from a hypothesis. But what he adds, that the future is said to be only what will sometime be present or past, is to be conceded of the absolute future, but denied of the conditional, which is therefore only called future, not because it will sometime be, but because it would be if the condition were posited. Finally, this future differs from the merely possible in this, that its contradictory is also possible, but something is said of it that is not said of the contradictory. It is possible for the Tyrians not to be converted from the hypothesis of calling, and it is rightly said: "If the Tyrians were called, they could not be converted." But we say that the conversion itself is not only possible from the hypothesis, but absolutely future. We do not, I say, say only, "If they were called, they could be converted," but absolutely, "They would be converted." Therefore this conversion is not only possible, but it adds actuality that is future from the hypothesis.

XII. The ninth argument embraces and confuses many things, both good and bad. God, he says, cannot know by conditional knowledge what would be future in these or those circumstances. First, for the reason proposed in the first argument. What? Did not the reason proposed in the second and third arguments and in others following also conclude this same thing? What, I ask, did he undertake to prove in this whole chapter and with these ten arguments, except that God cannot know by conditional knowledge what would be future in these or those circumstances?

He adds secondly another reason, which itself will be the ninth, because, he says, conditional knowledge of itself posits or removes nothing in reality; it affirms or denies nothing that will be, understand, absolutely. As if he were saying: Knowledge that posits or removes nothing in

DISPUTATION II

reality, and that affirms or denies nothing to be absolutely future, is not in God; but conditional knowledge is such; therefore. I waste the reader's leisure if I respond; briefly, I say that the major begs the question. I add that knowledge which posits nothing in reality, that is, in the object absolutely, nevertheless posits in the knower knowledge worthy of him, because it pertains to Him to know not only what is posited absolutely, but moreover if this were posited, what else would follow from it either necessarily or contingently and freely.

He adds thirdly another reason, which could be called the tenth. Because since about almost everything about which absolute propositions are made, hypothetical ones can be made, conditional knowledge about all things will have to be admitted in God, and that prior to absolute knowledge, which is most absurd. I respond: I deny that there can be knowledge about all things which both adds something to that knowledge by which they are known to be possible, in the way that was said a little before, and abstracts from their absolute existence; and consequently I deny that conditional knowledge is given about all things, as it is convertible with middle knowledge.

He adds fourthly another reason, which should be called the eleventh. Because God cannot know what would be future unless He knows all the causes on which that future can depend; but He does not know all these by that knowledge, because, namely, He knows no decree of His will, without which no effect can be, [as existing]. I respond: God knows all the causes of a conditional future, and also that decree of His which is necessary for this kind of futurity. But I say that for this, no decree existing absolutely, or which exists in fact, is necessary, but only one that could exist. The hypothesis from which God understands something to be conditionally future is the hypothesis of such a will in such circumstances to be posited and helped by the concurrence necessary for acting and accommodated to its freedom, which hypothesis includes the decree of concurring, not as actually posited, nor as to be posited, at least absolutely, but as possible to be posited. Hence God sees that the will would

DISPUTATION II

operate freely. And this knowledge must be conceived in such a way that God says, abstracting from all existence of a free decree and from the knowledge of vision by which He Himself understands His own decree as actually and absolutely existing: "If I will to create that will in such circumstances, and if I will to concur with it in the way that is apt for its freedom to be preserved, it will freely elicit that act," or, "It will freely not elicit it."

And while the Anonymous asks what that decree is like, whether that will of God that is then understood is absolute or conditional, I respond by asking in turn what that will is like by which God in fact decrees to create the will of man or Angel and to exhibit His concurrence to it accommodated to its freedom? For such a will is understood through the knowledge that abstracts from the knowledge of vision, as is posited in reality, and as is understood through the very knowledge of vision. But there is only this difference, that through the latter it is understood as actually existing absolutely, through the former as possible. For just as God understands that He can will to create another Angel, which in fact He does not will to create, and consequently understands that will of His as possible, abstracting from its actual and absolute existence, so He understands that He can will to create that Angel which in fact He does will to create, and that He can will to concur with its will, independently of and abstracting from the actual and absolute positing of both decrees; and this I call understanding as possible, not as if its non-existence were positively conceived, but because it is abstracted, in the way that the knowledge of simple intelligence by which Michael is understood as possible is abstracted both from the existence of the same Michael, and from the knowledge of vision which intuitus him as existing. From this possibility both of the Angel and of the decrees, I say it follows conditionally that this indeed would freely and contingently be future, but that would freely and contingently not be future. And I wonder that the Anonymous here mixes in the refutation of Suárez, who asserts that in God there is knowledge both conditional and absolute with respect to divine acts as some-

DISPUTATION II

how and improperly future both absolutely and conditionally; for that controversy is disparate, and whatever you decide about it matters little for the solution of this argument.

XIII. The tenth and last argument does not attack conditional knowledge as it is posited by us, but some other imaginary kind, namely, by which it is said to be known what the will would do in these or those circumstances, if it were to act by itself and independently of God. Wherefore, if there are any who delight in proposing and solving questions of this kind, let them see what they will respond. I say only this, that on this point the Anonymous attacks this knowledge ineffectively, because with that hypothesis admitted, namely, that God knows in which direction the will would be inclined if it were to act by itself in these and those circumstances, he contends that knowledge of this kind pertains either to the knowledge of vision, or to the knowledge of simple intelligence. For, he says, given that hypothesis, either the will is going to do something or not; if the first, this pertains to the knowledge of vision; if the second, to the knowledge of simple intelligence. But this argumentation labors under a double and indeed manifest fault. First, that what is supposed to be future from a hypothesis, even an impossible one, is confused with that which exists absolutely in some difference of time, and therefore is reduced to the object of the knowledge of vision. Second, that the will's not going to do something is thought to be known by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, and I am mistaken if he does not also think that nights and blindnesses and things of this kind are known by God by the same knowledge. But I thought that the knowledge of contraries was the same, and that free and contingent negations of beings and actions are reduced to the same genus to which the free and contingent existence of those things, whose negations they are, is also reduced, with Dionysius preceding St. Thomas when he says that God receives vision of darkness through Himself.

And this is the sum of the ten arguments that the Anonymous has prepared against middle knowledge, in his judgment most firm. Thus

DISPUTATION II

indeed it was expedient for him to think and speak, lest it should seem that there was no probable cause for departing from the opinion of friends. But I hope that the fair reader, having compared the solutions, will easily judge that it was highly improbable, since if this controversy were even doubtful, and offered to philosophers the choice of either opinion balanced by equal weights, nevertheless this learned man could not have been unaware that in doubtful matters, possession ought to have remained with friendship.

CHAPTER II. THE ANONYMOUS WRITER'S ATTACK AGAINST FR. LUIS DE MOLINA IS REFUTED.

XIV. After opposing the defenders of Middle Knowledge in general, the Anonymous Writer challenges Luis de Molina to a duel, intending to demonstrate what novelty and falsity this knowledge contains. He deals with him in such a way that he scrutinizes everything precisely, even quarreling about words and manner of speaking: certainly more ungenerously than befits the duties of friends, who ought to arrange matters among themselves in such a way that they neither focus excessively on exact balance, nor reduce minor matters to precise calculation. If this severity in examining the Anonymous Writer's commentaries were to please us as well, where would it end? And what page would not supply abundant material for fault-finding? But I shall not allow myself either to abuse my leisure in such matters or to cease serving well the humanity of the Reader.

§ I. WITHOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, THE RECONCILIATION OF FREE WILL WITH DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND DECREES IS DIFFICULT.

XIV. The first fault of Molina, therefore, is a certain declaration of danger if anyone wishes to reconcile divine providence with the free-

DISPUTATION II

dom of will and the contingency of events without the direction of Middle Knowledge. Regarding this danger, says the Anonymous Writer, Not only do I not see it, but neither have any of the Scholastic Doctors before him or the Holy Fathers noticed it. That the reconciliation of divine foreknowledge and providence with the freedom of will is difficult, and that there is a danger that someone might err in this matter, as Molina claims, are, I think, the same thing. I am not now contending that this difficulty or danger is removed by employing the distinction of Middle Knowledge; but that the reconciliation of divine foreknowledge with the freedom of will seemed difficult to the Scholastic Doctors and Holy Fathers, who, as our Adversaries say, were unacquainted with it, and who therefore philosophized without it, is so evident that if anyone denies it, he forces us to question either his diligence in examining the monuments of the ancients, or his attention in observing them, or his memory in retaining them. Therefore, I am greatly surprised by what the same Author says that all theologians before this recently devised Middle Knowledge had explained all these matters (which pertain to efficacious grace) conveniently and sufficiently. And this statement: All this certainty, harmony, gentleness, and efficacy of divine foreknowledge, providence, and concurrence with our freedom has been explained far better and more solidly by the Ancient and most distinguished Theologians than by any recent ones. Indeed, he thinks no differently about himself than about the Ancients, and therefore, having set forth what he believed to be a suitable explanation of this harmony, he adds: What can be objected against these things by our Adversaries, or what more can reasonably be asked by them in this matter, or answered by others, I do not see: and the ancient Theologians think that with this response, the entire difficulty has been exhausted, nor do they commonly offer another, especially St. Thomas.

XV. Perhaps there will be something later that we might both object to and respond to. Meanwhile, I say that this man does not agree sufficiently with those to whom he thinks these difficulties proposed by Molina were unknown. He names the Fathers. Let Augustine alone stand

DISPUTATION II

for all, who in the second book on the Merit and Remission of Sins speaks thus: "The very reason that can be initiated concerning these matters by such as we are **VEHEMENTLY CONSTRAINS** any of us who inquire, lest we so defend grace as to seem to take away free will, or on the other hand, so assert free will that with proud impiety we may be judged ungrateful to God's grace." And just as Augustine says he is vehemently constrained, the Anonymous Writer thinks he walks in openness.

The same Augustine in the book on the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Celestius says: "But because this question, where the discussion is about the will's freedom and God's grace, is **SO DIFFICULT** to discern that when free will is defended, God's grace seems to be denied; but when God's grace is asserted, free will is thought to be taken away; Pelagius can involve himself **IN THE HIDING PLACES OF OBSCURITY** in such a way that he might say he agrees even with those things we have presented written by St. Ambrose, and he proclaims that he also thinks these things and has always thought them, and thus he tries to explain each point in such a way that they might be believed to agree with his opinion." Here again the Anonymous Writer sees no danger where Augustine sees a difficult, obscure question, wrapped in hiding places in which heretics lurk—enemies, that is, of divine grace and free will.

The same Augustine in the book on Grace and Free Will to Valentine and the monks with him: "It has been reported to me, Brothers, by some who are in your congregation and who have come to us from there, through whom we have also directed these things, that there are disagreements among you concerning this matter (the harmony of grace with free will). Therefore, most beloved, so that the **OBSCURITY** of this question may not disturb you, I admonish you first to give thanks to God for those things you understand. But whatever it is to which the focus of your mind cannot yet reach, while preserving peace and charity among yourselves, **PRAY TO THE LORD THAT YOU MAY UNDERSTAND**, etc." Here too you see an obscure question, and one whose

DISPUTATION II

explanation exceeds the comprehension of learned men; and is to be expected not so much from the powers of human intellect as from divine revelation. Hence is that which Andreas Vega confesses (book 12 on Justification, chapter 22) that not even Augustine ever sufficiently untied this knot. "And I have often desired this," he says, "that Augustine would have openly and clearly responded to those objecting to him that one should refrain from preaching predestination and grace before the people, because it would harm the hearers, etc."

XVI. But since the Anonymous Writer also names Scholastic Doctors whom he thinks were fearless regarding this danger that Molina supposedly invented, let him hear Dominic Soto, who speaks thus: "It remains finally that we explain something about Paul's latter question, which indeed we confess has always been DIFFICULT to explain. Namely, why God complains about sinners whom He Himself has reprobated, since no one can resist His will. Nevertheless, the response is that neither predestination nor reprobation takes anything away from our freedom; otherwise, there could be no basis for either merit or fault. But from here SHADOWS OF DOUBT ARE CAST UPON US, namely that since neither God's knowledge can be deceived nor His will changed, and since from eternity God has not only foreknown but by certain purpose has determined what will happen to each person, our efforts seem to go in vain; since no freedom seems to remain for us, and thus God's precepts and admonitions, and the counsels of our prudence are futile. We certainly cannot deny that THE NARROWNESS OF OUR INTELLECT SCARCELY GRASPS THIS: yet we should not therefore deny either God's omniscience or His eternal will, or the freedom that we experience and which is most explicitly asserted throughout sacred scripture. But if we cannot achieve anything else in this difficult matter, it is easy to show that the same difficulty presses upon all, however they think about predestination and reprobation." See, Reader, how true it is that no one before Molina felt any danger in solving this question, which Do-

DISPUTATION II

minic Soto, who preceded Molina, both testifies has always been difficult to explain and also reduces his own intellect to constraint.

And let him hear Cajetan as well, who is even more ancient than Soto, whose words are those which we cited earlier: "And when you object, join these words together (namely, that God's election will infallibly have its effect, and that each of us has free will), I respond that I know that truth is not contrary to truth, but I do not know how to join these things, just as I do not know the mystery of the Trinity; just as I do not know the immortal soul; just as I do not know 'the Word was made flesh,' and similar things which nevertheless I believe." The same person, in response to that common argument about how divine providence, which is eternal and pre-exists the free effect that inevitably follows from it, does not destroy its freedom, speaks thus: "In the response to the first, a very difficult doubt occurs, and perhaps one insoluble by human intellect. For the evidence of which, that the doubt may be better understood in what it consists, it must be noted, etc." And then, having proposed both that doubt and the solution he could give, he adds: "But to save the aforementioned infallibility with the indifference or freedom of execution or event, this is the task, this is the labor. For if it is infallible, etc." He again reveals the difficulty and adds: "To this doubt I have found nothing written in St. Thomas. For I do not recall that he ever raised this issue. But he always endeavored to preserve contingency. In other Doctors also, I have hitherto found nothing on this question, except what is commonly said about the composite and divided sense; about the necessity of the consequence and of the consequent; about the freedom of divine election in eternity; and about the nature of causes that can go either way found in the universe. But all these things, as is clear from what has been said, do not satisfy the intellect." And after recounting and rejecting various ways of speaking, he says: "It is necessary, therefore, if the truth of this question is to satisfy our intellect, to say one of two things: either that from being foreseen infallibility does not follow, or that the inevitability of the foreseen event does not detract from the evitability of the same events. And

DISPUTATION II

this second view, indeed, because of the reason adduced above, I do not understand how it can be verified. For it is clear that evitability appears to be preserved only in a qualified sense. The first view, although it is commonly defended by the Doctors, who say that from being foreseen or willed or predestined (for as far as this difficulty is concerned, I take all these as the same) inevitability does not follow; I, however, not to oppose myself against the torrent, nor by asserting, but always maintaining the captivity of the intellect in obedience to Christ, suspect that just as from being foreseen, etc." In a word, from that which is 'being foreseen,' he suspects that neither evitability nor inevitability of the foreseen event follows, but something higher and more eminent. And he adds: "And if it is so, the intellect rests, not in the evidence of inspected truth, but in the inaccessible height of hidden truth. And this seems quite reasonable to my small intellect, both because of the reason stated above and because, as Gregory says, he thinks less of God who believes only this about Him, which he can measure by his own intellect. Nor therefore, I suspect, should any of those things be denied which we know or hold by faith to pertain to divine immutability, actuality, certainty, and universality and the like. But I believe something hidden lies either in the order that exists between God and the foreseen event, or in the bond between the event itself and being foreseen. And thus considering the intellect of our soul to be the eye of an Owl, I find its rest only in ignorance. For it is better, both for the Catholic faith and for philosophy, to confess our blindness, than to assert as evident things that do not satisfy the intellect: For evidence is that which satisfies." And finally: "The best and healthiest counsel in this matter is to begin from those things which we certainly know and experience in ourselves, namely that all things which are contained under our free will can be avoided by us; and therefore we are worthy of punishment or reward. But how, while preserving this, divine providence is preserved, and predestination, etc. Believe what Holy Mother Church believes. For it is written, 'Seek not the things that are too high for you': for many things are revealed to you above the senses of men: and this is one

DISPUTATION II

of them." See, Reader, with what fidelity the Anonymous Writer has said that None of the theologians prior to Molina noticed any danger in reconciling God's foreknowledge with freedom: all have explained such questions conveniently and sufficiently: nor does he see what more can reasonably be asked by the Adversaries, what can be objected, what can be answered. He himself, indeed, enjoys a certain light invisible to the eyes of others, and is so favorable to them that he contends they are eagles, where they call themselves owls; that they are most perceptive, where they confess their blindness; that they sufficiently solve what they think insoluble; that they conveniently explain an inaccessible truth in whose ignorance alone rest is found; that the entire difficulty has been exhausted both by others and especially by St. Thomas, when that which is more pressing has not even been raised anywhere by him, according to the testimony of the one who has most diligently studied the writings of the Holy Doctor, but has been so solved by others that whatever they say does not satisfy the intellect.

XVII. Finally, let him hear more recent Thomists who, although posterior to Molina, nevertheless report and approve the opinions of their predecessors. Diego Alvarez entitles disputation 118: "Whether the harmony of free will with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason"; and having presented a third opinion which states thus: "The third opinion acknowledges that the freedom of our will can indeed be evidently known and demonstrated by the light of nature alone, but how its actual use stands with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, and with the efficacy of the aids of divine grace, cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by the light of nature alone: and therefore the reason for this harmony **MUST BE BELIEVED AND THE INTELLECT MUST BE BROUGHT INTO CAPTIVITY IN OBEDIENCE TO FAITH,**" and he adds that I consider this opinion to be true and in accordance with the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, etc.

DISPUTATION II

Dominic Bañez also commands faith here: "If anyone does not understand how the use of free will is free and nevertheless is an effect already predefined by divine providence, he must believe it." The same author, having related the objections of those who say they cannot understand how grace, efficacious by predefinition, stands with freedom, says: "About to respond to this objection, I cannot sufficiently marvel at the ignorance, not to say rashness, of theologians of this kind. For first of all, they ought to have believed what they say they cannot understand. We believe the Mystery of the Trinity, even if we do not understand it." From these things it is clearly evident that not only Molina, but also other Doctors have recognized some danger in that in which the Anonymous Writer thinks no difficulty remains. And where was that light that shone upon this Doctor, when in the last days of Augustine first the African Church, then the Gallic Church was shaken, not having sufficiently comprehended his opinion on predestination? Where was it in some subsequent centuries, when France and Germany were again disturbed by Gottschalk, and mutual suspicion so divided the Church of Reims and the other Churches of Gallic Belgium on one side, and on the other the Church of Lyons with those of Vienne and Arles, that there was a long struggle lest predestination should be to anyone's destruction? Where was it when Wycliffe made trouble for Catholic doctors who were combating the necessity which he derived into human actions from divine foreknowledge and providence? Where was it when Luther and Calvin stumbled on the same stone? And when scarcely any other reef can be found more infamous for the shipwreck of Philosophers and Heretics than that connection of divine foreknowledge and providence with human freedom; did Molina, because he saw that there was some danger in it, see what no one before him had seen?

How much more correctly does Cardinal Sadoletto speak, when he warns that whoever demands that this MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL QUESTIONS, and if we wish to confess the truth, almost inexplicable,

DISPUTATION II

be discussed, stirs up a great confluence of most bitter disputes and disturbs a great sea.

§ II. ON THE DIVISION OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE AND THE PLACE OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE WITHIN IT.

XVIII. Another fault of Molina, according to the Anonymous Writer, is that under the name of free knowledge he involves and simultaneously confuses two kinds of divine knowledge, when he says that by this knowledge God knows those contingent complexes which are actually going to be future, which, says the Anonymous Writer, pertains to the knowledge of vision, and those which are not going to be future, which is proper to the knowledge of simple intelligence. But there is no one who cannot easily see that this fault is more correct than the censure itself, which, beyond reason and beyond example, objects to the knowledge of vision that which is something's being future, and objects to the knowledge of simple intelligence that which is being not future. For I presuppose what is manifest, that "not future" is taken by Molina in the same way as "future," namely formally and reduplicatively, as they say: and that his meaning is that concerning a thing which God knows to be possible through the knowledge of simple intelligence, He knows furthermore that it is future or that it is not future through free knowledge, which for him is the same as the knowledge of vision. This, moreover, is most true, and in accordance with the usage and understanding of the Scholastics, who so often think that what is not future pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence, taking it materially and specifically, for a thing which is not going to be future, and which, setting aside futurity, is nevertheless understood as possible. Nor can the Anonymous Writer deny that knowing that something is not going to be future properly pertains to free knowledge, for it is freely not future. But if he nevertheless contends that this knowledge is the knowledge of simple intelligence, he

DISPUTATION II

himself rather commits what he accuses: and involves and simultaneously confuses two kinds of divine knowledge.

But he adds that what Molina says is also not proven, that through that second knowledge, namely free knowledge, God knows things absolutely only and without any hypothesis or condition, as if, he says, those things which are going to be absolutely future would not also be future from some hypothesis and condition, and as if those things which are not going to be future, due to the defect and absence of some cause and condition, would not be not future. As if, I say, Molina would also deny that things are future from a hypothesis which are absolutely future. But they are future from a hypothesis independently of an actual and absolute decree, by which God decides to place the hypothesis; but they are absolutely going to be future dependently on such a decree. Whence also independently of that decree actually posited, they are known by middle and conditional knowledge; but dependently, by knowledge that is simply free, which is also called the knowledge of vision. Nor does this Author see that with some such "as if," the distinction of the knowledge of possibles from the knowledge of futures could be attacked; since anyone could say "as if those things which are going to be future would not also be possible," and therefore that knowledge by which they are known as possible should be distinguished from that by which they are known as future.

XIX. Thirdly, the Anonymous Writer cannot bear what Molina says, that God, from a most high and inscrutable comprehension of each free will, beholds through middle knowledge, etc. As if, says the Anonymous Writer, in those words there lurks something singular and excellent which is not in other divine kinds of knowledge, etc. But this is an excessive and delicate severity, which if one were to use, even the holy Fathers would have to be subjected to the rod; and not even he who objects to such things would escape. The inequality of effects rightly causes unequal epithets to be attributed to divine power; and it is considered somehow greater in producing an angel than in producing a fly. Why should not

DISPUTATION II

the inequality of objects in terms of knowability also obtain from us, that the divine intellect be unequally both apprehended and praised? And just as the view of the secrets of the heart is more difficult than that of the face itself, why should not that knowledge by which God scrutinizes human hearts be said to be of greater excellence than that by which He discerns their faces? Likewise, since it is more difficult to know those things which are future to us than those which are present, what fault does one commit who says that that knowledge by which God knows what is future to us is superior to that by which He knows what is present? Especially since the former exceeds the comprehension even of the angels themselves, but not the latter? Finally, since those things which neither are, nor will be, but would be if some condition were posited, seem to be more difficult to know than those which are absolutely going to be future, inasmuch as the latter are present in some temporal difference; and since this is clear even from the very confession of the Adversaries, while they deny that these can be known by God, either entirely, or at least before His decree, does he who also removes this obstacle from divine knowledge, and asserts that the rays of the divine intellect also reach to these objects, speak poetically if he says that this pertains to a most high and inscrutable comprehension of free will? Therefore, Molina committed no fault in that regard: but there is another matter which the Anonymous Writer did not observe, which nevertheless is reproved by others, and indeed deservedly. Namely, that he thinks that the very comprehension of free will is for God the reason for understanding future things; because it is established that the comprehension of a cause not having from itself a determinate connection with one of opposites, cannot be the reason for understanding one of them as determinately future; nor does it help at all that it is perfectly comprehended, since the more it is comprehended, the more that non-connection with one determinate thing is understood, but indifferently with either.

XX. For as to what the Anonymous Writer also criticizes, namely that Molina used the word "intuition" equivocally, as elsewhere the words

DISPUTATION II

"to see," "to foresee," "to discern," "to contemplate," which, he says, in this matter are taken more strictly by Theologians distinguishing the knowledge of vision and intuitive knowledge from the knowledge of simple intelligence, and are attributed by accommodation to the knowledge of vision alone; this fault, I say, I consent that it should not go unpunished for him, unless he has suitable authorities for it, namely St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and other Scholastics not of the lowest note. St. Augustine, while expounding that passage "What was made in Him was life": "In which life," he says, "He saw all things when He made them, and as He saw them, so He made them, not seeing outside Himself but in Himself." Likewise: "For He would not make them unless He knew them before He made them, and He would not know them unless He saw them, and He would not see them unless He had them; which were not yet made, except in the way He Himself is, not made." In which passage it is clear that Augustine is speaking of the knowledge of things produced, not as existing in some temporal difference, but as possible; that is, of the knowledge of simple intelligence: both because he speaks of knowledge which does not depend on the decree of making, but rather directs it, and because he also speaks of that whose formal and objective reason for knowing is God Himself, or the life of God itself. Moreover, God and the life of God, since it does not have a necessary connection with the existence of things as it has with their possibility, cannot be the reason for knowing them as existing, but only as possible. Augustine, therefore, uses the word "seeing" in expressing knowledge of possibles. St. Thomas speaks even more clearly: "It is evident, therefore, that in the mind of an artificer there can be knowledge of some artifact, sometimes indeed which he plans to make, but sometimes which he never plans to make, as when he devises some form of artifact or of craft, which he does not intend to make; but this artifact which he never plans to make, he does not always BEHOLD as existing in potency: because sometimes he thinks of such a craft for producing which his powers are not sufficient, but he considers it in its end, namely insofar as he SEES that he could

DISPUTATION II

arrive at such an end through such a craft, etc." He continues, "It is evident, therefore, that God can have knowledge of some non-beings, and of these indeed He has, as it were, practical knowledge, namely of those which are or were or will be, which proceed from His knowledge according to His disposition: but of certain others which neither were, nor are, nor will be, which, namely, He never planned to make, He indeed has speculative knowledge: and although it can be said that He BEHOLDS them in His power, because there is nothing which He cannot do, nevertheless it is more appropriately said that He BEHOLDS them in His goodness, which is the end of all things which are made by Him, namely according as He BEHOLDS many other modes of communication of His own goodness than what is communicated to existing things." See how St. Thomas also designates knowledge of possibles by the words "seeing" and "beholding." Dominic Soto can be added, whose words are these: "But because we said that creatures were foreseen by Him, we understand not only seen before they exist, but also seen before they are ordered to their ends, but with a vision of simple intelligence as we were explaining in the previous chapter, etc." It would be easy to note many such things in other authors; but who would have believed that this observation would be necessary to absolve Molina?

Fourthly, what he objects further in number 6 is a repetition of an argument already proposed and refuted in the previous chapter.

XXI. Fifthly, he says, That condition, that "if," and that order from infinites, either is actually to be posited in the nature of things or it is not: or it is only possible with a possibility of precision: if the first, its knowledge pertains to the knowledge of vision; if the second, to the knowledge of simple intelligence; if the third, to natural knowledge and that of precision. I respond: 1. that this is also a repetition of an argument proposed and solved, and that the Anonymous Writer is consuming himself in vain labor, while he contends that the knowledge of the conditional future must be reduced to one of the others. Let him grant us that there is such knowledge, and then let him place it wherever he wishes. For

DISPUTATION II

it will be easy to find a better place, if the one he assigns does not please.

2. For this argument to be valid, it should be expected that Theologians would approve the distinction of the triple knowledge which the Anonymous Writer has devised, since only two are usually distinguished by them—that of vision and of simple intelligence—to which he adds natural knowledge which he calls that of precision: and yet he does not allow Molina to add middle knowledge, as if he had the right that no one should dare what he thought allowable for himself.

3. That disjunction of the major premise is not good, because it is not divided into opposite members. That condition, that "if," that order both is to be posited actually in the nature of things, and is not to be posited. That "if" in Tyre and Sidon is not to be posited actually in the nature of things. That "if I shall be lifted up from the earth" is to be posited: what then follows? If it is to be posited, he says, knowledge of it pertains to the knowledge of vision. Knowledge of it as dependent on an absolute and actual decree of positing such an "if"; I concede: as independent of such a decree and as remaining in God even though a contrary decree were conceived, I deny. And when he says, if it is not to be posited, it pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence, I again make a distinction. If that "if" or condition is taken together with what is affirmed will follow from it, e.g., preaching and miracles proposed to the Tyrians together with their repentance, I deny. Because that is not only possible, like its contradictory: but it is moreover future, which does not apply to its contradictory. But if that "if" or that condition is taken alone and separately from what is said will follow from it, for example, preaching and miracles proposed to the Tyrians; I concede that knowledge of it pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence, not as it is distinguished by this Author against natural knowledge which he calls that of precision, but as it is confused with it by others: because that, or that condition so taken, is only merely possible: and therefore knowable only by the knowledge of simple intelligence.

DISPUTATION II

§ III. IN A CAUSAL SENSE IT IS TRUE TO SAY THAT FUTURE THINGS ARE FOREKNOWN BECAUSE THEY WILL BE, NOT THE REVERSE

XXII. Sixthly, because in explaining the concord between providence and free will, Molina had stated that it does not come from God's foreknowledge that free will inclines itself to one part rather than another; and therefore God foreknows what will happen because the thing endowed with free will will itself freely do that very thing, not the reverse. The Anonymous author says, "Let him be careful lest he himself is mistaken in reconciling the freedom of our will with divine foreknowledge." For if that "therefore" and that "because" are merely matters of consequence and inference, they are entirely true... But they are false if they are "therefore" and "because" of the thing itself. For God's knowledge and will depend on none of their objects; but conversely, all things, both free and necessary, depend essentially on both of these. He adds that even the knowledge of vision is causally prior to the thing known, and it places imperfection in God's knowledge to say that He knows what will happen, yet dependently on what will thus happen through free will itself.

The "because" and the "therefore" are taken by Molina in the sense that is appropriate for deriving a suitable reason why foreknowledge does not impede the freedom of the will. For this alone is intended in this passage. But for a suitable reason to be derived from this concerning why foreknowledge does not impede the freedom of the will, that "because" and that "therefore" must not merely indicate consequence and inference. For Molina would be quite absurd if he were to say that the foreknowledge of an act that must be free does not impede its freedom because it is necessarily connected with it; so that from the fact that the act exists, there is a necessary consequence and inference by which one concludes that foreknowledge preceded, or reciprocally, from the fact that foreknowledge preceded, there is a necessary consequence and inference by which one concludes that the act exists. Indeed, this too would be maxi-

DISPUTATION II

mally true, even if we were to suppose that freedom is destroyed by foreknowledge. For then both from the positing of the act, foreknowledge would be inferred, and from the positing of foreknowledge, the act would be inferred. Therefore, this is not all that is intended by both Molina and others through that "because" and through that "therefore." This is confirmed because they take that "therefore" and that "because" in such a way that it is not reciprocal. For they say that foreknowledge does not impede the freedom of the foreknown act, because this is true: "therefore the act is foreknown because it will be future," but not this: "therefore it will be future because it is foreknown." But if they merely designated consequence and inference, that "therefore" and that "because" would be reciprocal. Because it follows just as necessarily that the act will be future if it is foreknown, as that it is foreknown if it will be future. Therefore, they do not merely designate consequence and inference of foreknowledge from the act, but moreover a certain mode of causality in the future act with respect to foreknowledge, by which it happens that this is true in a causal sense: "the free act is therefore foreknown as future because it will truly be future." But not this: "Therefore it will be future because it is foreknown as future." For thus a suitable reason, and a manifest one, is rendered why foreknowledge does not destroy the freedom of the act. Namely, because since foreknowledge itself is consequent upon the act, it follows that even the necessity of the act, if any is inferred from it, is a necessity consequent upon the same act, and a necessity which the act itself causes—which is clearly not contrary to freedom. That "therefore" and that "because" are thus not merely of consequence and inference, but also "of the thing itself," to speak with the Anonymous author.

XXIII. But since he fears that the proposition "God therefore foreknows the future act because it will be future," in a causal sense, is injurious to God, it must be added that it does not at all designate true and proper causality, such as belongs to a cause physically influencing something, but only improper causality, such as belongs to a reason objectively moving or terminating, which presupposes the power of under-

DISPUTATION II

standing to be most perfectly complete, and requiring nothing else than that an intelligible object be posited. For when this alone is posited, the intellect understands it by itself alone and without the assistance of anything. But just as from the fact that the object is missing, nothing is taken away from the infinity of the intellective power, which consists only in this, that it is intellective of everything that is intelligible, so too, from the fact that the object is posited, no perfection accrues to it, because through itself it is expressive of the object; nor is anything else required on its part, except that it not be repugnant for it to be understood—just as God's effective power requires on the part of its effect that it not be repugnant for it to be produced. Therefore, since a created free agent is the cause why an object is posited, it can also be said to be the cause why it is perceived by that intellect from which nothing can be hidden of those things that exist; and the object itself, by existing and presenting itself with whatever existence it has to be seen, is also the objective reason why it is seen, which suffices for the causal sense of the proposition by which God is said to therefore foreknow something as absolutely future because it will be future, or because it will be; or as conditionally future, because it would be if the condition were posited.

And indeed this must always be kept before our eyes: just as it does not pertain to the perfection of effective power as such that it understand its own work, but only that it make the work if it is feasible, so too, it does not pertain to the nature of intellective power as such that it make its own object, but only that it understand the object, however and from wherever it was made and posited, and thus made intelligible. And if it is said to pertain to divine perfection not only to understand its object but also to cause it (which, however, will not seem necessary to one thinking that God understands negations, privations, repugnancies and impossibilities of things, which He does not cause)—but if it were necessary that He cause what He understands, that causation should be referred rather to omnipotence and effective power than to intellective power. And therefore, if anything were to be feared from that causal statement, "God

DISPUTATION II

therefore foreknows the future act because it will be future," it should be feared for omnipotence rather than for God's knowledge. But in reality, there is nothing to be feared, except for one who is accustomed to fearing shadows.

XXIV. But such a person can be made secure by the protection of the Holy Fathers, who—since they often say the same thing as Molina, namely that God foreknows future things because they will be future, not the reverse, and since they speak to the same end, namely to show that no necessity follows from God's foreknowledge that would prejudice the freedom of created agents—it cannot be that they spoke in any sense other than the causal one, unless we want to push them into the absurdity from which we have already freed Molina. Moreover, I add that this sense among the Fathers should not so much be conjectured or inferred as read. For Origen says in clear words that the predictor is not the CAUSE of the future, but the future, since it will be future even if it were not foreknown, has given the CAUSE of predicting to the foreknower. Athanasius, concerning the cross and passion of the Lord, says that the Prophets were not the authors for the Jews of those things which they committed against Christ, but rather the Jews themselves were THE CAUSE that the Prophets made such predictions about them. But how did the Jews furnish the Prophets with the cause for predicting, if not because they furnished God with the cause for foreknowing what He revealed to the Prophets to be predicted? Eusebius, from Origen, after reporting that foreknowledge is not the cause of future things, adds: "I will also say, even if it seems absurd to many, that what will be future IS THE CAUSE by which God foresees that it will happen." Epiphanius: "Not because Scripture predicted did the Jews crucify and Judas betray, but because Judas was going to betray and the Jews to crucify; for this CAUSE, Scripture predicted." Cyril: "Not, therefore, so that Scripture might be fulfilled, nor for THIS CAUSE were those things which Scripture predicted done by certain people, but on the contrary, etc." John Damascene: "God's foreknowing power has no CAUSE from us, but it

DISPUTATION II

PROCEEDS FROM US that He foreknows what we are going to do." Again: "The CAUSE of divine foreknowledge is this, that it was thus going to be." Bede, volume 8, book of various questions: "What, therefore," he says, "compelled God that we should seem evil to Him from eternity? Far from it. For rather WE COMPELLED HIM to see us as evil." To these must be added Ammonius, who was able to temper Peripatetic thoughts with Christian sensibilities, whose words the Anonymous author reports: "It must not be thought that what are called contingent things necessarily have a determined outcome because they are definitely known by the gods. For it is not because the gods know them that they necessarily happen; but since, having a contingent nature and an uncertain end, they will certainly have such or such an outcome, it is necessary that the gods know how they will turn out." Here you see that Divine knowledge, by which God sees a future contingent, derives the necessity of its existence from the fact that the contingent will be future, not the reverse—which cannot be unless the object has some character of cause with respect to the knowledge.

From these things, therefore, it is clear enough that what the Anonymous author says cannot stand—that those propositions of the Fathers are not causal, but only signify consequence and inference of foreknowledge from the future contingent. For they explicitly say that they are causal.

XXV. But he says that the very name "cause" and other causal particles, "therefore," "for this reason," "because," and similar ones, should not be pressed so much and taken rigidly; and that we would not dare to take them so rigidly and say that future things are causes of divine knowledge. It is certain from the authority of the Fathers, from natural reason, and from divine faith, that God by His knowledge and foreknowledge is truly the cause of all things.

We, however, press those particles only insofar as it is necessary to avert an unjust oppression from Molina, when he is criticized for what he received from the Holy Fathers. We also moderate that discourse: we do

DISPUTATION II

not take the name "cause" rigidly, when we deny all real influx, and say that the future is not a cause of foreknowledge by any other reason than because it exhibits what is to be known to a power that is most complete for cognition. But what moderation does he himself apply to those particles?

"They should be explained," he says, "as concerning the cause of consequence and inference, not the cause of the thing." As if to say, the fact that something will be future is the cause why we infer that it is foreknown. But first, does he not see that the Fathers' view has two parts, one of which he interprets in such a way that he destroys the other? The Fathers say: "The knowledge by which God knows that some contingent will be future is not the cause why it will be future." And: "The fact that some contingent will be future is the cause why God knows this." The Anonymous author explains this second part thus: "The fact that something will be future is for us the cause of inferring that God knows this." Very well. But is "God knows this" also for us the cause of inferring that it will be future? Why, then, do the Fathers deny that "God knows that something will be future" is the cause why it will be future? Second, it is clear from what has been said that the Holy Fathers say the same thing about prophecy and prediction as about foreknowledge. Therefore, let him see whether this statement fits well: "The fact that some contingent will be future is for us the cause of inferring, therefore it has been predicted." And: "The fact that some contingent has been predicted is not for us the cause of inferring that it will be future." Third, let him apply that interpretation to the purpose of the Holy Fathers, who infer from it that the knowledge by which God knows that something will be future does not obstruct freedom, nor induce a necessity contrary to contingency. But see whether this inference is suitable: "From the fact that something will be future, we can infer that it is foreknown by God; therefore, foreknowledge does not obstruct freedom, nor does it infer necessity." But I will likewise conclude that a necessary effect is not necessary. For from the fact that this effect will be future, we can infer that its

DISPUTATION II

cause will precede: therefore, does that cause not influence necessity into the effect? Fourth, what is for us only a cause of consequence and inference must be foreknown with respect to what follows from it or is inferred from it; and thus smoke seen by us is a cause of consequence and inference with respect to fire, and similarly, light with respect to the sun, and is said to be a cause only in knowing, because by knowledge of itself, it excites knowledge of the other. But to whom, I ask, is the fact that some contingent will be future more known than the fact that it is foreknown, so that the latter can be inferred from the former?

XXVI. Fifth, this is confirmed by what they call an argument *ad hominem*. For in order to defend Aristotle's view on future contingents, the Anonymous author thinks it is the same thing for one of two opposites concerning a future contingent to be determinately true or determinately false, and for this truth or falsity to be known. And because by no natural way or reason can we say with certainty, distinctly, and determinately that one of those opposites is true and the other false, therefore neither is determinately and properly true or false. I do not attack this view at present, nor do I show how poorly this author has served the truth, while he pursues those whom he says have poorly served Aristotle. I only accept what he gives, that by no natural way or reason is a future contingent known to us, even though it is known by a supernatural way and reason, namely by the testimony of God revealing it. I argue as follows: What is unknown cannot be a cause in knowing, or a cause of consequence with respect to another unknown; the future contingent is such with respect to prediction and foreknowledge; therefore, etc. Likewise, what is a cause in knowing, or a cause of consequence and inference, must be better known than that with respect to which it is said to be a cause. A future contingent known through God's revelation is not better known than prediction, since this is itself the revelation, nor than foreknowledge, since to know the revelation is the same as to know God speaking knowingly, that is, from foreknowledge; so that it is contradictory to understand prediction and not understand foreknowledge. There-

DISPUTATION II

fore, a future contingent known through God's revelation cannot be a cause in knowing, or a cause of consequence and inference with respect to foreknowledge or prediction. Therefore, this interpretation collapses.

XXVII. Nor are the other four interpretations that he adds any stronger. The Fathers often speak about future sins. But they also often speak not only about those, but also about good acts, as can be seen in Origen cited by Eusebius in the passage cited above, where he also includes those things that are done excellently by us; and Athanasius, who denies that miracles are therefore future because they were foretold, but the reverse. Jerome manifestly speaks of good and evil, Damascene of virtue and vice. At other times they speak universally. As Epiphanius in the passage cited above; Jerome in chapter 26 of Jeremiah; Origen against Celsus. And even if they always spoke about the foreknowledge of sins, nevertheless, because they chiefly intend to safeguard the freedom of sinners and exclude the necessity contrary to it, it cannot be that they do not use a common principle equally necessary to safeguard also the freedom of good actions, since these must be no less free, nor is more required for the freedom of evil actions than for good ones. Finally, it is no more absurd to say that some future good is the cause why it is foreknown by God, than some evil; indeed, it is more tolerable to say that God's foreknowledge depends on a future good than on an evil. This response, therefore, is irrelevant.

Nor is the one in which he says that some of these Fathers do not speak about foreknowledge, but about foretelling and prediction, which is not the cause of future events. For first, it would be enough that most speak about foreknowledge. Moreover, foretelling has no connection with the existence of the foretold thing except by reason of the foreknowledge underlying it. Therefore, what they say—that the thing being future is the cause why it is predicted—cannot be true in any other way than because it is the cause why it is foreknown. For things have nothing in common with words except insofar as the latter are surrogates of concepts. And it should be noted that the Anonymous author always solves only the mid-

DISPUTATION II

dle part of the objection. For the fact that the Fathers speak about prediction only serves to make us believe that they rightly said that the prediction of a future thing is not the cause why it will be future; but how will what they add be true—that the thing being future is the cause why it is predicted?

XXVIII. The fourth exposition is worse than the others: that the Fathers spoke popularly, only wanting to declare that God by His knowledge and foreknowledge in no way harms our freedom, etc. I wish he would teach us when the Fathers speak seriously and dogmatically. Is it when they interpret Scripture? Origen is cited on Paul's Epistles; Chrysostom on Matthew, homily 60, on chapter 18; Jerome on the Prophets; Cyril on John. Is it when they propose the doctrine of faith to unbelievers? Origen is disputing with Celsus, an Epicurean philosopher. Is it when they defend the Catholic faith against heretics? Epiphanius is attacking the Cainites; Damascene, the Manicheans. When will they speak theologically if they are speaking popularly then? He says the Fathers wanted to show that God's knowledge does not harm freedom, which is true; but to whom, I ask, was this to be shown—to the common people or to philosophers? Eusebius, citing Origen, teaches that the Greeks, hindered by this difficulty, went astray and denied foreknowledge in order to maintain contingency; Ammonius testifies that many others of those who "appeared more perceptive" (Greek word missing) went to the opposite extreme, persuaded that there is no contingency in human affairs. I do not know whether the Anonymous author also wants Ammonius to have spoken popularly when he follows Aristotle in his commentary. These, therefore, are the ones whom the Fathers instruct, not the common people. But suppose they were dealing with the common people, not with philosophers, and wanted nothing other than for them to understand that God's foreknowledge does not take away freedom; the question is whether he thinks honorably enough of them who believes they confirmed a true matter with a false reason, when they say that the freedom of human acts stands with God's foreknowledge because they

DISPUTATION II

are not therefore future because they are foreknown to be future, but rather therefore foreknown to be future because they will be future?

I do not understand the final exposition, which is the fifth in the Anonymous author's work, to confess my slowness, nor do I see what weight it can bring to solve the proposed difficulty. "It could be said," he says, "that the Fathers only mean that we cannot conceive the foreknowledge that God has of future things unless they are truly future, etc." The Fathers want what is foreknown to be future to be free because it is not therefore future because it is foreknown, but therefore foreknown because it will be future. What does this, I ask, have to do with our knowledge of such foreknowledge? And what will harm freedom more or less if foreknowledge is understood by us in this or that way? Finally, I do not experience what the Anonymous author promises, that it will be very easy for anyone to apply whichever of these expositions they wish from the recited testimonies of the Holy Fathers, or from any that might be adduced, and whichever is convenient for each person. For we have already applied them, and whichever way they are turned, none finds its place, none fits.

§ IV. AUGUSTINE, GREGORY, AND THOMAS AQUINAS SPOKE IN THE SAME SENSE.

XXIX. BUT we must address the authority of St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and St. Thomas. For St. Augustine clearly teaches a causal statement contrary to the above, namely that created things are not seen by God because they exist, but rather they exist because they are seen by God. Gregory says the same, and St. Thomas refers to and follows him. We do not deny that God's knowledge is the cause of things—far from it! We only deny this of the knowledge called "knowledge of vision," by which God knows existing creatures as existing in some temporal differentiation, or which is expressive and declarative of their existence and actuality. We deny, along with those Fathers whom we have previously cited, that this knowledge is the cause of its object. We also deny that

DISPUTATION II

those authorities who are cited against us are speaking about this knowledge, but rather about the knowledge of simple intelligence, by which even those things that have been made and exist in some temporal differentiation are known as possibilities. Since this knowledge presents all reasons to the divine will by which it might be induced to will to make certain possibilities exist, and all the modes to be preserved in doing so, it is the most perfect director of the divine will. Thus, through the mediation of the operative will, it is a cause without which nothing would be future, not even evil—for it directs the permission of evil. Moreover, it is the cause of why every good will be future in the manner that is congruent with the creature's freedom. Thus we interpret these Fathers and reconcile them with others whose seemingly contrary opinion, though not actually so, we have presented earlier.

XXX. Lest anyone place undue emphasis on the fact that St. Augustine and St. Gregory use the verb "to see," which typically designates only the knowledge of vision, we have already shown that not only the Scholastic Doctors but Augustine himself used this verb to designate knowledge of possibles. And I now demonstrate this same usage in St. Gregory, whose words that are cited against us are: "By seeing non-existent things He creates them, by seeing existent things He contains them." Since Gregory speaks of "vision" as dealing with the same object both as non-existent but to be created, and as existent and already created—and since knowledge that concerns what exists, not as existing but according to the being it has even when not existing, is not knowledge of vision strictly taken—it follows that Gregory takes "vision" in a broader sense that can also be applied to the knowledge of simple intelligence.

XXXI. This interpretation is far more easily applicable to St. Thomas. For first, he nowhere indicates that this knowledge which he says is the cause of things is the knowledge of vision strictly taken. That it is not can be proven from many passages. But the one usually cited against us from the First Part, Question 14, is sufficient, where he speaks thus: "But we must consider that a natural form, insofar as it is a form

DISPUTATION II

remaining in that to which it gives being, is not named a principle of action, but according to how it has an inclination to an effect. And similarly, an intelligible form does not name a principle of action according to how it is only in the one who understands, unless there is joined to it an inclination to an effect, **WHICH IS THROUGH THE WILL**. For since an intelligible form is related to opposites (since there is the same knowledge of opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one by appetite, as is said in *Metaphysics IX*." From this he concludes that God's knowledge is the cause of things "according to how it has the will conjoined to it." And he denies that the character of causality belongs to it unless the will is joined to it. These words are illuminated by other passages from *Question 2 on Truth*: "Between God's knowledge, which is the cause of a thing, and the thing caused, there is found a double medium: one on the part of God, namely the divine will; another on the part of the things themselves in regard to certain effects... However, every effect not only follows the condition of the first cause, but also of the intermediate cause. And thus, things known by God proceed from His knowledge **BY WAY OF THE WILL**." From these words of St. Thomas, the following points are gathered. First, that God's knowledge which is the cause of things relates itself indifferently to opposites, but is determined to one of them by the will. This can have no other meaning than that, of itself, it is not more inclined to the production than to the non-production of what it represents as possible, but by the addition of the will's decree it is determined to the production of certain things (of which it is therefore the cause) and to the non-production of others (of which it is therefore not the cause). Second, this knowledge is that to which we understand the inclination to act is joined through the will, and which therefore is knowledge without the will, but is not active. Third, it is that knowledge between which and the effect the will of the producer is intermediate, and which therefore is like a first cause with respect to the will, which is only an intermediate cause. But none of these characteristics belongs to the knowledge of vision as such. Therefore, the knowledge

DISPUTATION II

of vision is not what St. Thomas considers to be the cause of things. The minor premise is manifest. For who could have such a perverse thought as to conceive that knowledge which does not extend to its object except as existing—which is what the knowledge of vision is—relates indifferently to opposites, that is, to the existence or non-existence of that object? Who would conceive that the will to produce something is added to the knowledge by which the same thing is seen as already produced, and is joined to it, as it were, extrinsically, when rather it is presupposed by that knowledge? Who would imagine that this same will is intermediate between the effect and the knowledge of vision, when rather it precedes the knowledge of vision? And how would the book on order and on prior and posterior stand if such a disturbance were introduced, so that the knowledge which is called the first cause would be the knowledge of vision, which would be followed by the decree of the will as a posterior and intermediate cause between the first cause and the effect—when it is manifest that if there is any order among those acts, the decree of the will by which the object and, as it were, the terminus of the knowledge of vision is posited, if it is not prior, at least cannot be posterior to that knowledge? From these considerations, it is clear that St. Thomas, when he asserts that God's knowledge is the cause of things, takes knowledge indeterminately and without distinction, seeing that he only wanted to establish this: that God should be called an intellectual agent, most knowingly and most freely producing whatever He produces. This is easily admitted by acknowledging a knowledge that directs the will, which, through the act it directs, is said to cause everything that depends on such an act. But the knowledge that directs the divine will cannot be other than the knowledge of simple intelligence and what we defend as middle knowledge, which would still remain even if the act of the will did not follow. For it is directive of the free act, and consequently, with that knowledge established, it is still within the power of the divine will to will or not to will what is represented through it. And if the divine will wills it, this knowledge will become efficacious by the addition of such willing; if it does not

DISPUTATION II

will it, the knowledge will always remain the same, but inefficacious. But the knowledge of vision, which has a necessary connection with the effect seen, would not remain if the volition to produce such an effect did not follow. Hence, it cannot be said to be directive of that volition, nor, through its mediation, the cause of the effect.

XXXII. That this is the mind of St. Thomas, beyond what we have already said, is further demonstrated by another argument. Specifically, whenever St. Thomas explains how foreknowledge of the future—which is the same as the knowledge of vision—does not impose necessity incompatible with the freedom of its object, although it is necessarily connected to it by a necessary consequence, he draws the reason from the fact that it does not relate to the object as future and existing in its causes, but relates to it as present and existing in itself, in the way our sight relates to its object as it is in itself. And thus, just as our sight, however necessarily it may be connected to the existence of the thing seen, does not impede its freedom and contingency, which it has from elsewhere, so neither does the divine vision impede the same. St. Thomas uses this reasoning and example in many places, such as in Question 16, "On Evil," article 7, in response to the 15th objection, and "On Truth," Question 2, article 12, in response to the 2nd and 7th objections, and in book 1 of "On Interpretation," lectures 13 and 14, from which passage these words are noteworthy: "Something is true in the way in which it has being. When something is present, it has being in itself, and therefore it can truly be said of it that it is. But as long as something is future, it is not yet in itself, but it is in some way in its cause. And furthermore, God is entirely outside the order of time, as if situated in the citadel of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to which the whole course of time is subject, according to His one and simple intuition. And thus, in one intuition, He sees all things that occur according to the course of time, and each thing according as it is existing in itself, not as future with respect to His intuition, as if He would see it in the mere order of its causes; but in an entirely eternal manner, He sees each of those things which are in any time,

DISPUTATION II

just as the human eye sees Socrates sitting in himself, not in his cause. However, from the fact that a man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of this sitting, which relates to the order of causes to the effect, is not removed; yet the human eye sees most truly and infallibly that Socrates is sitting while he is sitting, because each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Thus, therefore, it remains that God most certainly and infallibly knows all things that happen in time, and yet those things that occur in time do not happen or come to be by necessity, but contingently." This discourse would otherwise be useless, but it is full of wisdom and reason if it is understood in this way: that foreknowledge of the future does not impede its contingency because it does not relate to the future as something to be produced, but as something already produced in that differentiation of time in which it will be future. Or, because foreknowledge is not operative of the future as something to be made, but is speculative of it as something already made. For this is what it means to relate to it as it is in itself and placed outside its causes. From this, one can well understand how that necessary connection of the future with foreknowledge leaves freedom inviolate. For the necessity that harms freedom is derived from the prior to the posterior, and from the cause to the effect; but foreknowledge, which does not regard the future except as existing and in itself, and placed outside its causes, cannot have the character of a cause with respect to it. Therefore, it cannot introduce causal and antecedent necessity into it, which alone removes contingency. Rather, the future itself, insofar as it exhibits itself to be known by its existence and real presence, can in a certain way be said to be the cause of its foreknowledge, as we have explained earlier. From this, it also happens that the necessity which the future derives from foreknowledge is consequent upon itself, as we referenced from Anselm and Damascene, to whom we should add Chrysostom (Hebrews, chapter 7, Homily 11, and to the people, Homily 42). And thus, the example or similitude of human intuition fits excellently. Since St. Augustine also uses this example for the same purpose, namely to reconcile divine foreknowledge with free will, it remains for us to say that

DISPUTATION II

both agree in the same opinion, namely that they deny that both divine foreknowledge and, universally, the knowledge of vision as such is the cause of things, although they all suppose that God's knowledge, and thus the knowledge of vision specifically, insofar as it either is identical to or includes the knowledge of simple intelligence, is the cause of all those things which are done by God in the way they are done by Him. This knowledge, because when taken indeterminately it relates to both what will be and what will not be, but is determined by the conjoined will, therefore has no other connection with the future than that which the will has, which itself also has no connection repugnant to freedom, as must be supposed here from elsewhere.

XXXIII. The Anonymous One responds that this similitude of human vision is entirely unhelpful because it is popular and accommodated to the capacity of the common people. This is also a popular solution, which would render useless all the authority of the Fathers and Doctors. Does St. Thomas interpret Aristotle and accommodate himself to the capacity of the common people? That would be imprudent, for he would not be mindful that he is dealing with philosophers. Does he discuss the knowledge of demons in the question "On Evil," and the knowledge of God in the second question "On Truth," and then use popular examples which, if examined, prove nothing? This too would be rash, for he should have considered that he was instructing theologians. I am not ignorant that comparisons sometimes limp, as they say; but if they limp on both feet, and are not even right in what is intended through them, they are inept and, when produced in the presence of learned men, can only offer a ridiculous spectacle. And see, I ask, how St. Thomas's discourse would proceed if the Anonymous One's opinion were true. His purpose is to show that God's foreknowledge does not remove freedom, even though there is a necessary consequence from it to the existence of the thing foreknown. To illustrate this, he uses the example of human vision, from which, although there is also a necessary consequence to the thing seen, the thing seen is nevertheless free. But if foreknowledge is the

DISPUTATION II

cause of the thing foreknown, while vision is rather the effect of the thing seen, this whole argument would have to be conceived as saying that it is not surprising if God's foreknowledge, from which the foreknown thing is necessarily inferred as from a cause, does not remove freedom, when it is evident that human vision, from which the thing seen is also necessarily inferred as from an effect, does not remove it. See, reader, whether this comparison brings light or darkness.

XXXIV. This is seen even more clearly in St. Augustine, who, as is evident, uses accurate and exact argumentation, such that not even the refinement of Scholasticism seems to be lacking. For he asks Evodius, with whom he is conversing, why he fears that God's foreknowledge might exclude the freedom of the foreknown thing. Is it from the special character of foreknowledge as divine, or from the common character of foreknowledge in general? Soon he extracts the admission that this quality does not belong to foreknowledge as divine, because it follows necessarily only insofar as, if something is foreknown by God, it will happen. Since this also follows necessarily from human knowledge, if there is any, it is concluded that God's foreknowledge does not conflict with freedom as it is God's, but as it is foreknowledge. Then again he assumes that foreknowledge in general does not conflict with the freedom of the foreknown thing, and proves this in the case of humans, whose foreknowledge is not related to the future differently than memory is related to the past, even that past which is not produced by the one who remembers, by which no one thinks the freedom of that past is impeded. From this it finally follows that neither is there anything in God's foreknowledge that would impede the freedom of the foreknown thing. This is Augustine's most genuine thought, as will be clear from the words I will soon produce. This whole argument is not only rendered useless and absurd if the Anonymous One's opinion is true, but also captious and fallacious, and composed to deceive, so that it would be irreverent to attribute it to Augustine. For Augustine does not truly assume that if God's foreknowledge harms freedom, it would harm it not as it is God's, but as it is foreknowl-

DISPUTATION II

edge. For if it harms, it harms especially as it is the cause of the foreknown thing, and it is not a cause as it is foreknowledge in general, but as it is God's, according to the Anonymous One's opinion. Likewise, this too is insidious: that God's foreknowledge, if it hinders freedom, does so because there is a necessary consequence from the truth of the foreknowledge to the truth of the foreknown thing, which is equally found in human foreknowledge, yet does not hinder freedom. Insidious, I say, is that claim. Since the consequence that is called necessary from human foreknowledge to the existence of the foreknown thing is rather a consequence of the cause from the effect than of the effect from the cause. And therefore human foreknowledge about the future is compared to memory about the past. But the consequence that is called necessary from God's foreknowledge to the foreknown thing is, according to the Anonymous One, a consequence of the effect from the cause. Who does not see how absurd it is to suppose that some cause does not introduce necessity into the effect, when the effect itself does not influence the cause at all? Or what proportion is there between the memory of the past and the foreknowledge of the future, such that the latter is understood not to obstruct the freedom of its object because the former does not obstruct it, if the latter is a cause and the former is not? But let us hear Augustine, who addresses Evodius, who objects that God cannot justly punish what must necessarily happen, and that things that are foreknown must necessarily happen. "From what does it seem to you that our free will is opposed to God's foreknowledge? Is it because it is foreknowledge, or because it is God's foreknowledge?" Evodius: "Because it is God's." Augustine: "What then if you were to foreknow that someone would sin, would it not be necessary that he sin?" Evodius: "Indeed, it would be necessary that he sin, for my foreknowledge would not be true foreknowledge unless I foreknew with certainty." Augustine: "Therefore, it is not because it is God's foreknowledge that those things which He has foreknown must necessarily happen, but only because it is foreknowledge. For if it does not foreknow with certainty, it is certainly no foreknowledge at

DISPUTATION II

all." Evodius: "I agree, but to what end?" Augustine: "Because, unless I am mistaken, you would not immediately compel the one whom you foreknew would sin to sin; nor would your foreknowledge compel him to sin, although he would undoubtedly sin. For you would not otherwise foreknow that it would happen. Therefore, just as these two things are not opposed to each other, that you by your foreknowledge know what another will do by his own will, so God, compelling no one to sin, nonetheless foresees those who will sin by their own will. Why then should not the Just One avenge what the Foreknowing One does not compel to be done? For just as you by your memory do not compel those things to have been done which have passed, so God by His foreknowledge does not compel those things to be done which will be done, etc."

XXXV. This disputation has been carried on longer than I had thought, because I needed to bring together in one place what the Anonymous One had said in scattered form, to establish that the knowledge of vision is the cause of things. And yet it seems that we should not omit the demonstration which he promises to give of this matter. For demonstrations are very rare commodities in this darkness and ignorance of things in which we find ourselves, and therefore they should be collected more diligently and highly valued when they occur. Therefore, the knowledge of vision is proven to be the cause of things by what he calls "a plainly demonstrative argument": "It is impossible for knowledge to be the cause of that thing which it does not know, and of which it is not the idea. But the knowledge of simple intelligence is not the idea and similitude of any created thing, but only the knowledge of vision. Therefore, etc." The major premise is proven because every art and every productive knowledge is productive only of that thing which is its object, or of which it is the idea. The minor premise is proven from the definitions of both types of knowledge accepted by all theologians and related by us above in chapter 23. For the knowledge of simple intelligence is defined as knowledge of those things which are not, nor have been, nor ever will be, and therefore of those of which God neither was, nor is, nor will be the cause.

DISPUTATION II

But the knowledge of vision is of those things which are, have been, or will be, and indeed by God, etc. He adds: "Although the knowledge of God, prescinding from the will and as it precedes and sheds light on His absolute decree concerning some work to be done, is not yet the knowledge of vision, but only of precision, nevertheless when conjoined with the will and determined by it to effect something, or as it is actually directive of the divine power operating and executing something externally, it is truly the knowledge of vision, not of simple intelligence." There you have a plainly demonstrative argument, which if I were to examine first, I would sooner count five terms in that syllogism than the Anonymous One counted four in a certain other argument of Suárez, which he therefore pronounced to be null, though it is excellent when the desire to litigate is set aside. Since this also displeases me, and there is no time to lay snares for speech when the mind of the speaker is not doubtful, or to weave a dialectical question from a theological one, having conceded the major premise, I deny the minor. To its proof, I likewise deny that all theologians define the knowledge of simple intelligence in such a way as to say it is of those things which are not, nor have been, nor will be, taking this formally, so that it is declarative of non-existence; but rather materially, so that it is understood to be declarative of possibility and of all attributes which necessarily belong to those things which in fact neither are, nor have been, nor will be. Similarly, I deny that all theologians define the knowledge of vision in such a way that it is of those things which are, have been, or will be, speaking materially; but indeed also formally, so that it is understood to be declarative and expressive of existence in those differentiations of time. In this way, it is still not defined adequately, since it is also declarative and expressive of non-existence and of every contingent and free predicate, as we have said before. And I say that this is the opinion of Diego Ruiz, who has the right and merit to be counted among theologians, and who reports Marsilius, Molina, and Bañez as holding this view. Indeed, even St. Thomas. Therefore, given this opinion that God's absolute knowledge (for we set aside conditional knowledge) is ad-

DISPUTATION II

equately divided into that which deals with the possibility of the knowable and every non-contingent or non-free attribute, either affirming or denying, whether the object exists or not; and that which deals with existence and every contingent or free attribute, in the same way, namely by affirming or denying—I say that the former can have the character of an idea and similitude of things to be created, insofar as it suffices to be called their cause, with the will joining in, as St. Thomas says. And because it pleases us, along with the already praised authors, to call this the knowledge of simple intelligence, we conclude that it is the knowledge of simple intelligence that is called the cause of things, not the knowledge of vision, which is posterior to the will. But when we claim the support of the praised authors, we do not thereby admit that the others are opposed to us, since it is clear that they do not so much deny the distinction of the two kinds of knowledge according to the given interpretation as they do not affirm it, because they do not discuss these details. One who attends to how far from their mind is that tripartite division into the knowledge of simple intelligence, vision, and precision will easily judge that they would agree. For you will hardly find any trace of this third member in their works. And since, on the other hand, the knowledge which this author calls "of precision" cannot be reduced to the knowledge of vision, since it has no connection with the existence of things, it remains that they comprehended it under the knowledge of simple intelligence, so that there is a danger that what he thinks is the definition of knowledge of simple intelligence accepted by all theologians may be accepted by none. It should also be considered how, in that division by which God's knowledge is divided into the knowledge of simple intelligence, vision, and precision, the thing divided is distinguished from this third dividing member, and what should be thought of one who would divide animal in three ways, into rational, irrational, and that which abstracts from both.

But neither do I sufficiently understand how these things that the Anonymous One adds cohere: "God's knowledge as it precedes and sheds light on His absolute decree concerning some work to be done is not yet

DISPUTATION II

the knowledge of vision." For as it precedes and sheds light on God's decree, it cannot be denied that it is a cause, by means of such decree, as we were reporting from St. Thomas, of those things which follow from it; nor can anything else be required for the character of an idea and exemplary cause, of the kind that the Anonymous One intends, than that it precede and shed light on the efficacious will by which something is made. But under that aspect, it is not yet, says the Anonymous One, the knowledge of vision. Therefore, God's knowledge, which is not yet the knowledge of vision, is nevertheless the cause of things. Therefore, it is false that only the knowledge of vision, as such, is the cause of things. And thus, the argument that was said to be plainly demonstrative confounds itself.

I would also like to know how these things square with each other: that God's knowledge as it precedes and sheds light on the decree of the will is not yet the knowledge of vision, and that it is the knowledge of vision as it is actually directive of the divine power executing something externally. Does God's knowledge precede or shed light on His own decree in any way other than actually? How, then, will these two be distinguished—that the divine knowledge actually sheds light on and precedes the divine decree, and that it is actually directive of the divine power—so that one can rightly be affirmed and the other denied to pertain to the knowledge of vision? Is it, I ask, one thing for divine knowledge to shed light actually on the divine decree, and another for it to direct actually? And consequently, can it, as actually directive, pertain to the knowledge of vision, and not as actually shedding light? And does one who confuses and entangles these things think he is using a plainly demonstrative argument? Add to this that it is stated equivocally that God's knowledge, as it is actually directive of the divine power, is the knowledge of vision. For if the sense is that formally and precisely by the very fact that divine knowledge directs the will or power, it is the knowledge of vision, this is false, because under that precise aspect it does not represent anything as determinately existing or non-existing. But if he means that as it is actual-

DISPUTATION II

ly directive, it is consequently and inferentially the knowledge of vision, this is true. For from the fact that it is understood to be actually directive, we gather that there is some free decree, and that there is something freely future or non-future by virtue of such a decree, and consequently that there is some knowledge in God which, as formally representative both of the decree and of that which by virtue of the decree will be or will not be determinately, should be called the knowledge of vision—but not precisely as directive. In a word, directive knowledge of the divine decree does not become the knowledge of vision by the addition of such a decree merely as a co-cause, but by its addition as an object, thus exhibiting both itself and its effect to be known. For then what was only the knowledge of possibles, by a certain divine extension, becomes the knowledge of existents.

Therefore, from that plainly demonstrative argument, I do not see what can be gathered except some material for constructing an argument that is turned back upon its author in this way: Only the directive knowledge of the divine decree is the cause of things; the knowledge of vision is not directive of the divine decree. Therefore, the knowledge of vision is not the cause of things. The major premise is evident. For knowledge to be directive and to be practical are the same: and to be practical and to be a cause are likewise the same. Hence, what is not directive can be neither practical nor a cause. The minor premise is proven: Knowledge that would exist under the possible hypothesis that it was not the knowledge of vision is not the knowledge of vision, as is evident from the terms. Directive knowledge of the divine decree would exist under the possible hypothesis that it was not the knowledge of vision. Therefore, directive knowledge of the divine decree is not the knowledge of vision. This minor premise is explicated by proposing the example of the decree to create this world, and the directive knowledge of such a decree. For from the fact that this directive knowledge is of a free act, it follows that the supposition is possible that such knowledge exists and that such an act or decree does not exist. From that possible supposition, it follows

DISPUTATION II

that such knowledge would exist, but the world would not, and therefore neither would the knowledge of vision of the world, which is impossible without the world existing. Therefore, from the possible supposition that there is no knowledge of vision of the world, there would still be directive knowledge of the decree to create the world. Just as in fact there is directive knowledge of the decree to create another world, from which God freely abstains, which lacks nothing for the complete character of a cause in first act. But enough of these matters. Let us return to purging the other alleged errors of Molina.

§ V. THE REST OF MOLINA'S TEACHINGS ARE DEFENDED, AND (THERE IS A DISCUSSION) ABOUT THE ORDER OF THE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR AMONG DIVINE ACTS.

XXXVII. This therefore is the seventh point that is criticized in Molina: that from our finite, imperfect, and inadequate way of conceiving God's infinite knowledge, he seems to want to define the way in which God knows, wills, acts, understands, and operates in reality; and he believes that the harmony and gentleness of divine foreknowledge, will, and concurrence with our freedom in reality is just as we conceive it. This, he says, does not seem sufficiently theological. And he amplifies this with many words in an oratorical and sermonic manner. What? Must we also say that God is not infinite, omnipotent, and omniscient in reality, since we should not believe Him to be in reality as we conceive Him? To the point, my Doctor. Molina asks only this one thing: that you concede that God certainly knows what He affirms—namely, that from a hypothetical circumstance that did not actually occur (such as preaching), the Tyrians would convert, and likewise in other cases. If you concede this, he will be satisfied, and he will not deny that God both knows this and uses that knowledge not in a human way, but in His own divine way. Your task,

DISPUTATION II

while denying the first point, will be to demonstrate that the second is impossible, which has not yet been accomplished.

XXXVIII. Eighth, he says: "It seems very novel and absurd what Molina says, that between the absolutely future and the absolutely non-future, there exists a middle ground, namely the conditionally future. For by the same logic, one might say that between man and non-man there exists a middle ground, namely a learned man or a dead man... Therefore, just as a learned man is contained under one extreme of the contradiction, namely 'man,' and a dead man under 'non-man' simply, and there is no middle between the two; likewise the hypothetically future is in no way a middle ground between the future and non-future, but is contained under one of these two." But Molina does not contradict this: he never denied that the repentance of the Tyrians, for example, which is said to be hypothetically future, is absolutely non-future. Thus it is placed under one member of that contradiction—either absolutely future or absolutely non-future. But Molina also knew—what the one who objects to this cannot have failed to know—that a middle between two extremes is said to be not only what is excluded from both, but also what participates in both in some respect. And because the repentance of the Tyrians, which is absolutely placed under the non-future, nevertheless participates in the condition of the future from the hypothesis of preaching—just as the conversion of Paul, which was absolutely future, nevertheless participated in the condition of the non-future if Stephen had not prayed, as it is commonly said—therefore both the repentance of the Tyrians and the conversion of Paul can be said to be something in the middle between the absolutely future and absolutely non-future. This middle can also be found between any other contradictory contingent extremes that can separately belong to the same subject, such as between learned and non-learned, healthy and non-healthy. For Aristotle was to be placed absolutely under "learned," such that he would have also been future non-learned if he had continued to devote himself to games and taverns, as he had begun to do. And many are absolutely placed under

DISPUTATION II

"non-healthy," such that they would have been placed under "healthy" if they had chosen to live more temperately. Why therefore could not both that hypothetically future ignorance of Aristotle and the health of these others be called something in the middle between being absolutely learned and being absolutely non-learned, being absolutely healthy and being absolutely non-healthy? This response would indeed be sufficient if Molina had said what this Doctor attributes to him, namely that there is something in the middle between the absolutely future and the absolutely non-future. But he only says that there is a middle between the merely possible and the simply future. He calls merely possible that which excludes every aspect of futurity whatsoever, such as the repentance of the people of Chorazin, which was neither absolutely nor hypothetically future, yet was still possible—otherwise they would not have been reproached for their impenitence. Therefore, between what is possible only in this way and what is simply future, he says there exists something in the middle, such as the repentance of the Tyrians, which agreed with the repentance of the people of Chorazin in this respect: that it too was not simply future, and therefore was excluded from that extreme, "simply future." But it was therefore not placed under the other extreme, which is "merely possible," for it added hypothetical futurity to mere possibility, in which it differed from the repentance of the people of Chorazin. Since, therefore, it was placed neither under "simply future," in which it agreed with the other, nor under "merely possible," in which it differed, what remains except to say that it was in the middle between both? The same could be said if you compare the same repentance of the Tyrians with their obstinacy. For the obstinacy was not simply future, nor could it have been without preaching, which itself was not future. Nor was it future from the hypothesis of preaching, since Christ declared that they would have done penance. Therefore it was only merely possible, from the hypothesis of preaching. Therefore, the repentance which itself was not simply future, and which added hypothetical futurity to the mere possibility of obstinacy, was in the middle between the two extremes of absolute

DISPUTATION II

futurity and mere possibility. This is so evident that he could hardly be an ancient and suitable philosopher to whom this seems novel and absurd.

XXXIX. Finally, "It is not acceptable," he says, "that Molina makes his middle knowledge prior to the other two, namely the knowledge of vision and simple intelligence. For as I was saying in the preceding chapter: prior in what way? Not in time?" etc. Here too something is attributed to Molina which he by no means says, namely that middle knowledge is prior to the knowledge of simple intelligence, which for him is the same as natural and necessary knowledge. Rather, he says it is prior to the knowledge of vision, which concerns contingent things that are either absolutely future or absolutely non-future as such. But because the Anonymous thinks that the fact that something is not future is known through a different kind of knowledge than that through which it is known that something is future, and he wants this to be the knowledge of simple intelligence, he therefore attributes to Molina the view that middle knowledge is prior to the knowledge of simple intelligence. In this matter, if anything seems absurd, it all arises from that absurd nomenclature of the knowledge of simple intelligence, of which Molina is innocent.

XL. Now, as to his question by what priority middle knowledge can be said to be prior to the knowledge of vision: It would require a longer discussion to examine the Anonymous's doctrine, who wrote about order in order to eliminate it between God's free and necessary acts. And as if the eternity of divine things and their independence could not otherwise be maintained, he forbade anything to be called prior or posterior. But because he himself says this discussion is hairsplitting, one should refrain from useless shearing—although the Anonymous seems to have wasted much effort on it, for he treats this question in several chapters from the twenty-ninth to the forty-sixth. So enjoyable was it for him to spin these hairsplitting threads.

XLI. But lest we seem to have evaded the question of by what priority middle knowledge is prior to the knowledge of vision, I will first ask in turn what priority he himself understands when he admits that the

DISPUTATION II

knowledge which he calls "of precision" precedes and illuminates the divine will. For I think he himself will not deny that some priority is signified by those words, unless he concedes that he has spoken improperly. But if he admits only that priority which is called "in the consequence of subsistence," as he seems to indicate elsewhere, I say that by this priority middle knowledge is prior to the decree of the will that predefines or permits future free acts, and consequently to the knowledge of vision that expresses these same acts as absolutely future. For middle knowledge precedes and illuminates that decree, such that it is true that the decree would not exist if middle knowledge did not exist, but middle knowledge would remain even if the decree did not follow. And because the knowledge of vision of those acts follows the decree, it is likewise true that it would not exist if middle knowledge did not precede and illuminate the decree, but middle knowledge would remain even if the knowledge of vision did not follow.

Now, because middle knowledge is not related to the knowledge of vision entirely as animal is related to man, and in general as a common concept is related to a particular concept (since each of these is a singular and individual concept), the priority in the consequence of subsistence should not be admitted here as it is between a universal and a particular contained under it, but rather as it can be between those things of which one depends on the other but not vice versa. For this is how middle knowledge is related to the knowledge of vision, always preserving real identity and unity. This, I say, is how it is in reality. For what we say is not derived from our concepts—namely, that the predefinition of a free act would not exist if there were not middle knowledge of it, but middle knowledge would exist even if there were not predefinition of the free act. For this is true regardless of anyone thinking of it, and therefore that priority should not be said to be merely an extrinsic denomination derived from our concepts, but a real foundation for it must be supposed to exist in the entity of the Divine act. The same applies to the knowledge of simple intelligence compared either with the free decree or with the

DISPUTATION II

knowledge of vision that follows from it; likewise to the knowledge of vision of one thing compared with the knowledge of vision of another, as if the foreknowledge of a future sin were compared to the foreknowledge of the punishment to be inflicted for it; likewise to one free decree compared with another, as if the decree to permit sin were compared with the decree to punish it. Indeed, even where there is reciprocal consequence, one thing can still be considered prior to another in divine acts. And thus, although from the fact that God sees that the last judgment will occur, we may rightly infer that it has been decreed by God, and from the fact that we understand it to have been decreed by God, it also rightly follows that it will occur; nevertheless, there is reason to say that the decree of judgment is prior to its foresight, not vice versa, by a priority founded in the thing itself. For just as when acts are really distinct, if one presents to the other an object toward which it tends, and not vice versa, the former is said to be prior—in which way our cognition is prior to volition, and formal premises to the conclusion—so if one act, notwithstanding its simplicity, has a dual aspect, of cognition and volition, and under one aspect presents to itself an object to be attained under the other aspect, why should it not be said to have in itself a virtual order of prior and posterior, and a real foundation for being conceived as prior to itself under another aspect? This, then, is how the decree concerning the Last Judgment relates to its foreknowledge, because the decree is the cause by which the judgment becomes future, and to that extent it is also the cause by which that object is presented to the divine intellect as something to be foreknown. And in the same way, the vision by which God sees Himself is prior to the love by which He loves Himself, and the knowledge of possibles is prior to the love of them, although in these cases there is a reciprocal inference of existence: because even if there is reciprocal inference of existence, there is not reciprocal presentation of the object, but there is a foundation in reality for saying that the vision or knowledge presents to love an object toward which it tends, not vice versa.

DISPUTATION II

XLII. For what the Anonymous says, that this kind of order was unknown to the Fathers and ancient Scholastics, is sufficiently refuted by what they say about the will to punish and to exercise vindictive justice, which they say has a cause in us, namely sin, and is consequent. For this is the same as saying it is posterior to the foreknowledge of future sin. Likewise concerning the will to have mercy and to confer grace on sinners, which they similarly want to have a cause in the merits of Christ, which is to be posterior to the foreknowledge of those merits, and so on with other things. But one can see more recent theologians, who are so unanimous in admitting some series of divine acts that it is manifest that there is a certain common seed of earlier centuries and indeed of Christianity itself, which, with the division and multiplication of schools over time, has everywhere grown into the same opinion.

XLIII. But he also adds that this series of decrees is useless. In this, he accuses the experience of almost all mortals who happen to have some notion of these matters. What, does it not contribute to explaining what we owe to Christ the Lord, to say that the will to confer grace on us was conceived from the foreknowledge of His death? Does it not help to stop the mouths of desperate men, to say that they themselves have provided a voluntary cause for the foreknowledge of their sins? And that this foreknowledge, while representing sins, has presented to God a just motive for punishment? For that it also contributes to understanding the harmony of foreknowledge and providence with free will may perhaps be shown later. Now I say only this: that the Anonymous, who thinks those questions are easy to understand when the order of prior and posterior is removed, is advocating facilities unknown to other Doctors, and by the success of his efforts achieves only this: that common thoughts are believed to be better.

DISPUTATION II

CHAPTER III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ANONYMOUS AUTHOR'S DOCTRINE AND INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE PASSAGES SUPPORTING MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

XLIV. In order to respond to the scriptural testimonies by which middle knowledge is supported, the Anonymous author puts forward many premises that are partly extraneous and useless, and partly just as obscure and uncertain as the very matter under dispute.

The first is that there exists a wide distinction between divine knowledge and external revelation. Who doubts this? But to what purpose is this mentioned? Because, he says, it follows that although God speaks hypothetically with us when He reveals something, He does not think hypothetically. This is indeed excellent, just as it does not follow that God has Hebrew thoughts from the fact that He speaks to us in Hebrew, but rather divine thoughts. We are not inquiring about the mode of knowing, but about the thing known: nor do we contend that God thinks hypothetically, but that He thinks about hypothetical things, which are hypothetically future. When our opponents deny this, they not only deny that God knows in the way He speaks, but that He knows the thing He speaks about: which is to say that God does not know what He is saying. For God clearly and distinctly says that one thing will be, if another is posited. If He knows this, then He knows something conditionally future: and if He does not know it, He says what He does not know.

XLV. The second premise reveals an inconsistent and uncertain line of thought. He says that a hypothetical statement is more of an inference than a statement, that it most closely approaches the third operation of the mind; yet differs from it; it does not properly affirm or deny anything, but only signifies some connection and inference of the consequent from the antecedent. What, I ask, do these things mean, and to what do they pertain? It would be surprising if he did not conclude that

DISPUTATION II

there are four operations of the mind. For a hypothetical judgment, after it is more of an inference than a statement, after it closely approaches the third operation, what can it be except something intermediate between the second and third operation? But how can one conceive of something between the second and third unless where four are enumerated? But what he says about this judgment not properly affirming or denying anything, but only signifying some connection and inference, is inconsistent. For it does not signify that connection and inference in just any way, but assertively and judicatively, so to speak: and to signify assertively or judicatively is the same as to affirm or deny: and to affirm or deny some inference or connection is to affirm or deny something. But this, he says, is not to affirm or deny absolutely; as if he were saying that a hypothetical judgment is not an absolute judgment—who contradicts this? The question is not whether a hypothetical judgment is absolute, but whether it exists. He adds that a hypothetical statement is no more a statement than a hypothetical syllogism is a syllogism. And the latter is not properly a syllogism, as Julius Pacius notes. I concede that what is called a hypothetical statement is no more a statement than what is also called a hypothetical syllogism is a syllogism: but if Pacius denied that this is a syllogism, he would have poorly advised himself. Since it is manifest that there is a syllogism wherever there is a formal and necessary consequence from two premises: likewise this is found in what is called hypothetical; not according to the method that the Anonymous author refers to from Pacius, but according to another most commonly used among all Dialecticians, whereby in the major premise of a combined and hypothetical proposition, in the minor premise one part is posited absolutely or is destroyed, so that the other in the conclusion is similarly posited absolutely or is removed. Of this technique the Anonymous author could have found authors a little more ancient than Pacius, and more reputable, Severinus Boethius, the Leader of Latin Peripatetics, who once wrote two books on hypothetical syllogisms: and St. Thomas who also treats them in *Opusculum* 48, chapters 16 and 17, and mentions a more extensive treatise on

DISPUTATION II

this very subject written by himself. The Anonymous author has not seen these authors when he denies that there is any figure or modes of such syllogisms; since they establish both figures and modes far more numerous than there are in categorical syllogisms. For Boethius, toward the end of the second book, in the third figure alone counts forty hypothetical modes. But Julius Pacius also adds these words: "Nor do I therefore reprimand, indeed I praise those who explain hypothetical syllogisms, since Aristotle himself treats of these; not only here, but also later in chapter 29, the seventh part of which chapter will say that it must be explained in how many ways hypothetical syllogism are formed." And for chapter 29, where Aristotle treats of these syllogisms and briefly touches on two of their kinds, but indicates that a longer treatment of them remains, Pacius notes these things: "All these things are very obscure, since even though the Philosopher in the following part admits that hypothetical syllogisms must be explained more accurately, and divided into their kinds; yet either he did not fulfill this later, or the writings on this subject have perished through the injury of time... But neither has Theophrastus's book, which he wrote on hypothetical syllogisms, come down to us, from which Alexander and Philoponus report some things." From this you may understand how inconsiderately the Anonymous author has said that Aristotle, in his utterly complete Logic, taught nothing about hypothetical propositions or syllogisms. Since it is clear that Aristotle both taught something about them and thought that more should be taught. Which also the most ancient disciples of Aristotle supplied. Certainly for no other reason than because they thought them to be true syllogisms, and more useful than seemed to the Anonymous author.

XLVI. The third premise is that the inference signified in a syllogism does not exist in reality: similarly, neither does the consequence and inference of a conditional proposition signified by the conjunction "if": but it exists only in our intellect. And because the divine intellect does not infer one thing from another, therefore God knows nothing conditionally but only absolutely. Here again he misses the point. We are not asking

DISPUTATION II

whether God knows some things conditionally, but whether He knows conditional things or things that are conditionally posited. For if we obtain this, it matters little whether He knows them absolutely or conditionally, inferentially or by simple intuition at once. And just as no one would deny that God knows without discourse those very things that we know discursively, so it cannot be denied that if we know something conditionally and truly, He also knows it, not in our imperfect way, but in His own most perfect and divine manner. For God does not fail to know any truth. The Anonymous author is also mistaken when he supposes that every conditional is inferential, since it is sufficient for its legitimate sense if there is some concomitance that it signifies, of antecedent and consequent; with a free and not necessary dependence of one on the other. Finally, he is most widely mistaken when he denies that the inference signified in a syllogism and in a conditional proposition exists in reality, but is only in our mind. Because it is manifest that the formal inference which is in our mind is representative and assertive of the objective inference, which if it does not exist in reality, it follows that all our mental inference is false, as being assertive of something that does not exist.

The fourth premise is that all our statements and those of scripture are not to be interpreted rigidly and, as they say, literally. Let this pass. But to what purpose this is directed will be clear later.

XLVII. The fifth follows from the fourth: When something in sacred scripture is said absolutely or hypothetically to be future, which in reality is not future, nor ever was, God wishes to signify and intend something other than the futurity of that thing, and therefore what is said to be future is future in name only, or as Augustine says, it is a "future non-future." This rule is either useless or deceptive. For when he says, "when something in sacred scripture is said absolutely or hypothetically to be future, which in reality is not future," if it is understood here, as it should be, "neither absolutely nor hypothetically," it is true that God's words must be taken in another sense than as designating the futurity of that thing: but this does not help him. But if that is not understood, but the

DISPUTATION II

sense is: "when anything in sacred scripture is said to be future absolutely or hypothetically, which in reality is not future, nor ever was," supply "absolutely," the statement is deceptive, and the rule which prescribes that God's words are to be interpreted in another sense than as designating at least the hypothetical futurity of that thing is false. For it is false and contains an obvious begging of the question. If scripture says something is hypothetically future, which is neither actually nor ever was absolutely future, one must believe that God wanted to signify something other than that it is hypothetically future. And he labors in vain to fortify himself with the authority of St. Thomas and St. Augustine. For there is not the slightest indication in them by which such an absurd interpretation is suggested.

XLVIII. Having set forth these premises, the Anonymous author undertakes the interpretation of those passages which seem to prove that middle knowledge exists in God. And first he responds in general and in common by proposing a twofold solution, one of which must necessarily coincide with the other in order to have any force. Then finally he runs through each passage, responding. I too, against all solutions of this kind, raise three objections in general and in common. The first is that nothing else is brought forward than what has hitherto been commonly brought forward by those who have attacked middle knowledge. However, it was expected that one to whom the truth had so shone forth as a friend, as to seduce him from the common opinion of the rest of his friends, would emit some new ray, by which he would show that his departure from others was justified, and would prove that there was some value in this new work. The second is that the same solutions have not only been commonly proposed by the attackers of middle knowledge, but are also despised by most as less suitable and less true. For both from the Calvinists, Twisse denies that he is satisfied with them, as was seen earlier: and from the Thomists, almost all the more recent ones think that those testimonies compel not indeed middle, but nevertheless conditional knowledge, that is, knowledge of conditionally future things, as will be shown later, which

DISPUTATION II

is perpetually denied by all those responses. But since that on which the Jesuits, Thomists, and Calvinists agree ought to contain a truth that is by no means doubtful; it follows that the money which that solver presents to his creditors is not legitimate, since it is rejected by the judgment of all of them.

The third is that, since all those scriptural testimonies in their primary and proper acceptance of words signify something future from a hypothesis: and the Anonymous author in all his responses denies that it is future and contends that there is another meaning that the Holy Spirit intends than that which His words present, we must see what exception he pretends from the rule which prescribes that God's words are to be interpreted and believed according to their proper and true meaning. For the two exceptions that are usually made, namely manifest falsity or absurdity, and opposition with other testimonies of God; the author has nowhere proved that they have any place here, as can be gathered from the solution given in the previous chapter of all the arguments that he uses. And this is that, not vociferation which he attributes to Suárez, a most modest author, but the most just complaint of all those who complain that by this manner of philosophizing all force is taken away from sacred scripture: while it is permitted to twist it to an improper understanding, whenever someone occupied with some opinion, true in his own judgment, but in another's either false or certainly doubtful, fears that what is immediately said by God may not be true: and prefers to accommodate His mind to his own, rather than to correct his own from His words and testimony.

XLIX. Now let us touch upon each point individually. The first of those two common solutions is that conditional propositions and revelations, which are in sacred scripture, are not a necessary argument for conditional knowledge: because there is a different rationale for them and for it. On the contrary, from revelation, one necessarily infers knowledge of the thing that is revealed: because the revealer is not ignorant of what he says: therefore from a revelation signifying that something is future

DISPUTATION II

from a hypothesis, one necessarily infers that the revealer knows that it is future from a hypothesis: and this is conditional knowledge. Therefore one must arrive at the point where either conditional knowledge is admitted, or it is denied that there is any revelation which signifies by the intention of the revealing God that something is future from a hypothesis; which is the second common solution, of which more shortly.

L. The Anonymous author adds, "Nevertheless, God knows most perfectly all our absolute and hypothetical statements, and what is signified to us by them, and what falsity, or truth, or probability they have." From these words a manifest argument for conditional knowledge in God can be drawn. For it is established that we form hypothetical judgments: whether those which seem to rely on God's revelation, or others which we conceive, led by probable conjectures: by which we distinctly signify that something is future under a condition. E.g., we not only say that it is probable or that there is a danger that he, if he should watch or hear comedians, or if he should read this or that book, would form such and such a plan; but we affirm absolutely that he would form it. This judgment, although it is opinionative, obscure, and uncertain (in which it differs from that by which mere probability or mere danger is enunciated, which is always or almost always manifest), is nevertheless truly and formally a judgment; and therefore it is not only probable, but moreover true or false; because every judgment that is truly and properly such either is or is not conformable to its object, and to that extent has some truth or falsity. Nor does the Anonymous author deny this. For he admits, when he treats of singular opposites concerning the contingent future, that if for a proposition to be true is nothing other than to be conformable to its object, and to be false is to be non-conformable; of opposites concerning a singular contingent future, one can be said to be determinately true, the other determinately false. In that sense, therefore, I contend that our hypothetical and opinionative judgment, by which we say, if Paul were to watch comedians, he would sin, is either determinately true, not false, or is determinately false, not true: therefore God knows

DISPUTATION II

this, since He knows most perfectly what any judgment has of falsity or truth or probability. But it is impossible for God to know that judgment is false, unless He knows that something is contingently not future from some supposition: just as it is also impossible for Him to know that it is true, unless He knows that something is contingently future from some supposition, as is obvious: but to know this pertains to conditional knowledge, or to knowledge of things conditionally future: therefore such knowledge cannot but be in God, if both hypothetical judgments about things future under a condition exist in us and are known to God.

Nor can you say that God knows this by the knowledge of vision, or of simple intelligence, which is another solution soon to be rejected: because I am not disputing by what knowledge God knows this, but what object He knows: and because it is manifest that the object of my judgment is an object future under a condition (for this is what I enunciate), it follows that God also knows it, and knows whether the object is or is not future under a condition, in whatever way and by whatever knowledge He knows it, which if one does not wish to call conditional, it is enough if it is conceded to be of an object future under a condition.

LI. The second general response "concedes what is most true, that God certainly and infallibly knows all things which are called conditionally future. But it denies that they are known by any middle and conditional knowledge, but only by absolute knowledge either of vision or of simple intelligence, by the former if they are sometime future, namely absolutely; by the latter if they never are," understand also absolutely. He adds "that these conditional future things which are not absolutely future, do not differ from purely possible things, except by our conditional way of conceiving and enunciating." Likewise, "When they are said by God to be future, God wishes to indicate something other than their futurity." If anyone should consider this doctrine more attentively, he will easily judge with me that the great man, evidently occupied with more serious business, has not sufficiently examined these theological matters. The second response concedes that God certainly knows all things which are called

DISPUTATION II

conditionally future? It therefore concedes what is not asked; for what is asked is not that God be conceded to know certainly those things which are called conditionally future, but that He be said to know them as conditionally future, so that His knowledge is assertive of such futurity. But this is not conceded by this author, but rather soon denied, when it is said that God wishes to signify something other than their futurity, if ever He pronounces them future.

Now what he adds, "These future things, if they are not at some time absolutely future, do not differ from purely possible things," is the same as if he were to say that whatever we truly conceive and enunciate as future under a condition, so that our judgment is assertive of futurity itself, and not of another thing, is falsely said to be future, and all those judgments of ours are false. The consequence is proved by proposing this example. Let there be a most filthy man, e.g., Domitian, who with God so disposing will not in reality encounter an honest and comely and lovable matron: whence it is not absolutely future that he would desire her. Yet someone judges by a hypothetical judgment, if he were to encounter her, he would desire her. But he judges this in such a way that he does not merely state that there is a danger of that thing: or that Domitian is disposed to this: or that it is probable that it would happen thus. For in those ways God is also conceived to signify hypothetically future things, but he enunciates in the way that he can, and in the way that God cannot from supposition, namely in such a way that that futurity of hypothetical desire is signified directly and through itself. I ask whether that judgment "if Domitian were to encounter her, he would desire her" is true rather than this other one, "if he were to encounter her, he would not desire her": or "if he were to encounter her, he would moderate himself and his appetite?" If it is true rather than that one: therefore the hypothetical futurity of desire differs from a purely possible thing. For that he should not desire, or that he should moderate himself, is purely possible: but that he should desire is something else in addition, since it is said to be true rather than the other. But if it is not true rather than the other: therefore

DISPUTATION II

it is simply false. Because what is not more true than what is simply false, is itself also simply false: that hypothetically future desire of Domitian is not more true than his future self-control, which can be supposed in this case to be simply false: therefore, etc. Indeed, whenever something is asserted which is not as it is asserted, the assertion is false: but the hypothetically future desire of Domitian is asserted, which in reality is not thus future: therefore that assertion is false: and the same could be said of the judgment by which we enunciate that a most cruel man, such as Nero was, if he were to encounter someone by whom he thought himself injured, would order him to be led away: or of a most rapacious man, if a rich man should meet him, he would rob him: and so for others. None, I say, would there be out of the infinite number of such hypothetical judgments, which may deal with any imaginable matter, in which nevertheless a free concomitance or consequence of the consequent from the antecedent is supposed, which would not be false. But a judgment assertive of something cannot be false unless the negative judgment of the same is true, as is obvious, since for the truth of a negation it suffices that there not be that which is required for the truth of an affirmation. It follows therefore that all negative hypothetical judgments about things which will not absolutely be are true, e.g., it will be true that if Domitian were to encounter her, he would not desire her: if someone hated by him were to encounter Nero, he would not order him to be killed, and so for all other things which are infinite. But I appeal to the Anonymous author's conscience whether he truly thinks this is so: and whether he would want to assent to all of them as true.

This is explained further. Because when you deny that what I say "if she were to encounter Domitian, etc." is true, you deny that it would be future that he would desire her: and you think that you deny truly: therefore it is true according to you, if she were to encounter Domitian, he would not desire her. God therefore knows this, since it is true: and thus there is negative knowledge in God of a conditional future. Why therefore should there not also be affirmative knowledge?

DISPUTATION II

LII. But what he says, that conditionally future things which will not be absolutely, differ from merely possible things only by our conditional way of conceiving and enunciating, I do not sufficiently understand. And I ask whether that way of conceiving is arbitrary, or has a foundation in the things themselves and objects? For if the foundation is in the objects, they differ in reality itself, and not only in our way of conceiving: if not, since it is merely possible that Nero would spare a man whom he hated, if he were given the opportunity, there will be no distinction between these two, that he would spare him, and that he would rage at him on that hypothesis: provided that we enunciate both in the same way.

Nor can you say that one is probable, the other is not: because probability is not enunciated, as I suppose; but futurity itself: which since it is not more in one than in the other, consequently the thing enunciated will be the same in both cases. Indeed, contradictories will be reconciled: nor will there be any conflict between that someone would rage, and that he would not rage on a hypothesis: that he would desire and that he would not desire: that he would rob and that he would not rob, and so for all others.

Finally, what he adds, that when such things are said by God to be future, God wishes to signify something other than their futurity, he says has been explained by him at greater length in the previous chapter, but it was to be explained in few words, what is easy to understand; but to be proved with many words, what is difficult to believe, as appears from the things that have been objected, and which remain to be said. And this is the outcome of the general responses: let us hear the particular ones.

LIII. To the passage about the conditionally future repentance of the Tyrians and Sidonians he provides four expositions. The first is, "that Christ wished nothing else than to rebuke the hardness of heart of the Jews in believing by comparison with the Tyrians and Sidonians"; that is entirely so. But since he rebukes the hardness of Jews by comparison with the future softness of the Tyrians, so to speak, that is, with future repen-

DISPUTATION II

tance, and that was both voluntary and only conditionally future; it follows that something both voluntary and conditionally future was known by Christ, which is all we intend. But, he says, future repentance is not signified, but only a better disposition for repentance. First, the words themselves, "they would have repented," signify repentance future from a hypothesis. Second, a rebuke is less apt by which one's impenitence is argued through another's greater disposition for repenting; since it is manifest that reproaches of this kind are not made fittingly except through the opposition of contraries, and always deal with the things that are voluntary and free. But a disposition for repentance is not opposed to impenitence; but repentance itself: and that disposition, if it is not something voluntary and free, does not contribute to rebuke; if it is, we have our intention, for something free from a hypothesis is future is signified. I add, since what is said to be only hypothetically future does not differ from the purely possible according to this author's view: nor is it really such as it is said to be; the Jews could have laughed at this rebuke, and said that as far as repentance is concerned, there is no distinction between them and the Tyrians; for it is purely possible in both.

LIV. The second exposition is this. In Christ as human, there could have been conditional knowledge: but it does not therefore follow that such knowledge exists in God as well. Listen, my Doctor, do you concede that there is some knowledge in humanity that is not in God? Is the knowledge that exists in humanity about something that does not exist, so that the philosopher's statement "what does not exist cannot be known" might be called false? But if what is known by humanity exists, can it be unknown to God? And if it cannot be unknown: and if what is known here by Christ is the future conditional repentance of the Tyrians, could God have been ignorant that it would happen? Christ, he says, knew only that the Tyrians' repentance would have a morally probable connection with the miracles performed among them. But no miracles were performed among them. Therefore, it can only be said that he knew that if miracles were performed, repentance would follow morally and

DISPUTATION II

probably. But if Christ knew this, God knew it too; otherwise, either he or something true would have been unknown to God. This knowledge was nothing other than knowledge of the conditionally future, therefore God knows that something is conditionally future, and the testimonies that seem to signify that future condition do indeed signify it, and this is according to God's intention, contrary to what was said before. Therefore, there is no reason to distinguish between the knowledge of Christ as man and the knowledge of God with respect to the object, since both formally represent the same thing—namely, something that is future under a condition. For regarding the act itself, there is an infinite distinction between human knowledge and divine knowledge of any thing.

Furthermore, Christ was, I believe, a sufficiently good theologian and was not ignorant—if indeed this is knowable—that a so-called conditional future does not differ from the purely possible. And because the impenitence of the Tyrians was purely possible, even under the hypothesis of miracles, consequently he knew that repentance was no more likely to occur under that hypothesis than impenitence. Therefore, neither condition had a greater connection with that hypothesis than the other, because what is equally not future from some hypothesis is equally not connected with it. How, then, would he have predicted repentance rather than impenitence? And since for someone to whom something is certain, the contrary cannot be considered probable except in relation to those who lack the same certainty, how could it have been probable to Christ that the Tyrians' repentance would happen from the hypothesis of miracles, when it was certain to him that it would not happen, as the Anonymous author supposes?

LV. He says the third interpretation is that of certain others, who believe that "Christ spoke with exaggeration for the purpose of more vehemently rebuking and reproaching the incredulity of the Jews..... and therefore thought nothing less than about the conversion and repentance of the Tyrians and Sidonians (especially as known by conditional knowledge)." But these Authors first seem to be too favorably disposed to the

DISPUTATION II

Hebrews, since they assume their obstinacy was less than Christ's rebuke and amplification. They would show that benevolence more appropriately toward Christ, whom they claim thought nothing less than what he was saying. For what they add, "especially as known by conditional knowledge," what, I ask, is the meaning of this? And by what other knowledge could Christ have known the future repentance of the Tyrians under a hypothesis except by conditional knowledge?

LVI. He proposes a fourth exposition tentatively. "It can be said," he says, "that Christ spoke according to the common usage of men, especially of the wise and elderly. Who, as Aristotle notes in his *Rhetoric*, do not speak very affirmatively and assertively about human affairs... or because it is characteristic of a modest disposition to speak doubtfully even when one does not doubt." I would like to know whether it is the practice of the wise and elderly that when they know with certainty that something is not the case, they nevertheless affirm, even doubtfully, that it is? And whether Aristotle teaches this in his *Rhetoric*? And whether it would have been fitting for Christ, who most truly professes himself to be the truth, to conform himself to Aristotle in such a way that he would predict, even doubtfully, that the Tyrians' repentance would happen under a hypothesis, when he knew with certainty that it would not happen under that hypothesis?

LVII. In the second place, he adapts the same interpretations to the scripture from the words of Elisha to Joash, King of Israel, which can be refuted by the same arguments, except that in this passage what is signified is not so much what a man would freely do under a hypothesis, which is what is chiefly in question, but rather what God himself would do, since the sense is: "if you had struck etc., God would have given you the power to strike Syria even to its destruction." And therefore I do not so readily use this passage as I do others to prove middle knowledge.

LVIII. The same applies also to the third passage concerning the future betrayal by the citizens of Keilah under a hypothesis, which he contends was only a danger announced to David by God, even though

DISPUTATION II

there was no actual evil intention toward David among the citizens of Keilah. From this it follows that this danger was future only under a hypothesis—indeed, under a hypothesis that never existed. And because something of this nature does not differ from the purely possible, and if it seems to be called future, the words that signify this must be interpreted in another sense, according to the principles of this Doctor. Consequently, God would not have wanted to signify this danger either. Let him therefore seek another exposition. I add that we must believe that God responded to what David was chiefly asking; and David, by the privilege of prophets, asked what he could not know by other means, and what was of the greatest importance to know. Whether there would be a danger of betrayal with Saul approaching and besieging the citizens of Keilah, who were his subjects and far too weak to resist, for the sole purpose that they might not protect his enemies—which reason seemed on the surface most just—this could not have been unknown to David. But since it often happens that what poses a danger does not follow, it was in David's interest to know this, and this is what he should have asked. For if betrayal was not actually going to follow, he could have remained despite the danger; if it was going to follow, he should have fled—not because of the danger of betrayal, but because of the betrayal itself that was actually going to happen. This, therefore, was what the prophet could and should have asked, and asked it from God, who alone could know it with certainty. I add that since something is said to be in danger only when its outcome is uncertain—and we do not now consider there to be a danger that there will someday be a final and universal judgment, because we are certain by divine revelation that it will happen; or that there is a danger that the Blessed will fall from their state, because this too is certain to us—God, to whom it was certain that the betrayal by the citizens of Keilah would not happen under the hypothesis, as the Anonymous author claims, and who therefore could not have wanted to signify it as future, knew that there was no danger of it, just as we know there is no danger that the present state of the world will be perpetual, or that the wicked

DISPUTATION II

will eventually depart unjudged and unpunished. Which of us would want to announce this to some pagan, for example, who does not have the same faith as we do, if he were seriously questioning us? Or who would not think he was mocking the man if, not from his own faith but from the other's ignorance, he said to him that there was a danger that there would never be an end to the present state of things, and never a common judgment of the good and the wicked? Thus, therefore, according to the doctrine of this Author, God would have mocked David.

LIX. The fourth passage from the book of Wisdom contains a clear proof of middle knowledge, when it is said of the righteous who did not live long: "he was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding." The obvious and immediate sense of this statement is that since God knew he would fall if he lived longer, he took him away while he was still standing and uncorrupted. But immediately there occurs Augustine's interpretation, in which it is said that only the dangers of this life are signified here, from which God wanted to snatch away the one whom he desired to save, but not foreknowledge of future sins if he were allowed to live. To this objection I respond that the testimonies of St. Augustine in favor of conditional knowledge are so clear that even the Thomists themselves admit it is useless to dispute them; nor do they want anything else to be inquired into, except whether by these testimonies it is established that such knowledge exists independently of the decree of the divine will, in which way alone it can be called "middle"; or whether it depends on it, in which case it is only conditional, which they do not deny. Augustine, therefore, must be interpreted in such a way that he does not deny any and all knowledge of the future sins of the one who is taken away in youth, but that he denies the kind of knowledge that the Massilienses affirmed. Since the Massilienses contended that grace is given according to our merits, and they had, as it seemed and as Augustine indicates in this place, chapter 12, an easy proof of this in adults, in whom they could suppose certain prior merits, with which in mind God was moved to give grace—but when it came to infants, some of whom are

DISPUTATION II

saved by receiving the grace of baptism, while others perish by not receiving it—"here," says Augustine, "every assertion of human merits preceding the grace of God fails." But lest it should seem to fail entirely, they wanted to resort to merits that would be future if they were allowed to live, saying that one died after receiving baptism because he was going to live well, while another died without receiving it because even if he had received it, he would not have preserved grace. Thus, what the memory of past merits does in adults, they said the foreknowledge of future merits does in infants, as if indeed such foreknowledge of future merits were the same as the memory of past ones, or the same as what is supposed by all Christians to be the foreknowledge of Christ's merits, in view of which, long before they existed, grace was given to the ancient Fathers. This, therefore, is all that Augustine denies. He denies, I say, taking it as certain and undoubted, that foreknowledge of future merits can move one to give a reward, except for the kind of foreknowledge that corresponds to the memory of past merits, or that is similar to the foreknowledge of Christ's merits—that is, absolute foreknowledge—that any such foreknowledge exists in God with respect to infants whom an untimely death takes away. And so, since it would follow from the Massilienses' opinion that the passage from the book of Wisdom, "he was taken away lest wickedness etc.," is false, because after his merits were going to be evil, according to their philosophy, he should have been taken away not to glory, as is supposed, but to punishment—and therefore they would regard the book itself as suspect, as less canonical—Augustine argues both for the authority of the book and for the truth of that passage, when he says it is to be interpreted according to the dangers of this life, namely, so that the misery of those in danger is understood to have excited divine mercy to prevent future sins, but not that future sins excited divine justice to punish. For future sins could not do this, since that prevention by divine mercy had made them not future, at least in the way that is necessary for them to provoke God's justice, that is, absolutely.

DISPUTATION II

Nor could Augustine have thought otherwise, since it is manifest that every danger is so connected with either outcome that it is impossible not to follow either the evil of which there is said to be a danger, or its fortunate avoidance. From this it necessarily follows that whoever supposes a danger supposes that one of these alternatives will determinately happen in the future, although we cannot know which one. But when you suppose that one alternative will determinately happen in the future, to think that God does not distinctly know which one it is—this is to transfer our ignorance to him. It could similarly be said that when he knows something is colored, and either white or black, he nevertheless does not know which it is.

LX. Finally, the Anonymous author contends that "it is certainly quite marvelous that Scripture is filled with such conditional propositions, from which our Adversaries derive their opinion, yet these have never been explained by interpreters according to their understanding, nor has such knowledge been hitherto intimated by them anywhere." This conclusion seems to me also quite marvelous, after so many testimonies of the Holy Fathers and other Doctors which Diego Ruiz has collected in his treatise on the knowledge of God, and other recent Scholastics, by whom the above passages of Scripture are explained in such a way that the Thomists no longer want there to be any controversy about conditional knowledge, but only about its independence from God's decree. And it will soon be clear that my amazement is much more justified than that of the Anonymous author. He should also have attended to what Augustine says in a similar matter: "What need is there for us to examine the works of those who, before this heresy arose, did not have the necessity of engaging with this difficult question?" It is through disputation, indeed, that truth is unfolded; and what lay hidden obscurely in the thoughts of learned men comes forth into the open especially when it is contradicted, so that it should not seem quite marvelous, even if we were to grant that the ancient interpreters of Scripture did not much engage with that question which Molina, as they claim, first debated. It would be enough, in-

DISPUTATION II

deed, that they do not seem to contradict the new positions of the disputants.

CHAPTER IV. ON THE FATHERS AND SCHOLASTIC DOCTORS.

LXI. In refuting the testimonies of the Fathers that appear to prove *scientia media* [middle knowledge], Anonymous so confuses contrary and contradictory solutions and denies such manifest deductions that the truth which made his eyes different from the eyes of his friends seems not to have been friendly at all—indeed, not even truth. The Fathers discuss this question: Why did God, foreknowing the future sin of the Angels, nevertheless create them? Likewise, why Adam? Why did He choose Saul, etc.? In this question, the foreknowledge of future sin is certainly presupposed by them, which we contend is conditional. Anonymous, however, who denies that it is conditional, says first that, according to the mind of the Fathers and the common sense of Theologians, these things are said only of the absolute knowledge of God, and with respect to those things that are truly and absolutely future. Therefore, he says, the Adversaries, especially Suárez and Peter of Saint Joseph, falsely and contrary to the mind of the Holy Fathers interpret these in terms of their *scientia media* and conditional foreknowledge of creating Angels and humans, which they claim precedes in reason the absolute decree to create them and permit their fall into sin. He marvels at Suárez who interprets Jerome's passage in this sense, which he claims should rather be understood of God's absolute knowledge joined with the will to permit sin, which is truly foreknowledge. Thus he says in number 2. And soon after, in number 3, he presents Peter of Saint Joseph's objection thus: "But," says Peter of Saint Joseph, "the Holy Fathers speak of knowledge that directs the divine decree." He resolves it thus: "Indeed. But this knowledge is conditional." He denies this. "For it is only knowledge of precision, or of possibles, by which God knows what He can do either alone

DISPUTATION II

or with this or that created will, which suffices for Him to choose and decree this or that." The Fathers speak of absolute knowledge and with respect to those things that are truly future; likewise, of knowledge conjoined with the will, which is truly foreknowledge: and yet the Fathers are to be understood as speaking of knowledge of precision and of possibles, which directs the divine decree, and which becomes knowledge of vision when that decree is added. How, I ask, do these things square with each other? Is God's knowledge as conjoined with the will a knowledge of precision? As conjoined with the will, is it directive of the will? If we speak properly, should not that which directs include that which is directed, and that which effects, the effect itself? And see how he destroys this same point again. Therefore, since in the aforementioned questions and answers, a comparison is made only between the external production of things in time and God's eternal and internal knowledge and absolute foreknowledge, which He has concerning the sins of the wicked and concerning the order of all things that will come to be in reality; none in them, etc. The Fathers compare external production with eternal foreknowledge, which God has concerning future things: and yet the foreknowledge of which they speak is only knowledge of precision, or of possibles, by which God knows what He can do? These things perhaps seem more worthy of wonder than what was brought forward earlier from Suárez.

LXII. Now since he says there is not even a single word in all the sayings of the Fathers about conditional knowledge or foreknowledge, nor that they in any way presuppose or touch upon it, I demonstrate with such evident deduction that the knowledge of which they speak can be nothing other than conditional that even in this place, while Anonymous resists, he becomes a remarkable Anonymous who so easily marvels at others. For otherwise, the doubt of the Holy Fathers would be most absurd. For what he says—that the Holy Fathers compare the external and temporal production of things with eternal foreknowledge of future things—is the same as if he were to say that the Fathers ask this: why did

DISPUTATION II

God produce the Angel in time, whom He knew from eternity would sin with that knowledge which either presupposes the will to create or is conjoined with it; likewise with that which is similarly conjoined with the will to permit sin. And therefore this would be the Fathers' doubt: Why did God, supposing that knowledge which He had conjoined with the will to create the Angel and to permit his sin, nevertheless create him in time? This is equivalent to this other question: Why, supposing the will to create the Angel and permit his sin, which was eternally in God, did God nevertheless create him in time? It is equivalent, I say, because whoever supposes knowledge conjoined with will supposes the will itself; and therefore whoever asks why, supposing knowledge conjoined with will, etc., also asks why, supposing the will, or what is the same, why, supposing both knowledge and will. But who does not see that this question—why, supposing the knowledge and will to create and permit sin, did God create and permit?—is both most inept and entirely unworthy of the intelligence and wisdom of the Holy Fathers? For what kind of monstrosity is this? To ask why God did something, on the supposition that He willed to do it? For it is manifest that such a supposition which is added to the question contains the cause of doubt and the difficulty which is to be resolved in its solution; and thus it is the same to ask, why, supposing knowledge, etc., and to ask, how did the knowledge, which we suppose, not prevent what was done from being done, which we wonder at. But if both knowledge and will to act are supposed, behold for yourself an extraordinary form of question: How did knowledge conjoined with the will to create the Angel, and with the will to permit his sin, not prevent him from being created in time? And who would be so ingenious as to wonder that the will to do something does not prevent that thing from being done? Or that knowledge which does not prevent us from willing something does not prevent us from doing it?

LXIII. It is therefore most manifest that knowledge should not be conjoined with will here, but rather separated, lest the doubt be absurd; nor should it be asked why, on the hypothesis that He knew and willed,

DISPUTATION II

He did something; but why, on the hypothesis that He knew, He willed to do it. Indeed, when dealing with a free agent, there should not be, nor should one seek, any other reason for external action than that which is the cause and reason for internal volition, and he would be ridiculous who would ask me why I did something, if he intends anything other than to know why I willed to do it. Likewise, if he should wonder how something did not prevent me from doing it, on the hypothesis that strength was not lacking, for any other reason than because he does not know how it did not prevent me from willing it. This, therefore, is the sense of the Holy Fathers, and it cannot be otherwise: Why did God, when He knew the Angel would sin if He willed to create him in the state in which He did create him, nevertheless will to create him and place him in that state? Or, Why did that foreknowledge not prevent this will? And, What was the reason that overcame the difficulty of willing to create, which the foreknowledge of the sin that would follow presented? In this way, that question has a suitable form and poses a problem to be resolved with care and labor. But it is also clear that this knowledge of sin, if God were to will to create the Angel, that would follow, can be nothing other than conditional knowledge. This is demonstrated as follows: Because knowledge that can prevent something from being absolutely future cannot be knowledge by which that thing is known as absolutely future. But the knowledge of which the Fathers speak could prevent the sin of the Angel from being absolutely future, as they at least supposed; therefore, it was not knowledge by which it was known as absolutely future; and yet it was known as future. For the Fathers clearly signify this. Therefore, it was known as conditionally future only. And that this is entirely the opinion of the Holy Fathers, one passage from Augustine suffices, from Book 22 of *The City of God*, where he says that God, when He foreknew that certain Angels through pride, by which they would want to be sufficient for their own blessed life, would be deserters of so great a good, did not take away this power from them, judging it more powerful and better to do good even from evils than not to allow evils to be. Likewise, since He

DISPUTATION II

similarly foreknew that man would sin through transgression of God's law by desertion of God, He did not take away from him the power of free will, at the same time foreseeing what good He Himself would do from his evil. In this passage, who does not see that Augustine attributes to God's providence and free disposition the fact that He left the use of free will to both the Angel and man, even though He knew they would abuse it? Who likewise does not see that that knowledge by which He saw they would abuse it cannot be absolute knowledge of future things? For it is contradictory for there to be absolute knowledge of the future and for the cause without which it is impossible for that thing to be future to be removed. Therefore, since with free will removed it is impossible for sin to be future, consequently with free will removed, it will be contradictory for there to be absolute knowledge of future sin; and conversely, supposing absolute knowledge of future sin, it will be contradictory for free will to be taken away. Therefore, that free will is not taken away, supposing that knowledge in God, should not be attributed to God's free disposition, but rather to impossibility; nor should it be said that God judged better where He could not have done otherwise. Therefore, for Augustine's sense and reasoning to be consistent, it is evident that he understands another knowledge of future sin than absolute knowledge; but there is no other except conditional knowledge. As if I were to say: The knowledge of future sin of which Augustine speaks is that, supposing which, God is free to take away or not take away free will from the one who will sin. But supposing absolute knowledge of future sin, God is not free to take away or not take away free will from the one who will sin. Therefore, Augustine is not speaking of absolute knowledge of future sin. Therefore, he is speaking of conditional knowledge, because there is no other knowledge of future sin.

LXIV. To this passage of Augustine I will add that which Anonymous thinks either Alarçon did not read, who uses it in his treatise on the knowledge of God, or did not understand, or did not report faithfully enough—so generous is this author even with those whom he calls

DISPUTATION II

friends. But I will first present the complete passage, then the reason for such a harsh judgment, so that the learned reader may see who has better read or understood Augustine. The words of Augustine, therefore, are: "We are discussing those who do not have perseverance in goodness, but who die with their good will having failed from good to evil. Let them answer if they can why God, when they were living faithfully and piously, did not then snatch them from the dangers of this life, lest malice change their understanding and deception deceive their souls. Did He not have this in His power? OR DID HE NOT KNOW THEIR FUTURE EVILS? Certainly nothing of these things can be said except most perversely and most insanely." Here Anonymous asks, where is conditional knowledge in this? I can respond by asking in turn, where are the eyes of one who does not see it? Conditional knowledge is contained in this passage in these words: "Or did He not know their future evils?" But, he says, does not Augustine speak expressly of truly future evils? He speaks, I say, of truly future evils, but there is a twofold knowledge of them in God; one which depends on the absolute decree of positing the condition from the supposition of which they are future, and that is the knowledge of vision and absolute foreknowledge of future sin; the other is independent of such a decree and would remain even if that decree were not conceived, and that is conditional knowledge, which I say Augustine understands by those words "did He not know their future evils?" Because it is most evident that the knowledge of future evils here designates that by which divine power could be directed to prevent and impede them from becoming absolutely future, or knowledge which presented God with a motive for snatching away men whose malice was going to change their understanding. And it is contradictory for this knowledge to have been absolute and dependent on the decree not to snatch away men. Because, as I was saying before, supposing knowledge of sin as absolutely future and an absolute decree of positing the condition from which it will infallibly follow, it is contradictory for God to be able to prevent it or to snatch away the one who will sin. For this would be the same as snatching away

DISPUTATION II

one whom He had decreed should not be snatched away. And he would be ridiculous who, as Augustine does here, would refer to the hidden and inscrutable cause of divine judgments the fact that God did not do what was impossible for Him to do—namely, supposing knowledge of sin as absolutely future, to render it not absolutely future by snatching away the sinner before he sinned. Therefore, that knowledge which Augustine understands by those words "did He not know their future evils?" is not absolute knowledge of sin as future. And yet it is knowledge of sin as future, as is clear. Therefore, it is conditional. Again, I say that Augustine clearly conjoins that knowledge of sin with the free power of snatching away the one who will sin, when he says, "Let them answer if they can why God, when they were living faithfully and piously, did not then snatch them from the dangers of this life, lest malice change, etc. Did He not have this in His power? Or did He not know their future evils?" These words clearly have either this sense or none: let them answer if they can why God, when He both knew that many of the reprobate would sin if they were allowed to live, and could by His free will prevent such sins by removing those who would sin through a premature death, did not do this? And Augustine supposes that those whom he questions cannot answer. But if by that knowledge of future sin he meant absolute knowledge, which depends on the decree of allowing those who will sin to live, he would conjoin with the power of snatching them away a supposition which would make that very thing impossible. And thus this knowledge conjoined with power would bind it and impede it, whence it would be the same to say, "Let them answer if they can why God, having such power with such knowledge, did not snatch away those who would sin," as to say, "let them answer if they can why God, having the power to snatch away impeded, nevertheless did not snatch away those who would sin?" Than which question what can be imagined more absurd? Or who would hesitate to find an answer? But it becomes entirely congruous if conditional knowledge is supposed in this manner: "Let them answer if they can why God, when He knew they would sin on the hypothesis that they were allowed

DISPUTATION II

to live, and could by His free will not posit that hypothesis, that is, not allow them to live longer, and thus prevent sins that were only future from the hypothesis from becoming also simply and absolutely future; did not do this?" Or, "Why did He not use that knowledge so that by His power He might remove or not posit the hypothesis from which He saw sin would follow?" In this way, I say, the question is most apt, and Augustine rightly says, let them answer if they can. For those whom he questions can respond nothing else except what Augustine chiefly intends, that is, "O man, who are you? O the depth of the riches," etc. Anonymous must necessarily admit, willing or unwilling, that this alone is the true mind of Augustine, if he himself provides the attention in understanding him which he demands from others.

LXV. With the same facility, I could have found middle knowledge among the older Scholastics. And first, I fear that he affirms too confidently that "None of them, nor any other before Molina, ever thought of God's middle knowledge, not even in a dream; nor did they anywhere either suppose it or employ it to resolve any difficulty of either sacred scripture or scholastic theology." For if this had been said by one of the Thomists, who distinguish middle knowledge from conditional knowledge, it would perhaps seem tolerable; but since this Doctor confuses both, who would not marvel that he so affirmatively denies that conditional knowledge was known to the ancient scholastics, which the Thomists admit appears so clearly in them that they say we are doing what has already been done when we undertake to prove it? Indeed, unless Authors call it by its name and say in so many words that there is conditional knowledge, or middle knowledge, or that besides the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision expressing things absolutely future, there is another which represents things future from a hypothesis, he does not think conditional knowledge has been sufficiently designated by any mortal. By this reasoning, we could also deny that one has thought about man who has spoken of a risible or admiring animal.

DISPUTATION II

LXVI. But let him tell us what knowledge he was thinking of, who in the time of Augustine said that the Lord foreknew that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have later fallen away from the faith, when they had believed after miracles were performed among them, and rather by mercy He did not perform these miracles, by which they would have become liable to more severe punishment, if they had abandoned the faith which they had held? Could this knowledge have been anything other than conditional? And yet it was a Catholic disputant who said this, and not an ignoble one, a learned man and exceedingly acute. For he is adorned with these praises by Augustine. Had Anonymous read this passage when he pronounced that none of those whom Ruiz praises, nor any other before Molina, ever thought of conditional knowledge, not even in a dream? And since it is established by a thousand testimonies of Augustine that the Semi-Pelagians were accustomed to abuse conditional knowledge, which they maintained, for their error; and now we see that he is called Catholic who had an opinion of that knowledge in common with them; what else can we judge than that only the abuse of that doctrine was attributed as a vice to the Semi-Pelagians, not the doctrine itself? This is also clear from the fact that while Augustine refutes them, he is nowhere found to have attacked the very supposition of such knowledge, but only its abuse. But if that supposition was common at that time to both heretics and Catholics, were those who followed so unskilled, and so inexperienced in reading and understanding Augustine, that none ever thought about this matter, not even in a dream, which was so well-worn in that age?

LXVII. Anonymous denies, however, that this was said by him either slanderously or boastfully, and in order to make faith in this matter, he promises to show, as a specimen, in three of the many whom Didacus Ruiz had brought forward, that they thought nothing less than of conditional knowledge. These are the Master of the Sentences, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas. But I, with the same brevity as he and for the sake of a specimen, designate one of those three, and without any other selec-

DISPUTATION II

tion than the first he offers, to show that this Doctor does not fulfill what he promises. The words of the Master of the Sentences are these: "Some are moved, saying, why did God create those whom He foreknew would be evil? Because He foresaw what good He would make from evils." And after a few words: "It is said in vain, God should not have created those whom He foreknew would be evil; for He knew they would profit the good." Then Anonymous says: "What theologian or philosopher would infer from these words that the Master of the Sentences thought or supposed that there is conditional knowledge in God?" But, I say, what does one have of either theologian or philosopher who does not infer this from them? Does not the Master respond, having admitted the supposition of the questioners? Is not this one part of this supposition: God knew those whom He created would sin? Is not this another: God could be induced by that knowledge not to create? For the questioners would have been foolish if they did not suppose either one or the other. It helps, however, having admitted this, to appeal to the theology of this Doctor, which he desires in others—does he think that God, by knowledge of sin as absolutely future, could have been induced not to create the sinner? For if He could have been, since these are necessarily connected—the sinner not being created and God not foreknowing absolutely that he would sin—it follows that by that knowledge by which God knew absolutely that someone would sin, it could have happened that He would foreknow absolutely that he would not sin. Because after it could have happened by that knowledge that He would decree not to create, and consequently that He would know absolutely that he would not be created, it could consequently have happened that He would know absolutely that he would not sin. How not only untheological but even unphilosophical this saying is, let the Adversary judge. But if God could not have been induced by absolute knowledge of future sin to decree that the sinner should not be created, since nevertheless He could have been induced by some knowledge of future sin, as the Master supposes, it remains that this was knowledge of sin future under a condition. Therefore, he is completely mistaken when

DISPUTATION II

he adds, "Do not the words 'to foreknow,' and 'to foresee,' and 'to know they would profit the good,' clearly indicate the knowledge of vision?" Because they clearly indicate another than the knowledge of vision, if indeed they indicate that by which God could have been induced not to will to create the one who would sin. And when he adds, "or as others prefer, they are to be understood of the knowledge of simple intelligence, which they want to be the cause of things," he wastes words. For let it be understood of that knowledge; what else will he obtain, than that the knowledge of simple intelligence in some part of it is conditional knowledge? But we care little about this, since our only purpose is to establish that some knowledge should be said to exist by which God knows that which is future only from a hypothesis, dependently on a created free cause. Once this is obtained, I have often said that we allow it either to be reduced to the knowledge of simple intelligence or to the knowledge of vision, or to occupy its own place apart from them.

CHAPTER V. HOW HE RESPONDS TO ARGUMENTS.

LXVIII. An Anonymous author also attempts to dissolve the arguments for middle knowledge, especially those proposed both by Louis of Dole of the Order of Capuchin Fathers and by Peter of St. Joseph, a Cistercian, in chapters 30 and 31. How successfully he does this must now be examined. The first argument is drawn from the knowledge necessary for a free agent to foresee what will or will not follow from what he decides. In reporting and solving this argument, he is eloquent; but somehow the abundance of words has overwhelmed both the force of the argument and the fairness of the solution. This argument assumes that it pertains to the perfection of a free agent that the decree by which he establishes something should be directed by a foreknowledge of those things that will follow from what he decrees. Thus, a father who proposes to send his son to Toulouse for studies would be unwise if this proposal

DISPUTATION II

were not directed by a prior judgment by which he foresees whether, all things considered, it will happen that the son will truly apply himself to his studies, or whether he will be carried away by the example and counsel of corrupt young men, who can easily be encountered in a large and populous city. Given this, which cannot be denied, it is further added that it therefore pertains to the perfection of the First Free Cause that the decree by which He determines, for example, to create an angel in this or that manner, should be directed by a prior cognition representing what will or will not follow from the angel so created. Likewise, that the decree by which He determines to create man and permit him to be tempted by the serpent should be directed by a prior cognition by which He knows what will or will not follow from such a temptation. For it would be a disorderly and imprudent manner of acting if God were first to decree something future, and then learn what other thing would also be future as a result of that first future thing, since it is characteristic of a lazy and inconsiderate person to decide, "Meanwhile this must be done; afterward we shall see what will follow."

Now we further argue: that foreknowledge of the event to follow from the decreed thing is conditional knowledge. For it is knowledge, since opinion and conjectural cognition cannot exist in God; and it is knowledge of a future, as we suppose; and it is not knowledge of something absolutely future, which would be directive and independent of the decree by which something becomes absolutely future; therefore it is knowledge of something conditionally future.

LXIX. This is the first argument, the solution to which he stretches over three pages, and the sum of which is that neither a created free agent nor God needs conditional knowledge to decree something prudently: for absolute knowledge is sufficient, concerning the nature, possibility, impossibility, etc., of things to be done, and in God the knowledge which he calls "of precision" is sufficient, by which He knows all possible things and all possible modes of acting and concurring with causes, both necessary and free, while preserving their freedom, most ful-

DISPUTATION II

ly, most clearly, and most distinctly. This manner of speaking has this perversity: that it seems to deny the conclusion of the argument, when it should first respond to the premises. Let him tell us whether it is true that one who decrees something, if he decrees prudently, should be directed by knowledge representing what will follow from the thing he decrees, or not? Should not such knowledge be more perfect as the agent's providence is more perfect, so that in God it must be most perfect? Is it sufficient for one who sends his son, as I was saying, that he knows it is possible that the son will attend to the study of letters, and that it is possible that he will be distracted from it and led into depravity? And should he not, as much as possible, foresee by conjecture which of these will happen? And should not what is gathered by conjectures by a human be held with certain comprehension by God? To this, a distinct response is expected, which cannot be negative unless it is entirely improbable and absurd: it will then be easy to extract that such knowledge cannot but be conditional. For what he says about the knowledge of precision in God serving this function is false, if that knowledge only represents possibilities, since here we are inquiring about knowledge that directs divine decree, by which is understood not what might follow from the creation of an angel, but what will follow; likewise what will follow from the creation and temptation of man. But the knowledge of precision represents only what might follow; or if it also represents what will happen, then in that aspect it is what we are seeking, namely, conditional knowledge. And thus it is clear that this argument remains unsolved by this author.

LXX. The same must be said about what for us is the second argument from number 8, for the intervening arguments share a common difficulty with what is for us the fourth. This argument is drawn from the absurdity that follows from the denial of conditional knowledge, namely, that God, when questioned by men, would have nothing to answer except that He does not know. For suppose He is asked: Will the King gain victory if he engages with the enemy? Whether He answers that the King will be victorious or will not be victorious, He will show

DISPUTATION II

that His knowledge is conditional, which because it cannot exist according to our Adversaries, it remains that He must say He does not know.

This objection has been answered by the Anonymous in such a way that he does not seem to understand it. For he speaks thus: Either that battle will happen or it will not; if it is not going to happen, [absolutely speaking], since God knows this by the knowledge of simple intelligence, God will answer absolutely that neither the battle nor the victory will take place. But if the battle is going to happen, etc. The first part of this answer is sufficient to show that this author imagines God as responding similarly to himself. He will answer, he says, absolutely that neither the battle nor the victory will take place. Thus he will answer what is not asked. God is not asked whether the battle or victory is absolutely future, but whether victory would be future if there were a battle. This question expects an answer, even if it has already been heard that neither will occur. I suppose, I say, that God has already answered that there will be no battle, and consequently no victory. Having heard this, cannot one still ask, but what if there were, or had been a battle, would there also be or have been a victory? Here, what will God say? "There would have been"? or "There would not have been"? But He can know neither except by conditional knowledge, which whoever takes away forces God to say He does not know.

LXXI. The third argument, which is proposed and solved in chapter 31, assumes this: That there is in God an infinite power of understanding, which no truth escapes; Also, that there is a truth signified by these words: "A free agent, if placed in these or those circumstances, will consent to divine grace; if placed in these or those, will not consent"; Therefore God is not ignorant of this; but neither can it be known by Him by any other knowledge than conditional or middle knowledge; Therefore such knowledge must be admitted.

To this argument he applies two responses, of which I do not sufficiently see what the first proves or what it is worth, unless it collapses into the second. For he distinguishes the minor proposition, and even

DISPUTATION II

seems to want to dispute the major. And he distinguishes that, "will consent," or "will happen," or "will not consent": for God knows this not as something future, but as something actually present. But it is sufficient for us that God is conceded to know what is for us hypothetically future. For we say that knowledge is conditional, whether He sees it as future or as actually present: provided that both that act and that futurity is suspended on a condition. Hence he must add further that there is nothing at all that with respect to us is only hypothetically future, or only hypothetically not future, dependently on a created free cause, but that whatever is hypothetically future is also absolutely future; and whatever is not absolutely future is also not hypothetically future: of which the former is known by the knowledge of vision; the latter by the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is the second response, sufficiently refuted from what has been said before. For it has been shown that something is truly said and thought to be hypothetically future for us, which is not absolutely future, of which kind was once the conversion of the people of Tyre if preaching and calling had preceded it. Nor do I see by what reason anyone could deny that in whatever circumstances enemies had encountered Nero, which in fact did not occur, he would have harmed them, and similarly with other cases.

LXXII. But there also remains an argument by which it is proven that something is not absolutely future, which nevertheless cannot be denied to be hypothetically future, namely the free omission of a free act, whether pure or not pure: which, when it is not absolutely future on the hypothesis of a free cause, neither is it absolutely future itself. And yet then, when it is denied to be absolutely future, it cannot be denied to be hypothetically future. Because if you deny it is hypothetically future, you must concede that its contradictory is future, namely, the free act. Let us suppose, I say, that it is absolutely future that this man will not go to the comedians, and thus this hypothesis will never be absolutely posited, if that man heard the comedians, etc. From this I say it follows that it is absolutely future that he will not conceive any evil will. But it is not abso-

DISPUTATION II

lutely future that he will freely omit such an evil will. For this free omission to be said absolutely future, the hypothesis of the freely omitting cause must also be absolutely future; which nevertheless is here supposed not to be future. Therefore it is not absolutely future that this man will freely omit an evil will at the comedians. But I ask whether you deny that this omission, which you deny to be absolutely future, is also not hypothetically future; and whether you want this conditional to be true: "that man who in reality will not go to the comedians, if nevertheless he went, would not freely omit an evil will"? For if it is true that "he would not freely omit," then it is true that "he would freely conceive an evil will," which is impossible for a free omission to be separated from a complete free cause, except by the free positing of the omitted act, which nevertheless you deny would be hypothetically posited. But if the contrary is true, namely, "he would freely omit," then we have some free exercise from a hypothesis, which is not absolutely future and accordingly something knowable by conditional knowledge alone, which is not knowable by any absolute knowledge.

Indeed, free production or free omission of a positive act is so necessarily conjoined with the supposition of a complete free cause, that it is no less impossible for this supposition to exist and for neither of those to exist, than it is impossible to suppose an animal and not to suppose that it is either rational or irrational. And therefore just as, given a hypothesis of a particular animal, it necessarily follows that it is in reality either rational or irrational, so that it would be a mark of ignorance not to be able to say distinctly which of those it is; so, given a hypothesis of a complete free cause, as is, e.g., this man hearing comedians, it is impossible that there does not follow either the free exercise of an evil will or the free omission of it: so that one cannot be omniscient who cannot say which of those would occur given that hypothesis. Therefore whichever of those God knows, He always knows something future under a condition which in reality will never exist: which is to know something only hypothetically future.

DISPUTATION II

LXXIII. The fourth and final argument raises that difficulty which, although well-worn, is nonetheless thorny, concerning the absolute decree of God regarding free acts of creatures; which cannot be entirely denied, nor can it be conveniently explained without middle knowledge, in such a way that both the freedom of the creature and the holiness of God concerning evil acts are preserved. And indeed concerning evil acts, I do not find anywhere explained by this author how God relates to them, or what is the reason for foreseeing them; except that he often inculcates that God is not the cause of evils, but since those who nevertheless admit predefinitions of evils also say this, we do not know whether he runs the same risk, or whether, having denied the predefinition of evils, he prefers to seek a special reason why the predefinition of good acts is necessary for them to be foreknown.

On how freedom stands in a predefined act without middle knowledge, he disputes at length both in chapter 31, where he responds to the arguments of Peter of St. Joseph, and especially in chapters 41 and 42, where he discusses the harmony of foreknowledge with freedom. And in general it can be said that in solving this knot, which is known to be most entangled, this author has accomplished nothing beyond the common attempts of both Twisse and others. That these are invalid is sufficiently proven by what was opposed in the previous disputation; I refer the reader there, where he will also see how the author does not satisfy the authority of St. Thomas, who by no means would have sought the reason for foreknowing future contingents from their presence or presentiality to eternity, if he had believed that there was some absolute decree by which they were predefined and acquired that presence or presentiality.

LXXIV. But these few things must be observed to free recent theologians from calumny, whom the Anonymous treats so severely in this place that there may be a suspicion of violated civility.

First, he says that the distinction of the divine will into antecedent and consequent, handed down by Damascene, is understood

DISPUTATION II

differently by recent theologians than it was understood by St. Thomas and other ancients. For recent theologians understand by the name of antecedent decree that will of God by which He absolutely and efficaciously, with no respect for the free cooperation of our will, wills or decrees something. Consequent decree, on the other hand, is that by which, presupposing middle knowledge and cognition of our conditionally future cooperation, He efficaciously wills to work with us. To correct this error of recent theologians, he adds that for St. Thomas and the ancients, the antecedent will of God is that by which a thing is willed by God from its first, absolute, and simple consideration, without considering all and each of its particular conditions; the consequent will, however, is that by which a thing, considering all its causes and particular circumstances, is willed by God. And a little later: from which it is clear that God's pre-determining decree for Peter's conversion is not antecedent: both according to the doctrine of the ancients, because it is efficacious and simply concerned with an object clothed with all its particular circumstances; and according to the recent theologians, because it is not without respect to Peter's free cooperation: and therefore it is an absolutely consequent decree, nor does it in any way take away the freedom of Peter's conversion, but on the contrary places it in second act. In this observation there are four things to be noted.

1. That he has not indicated who those recent theologians are who so badly interpret Damascene. For they are unknown to us, nor do we know any others except those who call an antecedent decree that which is not illuminated by knowledge representing some motive on the part of free will, or a reason for willing what is decreed; and consequent, that which is illuminated by such knowledge. And thus they say that the will to save all men is antecedent, because it is directed by knowledge which exhibits a motive for destroying rather than a motive for saving on the part of men, namely, their sin; but that the will to punish is consequent, which is directed by knowledge presenting such sin as committed at a certain point in time. And because what is conditionally future,

DISPUTATION II

whether good or bad, is not a suitable motive for conceiving an absolute will either to punish or to reward, therefore neither is that decree called consequent which follows only the knowledge of the conditionally future. In this matter the Anonymous has been deceived, and has attributed to the Recent theologians an error which exists nowhere except in his own thoughts. And this doctrine of the recent theologians is not so much an interpretation as a repetition of what is said both by Damascene and by St. Thomas, both of whom deliberately offer as an example of antecedent and consequent will the will to save all men and the will to condemn some, because these examples are indisputable. For concerning the will to efficaciously and absolutely save some, there is controversy; and those who say it is conceived from the foreknowledge of merits make it consequent, those who deny this make it antecedent, insofar as it has the character of intention. For insofar as it is executive of the actual giving of glory, with the use of means already supposed and foreknown, it too is consequent. This is the doctrine of recent theologians, at least of those known to us, which is the very same as that of those from whom the Anonymous thinks they have defected.

LXXV. 2. But he is further mistaken when he tries to present a better notion of both these wills, and he confuses rather than explains the opinion of the Ancients. For what is this: that the antecedent will is that by which a thing is willed by God without considering all and each of its particular conditions; and the consequent will is the converse? What, I ask, is meant by "considering the conditions"? And what are those conditions? For what St. Thomas says, "considering all particular circumstances," can easily be understood from his prior words, when he says, "Something can be in its first consideration, according to which it is considered absolutely, good or bad, which nevertheless when considered with some addition, which is its consequent consideration, is the opposite. Like for a man to live is good, and for a man to be killed is bad, according to absolute consideration; but if it is added concerning some man that he is a homicide, or that he lives to the danger of the multitude, thus it is good

DISPUTATION II

for him to be killed, and bad for him to live." From which it is clear that what he says, that the consequent will is that which is conceived considering particular circumstances, is the same as saying it is that which is illuminated by the consideration of the thing with some addition, as that a man is a homicide, which is, as I was saying, the very thought of recent theologians. But this is not the thought of the Anonymous, as is clear from what he concludes when he says, "Hence it is clear that God's predetermining decree is a consequent will, both according to the Ancients and according to the Recent theologians, because it concerns an object clothed with all its circumstances, and with respect to Peter's free cooperation." Let him tell us what is that addition from the consideration of which the predetermining decree is directed, so that it can be said, according to St. Thomas, to be a consequent will? Does God consider something in him whom He decrees to predetermine, as He does in him whom He decrees to punish, as, that he is a homicide? Does the doctrine of predeterminists permit this? But see what disguises this Author both endures and creates. He confuses conditions and circumstances following from the decree or will with those presupposed: and for him it is the same for an object to be represented as to be clothed with some circumstance and to be represented as clothed: likewise, for God's decree to bear respect to Peter's free cooperation as to an effect following from the decree itself, and to bear respect to it as to a motive represented to God and presupposed by the decree, in the way homicide is presupposed by the decree to punish the homicide. And because when God decrees to predetermine, as he thinks, He decrees to predetermine to an act as exercised freely, that is, to an act as clothed with freedom, to use his metaphor; and consequently the knowledge which illuminates such a decree represents the same object as thus to be clothed; therefore he thinks this will is consequent: as if it were the same to decree an object to be clothed and to suppose it clothed: likewise, to look to an object as something to follow, and to look to it as presupposed. In this he is quite mistaken, because it is most evident that the will is called consequent, both by Damascene and

DISPUTATION II

by St. Thomas, because it supposes something on the part of the object, such as that the man is a homicide, not because it makes it so. For if it made it so, would not one speak most perversely who called it consequent and not rather antecedent? Let him consider, I ask, those words of Damascene where he says that the first and preceding will and acceptance exists from God Himself, but the second and following exists from our cause.

LXXVI. 3. And this is the third thing that seems worthy of censure in this author: namely, that he says the predetermining decree of Peter's conversion is a consequent will. For since the decree is will, nothing else can be expected than that the will predetermining Peter's conversion should be called a consequent will, and thus the lowest things are mixed with the highest and the first with the second. This confusion of things and words is always indecorous, but especially in a new work *On Order*, and on the prior and posterior.

LXXVII. 4. Hence finally it is understood that what he adds is in vain, that because the decree predefining Peter's conversion is consequent, it in no way takes away the freedom of Peter's conversion, but on the contrary places it in second act. Because if pretenses and illusion of the mind are absent, that which predefines conversion and causes it can in no way be said to be consequent to it. But if it does not follow it, but rather precedes it—that is, if it is not dependent on it, but conversely is that on which it depends—by whatever respect it may be called consequent, it helps not at all to understand how it does not take away freedom. For when something is said not to take away the freedom of some action because it is consequent, it is understood to be consequent from such an action, or from the cause as producing it, so that Damascene's statement is true that its cause exists in us: because we immediately understand that if any necessity arises from there, it is not that which the freedom or free cause suffers, but that which it makes. But if, by some other respect I know not what, something is called consequent, yet in such a way that it nevertheless occupies the cause and impels it to act,

DISPUTATION II

what does that empty name of consequent do, that it should therefore be believed not to take away freedom?

LXXVIII. Of the same color is what he has in chapter 42, where after saying that we spoke in Latin and elegantly but not very theologically in explaining the use of middle knowledge, he himself proposes a specimen of a better opinion. "They should say," he says, "that God foreknows that the will placed in these or those circumstances will freely operate this or that, and by His will decrees that it should operate freely. If they did this, it would immediately appear that in reconciling God's providence, foreknowledge, and decrees with our freedom, there is almost no difficulty: and that men have no cause for expostulation or complaint against God: since with His knowledge, foreknowledge, definition, predefinition, determination, predetermination of our acts, and with His concurrence even prior by nature, He knows, wills, and effects nothing else than that we operate freely. But who would be so stupid as to say that this overthrows or even slightly injures our freedom?"

I can easily understand how an absolute and efficacious decree by which, without middle knowledge, some act is predefined as free, does not overthrow its freedom: because this is supposed. But I can also easily understand how it does overthrow it, and therefore how such a decree implies a contradiction. Because I do not understand how it is in the power of the created will to make that decree be or not be. And after it is supposed to be absolute and efficacious, I also do not understand how it is in the power of the created will to bring it about that the free suspension of the predefined act is compatible and coexistent with it. But if the will can neither bring it about that the predefining decree does not exist, nor that, given the decree, there is nevertheless a free omission of the predefined act, I immediately understand that, given the supposition of such a decree, such an act cannot be in the power of the will, except in the way that vision is in the power of the eyes when they can neither dispel the surrounding darkness nor, with the darkness remaining, see anything; or in the way that running is in the power of captives who can nei-

DISPUTATION II

ther cast off their shackles nor, retaining them, walk. Indeed, I am greatly surprised that the Anonymous so easily understands the contrary, when he himself approves that definition of a free act, by which it is said that with its causes posited and existing it can either be or not be. And that definition of a free cause by which it is said to be in its power to act or not to act, even with other things necessary for action being posited. For those who have therefore begun to reject such definitions as absurd show sufficiently that they could not bear that sense, because their doctrine could not tolerate it. And what, I ask, would it be for a free act to be able not to exist with its causes existing, if not for its non-existence to be able to be reconciled and harmonized with the existence of its causes? Or if this is not the case, how will not the same be said of the necessary as is said of the free? Also, what does it mean for a free cause to be able not to act, even with other things necessary for action being posited, except that in those other things there is nothing from which the necessity of acting can follow, and consequently nothing with which non-action cannot be joined? Is it not manifest from the sense of all grammarians and dialecticians that that particle "even with other things posited" renders a reduplicative and composite sense, and can in no way allow a specificative and divided sense? Would not one who said that a captive, even with shackles in place, or even with the prison closed, can flee, be laughed out of court? But it is established that among the causes of a predefined act, the pre-defining decree must be numbered; it is also established that it implies a contradiction for the non-existence of that act to be compatible with such a decree; therefore it implies a contradiction for there to be freedom in such an act.

LXXIX. Therefore I join myself to those stupid ones who cannot see the clarity spread by this author for understanding the harmony of divine foreknowledge and predefinition with the freedom of the predefined act, without middle knowledge: and I do this all the more gladly because I understand the number of companions to be so great that, given the multitude of stupid ones, it is necessary that the enlightened be

DISPUTATION II

very few. For in this number, besides all Jesuits, are included the Thomists themselves, who, as we have seen, demand blind faith in this difficulty from their followers, and press those who show themselves less ready to believe with instances drawn from the mystery of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Eucharist, which exceed our comprehension. So far are they from thinking that there is almost no difficulty here, as the Anonymous says.

LXXX. But since he undertakes to drive away our stupidity, let us test his hand. "They should say," he says, "that God foreknows that the will placed in these or those circumstances will freely operate this or that, and by His will decrees that it should operate freely; if they did this, it would immediately appear, etc." But I, my doctor, say what you advise, namely, that God foreknows that the will placed in these or those circumstances will operate this or that; but teach us, I ask, by what knowledge does God foreknow this? By that which depends on His absolute decree, by which He establishes that our will should operate this or that in these or those circumstances, and, to use your words, by that which must necessarily be conjoined with such a decree? Or by that which does not depend on nor is conjoined with that decree? If you understand the second, I experience entirely what you say, that there is almost no difficulty in conceiving the harmony we seek: but I am grateful to conditional knowledge. For there can be no other knowledge by which God foreknows independently, or apart from an actual and absolute decree, that our will in these circumstances will freely operate this. If you say the first, I beg you to take back your benefit. For it cannot be of use to us. For what does it help me to understand that God, by His absolute and predefining decree, becomes foreknowing that the created will in these circumstances will freely operate this, when the whole difficulty remains of understanding how that decree does not harm freedom, that is, how it does not imply a contradiction? And how will the whole appearance of the opinion fit, if it is to be conceived in this way, that God, with the addition of an absolute decree to His knowledge, foreknows that the will will operate, and by His

DISPUTATION II

will decrees etc., when this decree is already understood to be included in the foreknowledge? For if he were to separate that foreknowledge from the decree in such a way that the decree would be understood to come to the foreknowledge, just as every volition comes to the knowledge by which it is directed, the matter would be safe; but in this author's opinion, such a decree is not directed by that foreknowledge, but only by the knowledge of precision: nor can it be understood as supervening upon it, but rather so that it is, as it were, a part of it and included in it, so that even here the doctrine may seem involved and inexplicable, where he had hoped to heal the stupidity of others.

LXXXI. Secondly, it should be observed what he says about the multiple meanings of necessity, in order to show that the necessity that a free creature's action derives from God's predefinition does not impede its freedom. He says, therefore, that one kind of necessity is absolute, and another is conditional and hypothetical. Absolute necessity is necessity simply speaking, *per se*, antecedent of the consequent, and in the divided sense. Of this there are two species: one is natural, the other violent and forced, such as when a stone is moved upward by an external agent, or held in a hand, or suspended in the air on a column. Pay attention, reader, to this divider, and see how cleverly he designates and distinguishes the members of the division. Is a stone thrown upward by an external agent moved necessarily in the divided sense? What? Cannot a stone projected upward or a column held in the air fall just as much as a white wall can become black? What kind of philosophy is this?

But he proceeds: Conditional and hypothetical necessity is that by which something is said to be necessary by reason of something else. Here again, notice how he confuses absolute necessity with conditional necessity. For he establishes violent and forced necessity as a species of absolute necessity, but isn't what is necessary in this way necessary by reason of something else, and therefore conditional? Does not a stone that is moved upward by an external agent move necessarily by reason of something else? Is not what is held by hand or supported by a column held

DISPUTATION II

necessarily by reason of something else? It certainly might seem to someone that there is a certain confusion of thought here that ought not to occur in a treatise on order.

He adds two species of this conditional necessity: one in which that other thing by reason of which something is necessary is either a final cause or some other cause; another in which it is not a cause, but only a condition, as when it is said that if God foresaw that Peter would run, he necessarily runs. So says he, who by this very statement sufficiently indicates that the foreseeing of the running is not a cause, but only a condition. And he does not recall that he had contended with such great effort that the knowledge of vision is the cause of things, and consequently that the foreseeing of Peter running is the cause of that running.

LXXXII. This also should be considered: If the hypothesis by which something is said to be necessary *ex hypothesi* neither presupposes nor involves our freedom, and includes nothing that is in our power, the necessity from such a hypothesis is incompatible with freedom. Thus, from the hypothesis that a human is heavy, it is necessary that he fall downward. Therefore, the necessity by which a heavy object is moved upward is absolute, and that by which it is carried downward is conditional. The former is in the divided sense; the latter in the composite sense. And although they are diametrically opposed, with the former being violent and forced, the latter nonetheless is not natural. For if it were, it should be called absolute, not conditional, according to the notions previously given. I certainly do not know what kind of order this author was contemplating when he poured forth these things that seem to be so poorly ordered.

LXXXIII. There remains a final point on which depends the solution to that difficulty whereby God's absolute decree seems to impose a necessity on the thing it decrees that is incompatible with freedom. If the hypothesis, he says, by which something is said to be necessary *ex hypothesi* is in our power, or includes or presupposes our freedom, it does not harm freedom at all. From this he finally concludes: When it is said

DISPUTATION II

that what God has foreknown and what He has absolutely and efficaciously decreed is necessarily going to happen... If that "necessarily" is taken for qualified necessity and for the necessity of consequence from that hypothesis that in some way includes the freedom of the agent, the proposition is true; but if it implies absolute necessity, simply speaking, and necessity of the consequent, it is false.

The hypothesis from which it follows in this place that the operation of free will is necessarily going to happen is none other than God's absolute and efficacious decree. And therefore that "necessarily" is compatible with freedom because, he says, that hypothesis includes in some way the freedom of the agent. But I ask what is that way in which God's absolute and efficacious decree includes the freedom of the agent? For this is the one thing that it is most important to know, and yet this Doctor leaves it wrapped in swaddling clothes. God's absolute and efficacious decree concerning an act to be freely elicited, I ask, how does it include the freedom of the agent? Is it as something presupposed to the necessity by which that act is said to be future, so that the free agent can be said to cause or make such necessity, and that necessity depends on the free agent? Or is it otherwise? If otherwise—that is, if that necessity cannot be said to arise from and depend on the agent's freedom—then it is contrary to it, since it is manifest that a necessity whose cause the free agent can neither remove nor overcome by joining its opposite to it cannot be compatible with its freedom. Hence, if it can neither remove that divine absolute and efficacious decree nor join to it the opposite of what is decreed, there still remains to be explained what is unintelligible to us—indeed, to everyone—namely, that there is freedom in an act that is decreed in this way. But if the decree is said to include the free agent as the cause of that necessity, since that necessity is not only in its action toward existence but also in the agent itself toward acting, it will have to be said that the free agent necessitates itself, so to speak, to act, than which nothing can be more repugnant to its concept. For if it necessitates itself, does it do this necessarily or freely? If necessarily, why is it called free? If freely,

DISPUTATION II

how is it understood to be necessitated by itself? For what is free is that which can by itself act or not act; what is necessitated is that which cannot do otherwise. Hence, if something is both free and necessitated by itself, it follows that it both can do otherwise by itself and cannot do otherwise by itself. Therefore, although we can conceive that a free agent through its free action is the cause of some necessity—namely, that necessity by which it is said not to be able not to act on the supposition that it acts, which is not to be able to combine non-action with action; likewise, that necessity by which it is said not to be able not to be foreknown by an infinitely intelligent agent what is going to be, on the hypothesis that it is going to be; and that necessity by which, again, from the fact that it is foreknown, it is said necessarily going to be, which necessity in us is more for inferring the same from itself as foreknown than in the thing itself, whence it is also called the necessity of consequence—although, I say, we understand a free agent by the exercise of its freedom to cause in that way a certain necessity, it cannot be understood to be itself for itself the principle of necessity to act, because this plainly implies a contradiction.

LXXXIV. But to compress this reasoning into a few words, I briefly say: When you suppose that God's decree in some way includes the freedom of the agent, you either understand it to include the freedom of the agent as a subject that suffers the necessity of acting imposed by such a decree, or you understand it to include the freedom of the agent as a principle from which that necessity to act arises. Neither can be said. Therefore, etc. The minor is proven as to the first part. Because one who understands it thus solves the difficulty in no other way than by begging the question and by a naked affirmation of the very thing whose explanation and reason is sought. For it is asked how it can be that a free agent that suffers the necessity of acting imposed by God's decree does not lose the nature of being free, and it is answered that it does not lose it because God's decree includes it as the subject of the imposed necessity, which is merely to affirm that about which it is asked how it is possible. The minor is proven as to the second part. Because it is impossible that that of whose

DISPUTATION II

concept it is to be itself for itself the principle of acting or not acting indifferently should also be itself for itself the principle of acting necessarily. But it is of the concept of free will to be itself for itself the principle of acting or not acting indifferently. Therefore, etc.

LXXXV. From this you will further understand that it is in vain that the Anonymous adds, for the sake of removing equivocation, that one should speak thus: What God has foreknown and decreed to be future necessarily, simply and absolutely, that is going to be necessarily simply speaking; what He has foreknown and decreed to be future freely, that is necessarily going to be freely. For necessity does not harm freedom because it is called necessity simply and absolutely, but because it is independent of freedom and, moreover, insurmountable. Hence, by whatever names they name it and with whatever colors they paint it—whether it is yellow or blue—as long as it is supposed to be such that the free agent by its freedom can neither remove its cause nor overcome it by frustrating it of its effect and joining its opposite to it, they will never obtain that it can be thought compatible with freedom. For Augustine's saying will always stand: "If our necessity is that which is said not to be in our power, it is manifest that our wills, by which we live rightly or wrongly, are not under such necessity."

And what he says—that if God has decreed something to be future freely, it is necessarily going to be freely future—is the very thing that we have already shown against Twisse to involve a foul and gaping contradiction, since for God to make something necessarily freely future means nothing else than for God to bring it about that some agent acts in such a way that it cannot not act and yet in such a way that it can not act. How much better would he do if, with Cajetan, he would confess that he does not know how that "necessarily," which is from God's decree, and that "freely," which is from created free will, are joined together?

Indeed, just as it can happen that "necessary" is a mode of "free" or even of "contingent," as when we say "the free is necessarily free," or "the contingent is necessarily contingent," so it is impossible that both,

DISPUTATION II

namely "necessary" and "free," or "necessary" and "contingent," should be simultaneously modes of a third predicate, so that the predicate is in the subject both necessarily and freely, or both necessarily and contingently. For there is an obvious contradiction, as we have said, that one thing should be in another in such a way that it can not be in it, which is contingently, and cannot not be in it, which is necessarily. Therefore, when it is said that what God has decreed to be freely future is necessarily going to be freely future, the term "necessary" does not qualify only "freely" but also simultaneously "is going to be," and since it is impossible that it should not be future on the hypothesis of the decree, it is repugnant that "freely" should also qualify that very thing, "is going to be," while preserving the truth of the predication. Otherwise, it would both be future in such a way that it could not be, because contingently or freely, and in such a way that it could not not be, because necessarily.

LXXXVI. Thirdly, certain other critical observations of this Doctor are to be noted. 1. What some say—that one necessity is from an antecedent supposition and another from a consequent supposition—is to him a kind of trifling, because the same thing is said twice, just as if someone were to say that Peter is a rational man. Because, he says, the name of supposition, as they wish, signifies antecession or antecedence in that which is supposed. But it is absurd to say "from an antecedent antecedence." And for something to be from a consequent supposition is a repugnance and incompatibility of terms, and is to say that something is from an antecedent consequent. See, I ask, where this author objects to others' trifles, with what trifles he himself is occupied! Who told him that the name of supposition among us signifies antecession in the thing that is supposed? Does one who supposes that Jacob is later born than Esau signify antecession? Does one who supposes that a parish priest in a procession follows his cross-bearer also signify antecedence? And how can there be an incompatibility of terms for one who a little before confused a predetermining decree with consequent will? But suppose that "supposition" does signify antecession in that which is supposed; cannot the

DISPUTATION II

same thing both precede and follow with respect to different things? Why, therefore, should it seem superfluous and to say the same thing twice if, when a comparison is made with some third thing, a supposition is said to be antecedent or consequent with respect to it? Indeed, this is what those whom this author wrongly attacks do, who compare with a free agent, for example, both God's absolute and efficacious decree and God's foreknowledge. And because the decree is said to be independent and the cause why the free agent acts, and therefore prior in nature, they call the supposition of the decree compared with the free agent and action an antecedent supposition, and the necessity following from it a necessity from an antecedent supposition. And because foreknowledge is neither a cause nor wholly independent of the free agent and action, but follows from it as from an objective reason that moves, therefore the supposition of foreknowledge compared with the free agent and action is called a consequent supposition, and the necessity that follows from it is called a necessity from a consequent supposition. In this way, both suppositions are indeed antecedent with respect to necessity, but with respect to the free agent and action, one is antecedent and the other consequent. And the matter is so manifest that I cannot easily grasp what is worthy of a man in the contrary observation.

2. Nor is his other observation better, in which he criticizes the Moderns, especially Peter of St. Joseph, for having defined, with little logic and little knowledge, that necessity from an antecedent supposition thus: "An antecedent supposition is said to be that which is produced antecedently to the free operation of the will and independently of it." But if I were impelled by the same captious spirit, I would deny that necessity arising from a supposition is first defined there, but conversely I would say that the supposition from which necessity arises is defined. But let us see what he thinks should be amended in that definition. Since, he says, "antecedent" and "antecedently" signify the same thing and are conjugates, the thing defined is put in this definition. But hey, my good Doctor, why don't you yourself observe the rules that you impose on others? A little

DISPUTATION II

before, conditional necessity was defined by you thus: "Conditional necessity and necessity from a hypothesis is that by which something is said to be necessary by reason of something else," etc. Here I say that you define with little logic and little knowledge, which I prove thus: Because "necessity" and "necessary" are conjugates and signify the same thing, therefore the thing defined is put in this definition. Will not also that definition seem faulty by which the relation of Paternity is usually defined—"That by which the generator is referred to the generated"—because "relation" and "is referred" are conjugates? Indeed, things that are called conjugates, if they are relatives, are not uselessly repeated in a definition when in that repetition the term to which they are referred is expressed. For from that comes a new and clearer cognition. And so when it is said "antecedently to the free operation," because the term which the antecedent supposition respects is expressed, the definition is blameless. Indeed, I add that there is a place for that repetition of terms when what is defined is something complex, and one who, when asked what a white man is, would say that it is a man who disperses vision would not ineptly respond.

But what else? Furthermore, he says, when he should be defining the necessity of a cause, he defines the necessity of an effect, by saying that it is a necessity that is produced. I answer that in those words which he quoted three lines before from Peter of St. Joseph, there is not "a necessity that is produced." And although he says that it is produced, nevertheless because he also says that it has itself antecedently to the free operation of the will, does he not sufficiently signify that it has the nature of an effect with respect to that by which it is produced? But if it is understood to have the nature of a cause with respect to free operation, is not the necessity that is derived from that supposition into the operation truly the necessity of a cause? What, therefore, is he complaining about, or what is he seeking? He adds that since nothing necessary implies an order and antecession to the free operation of the will, it also should not be defined through it. And he does not recall that he said a little before that

DISPUTATION II

what God has foreknown and decreed to be freely future is necessarily going to be freely future. For how is it necessarily going to be freely future if the necessary cannot imply an order to the free?

LXXXVIII. 3. He says that what should be disapproved and avoided is that theologians, especially more recent ones, think and speak about God's knowledge and will just as about our own, and this when they say that things are past, present, and future to the divine knowledge and cognition, because they are only present. I agree that this reformation should be admitted by the Schools, but he is mistaken in thinking that especially the more recent need it. For it is clear that in this matter they have not degenerated at all from their predecessors. I add, nor from the Fathers. Unless perhaps he demands that all become Thomists and philosophize equally about the presence of things in eternity. When they themselves have agreed among themselves about this and will philosophize equally about it, it will have to be treated in public councils of theologians, after the Nominalists and Scotists have been heard. Meanwhile, since this author admits that future things do not coexist with God's eternity adequately but only inadequately, and it follows that God's eternity exceeds in existing what does not adequately coexist with it, and this either from the prior part, as they say, or from the posterior part, what sin will it be if that which really exceeds from the prior part, and therefore is really prior, is compared with them as future? And if that which really exceeds from the posterior part, and is therefore really posterior, is compared with the same things as past? Likewise, since this same author in this work repeatedly says that God is foreknowing of future things, even where he wants to correct others, does he not disapprove of what he himself commits?

LXXXIX. 4. The last observation is that most people here often trifle, that is, in the same proposition superfluously repeat the same thing twice, when they say that God antecedently predefines, predetermines, foreknows. For what, he asks, is that "pre" but "antecedently"? From which he concludes that it is not good to divide predefinition or prede-

DISPUTATION II

termination into antecedent and consequent. I do not care about these dividers either, but what will become of him who contends that a pre-determining decree is a consequent will? For since a decree is a will, a pre-determining decree will be a predetermining will; and yet if it determines to a free action, it is a consequent will, as it pleases this author. And because there is no doubt that another can also be given that is antecedent, if it predetermines to an act to be elicited necessarily, it follows that according to this author there is a predetermining antecedent will and a predetermining consequent will. Which has what worse than antecedent predefinition and consequent predefinition?

Then it also seems that this should be deliberated in the Senate of Theologians, whether those word-catchers so severe should be admitted among the Optimates that they demand syllables and cannot bear even one "pre" to be superfluous. For the common cause of the Nominalists, Scotists, and especially the Ancient Thomists is at stake, who, it is clear, handed down wisdom to posterity in a learned but nonetheless uncultivated and inaccurate speech. Did they therefore trifle whenever they uttered a syllable that was not necessary? But even this author who cultivates such an austere Grammar, what will he do if he is forced to prove that there is no tautology and vain repetition of the same thing in his writings? Let me be guilty of the crime that I accuse if I collect many instances against him. I take what is obvious in this very place where he teaches us how we should speak. They ought to say, he says, that God is foreknowing that the will is going to operate freely, in which speech I say that a trifling is contained, and universally whenever the foreknowledge of the future is named. Because that "fore" is superfluous and contains an empty repetition, which I show thus: Because the knowledge of the future imports this very thing. For what else is the knowledge of the future than the knowledge of a thing existing later? And what else is the knowledge of a thing existing later than knowledge prior to its object? But if the knowledge of the future means knowledge prior to its object, therefore when it is said foreknowledge of the future, that "fore" is superfluous and

DISPUTATION II

contains an inept repetition. Let him see, therefore, whether he too should not fear if theologians are forced to give an account not only of every idle word but also of every syllable.

XC. These are the things I had to dispute with this Doctor, which I hope will be the more pleasing to him because I understand that I have been invited by him with an honorable challenge, while he professes that he thinks and says with Cicero that he is so far from not wanting others to write against him that he even especially desires it. For the opinions that he has embraced do not so reside in his mind that he would not easily allow himself to be drawn away from them by more valid arguments if they occur to anyone. This testimony of a most candid heart bids us be of good courage, if any have been disturbed by his withdrawal. Indeed, it can easily happen that he entered into that plan more with the intention of testing his strength than with the opinion of overturning the view that he attacks. And as is the custom in playful contests, in which the French pretend to be Spaniards and the Spaniards French, so that they may prove invincible those whom they are trying to overcome, so he himself may have believed that the bulwarks of his friends would seem firmer after being vainly assailed by these new attempts. If he makes this clear, and as a known person confirms what as an unknown person he disapproved, he will certainly have done nothing foreign to the wisdom and prudence in which he excels. But if my expectation deceives me, let it be the judgment of the learned Reader whether it has been sufficiently established by this refutation that what he was unwilling to do voluntarily, he is forced to suffer unwillingly.

DISPUTATION III.

A THEOLOGIAN FROM THE COLLEGE OF DISCALCED FATHERS OF SALAMANCA

This disputation examines the theological controversy surrounding *scientia media* as it has developed in the disputes between the Jesuits and Dominicans over the past fifty years. The work addresses two principal opponents: the anonymous author of the Salamanca theological course and Father John of St. Thomas, both of whom accept God's certain knowledge of conditional future contingents while insisting that such knowledge necessarily depends upon divine predefinitive decrees. Against this position, the present work argues that God's conditional knowledge operates independently of any antecedent predefinitions, demonstrating that the disputed doctrine contains only two elements—the existence of conditional knowledge and the absence of conditional predefinitions—the first of which our adversaries have already conceded. The following chapters undertake to resolve the primary Scriptural objection drawn from St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, showing through careful exegetical analysis that the Apostle's prohibition against boasting remains perfectly consistent with the Molinist understanding of divine knowledge and human cooperation with grace. By establishing that the burden of proof rests upon those who would introduce conditional predefinitions into divine providence, this work seeks to vindicate *scientia media* as both Scripturally sound and philosophically coherent, while preserving the genuine freedom of created agents in their response to divine grace.

DISPUTATION III

CHAPTER I. THE STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY

I. The author of the Theological Course, which began to be published several years ago under the name of the College of Discalced Fathers of Blessed Mary of Mount Carmel at Salamanca, in the first volume on the first part, third treatise, discusses conditional knowledge in four disputations, namely the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, extensively attacking the middle knowledge as impossible on many grounds. Since his attack does not seem so insignificant that it should be disregarded, I thought it necessary to test whether it is indeed so forceful that it cannot be withstood. The state of this controversy differs from the previous ones in that this Author distinguishes conditional knowledge of what a created free agent would do under some supposition from middle knowledge in such a way that he firmly establishes the former while striving with all his might to destroy the latter. He concedes, namely, that God knows with certainty not only that it is probable, but absolutely certain that if David remains among the people of Keilah when Saul arrives, he would be handed over into Saul's hands; that if the one mentioned in the Book of Wisdom were allowed to live, not only would there be a danger, but it would truly happen that wickedness would alter his understanding; that the conversion of the people of Tyre and Sidon, had they witnessed the miracles which the people of Capernaum despised, would be not merely conjecturable but absolutely certain and beyond doubt; and likewise in other cases. He claims, however, that this is not middle knowledge, because it follows from God's predefinition, by which those things that are known in this way become both conditionally future and consequently knowable. And thus the entire difference by which that view is distinguished from ours is that our view rejects predefinitions of things to be produced under certain conditions by a created free agent, while that view both embraces and defends them.

DISPUTATION III

II. Father John of St. Thomas, a professor of theology at the University of Alcalá from the Order of St. Dominic, philosophizes in this manner in the first volume of his recently published Theological Course, where he extensively treats this controversy in relation to question 14 of the first part. Although I intend to engage with him in a separate disputation, I will here intermingle points that he shares in common with the one who now opposes me, to avoid repetition of the same matters or fragmentation of questions. He does not wish to dispute whether God knows with certainty not only the probability but also the hypothetical futurity of those events which we are discussing, but rather whether He knows them independently of their predefinition. Indeed, he is displeased that some of our writers have claimed this was denied by Thomists of an earlier age. For he speaks thus: "Therefore I do not know on what foundation or with what motive some opposing authors so widely spread in their writings that ancient Thomists denied to God knowledge of these future contingents; but that more recent Thomists, convinced by the force of arguments for the opposite view, have conceded it and have taken refuge, a few years ago, in that asylum of conditional decrees, in which God certainly apprehends those future events." And shortly before: "Concerning the first point (namely whether God knows conditional future events), there was scarcely any controversy, nor is it of any significance among authors whether such knowledge of these objects should be denied or attributed to God. The entire weight of the controversy, which for a little less than fifty years has been carried on between the Fathers of the Society and those of St. Dominic, concerns the second point: namely, regarding the decree, whether it is prerequisite for that knowledge." He adds: "I know that some authors gather with great display testimonies and proofs to show that God knows these things, on which they place such emphasis that they say the Thomists, who at first denied that knowledge of these future contingents exists in God, pressed by such a mass and strength of arguments, have surrendered and gone over to their camp. And with no small pomp of words, they trumpet an empty tri-

DISPUTATION III

umph over such a great victory." And after adding that all these things are but the rustling of leaves and empty shadows, he concludes: "In these matters there is found no controversy or doubt on this point, whether God simply knows these conditionally future objects; but whether God knows them certainly and infallibly before His decree." And he proves this from the thesis which Clement VIII proposed for discussion when these matters were being debated in Rome. From which it clearly appears that these authors contend for nothing else than that God's predefinition concerning what are called conditionally future events should be admitted, and for the rest they would agree with the defenders of *scientia media* that such future events are conceded to be known by God with certainty.

III. But as to what Father John of St. Thomas complains, that an accusation is made against recent Thomists as if they deny this knowledge; let him accuse Francisco Zumel, who speaks thus: "Other theologians have thought that God does not know conditional future events, because since such futurity is not true, and the condition is not to be fulfilled at any time, knowledge of such future events would be idle and irrelevant. Hence some theologians, pressed by this difficulty, have said that the knowledge which Scripture indicates God has of these future events is only a kind of conjectural knowledge: in which opinion must be counted all those who think that in God there is only one precise reason for knowing future contingents with certainty, namely, their real presence in the measure of eternity." Let him accuse the author of the Salamanca Course, when he says: "The first opinion asserts that, according to Sacred Scripture, God does not know with certainty the conditional future contingents of which we speak. Thus Ledesma... AND OTHERS AMONG THE YOUNGER THOMISTS." And again: "The negative opinion regarding the former part of the title, which is: 'Whether positive and efficacious conditional decrees concerning all conditional future contingents are to be posited in God?' IS DEFENDED BY MANY THOMISTS, both from the ancient and from the more recent." From

DISPUTATION III

which it follows that, since to deny these decrees and to deny certain knowledge of conditional future events is the same thing according to Thomists, many of them, both from the ancient and from the more recent, deny certain knowledge of conditional future events. Let him accuse Diego Alvarez in Disputation 10 on Auxiliis, where he attributes to Capreolus, Francis of Christ, Palacios, and some other theologians (who can be none other than Thomists) the view that the whole reason for foreknowing future events is their actual presence, which they have from eternity, and which being removed, it would consequently be necessary that they be unknown. Let him accuse himself, who narrates these things: "The difference, if any, among Thomists comes down to this only, that some of the ancient Thomists did not admit that such decrees exist in God in fact, at least for all the combinations that can be made and multiplied to infinity concerning these conditional events, but if any are given, they are only concerning some truths that pertain to God's present providence; but that this is not so certain that some passages of Scripture cannot be explained in a probable sense without such decrees of conditionals." And again: "However, we depart from those Thomists who refused to concede God's free decrees concerning such conditional objects." But the denial of these decrees is, as I was saying, in the contrary opinion, the denial of knowledge of future events under a condition. Finally, let him accuse all those who have used that argument against Molina, that God's knowledge is adequately divided into knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision, and that these conditionals cannot be reduced to either of those members. For it is evident that there is no stronger reason why this, which follows a decree, should be reduced to one of those rather than to the other; and the adversaries themselves differ among themselves on this point. From this it follows that those Thomists who rigorously maintain the aforementioned distinction have denied it. Therefore, those who say it was denied by yesterday's Thomists, at least by many of them, are not making false accusations. But if today's Thomists think differently, and are unanimous in acknowledging such

DISPUTATION III

knowledge, what have those sinned who believed that they could have been helped in this by the innumerable testimonies of the holy Fathers and Scholastics, brought forward for that purpose by authors of the Society? When we say this, we are by no means trumpeting, nor are we proclaiming it with pomp and triumph, for in such causes it is more glorious to watch and endure a triumph than to conduct one; it is enough for us that the sound of those pages in which that work is inscribed was not so faint that it could not reach the ears of some, even against their will. Time will prove how far from empty these shadows are.

IV. Meanwhile, we gladly embrace this confession, in which it is said that "in these matters there is found no controversy or doubt on this point, whether God simply knows these conditionally future objects," and we are grateful to our adversaries for wanting to relieve us of that part of the labor which seemed necessary to prove this. It remains, therefore, for us to discuss only this question: Is there in God an actual predefinition, even of those things which neither are, nor ever were, nor will be, but which would be freely produced by created agents if these or those circumstances were to concur? That is, is there in God an actual volition by which He says, "I will that if that young man lives longer, he perform acts which are evil, in all circumstances from which it is impossible to separate evil"? "I will that if David remains in Keilah, Saul will come, and the people of Keilah will betray David"? "I will that if the Gospel is proposed to the Tyrians and Sidonians, confirmed by miracles, they will do penance and be converted"? This is the point, they say, around which revolves the entire weight of the controversy. And to explain completely the entire species of thought and the whole economy of divine acts according to the opinion of our adversaries, those decrees must be conceived as follows: "I will, if that young man lives longer, that he freely produce acts which are evil, in all circumstances from which it is impossible for evil to be absent; and because I do not will absolutely that he produce those acts, therefore I also do not will absolutely that he live longer." "I will that if David remains in Keilah, Saul will come and the people of

DISPUTATION III

Keilah will betray him; but because I do not will absolutely that Saul should come and the people of Keilah betray him, I also do not will absolutely that he remain in Keilah." "I will that if the Gospel with miracles is proposed to the Tyrians and Sidonians, they be converted and saved; but because I do not will absolutely that they be converted and saved (we are disputing with doctors of positive reprobation), I also do not will absolutely that the Gospel and miracles be proposed to them." This is the point, they say, around which revolves the entire weight of the controversy, which for a little less than fifty years has been carried on between the Fathers of St. Dominic and the Society, with the Fathers of the Society denying that there are such decrees in God, and the Fathers of St. Dominic contending that they must be admitted, as well as conditional knowledge, which for the rest is admitted by both sides.

V. From this, however, it is first of all inferred that there was no cause for the disturbance in Spain when this question began to be discussed, and that Molina suffered an unjust persecution on this account, if he was not guilty of any other crime than denying that there are some predefinitions of those things which never exist, but which would nevertheless be freely done if their causes were posed. For how could this opinion have seemed either new or dangerous at that time, when the persuasion was so common that not even all things which will sometime be are predefined? Is there a stronger reason for conditional future events than for absolute future events, so that when you concede that there can be foreknowledge of the latter without predefinition, you are guilty if you think that the former can be known otherwise than because they are predefined? For as to the claim that it was then the common and certain persuasion of all learned men, academies, and nations that whatever is known by God to be absolutely future is known to be future because He has decreed that it should be future—if our adversaries wish to assert this stubbornly, they will easily find condemnation in the recent memory of those times. For what shall we say? That there were none then who opposed Calvin when he taught that "God did not otherwise foreknow the

DISPUTATION III

fall of the human race than because He Himself had ordained it," so as to defend some foreknowledge without ordination? None who tenaciously held to that saying of Augustine, and Prosper, and Fulgentius, and subsequently of the following Fathers, even of the Master of Sentences, even of St. Thomas, that "foreknowledge extends more widely than predefinition"? None who, with Justin, with Origen, with Eusebius, with Chrysostom, with Theodoret, with Damascene, even with Augustine, even with the Master and St. Thomas, would approve that causal statement, "future things are foreknown because they are future," and reject this one, "they are future because they are foreknown"? No followers of the Nominalist sect who expressly denied that God is therefore only foreknowing of future things because He is conscious of His own decrees? None of St. Thomas and the older Thomists, like Capreolus, who, with no mention made of decrees, referred the whole reason for foreknowing future things to their presence in eternity alone? Finally, none who feared every antecedent and decretory will concerning free acts, as contrary to liberty? Since, I say, such was then the disposition of Catholic doctors, which still is, so that he who said that, setting aside predefinitions, some things both are and are known to be absolutely future, would seem not at all suspect; was Molina to be denounced and pursued by land and sea on the grounds that he taught that, similarly setting aside predefinitions, some things are both known to be and are conditionally future? The prudent reader will judge whether these things are sufficiently coherent, and whether the Supreme Pontiff was rightly pressed, only to define that God's will should be conceived in such a manner: "I will that if I were to will the Gospel to be proposed to the Tyrians, they would be converted; but because I do not will that they be converted, I do not will that the Gospel be proposed to them." Indeed, if this is to be defined so that Molina may be condemned, we can live in security.

VI. Secondly, let it be inferred from what has been said that we are performing a gratuitous service, and beyond what is required, when we gather testimonies by which *scientia media* may be confirmed; for it is

DISPUTATION III

rather the duty of our adversaries to produce those by which they may attack it, than ours by which we may prove it. For since this opinion contains only two points, that conditionally future things are known, and that there is no predefinition of them on the part of the conditional object, which is the reason for knowing them: the first, which consists in a certain affirmation, would have to be proved by us, if our adversaries had not already by their confession relieved us of that labor. The second, which consists in a negation, awaits their proofs, and it is sufficient for us if we can conveniently solve them: which is the task of those who deny in any disputation. For to say that those predefinitions do not exist is the same as saying that no trace of them is found anywhere, either in Scripture, or in Councils, or in the Fathers, or in Scholastic Doctors. For just as one who denies that some opinion is Aristotelian imposes a burden on the opponent to produce those texts of Aristotle in which he seems to have held what is denied: so one who denies that something can be inferred from Scripture or the Fathers imposes a necessity on opponents to produce those passages in which what is denied seems to be contained. It is therefore sufficient for us that we can say that we assert what we find in Scripture, and in the Fathers, and in Scholastic Doctors, namely that there is conditional knowledge of free actions that would come about under some hypothesis; what we do not find, we do not assert, namely that there are predefinitions, even conditional ones, of those same actions. But it is the duty of our adversaries to show that they have better eyes, and to indicate the places in which those things can be seen which are not seen by us. But I do not say this as if we did not have many arguments, and those very effective, by which we can positively prove, from the Scriptures, and the Fathers, and other Doctors, not only that conditional predefinitions have not hitherto been admitted, but rather have been rejected: as is evident from what has been said in previous disputations, and what remains to be said; but so that it may be clear that we will abundantly satisfy our duty if we can just solve our adversaries' arguments without difficulty.

DISPUTATION III

VII. From this, infer thirdly what judgment should be made about a certain reasoning of this doctor of the College of Salamanca, by which he contends that in the question that asks whether *scientia media* is or is not in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas, the Dominican Fathers should be believed rather than us. Because, he says, the Dominican Fathers, led by no passion against their adversaries, or compelled by no necessity imposed from without (as they say), adduce St. Thomas for themselves and against *scientia media*. But the adversaries, although not affected by passion against the Dominicans, nevertheless as if compelled by necessity, support the doctrine of *scientia media* with the authority of St. Thomas. He proves the assumption unsuccessfully and with an argument composed to conclude rather the opposite. For he uses this dilemma: Because when Molina published his *scientia media*, either it was received in the School of the Dominicans as the doctrine of St. Thomas, or commonly rejected as contrary to him? We respond that it was neither commonly received nor commonly rejected, but rather buried under tacit hypotheses. But let that be. The first, he says, cannot be said, as is clear; if the second; therefore led by no passion against their adversaries, they rejected the aforementioned *scientia media* as something contrary to St. Thomas. Consider, I beg you, reader, this consequence. If the second, that is, if *scientia media* was commonly rejected in the School of the Dominican Fathers as contrary to St. Thomas when Molina published it. Therefore the Thomists, led by no passion, rejected the aforementioned *scientia media* as something contrary to St. Thomas. And consider also this: Especially since the Fathers of the Society up to those times had followed the way and doctrine of the Dominicans. And therefore it is incredible that they would not be, on that account, as was fitting, well-disposed toward them. The Fathers of the Society up to those times had been in the camp of the Thomists, as he himself supposes. Therefore when they began to turn their arms against them, having made a secession, could the Thomists not have been driven by any passion? But I do not dwell on these things, and I willingly accept what he says about pas-

DISPUTATION III

sion. For I am conducting a disputation, not a complaint. I contend only that the necessity of joining to their side both St. Thomas and other Doctors is greater for the Thomists than for the authors of the Society: not only because they are accusers, whose reputation is at stake unless they prove what they have alleged and show that there were just causes for raising that rumor by which the republic of theologians, and indeed the Church itself, was disturbed; but especially because after the entire weight of the controversy, as they say, tends toward this, to determine whether conditional predefinitions on the part of the object concerning those future events, about whose certain knowledge there is no longer any doubt, should be admitted or not; we who in that question sustain the part of those who deny, must expect that they will prove what we deny. There are not, I say, any testimonies for such predefinitions either in St. Thomas, or in Augustine, or in others. If it seems to you that I am wrong to deny this, produce them; otherwise it is my right to be able to deny what does not appear. And this is especially true when it is a question of criticizing the novelty of some opinion. Because for this to be done rightly, not only must other authors commonly have been silent on that matter, but they must also have taught the contrary; otherwise what is new is not therefore to be condemned. Therefore those who accuse of novelty that doctrine which denies prior predefinitions for conditional future events are forced to exhibit contrary testimonies from antiquity.

VIII. From which it follows, fourthly, that it could rightly be asserted by Suárez that this opinion about *scientia media* should be preferred to the contrary one, if the authority of ancient Doctors is sought. Because since this opinion, as I said, asserts two things, that there is knowledge of conditionally future events, and that there is no predefinition of them, the Thomists agree that the ancients taught the first. For the second, the silence of those same ancients can suffice. And although the argument which they call from negative authority does not compel, nevertheless it is valid for this purpose, that it may seem more probable that the Doctors did not believe, rather than that they believed what they

DISPUTATION III

nowhere affirm, especially where the questions are connected, and the time and occasion invited them to reveal that mind of which no traces are discerned, as happens here. For who would rightly blame one who thinks that the Doctors believed what he reads in them, and did not believe what he does not read? Therefore, unless the Thomists can show that the predefinitions which we have mentioned were well known to the ancients, it cannot be doubted that our suspicion, by which we say they did not approve them, is more probable than theirs, who try to persuade us of the contrary. But thus far they do not seem to have accomplished this sufficiently, as will be evident to one who goes through those things which they are accustomed to bring forward for that purpose, of which it is worthwhile for us to make some experiment.

CHAPTER II. SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY AGAINST MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE IS RESOLVED.

IX. It must be kept in mind that the entire controversy reduces to this question: whether there exists in God a predefinition by which what is freely future under some hypothesis becomes future. The adversary proves the affirmative position with a single testimony of Scripture selected from many, namely that of Paul: "That none of you be inflated against another on behalf of a third; for who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?" This passage, he says, suppressing many others, was selected because its truth seems impossible to maintain if middle or conditional knowledge is admitted; that is, as I have said, if this decree is not admitted in God: "I will that if this good happens to him, such a free act will follow"; which is to say that this decree shines forth in those words of Paul in such a way that, if denied, their truth cannot be so well preserved. Very well. The truth of other scriptural passages, therefore, cannot be so badly preserved with our position. And consequently, if this one is satisfied, middle knowledge is safe and need

DISPUTATION III

not fear anything from Scripture. I, however, do not in the least read the assertion of that decree, which is in question, in Paul's words; nor do I see how one who says he reads it there, whoever he may be, might not also easily read Hebrew without vowel points. Therefore I concede, as is proper, that the Apostle's statement and meaning are true, and I deny what is inferred from it, that a predefinition of acts conditionally determined on the part of the object must be admitted. You will say, unless this predefinition is admitted, it follows that one can be inflated and glory against another about something he has not received, and consequently attribute to himself that distinction by which the better differs from the worse, contrary to the Apostle's meaning. The consequence is proven: for with no predefinition admitted, it follows that he who does not consent to holy thought and he who does consent are antecedently equal. Therefore, since God provides equal things to both, as far as He is concerned, it remains that their difference is attributed to another cause; but there is no other cause besides their free will. This, therefore, is the cause of that distinction, and consequently to the Apostle's rebuke and question, "Who distinguishes you?", the other could say "my free will distinguishes me," and thus glory and be inflated against the other. For the fact that something divine is found in one that is not found in the other, namely the very concurrence of God in the second act, is no obstacle. Since that concurrence is equally offered to both, and the difference is only in this, that one accepted it by his own free will, the other did not accept it; hence the one who accepts may glory over the one who does not accept.

X. I respond, omitting for the sake of brevity those many things which are said and can be said in this difficulty, that it would be slight if we looked only at the Apostle's intention and scope, who addresses those Corinthians who preferred themselves to others, not because they had consented to divine grace, but because they had used better teachers and catechists. Since this situation had not at all depended on their providence, they were unjustly inflated one against another. But because an argument can be made, as it were, from parity, or even from greater to

DISPUTATION III

lesser, to rebuke people who attribute to themselves and to free will what should rather be attributed to divine grace, and because Saint Augustine frequently applies this passage to that end against the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians: It must be added that, even denying conditional predefinitions, the truth of the Apostle's words remains intact, even according to that interpretation or application of Augustine. And indeed, as far as inflation and glorying of one against another is concerned, this is never not evil, as is self-evident, even in those things that can be attributed to free will and natural powers. But regarding the distinction which the Apostle contends is received from God, and not arising from the will of those who are distinguished, when he says, "Who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received?", either he is asking whence comes the distinguishing power in the one who consents to divine grace—as if the Apostle were saying, "Who gave you that power by which you performed that good action, by which you would be distinguished from another?"—or he is asking whence comes the good action itself by which the distinction is made—as if he were saying, "Who gave you such a good action, by which you differ from that lazy one who does nothing?" If the first, since that distinguishing power necessarily includes two things, one supernatural and the other natural, namely the faculty of free will and God elevating it to a supernatural act (I use the same caution that the Adversary professes to use, who says he has spoken only of the gratuitous equality of God's will, not of the aids of grace that are received in the created will, so that he might not utter even the smallest word about these, as far as possible, so as to stay very far from the not-so-perfect observance of the decree of our Most Holy Lord the Roman Pontiff, by which it is prohibited that treatises and disputations on the efficacy of the aids of divine grace be committed to print)—since, therefore, the distinguishing or effective power of distinction necessarily includes two things, the faculty of free will and God elevating it, the Apostle rightly asks whence man has that power, because according to all that it signifies, it is either from God or is God Himself; namely insofar as it includes free will, it is from God as

DISPUTATION III

the author of nature, but insofar as it implies its elevation to supernatural act, it is from Him or is He Himself as the Author of grace. And thus, if that effective power of distinction is considered, he who consents to divine grace has nothing that he has not received. This is the confession that Saint Paul requires.

If the second, that is, if the Apostle asks whence comes the good action by which he who consents to divine grace differs from the one who does not consent, it is manifest that it cannot but be referred to the same Author, God, from whom flows its entire principle and productive power, or if account were taken only of that axiom which says that what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the caused. This applies especially here because the cause we have mentioned, productive of that action by which distinction is made, is from God as productive. That is, God intends, as far as He is concerned, that this cause should produce such an action; hence this action can in no way be said to be beyond God's intention, but rather according to His intention. Therefore, if the distinction in the second act is considered, or the action by which the one who consents to divine grace is distinguished from the one who does not consent, it is still true that he has nothing that he has not received; and thus to the Apostle's questions, "Who distinguishes you?" and "What do you have that you have not received?", if he who consents to divine grace wishes to say what the matter is, he will respond that neither in the first act nor in the second act does he have anything pertaining to this kind of distinction that is his in any other way than as received from God, and therefore that he rightly cannot glory or be inflated against another, as if he had something that is not received.

XI. You will insist: He who does equal things for two cannot be said to be the cause of that in which one exceeds the other. But God, in this hypothesis, does equal things for these two, one of whom consents to divine grace and the other does not consent. Therefore, He cannot be said to be the cause of that in which one exceeds the other. Therefore, the one who exceeds has that excess from himself, not from the one who

DISPUTATION III

does equal things, and can glory against the other on this account. I respond: I distinguish the major premise. He who does equal things for two antecedently cannot be said to be the cause of that in which one exceeds the other even antecedently—I concede the major. Of that in which one exceeds the other consequently—I deny the major. But God does equal things for the two, namely the one consenting and the one not consenting to divine grace, antecedently. Let this be the minor premise, which will later be denied. Therefore, He cannot be the cause of that in which one exceeds the other antecedently, if there is any such excess—I concede the consequence. He cannot be the cause of that in which one exceeds the other consequently—I deny the consequence. The reason is manifest, because that consequent consent, in which one exceeds the other, cannot but be the effect of that antecedent in which they are supposed equal, since that antecedent was posited by God so that there would be this consequent. Indeed, consent and cooperation with divine grace occurs according to God's intention and from God Himself, both mediately and immediately; and thus it is always true that the one consenting to divine grace does not exceed the non-consenting one in anything that is not from God.

XII. You will insist secondly: if that antecedent posited by God is equal in both, and posited with the same and equal will and intention of God, how does God not cause the same consequent in both, but only in one? I respond: because that antecedent is free in both cases, and by its freedom in one hypothesis it does not allow God to cause what He intends, while in the other hypothesis it allows Him to cause it. Therefore, you will say, at least this which is, that this one allows God to cause, will not be from God but from free will, and could be matter for glorying, as if about something not received, because as we suppose, what is from God in both is equal and the same. I respond by denying the consequence, because that allowing or not impeding is in reality nothing other than not suspending God's action or not performing a contrary action, which free will does by cooperating and consenting; hence since this co-

DISPUTATION III

operating and consenting is not from free will except as excited and aided and elevated by God, consequently this allowing or not impeding will not be from free will except as excited, aided, and elevated by God. And as to what is added, that what is from God is equal and the same in both of those two who are supposed—I have already distinguished: what is from God antecedently is equal and the same in both, but not what is from God consequently. And this is that in which one exceeds the other.

XIII. You will insist thirdly: This which is said to be from God consequently, namely that consent and cooperation, was offered just as much to the non-consenting and non-cooperating as to the consenting and cooperating; and therefore can be said to be given to one as much as to the other with respect to God. The only difference is that the latter accepted and received what was given, while the former did not accept it and therefore did not receive it. It remains, therefore, that the one who both accepted and received by his own free will can glory against the non-accepting one. I respond: Let the antecedent pass. I deny this consequence. Because that accepting and receiving is in reality nothing other than cooperating and consenting. But this is not from free will except as divinely elevated, excited, and aided. Therefore, that accepting and receiving is not otherwise from free will than as aided, excited, and elevated by God; and consequently, there is nothing here that is not received from God. Therefore, one cannot glory about anything as if it were not received. And if that recurs, that God provides the same things to both, therefore He does not distinguish them, contrary to what the Apostle wants, the response also recurs that God provides the same things to both antecedently, from which it does not follow that He is not the cause of that in which one is consequently distinguished from the other.

XIV. You will insist fourthly: Granted, let it remain that God is the cause of that in which one is distinguished from the other specifically, but not reduplicatively and formally, insofar as it is distinguishing and says something in one over the other. Hence, God cannot be said to be the cause of this distinction taken formally, but only materially, of the

DISPUTATION III

thing which is distinction, or by which distinction is made. Therefore, free will remains as such a cause, and consequently in that sense it can be said to be distinguished by itself, not by God. I respond that this distinction, taken formally and reduplicatively, signifies two things, namely the positing of that in which one exceeds the other in the one who exceeds, and the lack of it in the one who is exceeded; and consequently the cause of it so taken should be the cause both of that excess in the one who exceeds and of the defect in the one who is exceeded. The distinction, I say, of the consenting one from the non-consenting one, insofar as it is their distinction formally, not only signifies the positing of consent in the one who consents but also connotes or implies the non-positing of similar consent in the one who does not consent. Therefore, what is the cause of this distinction as such must be the cause not only of why there is consent in the one who consents, but also why there is non-consent in the one who does not consent. But neither God nor the free will of the consenting one can be such a cause. Not God, because He does not will that the one who does not consent should not consent, but rather wills that he should consent, and to this end He helps him just as much as the consenting one, as we suppose. Nor can the free will of the consenting one be said to be the cause of non-consent in the other, whom it does not regard and in whom it neither posits nor destroys anything. Therefore, whoever would want to assign such a cause would have to take together both wills, that of the consenting one and that of the non-consenting one; for both of them, given what is required on God's part, are the formal cause of that distinction or difference, insofar as it is comparative of one with the other and implies a defect in one of the same thing that it posits in the other. God, however, neither ought to nor can be said to be such a cause in any other sense than that He is the cause of why that consent, by which the one is in reality distinguished from the other, is posited in the one. But neither is the free will of the consenting one otherwise its cause than because, elevated and aided by God, it posits the same consent. It is sufficient, therefore, for the Apostle's intention, when God is said to distinguish the con-

DISPUTATION III

senting one from the non-consenting one, that He is the cause of that distinction taken specifically and materially, or that He is the cause of the consent by which it happens that the consenting one exceeds the non-consenting one. And what is commonly said applies in this place, when it is disputed whether the will, given unequal means, can choose the lesser over the greater; for it cannot do this with a comparative affect, desiring the lesser as it is lesser, because the ratio of lesser good is not something desirable or eligible. Similarly, the good of one, insofar as it connotes the evil of another, is not something lovable to God, nor consequently can God be said to desire or cause it under that aspect. And in this, if I am not mistaken, the Author with whom we are disputing was deceived, who seems to think that this distinction should be ascribed to God formally and insofar as one has something over another, not only materially, so that it suffices that that in which one exceeds another is from God. And this is that reason about which the learned Reader will judge whether it is suitable for preserving, as the Adversary demands, the truth of the Apostle's statement, setting aside conditional predefinitions.

XV. I add further that the Apostle is dealing with those people who glory about things they have absolutely, not about things they would have conditionally. For hardly anyone could be found so insane that, in order to glory, he would place himself under conditional knowledge and wish to derive present glory, which exists absolutely, from a good that is suspended by a condition. Besides the fact that, if we recur to those hypotheses, it could not happen, since they are infinitely infinite, that if one is glorious for you, another would not be shameful; and vice versa, if one is shameful for your companion, another would not be praiseworthy and honorable. With that reciprocal compensation, anyone who thinks it permissible to glory against another, from whom he can expect similar glorying against himself, would be foolish. This being established, therefore, namely that the Apostle is dealing with those who glory about what they have or do in fact, I say that, setting aside conditional predefinitions, there is reason for us to assert that God distinguishes them, even an-

DISPUTATION III

tedently to the absolute existence of the good about which they glory, by reason of the special benefit that is conferred on one over the other. Specifically, supposing conditional knowledge, by which He knows that in this hypothesis this one will use His grace well, that one will not use it well, but in another the opposite would occur, the fact that He establishes by His mere free will to posit the one in which He knows one will use it well rather than the one in which the other would also use it well, is something that antecedes the absolute positing of that good use and is something morally better and more desirable. If, therefore, someone should glory on that account, he could be struck by that question of Paul, "Who distinguishes you?" That is, since either these circumstances could occur to you, in which you operate well and he does not, or others in which he would operate well but you would not at all, who preferred you to him by establishing what was known to be better and more useful for you? "And what do you have that you have not received by the benefit of that preference? And if you have received it, why do you glory?" And there is no reason for the Adversary to object that the second act, such as consent conditionally future, cannot pertain to the first act. Because if he understands that the second act as conditionally future cannot be the object of foreknowledge illuminating a decree prior to the absolute futuration of the same second act, which is all we assert, he assumes something false; if he understands something else, it does not harm us. This is another reason by which the truth of the Apostle's words could perhaps not be so badly preserved without conditional predefinitions; but because, as I said, Augustine primarily uses that statement to commend God's benefit toward those who live well.

XVI. Finally, I add that, setting aside conditional predefinitions and admitting absolute ones, which it is far more probable, according to Augustine's mind, must be admitted with respect to good and supernatural acts, especially in the predestined, the interpretation of the Apostle's words is straightforward. For if we compare a predestined person with a non-predestined one, it is rightly asked of him, "Who distinguishes you?"

DISPUTATION III

That is, who separated you rather than him from the mass of perdition by gratuitous election, from which it followed thereafter that God's will concerning the good use of His graces was different in you than in him? To which question, what else can one who thinks himself predestined respond, than that he must adore divine mercy and kiss its benefits? If likewise a predestined person is compared with a predestined person who sometimes falls and does not always respond to God's will and love, to the one asking "Who distinguishes you?"—that is, who makes it so that from that election by which you are destined to attain eternal life infallibly, there follows another will of God concerning you in this occurrence of things, than concerning him, although he too is also predestined?—here again he can say nothing else than that this is a certain gratuitous gift of God. Finally, if a reprobate who sometimes lives well wanted to glory against another, whether reprobate or predestined but for the time being more wicked, it would be easy to restrain that pride. For insofar as he lives well, we who are ignorant of God's judgments and men's ends should not deal with him otherwise than as with a predestined person; and thus from that presumption, either ours or his, we can ask, "Who distinguishes you?" if perhaps he should become proud; and he will have nothing else to respond except that God is the cause and author of that imaginary distinction. But if there were some suspicion of reprobation, then there would be no need, to defeat his pride, to ask "Who distinguishes you?" For it is a greater matter of shame and abjection if he thinks that he is perhaps not distinguished but rather confused with the mass of the lost, than if he hears that he is distinguished not by his own judgment but by another's benefit. I say these things because Saint Augustine seems to indicate that that special will and predefinition of supernatural acts is proper to the predestined. But if one wishes to extend it also to the reprobate, and to say that their supernatural acts too are pre-defined, nothing is lost from this position that we defend; and it always stands that without conditional predefinitions, with only absolute ones, which are congruous to the nature of free agents supposing conditional

DISPUTATION III

knowledge, the truth of the Apostle's words that have been objected to us is preserved, which is all we intend here.

XVII. Nor are any of the things that the Doctor of the College of Salamanca attempts against these points an obstacle, as will be easily evident to anyone who compares them. For he relies on principles that are either entirely uncertain or false, some of which are to be briefly touched upon here.

XVIII. First, he frequently supposes that the inequality that free causes have in the second act must necessarily be traced back to some inequality in the first act. "It is confirmed," he says, "first, since in the aforesaid event Peter and John are separated and are unequal in the second act, namely in the concurrence itself; therefore they must also be separated and be unequal in the first act. Therefore, since this inequality in the first act cannot come from grace, if indeed they are presupposed to be undistinguished and equal in it, it must come from free will." This reasoning is later repeated. From this he infers, against the Apostle's meaning, that the one who consents can glory against the one who does not consent, if it is true that God's will toward them is equal, as if, just as God's will toward them is supposed to be equal, the faculty of will is not also supposed to be equal, and thus the one who glories can attribute some excess of the first act, which he does not attribute to God's will, to the faculty of will. But this is proper to free agents, that their antecedent equality can be the cause of consequent inequality; nor does freedom, or the faculty of acting and not acting, stand otherwise. But if an excess in the first act is necessary for one to surpass another, what will the one who suffers a defect in the same first act, for example of premotion, do, who nevertheless is bound to follow another?

XIX. Second, he seems to suppose that free will is not partly the cause of that distinction or excess by which the consenting one surpasses the non-consenting one; for he speaks thus: "Then finally because that distinction and inequality is not foreseen, according to the opposite opinion, as proceeding wholly and totally from grace as from a proximate

DISPUTATION III

principle, since grace is equal in both; therefore it is foreseen as proceeding partly from grace, partly from the will, according to what it has of itself, although associated with grace; and thus the will of Peter can partially glory against Paul, that he, from his own resources, although associated with grace, distinguishes himself." Because this Author proposes this as absurd, he consequently thinks that free will, according to what it has of itself, even as associated with grace, is not partly the cause of the distinction of the consenting one from the non-consenting one, but that it proceeds wholly and totally from grace. And nothing remains but for us to be objected that we think that free will, according to what it has of itself, or rather, what it is, cooperates with divine grace, does something, and is not merely a vehicle of the power acting in it, but a co-principle, which indeed we will endure much more willingly than if we were thought not to agree with the Council of Trent, or to favor those who say that free will does absolutely nothing in this matter and comports itself merely passively. Indeed, to omit the natural reasons that the concept of a vital principle, and also of a free one, suggests, so that we say that those actions that conduce to salvation are partly to be ascribed to free will, it is manifest that all of that is Augustinian, from those twelve or thirteen testimonies that were produced earlier, although more could also be produced; and Augustine contends that it is furthermore divine and pronounced by the Holy Spirit himself in the sacred pages. We therefore frankly confess that God, setting aside free will, is not the total principle of the action by which the consenting one is distinguished from the non-consenting one, and consequently that that distinction is not from God totally, as if free will were not some part of that principle from which it proceeds; nor does either the Apostle want this or the truth of the matter allow it; nor is the glorying of the consenting one over the non-consenting one inept on this account, because he contributes nothing to the consent by which he is distinguished, but because he neither contributes anything, nor can contribute anything, unless excited and aided by God. But this thought of the Adversary depends on another, which is soon to be

DISPUTATION III

discussed. Meanwhile, I add only three words from Nazianzen from his Oration on the Nativity of Christ: "Man has been endowed with freedom of will, so that the good might belong no less to him who chooses it than to Him who provided the seeds."

XX. Third, therefore, this Doctor thinks our position more difficult because we suppose that free will has a peculiar proximate and innate power of acting, although grace is furthermore necessary for it. For he speaks thus: "Then this solution can be impugned by another way, presupposing however what the Adversaries teach, as can be seen in Molina; that created free will, anticipated by God's gratuitous and sufficient will, or that which holds itself on the part of the first act, has a peculiar proximate and innate power of acting, distinct from the power that is superadded to it through that gratuitous will of God, and which is not formally conferred on it through such a will, although it cannot influence a supernatural act through this power unless associated with grace." From which position he infers, as something absurd, that the one consenting to divine grace can at least partially glory, because his distinction from the non-consenting one does not proceed wholly and totally from grace, but partly from grace, partly from the will according to what it has of itself, although associated with grace. Therefore, this Author, to avoid falling into this absurdity, shows that he by no means approves of that opinion, that free will through innate power, distinct from the power superadded to it through God's gratuitous will, does something. He supposes, therefore, that all of that which is in free will the principle of good action is superadded by God's gratuitous will. This thought can in no way be approved by us, nor can it be. For it seems to remove all action and activity from free will, and to make it, as I was saying, merely a vehicle of the power acting in it, in the way that water is a vehicle of the heat that heats in it. Indeed, whatever is superadded to free will by God's gratuitous will must be called both gratuitous and grace. But besides grace, there must be something on the part of free will that is the principle of action. Therefore, besides what is superadded by God's gratuitous will, there

DISPUTATION III

must be something on the part of free will that is the principle of action. The major premise is known from the penetration of the terms; the minor is proved: for it implies a contradiction for there to be cooperation unless there are distinct principles, because it would be ridiculous if someone were to conceive of grace cooperating with itself, just as free will also with itself. Therefore, since the true, proper, and real cooperation of free will with grace in a good work cannot be denied, unless we deny the foundations of faith, it follows that two principles must be distinguished, one on the part of free will, the other on the part of grace. Therefore, besides grace, something must be admitted on the part of free will that is the principle of good action. But whatever is besides grace in free will is innate and implanted; therefore, besides grace, a principle must be admitted on the part of free will that is innate and implanted to it, or rather, that is itself. And thus Augustine's example will be suitable, who demands of the Pelagians that they confess that free will is related to grace, with respect to good action, as the eye is related to light with respect to vision. That concession will also be suitable, in which he says to a man sanctifying himself through God's grace, "nevertheless, because you do something there by will, therefore something is also attributed to you." When he also says that man joins his will to God, what, I ask, does he understand? It is the will itself that joins itself. But to what does it join itself except for acting? And how does it join itself to act if there is nothing in it that acts, except what is joined to it, or as the Adversary says, super-added? What, I say, is it to join oneself to another for acting, if not to supply a co-principle of action? How is it said to supply a co-principle of action to another, if that to which it is supplied is the total principle and the total power from which the action proceeds? Or if it is not the total principle and the total power from which the action follows, how is it denied that what joins itself has some ratio of principle and power, which it joins? The same force is found in that other statement from Augustine: "Nor, however, is this matter to be approached by prayers alone, so that the efficacy of our will is not also subjoined. For God is called our Helper,

DISPUTATION III

and he cannot be helped EXCEPT ONE WHO SPONTANEOUSLY ATTEMPTS SOMETHING." He who helps for acting, what, I ask, does he help, if not some power, insufficient indeed, but nevertheless effective? Therefore, since God's gratuitous will, which is superadded to free will, is that which helps free will to act, and is therefore called Helping, what will it help except some power of it, insufficient I confess, but nevertheless some power, and indeed effective? But if this power is superadded, what else follows than that grace helps itself, which is ridiculous? If it is not superadded, how can it be denied that there is some power in free will, both effective and innate? This, therefore, is what we do not deny, and which seems to us most consonant with the principles of both philosophy and theology, and faith, that that very power and faculty of free will, which in natural works is the principle from which natural operation immediately and proximately essentially depends, is joined to grace and to God's will in supernatural works, and becomes, together with them, some part of that total principle on which supernatural action immediately and proximately and essentially depends. So that if, per impossibile, all that which is superadded to free will remained, with that innate and intrinsic power of it subtracted, it would be impossible for supernatural operation to remain, due to the defect of some essentially required principle. And we deny that anything follows from this that is repugnant to the Apostle asking, "Who distinguishes you?" For what is opposed, if God sees, setting aside predefinition, that free will through its innate power concurs in that action by which the one operating well is distinguished from the one not operating, and is its partial cause, it follows that the one who operates well can at least partially glory that he distinguishes himself from another—this has been rejected. For the Apostle does not prohibit that glorying only because free will through its innate power does nothing in that matter, but because it does nothing unless God excites and helps that innate power. Which Stapleton expressed concerning grace and free will, book 4, chapter 14, when he says: "Augustine does not deny that free will IS THE CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION, but only wishes there to be a

DISPUTATION III

superior and inferior cause." And, as I indeed think, the Adversaries would easily allow us to say that free will through its innate power is going to cooperate, if we admitted the predefinition of that operation, which is in question; just as therefore it would not then be permissible to glory, on account of the fact that it would operate through innate power, because it would not operate, except by the predefinition determining that innate power, so neither now should one glory, when we deny that that innate power will operate otherwise than by God supernaturally exciting and helping. And from this arises something else, which this author also ascribes to us.

XXI. Finally, it appears that the Opponent does not sufficiently distinguish between the conditional state and the absolute state, when from the fact that God sees hypothetically that those two individuals are equal antecedently—one who consents to divine grace and another who does not consent, with neither owing more to His mercy than the other in that state—he concludes that even after God has absolutely decreed to establish that hypothesis, thereby making what was known to be conditionally future into something absolutely future, they similarly remain equal antecedently and equally indebted in this state. Even if we were to concede this, the truth of Paul's statement would still be preserved according to that first interpretation which was provided. For the Apostle does not precisely require, by virtue of those words that are objected to, that one person must acknowledge himself to be more indebted than another. I do not say that one is not more indebted than another, but I say that this is not necessarily deduced from this testimony of the Apostle: for the truth of which it suffices if the one who consents acknowledges that he has nothing which he does not owe. This debt may seem to be equal even in the other person, although consent is not present in him, because it is absent only through his own fault: and he who corrupts a benefit through his own fault seems to owe as much to the benefactor as the one who preserves it. Therefore, Paul's statement does not demand that the one who consents should understand himself to be more indebted; but

DISPUTATION III

simply that everyone should understand himself to be indebted for everything about which he boasts.

XXII. But although this might be stated in this way; nevertheless, it is false that in that transition from the conditional state to the absolute, or in the decree by which the positing of the condition is decreed, given that foreknowledge which I mentioned, one cannot conceive of a special reason for benefit with respect to the one who absolutely consents, as was said before. And this is especially true if the decree by which the condition is established comes from an absolute predefinition, either of the consent itself, or even of the ultimate end, or glory, to which the one who consents is predestined on that supposition. And thus, not in one way, but in three, can the truth of the Apostle's words be preserved, without conditional predefinitions, contrary to what our Opponent feared. The first of these has pleased certain learned and pious recent thinkers; the second and third are more approved by me. Let the Reader make the choice.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER AUGUSTINE OPPOSED MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

XXIII. In these controversies, everyone easily agrees that the weight of Augustine's authority is great; only his meaning is sought, which the Doctor of the College of Salamanca contends is difficult to find, due to the multitude of testimonies that are adduced for both sides. For Augustine is said to sound and resound on both sides, Augustine meets Augustine from both sides; and since Augustine confronts Augustine, his face cannot be recognized unless carefully examined. Therefore, the same doctor attempts to discover Augustine's mind by two approaches. First, by examining his face and words in themselves, and attentively contemplating them. Second, through effects, or quasi-effects. Let us therefore also look at Augustine's face and see whether on his forehead is inscribed conditional predefinition, even of those things that never exist

DISPUTATION III

at any moment in time; for in this the whole difficulty revolves, as has been seen.

But it must be presupposed that the Semi-Pelagians admitted middle knowledge. That is, while they admitted conditional knowledge, they did not likewise admit predefinitions. This opinion, this Doctor concedes, was not heretical, although it belonged to heretics. Nor does F. John of St. Thomas differ, as will be established later. Nor could they say otherwise, since St. Augustine calls "Catholic" that doctor who maintained the same knowledge, as we saw earlier. From this you may infer that Molina was accused and dragged before tribunals for teaching something new—namely, that which in Augustine's age was taught by Catholics, and which, although heretics taught it, they did not teach heretically, just as they do not heretically profess that there is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And what follows from this, with such great formality demanded from the Holy See, is that a question hitherto undecided, whose definition had been free among Catholics on either side since the time of Augustine, in this age, when there was hardly anything to fear from Pelagian heretics, but much from Anti-Pelagians, should be decided in such a way that the latter might seem to have won the case.

§ I. THE FIRST TESTIMONY OF AUGUSTINE.

XXIII. In these controversies, everyone easily agrees that the weight of Augustine's authority is great; only his meaning is sought, which the Doctor of the College of Salamanca contends is difficult to find, due to the multitude of testimonies that are adduced for both sides. For Augustine is said to sound and resound on both sides, Augustine meets Augustine from both sides; and since Augustine confronts Augustine, his face cannot be recognized unless carefully examined. Therefore, the same doctor attempts to discover Augustine's mind by two approaches. First, by examining his face and words in themselves, and attentively contemplating them. Second, through effects, or quasi-effects. Let us

DISPUTATION III

therefore also look at Augustine's face and see whether on his forehead is inscribed conditional predefinition, even of those things that never exist at any moment in time; for in this the whole difficulty revolves, as has been seen.

But it must be presupposed that the Semi-Pelagians admitted middle knowledge. That is, while they admitted conditional knowledge, they did not likewise admit predefinitions. This opinion, this Doctor concedes, was not heretical, although it belonged to heretics. Nor does E. John of St. Thomas differ, as will be established later. Nor could they say otherwise, since St. Augustine calls "Catholic" that doctor who maintained the same knowledge, as we saw earlier. From this you may infer that Molina was accused and dragged before tribunals for teaching something new—namely, that which in Augustine's age was taught by Catholics, and which, although heretics taught it, they did not teach heretically, just as they do not heretically profess that there is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And what follows from this, with such great formality demanded from the Holy See, is that a question hitherto undecided, whose definition had been free among Catholics on either side since the time of Augustine, in this age, when there was hardly anything to fear from Pelagian heretics, but much from Anti-Pelagians, should be decided in such a way that the latter might seem to have won the case.

XXIV. Let us now come to Augustine. Two passages are presented to us, one of which our Adversary calls illustrious, the other outstanding. The illustrious one is what he has in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "This is the whole reason why it was said, by whomever it was said, 'he was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding.' It was said according to the dangers of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew what would happen, not what would not happen—that is, that He would grant him an untimely death so that he might be withdrawn from the uncertainty of temptation, not that he would sin, who would not remain in temptation." In this illustrious passage, as in Augustine's carefully examined face, this decree of God

DISPUTATION III

should be read concerning him whose evil life He prevents by an untimely death: "I will that if he lives longer, he will live a life that can only be evil; but I do not want him to live that life; I will that he not live longer." For we both agree to say that God knows that evil life would come if he who is taken away were to live; we disagree, however, because without the decree I mentioned, he denies that God knows this, while I affirm it. Our whole controversy is whether that decree is necessary for such knowledge or not. He thinks it is concluded as necessary from that illustrious passage. I deny its rays, and however diligently I examine Augustine's face shining in that light, I cannot help but deny that there is any lineament in it that represents such a decree, except always for the interpreter's brush and colors. For glosses very often supply what the text does not have, as happens here, where the Adversary supposes that Pelagian heretics believed that this knowledge exists so that they might find in human merits some cause of divine grace, and that it exists in that moment of reason which precedes the efficacious decree of the divine will. Augustine, therefore, in the cited passage, when he says that Scripture should be understood not according to foreknowledge but according to the dangers of this life, and that God foreknew what would happen, namely that he of whom Scripture speaks would be taken away, not what would not happen, namely that if he were allowed to live he would be perverted—is granting absolute knowledge of what will happen, which is had after the efficacious and absolute decree of the divine will, but denying conditional knowledge for that moment of reason for which heretics admitted it, namely before the efficacious and conditional decree. And indeed this gloss is clear, nor does it leave the glossator's mind in doubt; but I further ask for the author's mind, and I continue to assert that there is no trace in Augustine of either that moment of reason or that conditional decree.

XXV. And first, when the Adversary says that the heretics were Pelagians who abused the knowledge of conditionally future merits to evade the necessity of grace, he is mistaken. For Augustine explicitly denies that the Pelagians thought this way; indeed, he accuses the Massil-

DISPUTATION III

ians, about whom Prosper and Hilary had written to him, that is, the Semi-Pelagians, on the grounds that although they disapproved of the rest of the Pelagian doctrine, yet in this contemplation of merits future under a hypothesis, and of their efficacy, they erred more shamefully. His words in this very book are: "If the Pelagians heard this (that God takes account of what would be the future merits of infants if they lived), they would no longer labor in denying original sin... They would say plainly that there is no original sin at all, but that infants who are released from the body are either baptized or not baptized according to their future merits if they lived; and that they either receive or do not receive the Body of Christ according to their future merits... Thus they would easily argue and win their case, in which they deny original sin and contend that God's grace is not given except according to our merits. But because future things that are not going to be future are surely no merits at all, and this is very easy to see, therefore neither could the Pelagians assert this, and much less should these men have asserted it. For I cannot say how distressed I am that **WHAT THE PELAGIANS SAW TO BE UTTERLY FALSE AND ABSURD**, these people, who condemn the error of those heretics with us by Catholic authority, did not see." To the same effect is what he says a little earlier, where Augustine wonders as at something new that he finds there are men who philosophize in this way about merits conditionally future, although the tenets of the Pelagians were by no means new or unexplored to him: "But that someone is judged not according to the merits he had while he was in the body, but according to the merits he would have had if he had lived longer in the body; how men whose intellects, as your letters indicate, are not to be despised could have held this opinion, I am amazed and stupefied that I cannot discover, nor would I dare to believe it if I did not dare to disbelieve you." And that which he adds, that the Massilians by this dogma destroy that about which the Pelagians did not doubt, namely the authority of the book of Wisdom, and establish what "I say not that no one would believe, but that no one would even dream of"—namely that the dead are judged accord-

DISPUTATION III

ing to what they would have done if they had lived longer. Hence also that, when Augustine pressed the Pelagians with the example of Jacob and Esau, who are said by the Apostle to have been distinguished when they had not yet been born nor done anything good or evil, and they defended themselves by the foreknowledge of merits absolutely future, Augustine objects with the example of those in whom there can be no merits except conditionally future, namely of twins, one of whom dies in infancy with baptism, the other without baptism—having it as certain that the Pelagians do not believe that any account is taken of these merits. See how he speaks: "But to remove from you every hiding place of your darkness, I therefore proposed twins such that they would not be helped by the merits of their parents, and both would die in earliest infancy, one baptized, the other without baptism, so that you might not say that God, as you say against the Apostle about Jacob and Esau, foreknew their future works... But if it is most absurd, most insulting, and most mad that any men should be damned for sins which, as you say, they did not derive by inheritance from their parents, nor could they commit, or even think of, the twin brother of the baptized infant, not baptized, returns to you and silently asks you why he was separated from his brother's happiness. You completely lower your tongue and voice to this infant; to this one who does not speak, you have nothing to say. For **EVEN ACCORDING TO THE PELAGIANS THEMSELVES**, no merits can be found in infants why some of them should be sent to the kingdom, others alienated from the kingdom." From these it is manifestly clear that this error concerning the efficacy of conditionally future merits is completely alien to the opinion of the Pelagians; hence from this point the Adversary has not well examined Augustine's face.

XXVI. Secondly, neither from this other point. Namely, that he chose that passage from chapter 14 of *On the Predestination of the Saints* to show that Augustine repudiated the conditional knowledge which the Semi-Pelagians admitted, or that the Semi-Pelagians admitted what Augustine repudiated. For it is evident that the knowledge which

DISPUTATION III

Augustine seems to repudiate in this passage, the Semi-Pelagians themselves repudiated to such an extent that, because the authority of the book of Wisdom seemed to rely on it, they denied that the book itself was canonical. Specifically, the passage deals with the foreknowledge of future sins, if he who is said to be taken away in Wisdom 4 were to live, which Augustine had objected could equally serve to condemn him, or not to snatch him away, as similar foreknowledge of good works could serve to save another. And because they had nothing to answer, they absolutely denied that any evil merits are foreknown of him who, while living well, is taken away by an untimely death; and that the book of Wisdom, which says the contrary, does not establish faith, because it is not canonical. Let us hear Augustine: "Cyprian wrote a book on mortality, laudably known to many, indeed to almost all who love ecclesiastical literature, in which he declares not only that death is not harmful to the faithful, but is even found to be useful, since it removes a man from the dangers of sinning and establishes him in the security of not sinning. But what does it profit if even future sins, which have not been committed, are punished?" See how he objects the foreknowledge of conditionally future sins, to show that it helps not at all, and consequently that the foreknowledge of similarly future merits does not help either. He continues, confirming this very point with Cyprian from the book of Wisdom: "Nevertheless, he most copiously and excellently says that the dangers of sinning are not lacking in this life, nor do they remain after this life, where he also puts that testimony from the book of Wisdom: 'He was taken away, etc.' which was also cited by me; you said that the brothers rejected it, as if it were not adduced from a canonical book." From this it is clear that in order to repudiate that foreknowledge, the Massilians repudiated the book of Wisdom, which he repeats once and again in this very passage. So it is clear that to show that Augustine denied the foreknowledge which the Semi-Pelagians asserted, the Adversary has produced a passage in which no other foreknowledge is dealt with than that which the Semi-Pelagians denied more than Augustine himself, since Augustine only in some sense

DISPUTATION III

denies that the sins of him who dies innocent are foreknown, while the Semi-Pelagians absolutely denied it, and even the scripture itself, as if it could not be true in any sense. Hence you may gather how well the Adversary's words fit when he says that Augustine concludes in this passage "that God does not know the conditional, namely that he who was prevented by an untimely death would sin gravely if he lived longer, from the fact that in that moment about which the heretics were speaking, which is assigned for middle knowledge, namely before the efficacious decree of the divine will, it does not have the status of future." But the heretics denied that conditional more than Augustine himself, both for that moment and for any other. Therefore, this opposition between Augustine and the heretics must be gathered from elsewhere.

XXVII. Thirdly, therefore, he collects other testimonies to confirm his interpretation of that one.

The first is taken from the cited passage in book 2 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, where Augustine inserts these words: "For how did he foreknow those things to be future, which for those who would die in infancy, because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, he rather foreknew as not future." Where the Adversary notes that Augustine first attacked the opinion of the heretics about middle knowledge of merits future under a hypothesis, by showing that it can have no force or efficacy to excite God to add his grace to those merits; but now, by the words just adduced, he overturns it by another argument, namely that there is no such knowledge, since for that moment of reason about which the heretics speak, which precedes God's efficacious decree, there are no future merits, and therefore they are not foreknown. This gloss obtains that we believe the interpreter thinks this, although there is no sign of it in the text. But it is strange that he assumes Augustine is here attacking heretics who did not yet exist. Is it not clear, even from the very title of the book, that the Pelagians are the heretics with whom Augustine disputes there? Has it not already been clearly shown that the Semi-Pelagians, in the use and force of conditionally foreknown merits, exceeded

DISPUTATION III

the doctrine of the Pelagians? Does not Augustine indicate this in this very passage, when he denies that the Pelagians have anything to answer to the unbaptized infant asking why he is separated from his brother's happiness—namely, because the conditionally future merits and their virtue and efficacy were unknown to them? And in this passage, says the Commentator, Augustine attacks the heretics resorting to conditionally future merits "in the moment of reason which precedes God's decree," where Augustine absolutely denies that they resort to such merits.

XXVIII. The same hallucination occurs in the second testimony, from book 1 *On the Soul and its Origin*, chapter 12, when he says: "Moreover, foreknowledge itself is emptied if what is foreknown will not be. For how is it rightly said that something future is foreknown which will not be future?" Here, says the gloss, "Augustine attacks the middle knowledge, already attacked from the first point, from this second point; Because namely the aforesaid knowledge, as it was asserted by the SEMI-PELAGIANS AND PELAGIANS, namely as preceding the decree of the divine will, and therefore in the manner of middle knowledge, which consists in this, is not to be admitted; and from the defect of a knowable object in that prior moment, because it then has no futurity at all, Augustine concludes that foreknowledge is entirely emptied." See how confidently he everywhere impresses moments of reason both on Augustine and on those against whom Augustine disputes, and reads decrees where no mention of them is made, and continues to affirm that Augustine in this passage attacks the Semi-Pelagians, who had not yet arisen, and the Pelagians, who asserted none of the things that are attacked here, as has been said. Nor does he notice that in these books on the soul, Vincent Victor, recently a Catholic from the heresy of the Donatists, is being attacked, as is clear from the first chapters of the book, who, having rashly entangled himself in those questions whose outcomes he did not understand, in order to temper the opinion of the Catholics and the Pelagians concerning Original Sin, Augustine, thinking he should respond, while pressing the man and explaining and blocking all the ways by which he

DISPUTATION III

could escape, also indicates this one about conditionally future merits. The question revolves about why God places an innocent soul, which has not yet deserved any evil, into a body where it will contract original sin, with which it is to be separated from the body before baptism, and to be damned. When he had brought forward and rejected three causes for this, he similarly rejects this fourth one about conditional merits in this way: "Nor that fourth, that souls of infants about to die without baptism are relegated and damned by a just God into sinful flesh, which He foreknew, if they reached the age in which they would use free will, would live evilly. For not even he dared to say this, placed in such straits; indeed, even against this vanity, he has already spoken clearly and briefly enough, where he says, etc." Here, says the gloss, "Augustine disputes against that knowledge which was asserted by the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians," and yet he does not dispute against them, nor did he against whom he disputes assert such knowledge, but rather rejected it; "and it is a question about that prior moment which precedes the decree," one may supply "conditional," "when there is no more mention made of it than of the laws of the Twelve Tables."

XXIX. The same judgment should be made of the third testimony from book 26 against Faustus, who, since he was a Manichean, not a Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian, how can it be understood from what is disputed with him, before the Semi-Pelagians were born, what the contention was between Augustine and them? Especially since in that passage, there is no mention of those future things which depend on created free will, but of those which depend on God's will alone, such as the translation of Elijah, and other things which are done by God beyond or against nature, concerning which the discussion there is, as is clear from chapter 3.

XXX. For in the fourth testimony from the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 17, it is clear that the topic is not conditionally future things, but absolutely future things: and consequently, not knowledge or conditional predefinition, but absolute. The discussion there, I say, is

DISPUTATION III

about the beginning of faith and perseverance to the end, which goods, since the Semi-Pelagians denied them to be gifts of God, they also denied them to be predestined, and contended that from their absolute foreknowledge God was moved both to grant grace for completing works necessary for salvation, and finally glory itself, so that to the foreknown, not predestined, beginning of faith, grace would be given for consequent works; and to perseverance to the end, foreknown, not predestined, glory would be given. But Augustine, after he had proved that these also are gifts of God, consequently concludes thus: "These gifts of God, which are given to the elect who are called according to God's purpose, among which gifts are both beginning to believe and persevering in faith to the end of this life, as we have proven by such great argumentation and attestation of authorities—these gifts of God, I say, if there is no predestination which we defend, are not foreknown by God; but they are foreknown. Therefore this is the predestination which we defend." By these words Augustine contends nothing else than that there must be admitted a gratuitous and absolute decree of God either to give the grace which has been proven to be necessary for those goods, or for the goods themselves to be certainly and infallibly procured. The first is gladly admitted by Catholics who deny predestination before foreseen merits, and predefinitions of good acts. The latter is also admitted by those who prefer both predestination before foreseen merits and predefinitions of free and supernatural acts, which also seems to me more probable and more Augustinian. But what does this have to do with conditional predefinitions? For it to be a necessary consequence, and from the fact that nothing can be absolutely future without a present decree of God, it likewise follows that without it nothing can be conditionally future; in the meantime, while the Adversaries prepare to prove this, we will deny it.

XXXI. And these would suffice to show that conditional predefinitions of things future under a hypothesis are not visible even in the illustrious passage; but it helps to prove the same thing positively by the following arguments. The first is that this whole effort of the adversary

DISPUTATION III

tends to this, to maintain that in Augustine predefinition extends as broadly as foreknowledge of future things, which has been shown above to be quite false, not by vain interpretations and conjectures, but by the open signification of Augustine himself, and all attempts to evade his testimony have been rejected.

XXXII. The second is that if conditional predefinition does nothing, either for the aim of the Semi-Pelagians or for the aim of Augustine, there is no reason why we should understand it in the proposed passage, where it is not expressed. But it does nothing, that is, it neither harms one side nor benefits the other, which I prove. That predefinition can harm the Semi-Pelagians, and benefit Augustine, only insofar as it follows from it that grace is not given because of merits acquired by the powers of nature—for the whole contention revolves around this, that although the Semi-Pelagians did not deny that God's grace is necessary, yet they denied it for all acts which positively lead to salvation, for there are in us some such acts which are not gifts of God, as was said a little before, and there is in them some power of meriting and obtaining consequent grace. And when the examples of infants taken away before any merit, one with baptism, the other without baptism, were objected, they responded that although there were no past natural merits in them, there were future ones, from whose inequality arose that unequal lot. But this is what Augustine attacks, and it is agreed between us and the Adversaries that this is the state of that question.

But now I say that Augustine accomplishes nothing, even if he assumes that those natural merits conditionally future would not be future except after God's decree, because he accomplishes nothing unless he proves that they would not be future otherwise than from God's grace through Christ, and in such a way that they are not natural. But he does not prove this even if he obtains that they would not be future except after an efficacious decree. Therefore, even if he obtains this decree, it neither benefits him nor harms the Semi-Pelagians. I prove this last assumption chiefly from the opinion of the adversaries, from which it is clear

DISPUTATION III

that the material aspect of sin is absolutely predefined by God, and yet is not from grace through Christ. Also an indifferent act in the individual, which can be given in the opinion of the Thomists at least through extrinsic principles, and by conforming oneself to a probable opinion, even if it is not the opinion of St. Thomas, if it is given, will be predefined; and yet it will not be from God's grace. Acts of moral virtues, which have only philosophical honesty, can be given, at least some, through natural principles, and without grace through Christ, with most Thomists agreeing; yet they cannot be given without predefinition, which is said in that opinion to have a universal necessity for absolutely everything that happens anywhere. Therefore, since from the fact that many things are absolutely predefined, it does not at all follow that they are not from the powers of nature alone, excluding grace through Christ, however good they may be, what necessity is there that if something is said to be conditionally predefined, even if it is good, it immediately follows that it will be future from grace, and not from the powers of free will? But if this does not follow, what benefit is it to Augustine that those conditionally future merits, which the Semi-Pelagians want to be natural, that is, acquired by the powers of nature, are said not to be future except after predefinition? And what harm does this do to the Semi-Pelagians? Who does not see that they can take a shield from the Adversary and his Thomist comrades to elude all Augustine's efforts, and say, "It is so, those merits are not future except after the efficacious decree, since absolutely nothing good or evil will be future otherwise; but it does not follow from this that they are not merits of natural powers, as is also the material aspect of sin, and an indifferent act; and therefore if they obtain any grace, it should be considered obtained by the powers of nature." What can those say here who think it sufficient to constrain the Semi-Pelagians if whatever is conditionally future is only future after predefinitions? And hence it is clear how futile is what the Doctor of Salamanca has, that the error of Pelagius is evacuated if the conditional decree is conceded.

DISPUTATION III

XXXIII. The third argument is that if St. Augustine, while denying that conditionally future things are foreknown by God, would designate only that moment of reason which precedes the efficacious conditional decree, it would have to be denied in the same way that non-future things are foreknown. But he does not do this. Therefore, etc. The major is proved because a decree is as much required for something to become non-future as is required for it to become future; and given the opinion of the Adversaries, in that moment of reason in which we understand God neither willing that something be, nor not willing, there is no stronger reason for us to say that it is non-future than that it is future, except in a prescinding way, in the manner in which we deny that animal abstracted from its inferiors is rational or irrational, because it prescind from both. But to prescind from both is nothing other than for neither to be known in it, and therefore for neither to be affirmed or denied of it. In this way, if Augustine prescind that moment of reason, he ought similarly, as he denies that the future is foreknown because it is not yet future in that moment, to deny that the non-future is foreknown, because in that moment it is not yet non-future. But Augustine does not do this; instead, in place of the foreknowledge of the future, which he denies, he substitutes the foreknowledge of the non-future, which he affirms, as can be seen in all the passages that have been proposed. Therefore, he is not speaking of that moment of reason prescinded from decrees. As if I were to say, he who abstracts as much from the reason of foreknowing something non-future as from the reason of foreknowing something future, abstracts as much from the negative foreknowledge of the future as from the assertive foreknowledge of the future. But he who designates the moment of reason before every efficacious decree abstracts as much from the reason of foreknowing something non-future as from the reason of foreknowing something future. Therefore, he who designates that moment of reason abstracts as much from the negative foreknowledge of the future as from the assertive foreknowledge of the future. The major is clear from the penetration of the terms. For the foreknowledge of a thing cannot be

DISPUTATION III

conceived without conceiving the reason for foreknowing, and therefore he who abstracts from one necessarily abstracts from the other. The minor is the very doctrine of the Adversaries, which, since it holds that everything that is in any way future becomes actually future by God's present volition, and non-future by God's present non-volition, consequently they admit that prior in reason to that volition or non-volition of God, nothing can be or be known as future or as non-future. But that Augustine supposes the contrary, and by the same reasoning by which he removes the foreknowledge of the future, he posits the foreknowledge of the non-future, is clear from the testimonies adduced before. For he speaks thus against the Two Letters of the Pelagians: "For how did he foreknow those things to be future which, for those who would die in infancy, because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, he foreknew rather as not future?" Where you see the negative foreknowledge of the future, when he says "foreknew rather as not future," proposed by Augustine as excluding that which is supposed to be assertive of the future. But if this is excluded only for that moment of reason which precedes all decrees, it is necessary that for that moment of reason which precedes all decrees, there is a foreknowledge which is negative of the future, which is impossible according to the principles of the Adversaries.

The same must be said of the cited passage from book 1 *On the Soul and its Origin*, where when Augustine says that "foreknowledge is emptied if what is foreknown will not be," it cannot be understood of the moment of reason which precedes decrees, or it must be conceded that in that moment it is true of something, and therefore known by God, what Augustine says, "will not be," although in that moment it cannot be said of anything either that "it will be," or that "it will not be."

The same applies to the other from book 26 against Faustus, when it is said, "Moreover, if I should hear that something was going to be, but God caused it not to be, I will most faithfully answer that what God brought about was rather going to be, not that which, if it were going to be, He would not have brought about." It is manifest that these

DISPUTATION III

words cannot be referred to the instant of reason which precedes all free decrees, in which neither can God be conceived as about to do something, as Augustine conceives, nor more about to do one thing than another, as the same asserts. And therefore what follows also collapses: "For God knew what He was going to do, and therefore He simultaneously knew that the other thing was not going to be, which He was going to cause not to be." Here it is clear that one knowledge is excluded by another, and it is wholly denied that God knows something as future, because He rather knows it as non-future—which cannot happen in the moment of reason about which we are disputing, as has been said.

Finally, in this very passage from the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, which we are examining, the same thing can be seen. For here too Augustine opposes to the foreknowledge of the Semi-Pelagians another, by which that one is excluded, when he says, "Who foreknew this, which was future, not that which was not future." But take the moment of reason before every efficacious decree: is anything then future? Can God know it? In what sense, then, does Augustine want the knowledge of that which is future to impede the knowledge of that which is not future? From these, therefore, it is sufficiently clear that in all the passages by which the Adversary tries to establish moments of reason prior to decrees concerning conditionally future things, they are rather deleted. For in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 17, I have already said that there is no discussion at all of the knowledge of the conditionally future, but only of the foreknowledge of the absolute.

XXXIV. And hence that solution which the Adversary somewhere indicates is also refuted, that the conditionally future in that moment of reason which he imagines is non-future negatively. For this can be nothing other than being non-future prescissively, which is altogether to prescind it from what is actually either future or not future. But whoever so prescinds must also prescind both from that knowledge by which something is known to be future, and from that by which it is known not to be future, and both from the affirmation by which it is said "it will be,"

DISPUTATION III

and from the negation by which it is said "it will not be"—which, as we have seen, Augustine does not do, who posits the negative foreknowledge of the future, that is, the negation by which it is said "it will not be."

XXXV. Fourth Argument. If Augustine, when denying that God knows what is conditionally future, meant only that God does not know this in the logical moment that precedes every decree, he should not have offered as his reason that the opposite is absolutely future. Yet this is what he does. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proven and explained. For the fact that it is absolutely future that one who is said to be going to sin if he were to live is snatched away in youth, and consequently, that it is absolutely known that he will not sin, can be neither the cause nor the sign that he would not have sinned conditionally, nor therefore that he is not known to be going to sin in this way. The Semi-Pelagians would say, and rightly so, granted that God knew, after He himself had decreed this, what was absolutely going to happen—namely, that the person would be delivered from the dangers of sinning, and therefore would not sin—it does not follow from this that before such a decree, and any other actually existing decree, he would not have sinned on the hypothesis, nor that God would not have known this. It is evident that the absolute futurity of one of two opposites in no way removes the conditional futurity of the other. I say, the absolute futurity of the non-repentance or non-conversion of the Tyrians in no way impedes the conditional futurity of their repentance and conversion, and consequently, the absolute foreknowledge of their non-repentance does not impede the conditional foreknowledge of their repentance. Hence, whoever argues from the position of one to the destruction of the other does not argue well.

Yet Augustine, according to the opinion of our Adversaries, argues in this way, which is the minor premise of the above syllogism. For consider his words: "For it was said according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew what was going to be, not what was not going to be; that is, that He was going to grant him an untimely death, so that he might be removed from the uncertainty of

DISPUTATION III

temptations, not that he would have sinned, who would not have remained in temptation." Is it not sufficiently clear that Augustine's reason for denying that "he was taken away, etc." was said according to God's foreknowledge is this: because God foreknew what was going to be, not what was not going to be? But what is it that was going to be? Namely, that God was going to grant him an untimely death so that he might be removed from the uncertainty of temptations, which was absolutely future, not that he would have sinned, who would not have remained in the temptation, which was absolutely not future. And so, from absolute futurity and foreknowledge, he argues against both the futurity and foreknowledge of the Semi-Pelagians' conditional claim, which, if taken as our Adversaries want, for that logical moment which precedes every actually existing decree, has no opposition whatsoever with the foreknowledge of the opposite absolute claim, and therefore cannot be destroyed by positing the latter.

Augustine argues in the same way against the Two Letters of the Pelagians when he says: "How did He foreknow those things as future which, because His foreknowledge cannot be deceived, He rather foreknew as not future for those who would die in infancy?" Here you see that the phrase "He rather foreknew as not future" should be understood of absolute foreknowledge, which follows also from those who would die in infancy, which was absolutely future. But that phrase, "How did He foreknow those things as future," is, as our Adversary maintains, a negation of conditional knowledge for that logical moment which precedes conditional predefinition. Join, therefore, these two statements, and say: "How did God foreknow the future merits of infants, on the hypothesis that they would not die in infancy, and before He had decided anything about them; who rather knew absolutely that they would not be future, after He decreed to cut short their life and bring it about that they would die in infancy?" Behold, according to our Adversary's interpretation, the entire force of Augustine's reasoning, which, as is evident, is ineffective and absurd.

DISPUTATION III

The same is likewise evident from Augustine's words against Faustus, where he argues from absolute non-futurition against conditional futurition. If he wishes to deny this only for the logical moment that precedes conditional predefinition, his argument is no better than if he wished to deny it for the logical moment that follows that same predefinition. Besides those words of Augustine that we have already cited, these should be noted: "Therefore, all things that are truly future will doubtless happen; but if they will not have happened, they were not future," which, according to our Adversary's interpretation, would render this meaning: "Therefore, all things that are truly future conditionally will doubtless happen absolutely; if, however, they will not have happened absolutely, they were not future conditionally." For the phrase "will doubtless happen" corresponds to "if they will not have happened," which can only be understood of absolutes. And this itself is put forward to exclude another futurition, which our adversary supposes to be conditional, for the logical moment preceding every decree. And so from absolute non-futurition, Augustine infers conditional non-futurition; and from conditional futurition, he infers absolute futurition, an inference that cannot hold, not even in our Adversaries' opinion. Therefore, another sense must be sought. Finally, the same can also be observed in the passage cited from Book 1 On the Soul and its Origin, Chapter 12, as noted in the following Argument.

XXXVI. And from these considerations, the final Argument can be drawn. Because if what Augustine says against conditional knowledge equally opposes it for the logical moment that follows even conditional predefinition, in which our adversary admits it, as for the logical moment that precedes it, and in which the Semi-Pelagians are thought to have admitted it, it follows that our Adversary, while opposing Augustine to us, also opposes him to himself. But this is indeed the case. Therefore. I prove the minor premise. For what Augustine says is that those future things are not truly future; thus he speaks against Faustus: "Therefore, all things that are TRULY future will doubtless happen," to show that the

DISPUTATION III

future things he is attacking are not truly future, and consequently, that there cannot be such knowledge of them that can truly be called foreknowledge of the future. In another place, he calls them futures that will not be, when he says: "What of the fact that foreknowledge itself is rendered empty if what is foreknown **WILL NOT BE**?" Likewise, he calls them futures that **ARE NOT FUTURE**, and futures that are **NOTHING**, when he says: "For how is it rightly said that what is not future is foreknown as future? How, therefore, are sins punished which are **NOTHING**?" But what it means for these futures to be nothing, or not to be future, he himself immediately interprets when he adds: "That is, which were neither committed before the flesh when this life had not yet begun, nor after the flesh when death intervened beforehand." Here it should be carefully noted that the phrase "That is" indicates that this is not our gloss but the author's own, by which we say that to be not future, or to be nothing, only excludes the absolute existence of such futures, which is all that can be excluded by the fact that the soul did not live before the body, and after entering the body, was overtaken by death before it could sin. Here you see that in this passage too, absolute non-futurition is opposed to conditional futurition, which pertains to the immediately preceding argument. And in the same sense should be understood what he says in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "But how this came into the minds of such men, I do not know, that **FUTURES WHICH ARE NOT FUTURE** should be punished, or that the merits of infants should be honored." Likewise: "But because the futures of men that are not future are doubtless no merits at all, and this is very easy to see, therefore, etc." Namely, to be not future is nothing other than to be nothing; and to be nothing is nothing other than to not have been committed, neither before the body, because the soul did not pre-exist, nor with the body, because it was separated from it before the time of sinning; and therefore Augustine calls this non-future sin a sin "that is not spoken, done, or thought," and this is a sin that is nothing, not future, or not truly future, and a sin that will not be.

DISPUTATION III

Now let us suppose our Adversary's opinion, and designate the logical moment that follows conditional predefinition, in which moment he concedes that both the sin of one who is snatched away in infancy and anything else is conditionally future, and as such foreknown by conditional knowledge. I ask whether it is not still true that this sin is nothing? For Augustine calls it nothing because it is prevented by intervening death; but here too death is supposed to intervene. Is it not in the same sense in which it is called nothing that it is also called not future by Augustine? Is it not also called a sin that will not be? But if, according to Augustine's mind, it is called both nothing and not future and what will not be, who can doubt that according to his mind it is also said to be not truly future, especially since that which has its futurity suspended on a condition that will never be fulfilled is quite rightly denied to be truly future, and of which it cannot be affirmed "it will be" in any other sense than that in which it is affirmed "it would be if, etc."? And if this is so, who does not see that what Augustine says also applies here, that the foreknowledge of this future cannot rightly be called foreknowledge of the future, when he says: "For how is it rightly said that what is not future is foreknown as future?" Let our Adversary therefore see what counsel should be taken to defend his conditional knowledge with Augustine's contrary endorsement. And whatever he himself shall say will be useful to us, to show that Augustine is no more contrary to conditional knowledge for the logical moment that precedes even conditional predefinition than for the moment that follows it. When he has considered this, he will judge who has more diligently examined the face of Augustine, which from what has been said appears more averse to our Adversary's doctrine than to ours.

XXXVII. But it is time for us to offer its genuine interpretation, and to see in what sense it was said by him that the passage "He was taken away lest wickedness, etc." was not spoken according to foreknowledge, but according to the perils of this life. Likewise, that these conditional futures are not truly future, and are futures that will not be, futures

DISPUTATION III

not future, futures that are nothing. The difficulty consists in reconciling these pronouncements of Augustine with what he elsewhere openly says, both that these are future things, and that it can only be denied with the greatest insanity that they are known by God. Of this apparent contradiction, we have already rejected the reconciliation that our Adversary has contrived, concerning the two logical moments, in one of which, which is before all predefinition, Augustine is understood to deny conditional knowledge, and in the other, which is after predefinition, to assert it, because this idea seems to have no foundation whatsoever in Augustine's doctrine.

Therefore, another reconciliation must be provided, which has already been indicated and which immediately presents itself in the very face of Augustine, as our Adversary sees it. Namely, this must be supposed: that the Semi-Pelagians did not distinguish between conditional futurity and absolute futurity, and consequently between conditional foreknowledge and absolute foreknowledge. This is manifestly gathered from what Augustine says, that they took refuge in the future merits of infants when past merits were lacking. His words are: "There is sometimes a struggle against the Semi-Pelagians, who assert that God's grace is added to preceding merits in the age of adults who are already using the freedom of their will, but when it comes to infants and to the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, all human assertion of merits preceding God's grace fails. For neither are the former distinguished from others by any preceding good merits so as to belong to the deliverer of men, nor did the latter, since he is also a man, become the deliverer of men by any preceding human merits. For who would tolerate what is said, that infants, for their future merits in that same infant age, are baptized and depart from this life?" Here you see that future merits of infants are held by the Semi-Pelagians in the same regard as past merits of adults, and equal power is attributed to both for meriting grace, even though past merits, which imply absolute existence, can only correspond to those future merits that are also absolutely future. This is also

DISPUTATION III

indicated by Prosper, from whom Augustine learned that there were those who followed this philosophy, which, although he had refuted it before, was not as something asserted by anyone, but as something that one might imagine in thought. Prosper's words are: "And when among these the multitude of innumerable infants is objected to them... who having as yet no wills, no actions of their own, are separated by the just judgment of God... they say that such are lost and such are saved as the divine knowledge foresaw they would be in later years, if they were preserved to the age of action." And soon after: "But to such an extent do they subject God's election to imaginary merits that because past merits do not exist, they fabricate future merits that will not be future, and by a new kind of absurdity among them, both what is not to be done is foreknown, and what is foreknown is not done." See how the Semi-Pelagians regard the future merits of those who are not allowed to live as equivalent to the past merits of those who grow to adulthood, as if there were no distinction among future things between those that are absolutely future, which can be equated with past things, and those that are suspended on a hypothesis, which for this very reason lack the necessary proportion with past things, especially for moving the will of the rewarder. And therefore this seems a new kind of absurdity to Prosper, that some things are foreknown and yet not done, and not to be done, which absurdity would not exist unless there were presupposed a foreknowledge that does not distinguish between what is absolutely and conditionally future. For if it did distinguish, what would be absurd about something being not done and yet foreknown from some hypothesis?

Nor does it hinder what our Adversary says, that it cannot come into anyone's mind to think that the foreknowledge of what he who dies would have done if he had lived is absolute. For it can come into one's mind not to distinguish it sufficiently from conditional foreknowledge. And because this is absurd, it happens that we say it came into the minds of the Semi-Pelagians, who on that account seemed to Prosper to have fallen into a new kind of absurdity. Augustine wonders at this and is

DISPUTATION III

amazed, and would not dare to believe it, he says, if he did not dare not to believe Prosper and Hilary. Indeed, he indicates that the Pelagians were wiser to that extent, because they saw that this is most false and most absurd, which the Semi-Pelagians did not see. And before the asserter of this doctrine became known, Augustine had called it most absurd, most foolish, and most insane. From which one may argue thus: What could come into no one's mind in this controversy, Augustine chiefly thinks came into the minds of the Massilienses, as is clear from the passages quoted; but that the same account applies to absolute futures and conditional futures could come into no one's mind in this dispute, as our Adversary testifies. Therefore, Augustine thinks that this especially came into the minds of the Massilienses.

Therefore, when he says that neither do those merits exist as future, nor is there foreknowledge of them, he only intends that they do not have that kind of futurity by which they could be called absolutely and simply future, nor consequently should the foreknowledge of them be called absolutely and simply foreknowledge of the future. And he himself indicates this sufficiently when he calls them "futures that are not future." For it is clear that this proposition should be interpreted as these other sayings of Christ the Lord, "My doctrine is not mine," and this also of the Apostle, "I live, yet not I," where the latter part does not destroy the truth of the former, but modifies it. Indeed, Augustine expresses that mode when he denies that those futures are truly future, and that knowledge of them is rightly called foreknowledge, in the places cited before. Namely, absolutely future things are truly, that is properly, future, of which it is properly and truly said, "they will be"; but conditionally future things are not truly, that is properly, future, nor is the term "they will be" truly and properly predicated of them, which when said of them signifies nothing other than "they would be if the condition were fulfilled." And it is evident that this kind of suspended futurity is imperfect and defective compared to that by which something is said to be absolutely and entirely future. From which it follows that neither is that knowledge by which

DISPUTATION III

these improper futures are known rightly called foreknowledge of futures, as Augustine indicates and as was said a little before.

This difference and imperfection of the conditionally future is the reason why it is unsuitable for present effects, since it is manifest that as much actuality is required in the efficient cause, such as the meritorious cause, for some difference of time, as is found in the effect. Nor can it be conceived that that whose existence is suspended could give absolute existence to anything.

XXXVIII. From this you may understand that what our Adversary everywhere insists upon must be entirely rejected, namely, that Augustine refutes the opinion of the Massilienses on two grounds. First, on the ground that such merits that are only conditionally future are unsuitable for moving the will of the rewarder; second, on the ground that they are not future, namely, as he wishes, in the logical moment that is before conditional predefinition. This, I say, must be rejected because there is no sign of this diversity or distinction in the whole of Augustine, and because it is self-evident that the reasoning consisting of both of those grounds is one and undivided. For when it is said that future works, if those who are snatched away by death had lived, cannot merit for them the grace of baptism, for example, the reason is immediately sought, and none occurs more apt than that those futures are "futures that are not future," because they are not truly future, because as their futurition is suspended, so is all power of meriting and obtaining, because that of which nothing else can be affirmed than that it would be cannot be the cause for affirming of something that it is. And so, what our Adversary says is the second reason in Augustine is only a proof of what he numbers as the first.

And this interpretation of ours is also approved by Father John of St. Thomas, who was especially interested in not appearing to invalidate the argumentation of the Doctor of Salamanca. For when he well understood that if the reasoning that can be deduced from the cited passage in Chapter 14 of *On the Predestination of the Saints* had any validi-

DISPUTATION III

ty, it would serve rather to exclude conditional knowledge altogether than to exclude it for some logical moment, of which neither Augustine nor the Massilienses ever thought, he believed that the response should be that Augustine in that passage denies absolute foreknowledge on the part of the object, not conditional foreknowledge. For he denies foreknowledge by reason of which God either punishes or rewards. For, he says, the Semi-Pelagians said that someone is punished or judged, or given a benefit, in view of what he was foreseen to be going to do; but Augustine denies that anyone is judged on the basis of merits that are not in fact going to be future nor placed in the nature of things. But concerning what someone would do if he were to live, he denies that God has foreknowledge, that is, **ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE, SUCH AS IS REQUIRED FOR MAKING A JUDGMENT OF REWARDING OR PUNISHING.** And regarding another passage from Book 1 On the Soul and its Origin, Chapter 12: "Thirdly, we say that there Augustine literally speaks **OF ABSOLUTE FUTURES,** because Augustine was arguing there against the same response of the Pelagians, and he proves by many arguments that sins not committed are not punished by God, and thus he proves that foreknowledge is emptied if what is foreknown will not be, namely, according to the force and nature of absolute foreknowledge, such as is required for punishing and judging. For such foreknowledge must be of things that are in fact going to be future."

From this you may gather that our Adversaries' perspectives are different, and the same face of Augustine does not shine forth in all of them, and that we are sufficiently protected even by their own weapons, while one breaks the attack of the other, and finally that passage which one considered illustrious was seen as obscure to the eyes of the other, though most friendly.

§ II. THE SECOND TESTIMONY OF AUGUSTINE.

DISPUTATION III

XXXIX. Having explained the illustrious passage, there remains an outstanding text from the same book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 9, where Augustine responds to the objection of the Semi-Pelagians arguing, as it is customarily said, *ad hominem*. Specifically, when pagans once asked why Christ, by delaying his coming, had allowed such a multitude of people to perish as had existed from the beginning of the world; and they interpreted this as a certain defect in goodness, or an acceptance of persons; or certainly as proof of the non-necessity of redemption, if those to whom Christ was not known were thought to be saved; Augustine responds in such a way that he suggests that those who were saved before Christ are thought to have been saved through Christ, among whom he does not deny were many even from among the uncircumcised. As for the reason why this grace, like the doctrine of Christ, did not extend to all, but rather to some rather than others, he places the responsibility on people, and this not so much from his own opinion as from the opinion of the pagans themselves. For he turns this objection back on them, observing that the sacred rites of Jupiter or Apollo, or the philosophy of Pythagoras, were not always the same and did not reach all people; yet the pagans believed these things contributed to their happiness. Hence he says: "To this proposition the response is given, as to whether the sacred rites of their gods, which are known to have been instituted at certain times, were beneficial to men, and therefore I ask what happened to those who died before these rites were instituted?" And: "Why do they raise this question against the Christian religion, when they themselves either cannot answer us concerning their gods, or if they can, they can thereby answer themselves also on behalf of our religion?" And: "Therefore let them cease to object to us what can be objected to every sect and every name of religion." And soon after, speaking of Pythagoras, having said that not even at the time when he lived did everyone hear him or wish to follow him, he adds that which they would appropriately respond: "If Pythagoras had been of such power that he could preach his doctrines where he wished and when he wished, if he had also with this

DISPUTATION III

power supreme foreknowledge of things, he would never have appeared anywhere or at any time except where and when he foreknew that people would believe in him." Having presented this as though approved by them, he adds these words: "What will they answer, except that in the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God, where perhaps some other divine purpose lies hidden far more secretly, without prejudice to other causes which can perhaps be investigated by the wise, let us say this alone to them briefly in the investigation of this question: that Christ wanted to appear to men and have his doctrine preached among them when he knew, and where he knew there would be those who would believe in him." When the Semi-Pelagians seized upon these words to show that, even according to Augustine himself, the foreknowledge of works even conditionally future was the cause of that inequality by which some are preferred to others in matters pertaining to salvation, Augustine, who had received this from the books of Hilary, responds thus in chapter 9 of the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "Do you see that without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God and other causes, I wanted to say this about the foreknowledge of Christ, which seemed sufficient to convince the infidelity of the pagans who had raised this question? For what is more true than that Christ foreknew who, when, and in what places people would believe in him? But whether, when Christ was preached to them, they would have faith from themselves, or would receive it as a gift from God, that is, whether God merely foreknew them, or also predestined them, I did not then think it necessary to examine or discuss." The Doctor of the Salamanca College says that these final words contain the predefinition guided by conditional knowledge. Father John of St. Thomas agrees with him and adds that the *scientia media* [middle knowledge] is clearly DESTROYED here by Augustine. I, however, contend that this request of Augustine is completely innocent, and there is no one who should fear anything from it, except the Adversaries themselves. I therefore distinctly deny that in these words, "that is, whether God merely foreknew them, or also predestined them," any mention

DISPUTATION III

whatsoever is made of conditional predefinition, but rather of absolute predefinition. And not only do I deny this, but I also give a clear reason for denying it from Augustine's words immediately following. And I am greatly surprised at Father John of St. Thomas's interjected consideration. For to the above words he adds: "I weigh these words alone," he says, "because by them Augustine plainly destroyed middle knowledge." But, my Father, the scale is not yet full; weigh and consider also those which immediately follow, which are as follows: "Therefore what I said, that Christ wanted to appear to men and have his doctrine preached among them when he knew, and where he knew there would be those who would believe in him, could also be stated thus: Christ wanted to appear to men and have his doctrine preached among them when he knew, **AND WHERE HE KNEW THERE WOULD BE THOSE WHO HAD BEEN ELECTED IN HIM BEFORE THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD.**" By which he indicates that the predestination contained in the previous words is none other than election, by which some are said to be elected in Christ before the foundation of the world. But that this election is the same as absolute predestination in Augustine is so manifest that whoever wishes to deny it contentiously might seem not to have recognized him either by face or by garments. This I demonstrate from just one or two passages. For in this book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 16, he speaks thus of the Jews who refuse to consent to Christianity: "But what is that which follows in St. Paul, 'but as regards election they are beloved for the sake of their forefathers'? Are those enemies who have perished in their enmities, and those who still perish from that nation while opposing Christ, are they the elect and beloved? **ABSOLUTELY NOT; WHO, EVEN THE MOST FOOLISH, WOULD SAY THIS?**" And in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, chapter 14, where he speaks thus of the people of Tyre and Sidon: "This predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated; but the rest, where are they but in

DISPUTATION III

the mass of perdition by the just judgment of God, where the people of Tyre and Sidon were left, who could also have believed if they had seen those miraculous signs of Christ, but because it was not given to them to believe, even that by which they might believe was denied to them. From this it appears that some have in their natural capacity a divine gift of intelligence, by which they might be moved to faith if they hear words or see signs suitable to their minds; and yet if by God's higher judgment they are not separated from the mass of perdition **BY GOD'S PRE-DESTINATION**, neither the divine signs nor deeds by which they could believe are shown to them, if indeed they would hear or see such things." He adds that it did not benefit the people of Tyre and Sidon that they could have believed, since they were not predestined by him whose judgments are inscrutable and whose ways are unsearchable. And soon after: "But what the Lord said about the people of Tyre and Sidon can perhaps be understood in some other way; nevertheless, that no one comes to Christ unless it is given to him, and that it is given to those who were elected by him before the foundation of the world, he most definitely confesses, by whom the divine word is heard not with deaf ears of the heart, but with the ears of the flesh." From this passage it is most evident that, according to Augustine, the people of Tyre and Sidon, who are said to have been left in the mass of perdition, not predestined, not separated, not given the benefit of believing and coming to Christ, which is given to those who were elected in Christ before the foundation of the world—it is evident, I say, that they cannot be said to have been elected in Christ before the foundation of the world. Hence I argue thus: Election in Christ before the foundation of the world in no way pertains to the people of Tyre and Sidon; conditional predefinition of conversion and repentance pertains to the people of Tyre and Sidon; therefore, conditional predefinition of conversion and repentance is not election in Christ before the foundation of the world. The major premise is Augustine's; the minor, though false, is true according to the adversaries, who, while admitting that the conversion of the people of Tyre and Sidon was certainly

DISPUTATION III

foreknown by God on the hypothesis of preaching, and yet nothing is foreknown except by the benefit of conditional predefinition, consequently admit this predefinition with respect to the people of Tyre and Sidon. Now I further argue: Conditional predefinition is denied by Augustine to be election in Christ before the foundation of the world, as has already been shown; the predefinition designated in the passage we are discussing is said to be election in Christ before the foundation of the world; therefore, the predefinition designated in the passage we are discussing is not conditional predefinition; it remains, therefore, that it is absolute predefinition.

XL. Nor do they have anything else to respond than what the Doctor of the Salamanca College insinuates, that the name of Election in Augustine is sometimes taken more broadly for any efficacious decree concerning a good thing. We shall surely have to expect that he will also say that the reprobate, who, as he thinks, are moved by God's efficacious decree to the material aspect of sin, e.g., of final impenitence, are on that account sometimes considered by Augustine to be Elected in Christ before the foundation of the world. But I demand even one passage in which Augustine has taken that expression so broadly as to signify that any reprobate is nevertheless elected in Christ before the foundation of the world; and because the very evidence of the matter leaves no room to hope that such a testimony can be found, our reasoning and conclusion stands, by which we say that Augustine in the cited passage spoke of predestination, or of absolute predefinition, not of conditional predefinition.

XLI. For what Father John of St. Thomas adds seems remarkable. It is worth quoting his own words: "Lest anyone be troubled by the name of predestination which Augustine uses in the passage we are examining, let him know that predestination is not taken by Augustine in the strict sense in which it is now taken by scholastics, for the decree alone of giving and transferring to eternal life, but in a broader sense, for any decree preordaining, predefining, or determining things which he intends to do or arranges, even conditionally. This is evidently clear from

DISPUTATION III

the author of the book entitled *On the Predestination of God* in Augustine, which is found after the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, but has been relegated to the appendix by the Louvain editors; for there he admits predestination under a condition, and says that some predestination is of binding or necessity, some of condition: 'Augustine predestined,' he says, 'that the heaven should always revolve, etc.'" You see that the author of the book *On the Predestination of God* is distinguished from Augustine; thus the judgment of the Louvain editors is approved, who rejected that book as spurious, which is also the judgment of Bellarmine and almost all who have reviewed Augustine's works. And yet Father John of St. Thomas tries to prove from this that such a broad acceptance of predestination is found in Augustine. What kind of argument is this? To try to show how Augustine speaks from a book which you admit is by another author, and while quoting someone else's words, to introduce him as speaking and say, "says Augustine"? But I also give the Adversary a choice: does he want the doctrine of this book to be considered Augustinian or not? If he does not, the proof of his interpretation of the passage we are discussing is lost; if he does, the entire Thomist doctrine of predestination before foreseen merits is lost, which opinion Bellarmine also followed, and he had nothing more important than to deny that the book *On the Predestination of God* was a genuine work of Augustine, for the opinion of that author on predestination after foreseen merits is clearly evident.

XLII. Nor do I say this because there is any difficulty in what Father John of St. Thomas objects if I concede that Augustine is the author of this book. For we are not asking whether some conditional predefinition can be called predestination according to Augustine's mind, which is all that is proved from this; but whether conditional predefinition, which can also pertain to the reprobate, is ever called in Augustine that predestination which is also election in Christ before the foundation of the world; for thus he himself explains his predestination. I deny that this explanation can fall, according to Augustine's mind, on any condi-

DISPUTATION III

tional predefinition which is indifferent both to those strictly understood as predestined and to the reprobate.

XLIII. This, therefore, is Augustine's opinion in the proposed passage. He distinguishes there between God's predestination and Election, and Christ's foreknowledge, and supposes that the latter is subordinate to the former; and that Christ, having understood the eternal predestination and election of those to be saved, foreknew who would believe in his doctrine, and that this same foreknowledge, not insofar as it presented the future faith of those to be called, but insofar as it represented God's decree concerning those to be saved and called, impelled his will to want to appear to men and have his doctrine preached among them. From this it follows that there are no others, besides these elect, who were also foreknown to believe, if Christ should appear to them and preach his doctrine among them. For Augustine supposes that such were the people of Tyre and Sidon, and on this basis corrects his response to the questions of the pagans, or, as St. Thomas says, rejects it. For he speaks thus: "Are we to say what I said in another book where I responded to six questions of certain pagans, without prejudice, however, to other causes which the wise can investigate?" And having repeated that response: "This we certainly cannot say about Tyre and Sidon, and in them we recognize that these divine judgments pertain to those causes of predestination, without prejudice to which hidden causes I said I responded then." And again: "But can we say that even the people of Tyre and Sidon would have refused to believe when such miracles were performed among them, or would not have believed if they had been performed, when the Lord himself attests that they would have performed penance with great humility, if the signs of divine powers had been performed among them?" He wants, therefore, that without that special Election and predestination, certain others would have believed on the hypothesis of preaching; and consequently that this predestination is not necessary for some to be believers conditionally; nor does he indicate any other that is necessary; therefore, according to his understanding, none at all is neces-

DISPUTATION III

sary for some to be conditionally believers. But for them to be, and to be foreknown as absolutely going to believe, what is required is not the pre-definition of free action in itself immediately, but predestination, which is called by Augustine the preparation of grace in this very passage in which we are engaged. For, I say, in order for someone's faith or repentance to exist and be foreknown as absolutely future, an absolute decree is necessary, by which God determines to give that person the grace necessary for this. This decree, because it can most properly be called the preparation of grace, is consequently that predestination of which Augustine speaks here.

XLIV. It does not matter if this interpretation seems to someone not to fit well with the response that Augustine gave to the question of the pagans, because it should not fit, after Augustine rejects it. Nor should this be considered a fault in him: both because he does not give that response assertively, but to show that, although it is not legitimate, the pagans would have nothing to retort. This is signified by that manner of speaking: "What will they answer... if we say?" as if he were saying that those to whom he is speaking would also be compelled to use the same response, as has been said; and also because he places an exception of greater consideration for those things which he was holding back because they were not suited to their understanding.

XLV. It remains for us to touch upon those objections which the Adversaries raise against this interpretation. First, the Theologian of the Salamanca College emphasizes those words of Augustine in which he says that he responded thus to Porphyry without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, and except for the depth of wisdom and knowledge of God. By this he wants to signify an efficacious decree by way of intention, by which what is future under a condition is predetermined, and that the hidden counsel cannot be conceived in any other way. But I wonder how these things escaped him, who had so diligently resolved to examine Augustine's face, since it is clear that the hidden counsel of which this passage speaks is nothing other than what he later calls a high-

DISPUTATION III

er judgment, when he says, "And yet if by God's higher judgment they are not separated from the mass of perdition by God's predestination, neither are divine signs or deeds shown to them, etc." Where he speaks of the people of Tyre and Sidon, and concedes that their conversion was indeed foreknown conditionally, but contends that by that higher judgment its predefinition was prevented rather than conceived. For that secret judgment consists in this, that to some rather than others are applied those divine signs or deeds, from the supposition of which they are known to be convertible, as Augustine indicates when he says, "If by God's higher judgment they are not separated from the mass of perdition by God's predestination, neither are those divine signs or deeds shown to them," from the supposition of which the people of Tyre and Sidon were foreknown to be convertible: which is nothing other than saying that if they are separated by God's higher judgment, those signs or deeds are applied to them, that is, the means which were conditionally foreknown to be efficacious. So that it is manifest that this hidden judgment does not pertain to the people of Tyre insofar as it predefines foreknown repentance, but rather insofar as it excludes it. This is the hidden judgment or counsel in Augustine, that though the condition of men is the same, and some as well as others are conditionally foreknown to use divine grace well, yet it is given to these, but not to those. To one asking the reason for this, Augustine is accustomed to respond nothing other than "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments!" This is that eternal and absolute election of God, from which arises the inequality of those to be saved and those to perish, and which Augustine preferred to pass over in silence, because the pagans seemed less suited to comprehend it.

XLVI. Secondly, he also emphasizes that Augustine says, "But whether, when Christ was preached to them, they would have faith from themselves, or would receive it as a gift from God, that is, whether God merely foreknew them, or also predestined them, etc." Where he notes that it is the same thing for faith to be from God giving, and for it to be

DISPUTATION III

predestined. Likewise, it is the same thing for faith to be from us, and for it to be merely foreknown; but faith which is said to be conditionally future cannot be asserted to be from us, nor denied to be from God giving; therefore, what is said to be conditionally future cannot be asserted to be merely foreknown, nor denied to be furthermore predestined. This is the summary of the second consideration. To which I respond that faith being actually and absolutely from God giving, and being predestined with that predestination which Augustine calls in this very passage the preparation of grace, that is, being from an absolute decree by which God determines to prevent the will and give it the grace necessary for believing, is the same thing according to Augustine; but faith being only hypothetically to be given, and being actually predestined, I deny is the same thing according to Augustine. For it is enough if, as it is supposed only to be given, so it is supposed to be predestined; but this is supposed. For the meaning of a conditional proposition, by which future faith is enunciated, is none other than that if God prepared the grace necessary for believing, and gave it in time, then faith would be future; or, what is the same thing, if there is absolutely the preparation of grace necessary for believing, and from that follows its donation, faith will also be future. And thus faith is always conceived to be from God, either actually giving, or hypothetically going to give: if faith exists actually, God actually gives; if it does not exist actually, but would exist, God does not actually give, but would give. And it is wrongly required, indeed it is contradictory, that God should actually give that thing which is not actually given, but would only be given.

Similarly, when it is said that faith being from us, and being merely foreknown are considered the same thing according to Augustine, a distinction must be made. For being merely foreknown by absolute foreknowledge, and not also being predestined by that absolute preparation of grace necessary for believing, I concede is the same thing according to Augustine as being from us; and therefore it must be denied as heretical. But being merely foreknown conditionally through the exclu-

DISPUTATION III

sion of the present and absolute preparation of grace, I deny is the same thing as faith being from us. For it cannot be said to be from us when, in the hypothesis from which it is foreknown to be future, necessarily includes both the preparation and the donation of grace necessary for believing; nor is faith foreknown to be future in any other way than if there is, or will be, both that preparation and that donation of grace. And thus faith, which we say is conditionally future apart from a present and conditional predefinition, is neither asserted to be future from us, nor denied to be future from God giving it in the way in which it is given.

XLVII. Thirdly, he observes that Augustine was asked by Prosper whether God's purpose was based on conditional foreknowledge, as the Semi-Pelagians wanted, or rather whether that foreknowledge was based on purpose. Hence, for Augustine to be considered to respond appropriately when he says that what is foreknown is predestined, it must be understood of conditional predestination, which alone can be the basis of conditional foreknowledge. I respond that the Pelagians did not err only about conditional foreknowledge, but especially about absolute foreknowledge; and they did not resort to conditional foreknowledge except when absolute foreknowledge failed them. Augustine corrected both errors, but the Adversaries are clearly deceived when what is said to correct the abuse of absolute foreknowledge, namely, that it is based on the present and absolute preparation of grace and the future donation of it, whenever something useful for salvation is foreknown, is interpreted as also said to correct the abuse of conditional knowledge, which will be explained more fully later.

XLVIII. Fourthly, by clear reasoning he proves that the same reasoning applies to a conditionally future thing, and an absolutely future thing, as far as concerns the necessity of a present and absolute decree, by which it becomes future. "For," he says, "from the same cause on which an absolutely future contingent thing depends, a contingent and conditional future thing must also depend.... For just as future things themselves are only distinguished in terms of the absolute and the condi-

DISPUTATION III

tional, so also the cause and efficacious decree of God can be distinguished only in this, and therefore just as the knowledge of those things is based on purpose, not the other way around, so also the knowledge and infallible cognition of these things." I respond that there is a clear disparity between those two future things, as far as concerns that necessity of an efficacious decree, and that disparity is derived from the fact that they differ in terms of absolute and conditional being. For conditional being is being entirely suspended from a condition, the existence of which is not yet determined; and what is said of it, "It is, it depends," signifies nothing other than "It would be, it would depend," if the condition were posited. Since, therefore, it is sufficient that the existence of a cause necessary for some effect be proportionate to the existence of the effect itself, it is manifest that it is sufficient if, concerning an effect of which it is said that it would be, that it would depend, that it would exist, it is also said of its cause that it would be, that it would exist, that it would cause; but this we say of the cause of a conditionally future thing. For just as we say that this future thing would be, so we suppose that its cause would be, and this sequence is reciprocal: if such a cause were to be, such an effect would be; if such an effect were to be, such a cause would be, except that this second is more necessary. In that cause, therefore, is included both the decree of God, and grace, and whatever is necessary for that futurity, not as something that is, but as something that would be.

XLIX. Of an absolutely future thing, it is not only said, "it would be," but "it will be"; therefore, it should be said absolutely, "its cause will be," and consequently, "God's decree prerequisite for it will be." And because God's decree cannot be temporal, but if it will be, it is, and was absolutely from eternity, therefore for an absolutely future thing, an absolute and present decree is required from eternity. But just as, if by impossibility that decree were temporal, and were only absolutely future, we nevertheless conceive that there would still be in God an eternal foreknowledge of it as future, and by the benefit of it, also a foreknowledge of the thing for which it is required; so also a decree which is not abso-

DISPUTATION III

lute, but which would be if it pleased God, can be for him a reason conducive to foreknowing that to which it must be presupposed. For this is the difference, that every absolutely future decree, in fact exists; but a possible decree, or one to be posited according to God's freedom, is not necessarily in fact. Hence, although we cannot suppose something to be absolutely future which is not now, we can suppose something to be posited according to God's freedom, which nevertheless is not actually posited. And just as if it were only future, and not present, it would nevertheless contribute to the futuration of the thing for which it is required, and to the present foreknowledge of it; so although it is only to be posited according to God's freedom, and not posited, it can contribute to the conditional futuration of the thing to which it must be presupposed, and to the present and conditional foreknowledge of it.

L. And thus is solved the clear reasoning, which also runs into that which Father John of St. Thomas used. But this author objects certain things of his own, which must also be refuted.

Thus he argues first: "Either Augustine, when he argues against these Semi-Pelagian heretics, and places God's decree and predestination before foreknowledge, always spoke of absolute futures, never of conditional ones; or sometimes also of conditional ones." I reply that when he treats of the necessity of a present and actual decree for the foreknowledge of free acts, he always treats of absolute futures, and never of conditional ones. But he urges: if this is so, "Therefore Augustine omitted to respond to the Semi-Pelagians, and thus was very deficient; for they resorted to the foreknowledge of these future things, and on such foreknowledge founded their opinion of admitting God's decree." I respond: I deny this consequence. For Augustine responded to them abundantly when he indicated that it is a most absurd thought, and most foolish, which would seek the motive of a present and absolute decree from that which is only conditionally future. For the Semi-Pelagians did not found on such foreknowledge their opinion of admitting God's conditional decree, but an absolute one; in which they seemed to Augustine to be more

DISPUTATION III

inept than the Pelagians themselves, as we have shown before. Therefore they were rejected because they relied on the foreknowledge of conditional things as if it were the foreknowledge of absolute things, and they resorted to future things which are not future.

LI. He argues secondly as follows: The future about which Augustine speaks in the Questions of the Pagans is a conditional future, but for that future about which he speaks in the Questions of the Pagans, he requires God's decree. Therefore, a conditional future requires God's decree. Therefore, middle knowledge collapses. I respond first by turning the argument around and thereby proving that there are no conditional predefinitions, and consequently no conditional future distinct from the absolute. Because if the decree Augustine discusses is absolute, then clearly no conditional predefinitions can be inferred from it. But the decree Augustine discusses here is absolute, as has been shown and will be shown again shortly. Therefore, there are no conditional predefinitions that can be inferred from it, and no conditional future dependent on them. And thus collapses the conditional knowledge that our Adversaries defend. I respond secondly by distinguishing the minor premise: Augustine requires God's decree for that future which he discusses in the Questions of the Pagans merely to make it future conditionally; I deny this, for Augustine never dreamed of such a thing. That this future may be profitable for salvation, and be a suitable reason why Christ would want to appear to some rather than others, and thus pass from conditional being into absolute being, I concede. And I say Augustine expresses this when he speaks of Tyre and Sidon: "If it is asked of us why such great miracles were performed among those who would not believe them, and were not performed among those who would believe if they saw them, what shall we answer? Shall we say what I said in another book, where I responded to certain questions of the pagans, without prejudice, however, to other causes which the prudent can investigate?" And having repeated that response... "This certainly we cannot say of Tyre and Sidon, and in this we recognize that these divine judgments pertain to the causes of predestina-

DISPUTATION III

tion, without prejudice to which causes I said I was responding then." And afterward, when he explains those hidden causes of predestination: "But because it was not given to them to believe, even the means by which they might believe was denied to them." Likewise: "And yet if by God's higher judgment they are not separated from the mass of perdition by the predestination of grace, neither are the divine words or deeds applied to them, through which they could believe if they heard or saw such things." Likewise: "Therefore the eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their hearts so hardened as those of the Jews, since they would have believed if they had seen such signs as these saw; but it did not profit them that they could have believed, because they were not predestined by him whose judgments are inscrutable and whose ways are unsearchable, nor would it have harmed those others, etc."

From these passages I argue as follows: If any conditional predefinition is required for conditional knowledge, it was not lacking for the Tyrians. Those hidden causes which Augustine exempts when he responds to the questions of the Pagans were lacking for the Tyrians. Therefore, those hidden causes are not conditional predefinition, but rather absolute. The major premise belongs to our Adversaries. The minor premise is Augustine's in the words above when he says: "And in this we recognize that these causes, etc." Moreover, what was lacking for the Tyrians, according to Augustine, is nothing other than the fact that it was not given to them to believe, and the means by which to believe, because they were not separated from the mass of perdition by God's higher judgment through the predestination of grace, because they were not predestined. But all these things signify nothing other than the absolute will of God, by which their conditionally future conversion would pass into an absolute one, and thus would profit them; because as I have already said, whatever was necessary for their conditionally future conversion was not lacking, and is assumed by Augustine. Therefore, what was lacking for the Tyrians is nothing other than the absolute will of God, by which their conditionally future conversion would pass into an absolute

DISPUTATION III

one and profit them. And what was lacking for the Tyrians is what he exempted when responding to the Pagans, and these were the hidden causes of predestination. Therefore, what Augustine understood by that exception was a certain absolute will and election of God, by which conditional foreknowledge would pass into absolute, and by whose benefit what was conditionally future would become useful when it passes into what is absolutely future. Augustine clearly confirms this when he says, "But it did not profit them that they could believe, because they were not predestined." As if to say, that potentiality of the Tyrians to believe, which was a potentiality, as is customarily said, consequent and joined with the conditional futurity of the effect, would have been profitable to them if they had been predestined. This, therefore, is that predestination which Augustine wants to be added to his response to the Questions of the Pagans, not a conditional predefinition. And from this is solved another objection of this Doctor who argues as follows:

LII. Thirdly, when the Semi-Pelagians objected to Augustine what he himself had said in responding to the Questions of the Pagans, they did not object to it to prove that faith foreseen and foreknown by God was the motive and principle of our justification, for Augustine had not said this in that place, nor had he even slightly insinuated it. Therefore, the Semi-Pelagians adduced this passage only to prove that what they said about middle knowledge as to its substance was not absurd, namely, that God foreknew those conditional futures, and dispensed his decrees according to that foreknowledge, but did not have a decree prior to that foreknowledge. Therefore, the decree that Augustine was reticent about, and which he now explains in the book on the Predestination of the Saints and on the Gift of Perseverance, is a decree prior to that conditional futurity.

I respond that this reasoning suffers from multiple flaws; for first, it proves that the Semi-Pelagians did not adduce Augustine's statement to prove that the foreknowledge of a conditional future gives God some motive for granting grace, on the grounds that Augustine had not said this,

DISPUTATION III

nor slightly insinuated it. Namely, he thinks the Semi-Pelagians were so faithful in reporting Augustine's opinion, and so acute in grasping it, that there can be no suspicion either of their ignorance or of fraud, even in that matter in which Augustine thought them worse than the Pelagians themselves, and more inept. So we may rightly congratulate them that at some point they even have the Thomists favorable to them.

Secondly, it assumes that the Semi-Pelagians labored to free middle knowledge, as to its substance, from the suspicion of absurdity, about which no one had ever troubled them.

Thirdly, finally, it assumes that Augustine ineptly responded to the Pagans when he did not respond to what they had asked, but to something else I know not what. For the question of the Pagans, which is variously conceived in Augustine, has this one form: "Why did the Savior, who is called Jesus, withdraw himself for so many ages?" But he who asks why he withdrew himself, what else does he ask than why did he will to withdraw himself? And he who asks why he willed to withdraw himself, what else does he ask than what reason moved his will? But to ask this is to ask, "What was the motive of his will?" Therefore, if Augustine wants to give what is asked for when he responds to this question, he must give the motive of Christ's will. But he gives nothing other than what is contained in these words: "That Christ willed to appear to men, and have his doctrine preached among them, when he knew, and where he knew there were those who would believe in him." Therefore, the Semi-Pelagians could object these words to Augustine, on the hypothesis that they were to be explained of conditional knowledge, to show from his own doctrine that the knowledge of conditional futures gives Christ the motive for that special benefit by which he manifests himself and his miracles to some rather than to others.

LIII. For that this was the thought of the Semi-Pelagians is clearly shown; first from the letters of Hilary to Augustine, where he describes the theology of the Massilians thus: "But when it is said to them, why it is preached to some, or somewhere, or not preached, or why it is now

DISPUTATION III

preached when formerly it was almost not preached to all, as now it is not preached to some nations, they say this belongs to divine foreknowledge, so that at that time, and in that place the truth was announced, or is announced to those, when and where it was foreknown that it would be believed. And they testify that they prove this not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by an earlier disputation of your holiness, where, however, you taught grace with no less clarity of truth, as is that which your holiness said in the question against Porphyry concerning the time of the Christian religion, that Christ willed to appear to men, and have his doctrine preached among them, when he knew, and where he knew there were those who would believe in him." Where you see the Massilians adducing Augustine's response to the questions of the Pagans for this purpose, to give a reason why Christ willed to appear to some rather than others, and at one time rather than another. And it is manifest even to elementary students that the reason why Christ willed something is the reason which moved him to will it, which is to be the motivating reason for willing.

This becomes still more evident when the Semi-Pelagians adduce this passage, and certain other passages of Augustine from the Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, for the same purpose, as the same Hilary reports. The sum of which was that God chooses the merits of faith and impiety in foreknowledge, so that those whom he foreknew would believe, he would provide them with grace for doing good, and those whom he foreknew would not believe, he would desert by hardening them; but that faith was ours, not from grace, which was only added to faith for subsequently doing good. Since these things, according to Augustine, tended to the view that God was moved by the foreknown merit of faith to give grace, and moved by the foreknown merit of infidelity to desert, and thus to harden, who can doubt that those things which are cited simultaneously from the response to the Questions of the Pagans tended to the same view? And therefore from these citations, they themselves show what they infer in the same Hilary, when he adds: "But they contend that fore-

DISPUTATION III

knowledge, predestination, or purpose are effective to this end, that he foreknew, or predestined, or purposed to choose those who would believe." They themselves interpret in what sense this is to be taken when they say: "Whence they understand that foreknowledge in this way, that they are foreknown because of future faith." But these things are so manifest that it is surprising that a wise man could be confused in such a clear light, or could wish others to be confused.

LIV. He nonetheless insists: "That conditionally future faith is the motive and merit for Christ's coming is erroneous and Semi-Pelagian; but Augustine does not say that what he had responded to the Questions of the Pagans is erroneous. Therefore, what he had responded should not be understood of the motive or merit for Christ's coming." I respond, always excepting the right and judgment of grammarians, by asking why Augustine rejected, as St. Thomas says, what he had said in those Questions? Was it because it was Catholic and free from error? Likewise, since it is entirely of the same nature, and also produced for the same purpose, what the same Semi-Pelagians or Massilian objected to Augustine from the Questions on the Epistle to the Romans, why was it retracted by Augustine? Was it not because "he had not yet carefully inquired into, nor found out, what the election of grace is, which is nullified if it is given according to merits"? For from this it is clearly evident that what he had said in that place was said for the purpose that that foreknown merit might be thought to be the motive for obtaining grace. But since it cannot be denied that this was the very thing in which the Semi-Pelagians afterward erred, must not the same be said of that earlier passage? Nevertheless, that was said more innocently by Augustine, both because it was not said assertively, nor so much from his own opinion as from that of the Pagans themselves, from whom alone such a response could be expected if the question they proposed was turned back on them, as was said before; and because Augustine added a necessary exception of greater consideration and other hidden causes. But if Augustine had asserted that entirely, and in the sense in which it was taken by the Semi-

DISPUTATION III

Pelagians or Massilians, and had not used the exception I mentioned, who doubts that it would have been worthy of the same censure as what he said when expounding the Epistle to the Romans?

CHAPTER IV. SOME OTHER TESTIMONIES OF AUGUSTINE EXPLAINED, AND CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THE SEMI-PELAGIANS ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

LV. The theologian of the College of Salamanca distinguishes two main aspects of the Semi-Pelagian position concerning middle knowledge: one in which these heretics erred, insofar as they maintained that grace is given on the basis of foreknowledge of conditionally future merits, and therefore of merits independent of grace itself; another, in which, although they did not philosophize heretically, they were still rejected by Augustine, namely, that they claimed this knowledge precedes divine predefinitions and is necessary for reconciling created freedom with divine providence. Since we also defend these latter points, this author contends that the Society's doctrine of middle knowledge is the very same doctrine as that of the Semi-Pelagians—not the doctrine condemned by the Church, but the one which, although not heretical, was nevertheless rejected by Augustine. From this he believes it follows that the position we defend is by no means Augustinian. Father John of St. Thomas also frequently emphasizes this same point. To understand how empty this claim is, and how far they have missed the mark regarding both the Semi-Pelagians and Augustine, it is worthwhile to briefly explain to the learned reader what the Semi-Pelagian doctrine was on this point, and what Augustine's meaning was when refuting them. This will become clear from the following propositions.

DISPUTATION III

§ I. FIRST PROPOSITION.

LVI. The Semi-Pelagians erred primarily concerning the absolute foreknowledge of certain merits that precede God's prevenient grace, and also concerning final perseverance in grace once acquired without further divine assistance. This proposition directly contradicts the Doctor of the College of Salamanca, who speaks thus: "The Semi-Pelagians, whose argument Augustine confronts, did not say that the cause of God's election of some rather than others stems from the foreknowledge of good works absolutely future, which are seen through the knowledge of vision. Rather, they derived it solely from the foreknowledge of these same works as conditionally future, as Augustine teaches in the same book, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, ch. 12, and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 9 and following." In these words, what he claims is evident from chapter 9 of *On the Gift of Perseverance*—that the Semi-Pelagians sought the cause of the election of some rather than others not from absolute foreknowledge but from conditional foreknowledge—is false. For although it is clear from that chapter that the Semi-Pelagians also appealed to conditional knowledge, there is not a single word suggesting they did not rely on absolute knowledge as much and as long as possible, as is evident from that other passage they cite from the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, where Augustine speaks thus: "But this entire argument by which we defend the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord as truly being grace—that is, as not being given according to our merits—although it is supported by the most evident testimonies of divine eloquence, nevertheless labors somewhat in the case of adults already using the freedom of their will; but when it comes to infants, and to the Mediator between God and men himself, the man Christ Jesus, every human claim of merits preceding the grace of God utterly fails, because neither are those infants discerned from others by any preceding good merits so as to belong to the liberator of mankind, nor did he," etc. "For who would listen to the claim that infants who are

DISPUTATION III

baptized in infancy leave this life because of their future merits," etc. In these words, when Augustine openly says that the Semi-Pelagians are not so easily refuted when they claim that God's grace is given according to the merits of the recipients in the case of adults as in the case of infants who die after receiving baptism, it is evident that the only cause of this difference is that in adults it was easy to imagine preceding merits, which could not be imagined in infants. But the merits that could not be imagined, or that were lacking in infants, were only absolute merits, or those absolutely preceding. Therefore, these same merits were present in adults. Consequently, in adults, the foreknowledge that represented these merits to the divine will as a suitable motive for giving grace was, according to the Semi-Pelagians, absolute foreknowledge.

LVII. Secondly, the same can be seen in Prosper's letter to Augustine, when he says: "When they are confronted with the countless multitude of infants who, apart from original sin under which all men are similarly born in the condemnation of the first man, having as yet no wills of their own and no actions of their own, are, not without God's judgment, separated, so that before they can discern between good and evil, some of them, removed from this life, are received through regeneration among the heirs of the heavenly kingdom, while others without baptism pass among the debtors of eternal death; they say that such are lost and such are saved as divine knowledge has foreseen they would become in their adult years if they were preserved to the age of mature judgment." Here I ask: to whom is this distinction of dying infants, whereby some are saved having received baptism while others are damned not having received it, presented as an objection? To those asserting that this distinction arises from absolute merits, or from conditional ones? If the latter is claimed, the objection is ridiculous, because such conditional merits are found neither less nor more in infants than in adults; thus the instance based on the lack of such merits in infants would be useless against what was said about adults. If the former is claimed, as it should be, we have our point, namely that the merits and the fore-

DISPUTATION III

knowledge by which the Semi-Pelagians thought God was moved to add grace were absolute. This is clearly confirmed by what Prosper adds, that the Semi-Pelagians, in philosophizing thus about infants, "invent future things that will not be future because past things do not exist," as if he were saying that in adults these things are not invented because past merits were thought to exist in them. What else can these past merits be if they are not those absolutely existing and thus foreknown? This is further evident from what follows, that there is "a new kind of absurdity in this philosophy about the merits of infants, in that things not to be done are foreknown, and things foreknown are not done." This would be equally absurd in the merits of adults if their foreknowledge were also supposed to be conditional. Therefore, it was supposed to be absolute.

LVIII. Thirdly, this is proved by the fact that the Pelagians did not use conditional foreknowledge, but only absolute foreknowledge, as is clear from Augustine who, when the Pelagians said that Jacob was loved because of future works that God foreknew he would do, and Esau was hated similarly because of future works, "to remove from them every hiding place of obscurity, proposed such twins, who would neither be helped by the merits of their parents, and both would die in earliest infancy, one baptized and the other without baptism." This is nothing other than saying that when the Pelagians relied on the absolutely future merits of Jacob and Esau in assigning the cause both of divine love toward one and divine hatred toward the other, Augustine presented an objection based on those twins, in whom there could be no merits except conditional ones, which Augustine shows the Pelagians believed should by no means be taken into account, in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 12, when he says, "For certainly no merits, even according to the Pelagians themselves, can be found in infants to explain why some of them are admitted to the kingdom, while others are alienated from the kingdom," and therefore Augustine adds in the passage just cited against the two letters, that they are silent in response to the instance of the two twins: "Brother," he says, "that twin who was baptized returns to you along with

DISPUTATION III

the one who was not baptized; and silently asks you whence he was separated from his brother's happiness, why he was punished with that misfortune that, while his brother was adopted as a son of God, he himself did not receive the sacrament necessary for all ages, as you admit"... "To this infant who does not speak, you completely submit your tongue and voice; to him who does not speak, you have nothing to say." And it is clear from what was said before that the Semi-Pelagians exceeded the error of the Pelagians in that they applied such conditional knowledge of merits where they could not apply absolute knowledge. For where absolute knowledge could occur, they differed only in that they halved the Pelagians' doctrine, and of all the merit that the Pelagians put before divine grace, the Semi-Pelagians thought only some part should precede, namely good will and desire, and a certain beginning of faith, for which nothing was required except the grace of creation, as is clear from the entire letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, and from the two books *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, with which Augustine responded to them. From this I argue as follows: the Semi-Pelagians did not philosophize differently about that initial merit, which they placed before divine grace in adults, than the Pelagians philosophized about complete and total merit. But the Pelagians put the absolute existence and foreknowledge of such merit before divine grace, as has been proved. Therefore, the Semi-Pelagians also put its absolute existence and foreknowledge before divine grace.

LIX. Fourthly, it is clear from Augustine, who, after presenting and rejecting Pelagius's opinion expressed in these words, "Therefore, says Pelagius, God foreknew who would be holy and immaculate through the freedom of their will, and therefore He chose them before the foundation of the world in His very foreknowledge by which He foreknew that they would be such"—which, as has already been shown and is self-evident, is understood only of absolute foreknowledge—then presents the Semi-Pelagians speaking thus: "But we say," they claim, "that our God foreknew only faith, by which we begin to believe, and therefore chose us

DISPUTATION III

before the foundation of the world and predestined us, that we might already be holy and immaculate by His grace and help." Who does not see here that the absolute foreknowledge, which the Pelagians extended to sanctity and an immaculate life, the Semi-Pelagians restricted to faith, which, elicited without God's special grace, would subsequently obtain the necessary help for a holy and immaculate life? Who also does not see that faith, "by which we begin to believe," is by no means conditional, and consequently its foreknowledge can only be called absolute? Therefore, that foreknowledge, which the Semi-Pelagians primarily put before grace, is absolute.

LX. Fifthly, it is evident because the Semi-Pelagians maintained that the foreknowledge of one's own merits, independent of divine grace, was the same that Augustine himself had approved before these matters began to be disputed; therefore, they argued *ad hominem*, from what he had said in Questions on the Epistle to the Romans. But Augustine had not said that the foreknowledge of any conditionally future merit presented God with a suitable motive for reward, but only of absolute merit. Therefore, the Semi-Pelagians maintained the foreknowledge of absolute merit, and not merely of conditional merit. The major premise is proven from Hilary's letter to Augustine, where he reports the passage commonly proposed by the Semi-Pelagians to show that their opinion now was the same as Augustine's formerly. The minor premise is proven because that opinion, that God regards conditionally future merits, or as he puts it, "future things that are not future," seems so absurd to Augustine that he wonders and is amazed that it could have occurred to the Semi-Pelagians, and would not have believed it if he did not think he should believe the testimony of Prosper and Hilary: "How men whose intelligence is not to be despised, as your letters indicate, could have thought that anyone is judged according to merits he would have had if he had lived longer in the body, I WONDER AND AM AMAZED that I cannot discover, NOR WOULD I DARE TO BELIEVE IT, if I did not dare not to believe you." These words clearly indicate that he himself never believed

DISPUTATION III

anything similar. But see whether he himself did not believe and teach something similar, if what he taught on the Epistle to the Romans about the foreknowledge of the faith of the elect is to be understood as conditional foreknowledge. For so he speaks: "You will say to me, Why does he still find fault? For who resists his will?" These are the Apostle's words, to which Augustine adds his own commentary thus: "To this inquiry he so responds that we may understand that even spiritual men, not living according to the earthly man, can perceive the first merit of faith and impiety, how God by foreknowledge chooses believers and condemns unbelievers; neither choosing the former on the basis of works, nor condemning the latter on the basis of works, but both granting to the former's faith that they may work well, and hardening the latter's impiety by abandoning them, so that they work evil." And again, "All are equal before merit, nor can election be named in things that are wholly equal, since the Holy Spirit is not given except to believers... Therefore God does not choose anyone's works in foreknowledge, which He Himself is going to give; but He chose faith in foreknowledge, so that whomever He foreknew would believe, He chose to give the Holy Spirit to him," etc. In these passages I ask how our adversaries want us to understand what is said about the first merit of faith and impiety, and about their foreknowledge, which Augustine puts before both election to receive the Holy Spirit and the grace of good works, and the decree of hardening? Is it so that the sense is, when the first merit of faith was both existent and foreknown as absolutely future, God chose believers to whom He would give the Holy Spirit; likewise, when the merit of impiety was both existent and foreknown as absolutely future, God decreed to harden unbelievers by abandoning them? And if they understand it thus, which is the only way it can be rightly understood, then Augustine there deals with absolute and not conditional foreknowledge; and consequently the Semi-Pelagians, who make this opinion of Augustine their own, claim absolute foreknowledge of certain merits, which election to grace or abandonment follows, and not merely conditional foreknowledge, which is our point. Or should Augustine be

DISPUTATION III

interpreted so that the sense is, when the merit of faith or impiety was neither yet existent nor yet foreknown as absolutely future, but was foreknown only as conditionally future, God chose those who would believe only conditionally to give them the Holy Spirit, and those who would be unbelievers only conditionally to deny them the same, and to harden them when abandoned and forsaken by Him! Could this, I ask, be Augustine's meaning? And if they contend that it is, how much do they differ from those who say that God, when there were no absolutely future good or bad merits of infants, nor were any foreknown, but only conditionally, chose for salvation those whose good merits He foreknew in that way, and for damnation those whose evil merits He foreknew? And how could Augustine, who taught the former when he did not fully understand this question, wonder and be amazed, and not be able to believe that some could be found who, as he says, would dream up the latter? Does this not clearly convince us that the foreknowledge of merits on which the Semi-Pelagians primarily relied to support their error was absolute?

From this you will also understand that Augustine, when in his response to the Questions of the Pagans he had indicated that the reason why the Gospel is offered to some and not to others should be sought in conditional foreknowledge, by which it would be known who would believe and who would not believe, did not in any way say this because he thought it should be attributed to the merit of faith or the demerit of unbelief; for he would have thought what he later marveled could have come into anyone's mind, and what, as we saw earlier, he judged to be most absurd, most inept, and most insane. Rather, given a supposed general will to save all and call them to faith, a reason had to be sought why some were not called, and at that time Augustine thought it could be derived from the fact that, by conditional foreknowledge of future unbelief, the call would be understood to be useless, as Prosper also speaks from their viewpoint when he says in his letter that many are not renewed by the sacrament of mercy "because what would not be USEFUL for them to be renewed is foreknown," excepting, as he says, consideration of more

DISPUTATION III

hidden causes. Augustine therefore thought only that this foreknowledge in those who would not believe was an impediment to their calling, but in those who would believe it was only a cause removing a hindrance.

LXI. Sixthly, it is evident from what Hilary reports in his letter to Augustine, that the Semi-Pelagians could not bear to have the case of infants brought forward as an example for adults, on which point Augustine also attacks them. There is no other reason for this than that they thought there were preceding merits in adults but not in infants, as is also clear from Augustine when he says: "From the mouth of infants and nursing babes God has perfected the praise of His grace, while what we see in them, that is, in infants, whose liberation no good merits precede... this we do not hesitate at all to believe happens also in adults, not thinking that grace is given to anyone according to his merits." Therefore, the Semi-Pelagians did not think that these merits of adults preceded only in conditional foreknowledge, because that was the only way they thought the merits of infants preceded, yet they wanted the cause and reason for infants to be different. Therefore, they thought they preceded in absolute foreknowledge, while the merits of infants preceded only in conditional foreknowledge. This is confirmed, and

LXII. Seventhly, it is evident from the way in which Augustine, Prosper, and Hilary signify the concept of merits opposed to that conditional futurity which the Semi-Pelagians invented in the merits of infants, which, because it is opposed, can be nothing other than the concept of merits existing and foreknown absolutely. For Augustine, against those conditional merits of infants, urges the passage of Paul saying that man will be judged according to what he did in the body. "Did," he says, "he did not add, would have done." "But how this came into the minds of such men I do not know, that future merits that are not going to be future should be punished or rewarded in infants." And soon after, "What, therefore, is 'according to what he did through the body' if not according to what he did during the time when he was in the body?" And finally, "How men whose intelligence is not to be despised could have thought

DISPUTATION III

that anyone is judged not only according to the merits he had while he was in the body, but according to the merits he would have had if he had lived longer in the body," etc. Here you see Augustine opposing what someone did to what he would have done, and saying that what he would have done is a future that is not a future, if indeed it does not pass from conditional to absolute; similarly, he opposes the merit that someone had to the merit that he would have had if he had lived longer in the body, which likewise can be nothing other than opposing absolute merit to conditional merit. And so there can be no doubt that by "what someone did," "what someone had," and similar expressions, Augustine indicates something absolute, not something conditional. But both he and Prosper and Hilary express in exactly the same way the merits that the Semi-Pelagians put before divine grace in adults. Therefore, there can be no doubt that those merits were absolute and not merely conditional. I prove this assumption by various testimonies from the two books *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, and from the two letters of Prosper and Hilary. For Augustine attacks the Semi-Pelagians for saying that increased faith is the reward of begun faith, which was nothing other than saying that grace is given to adults to perfect faith because it was merited by one who began to believe. To this also pertains what is said in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*, ch. 17: "but these things," say the Semi-Pelagians, "are granted to us by God at the request of the faith that begins from us." Likewise, that they said God chooses us because we have believed, Augustine responds: "Not because we have believed, but that we might believe, He chose us... Not because we have believed, but that we might believe, we are called." Likewise, that they said, "God requires the beginning of faith by which we first begin to believe in Christ," and that "it is not a gift of God, so that when this has preceded, the rest follow as if by this merit." And Prosper, in his letter to Augustine, reports that they believed "men arrive at this grace by which we are reborn in Christ through natural faculty, by asking, seeking, knocking, so that therefore they receive, therefore they find, therefore

DISPUTATION III

they enter because by making good use of the good of nature, they have merited to arrive at this saving grace by the help of initial grace." Likewise, "it should not be doubted that the believer was devoted because he willed it." By this word the preceding merit of good yet natural (that is, independent of grace) will is expressed. Likewise, "Those who have spontaneously believed in God receive by the merit of belief the help of grace," namely, for more perfect faith and other good works. Likewise, "The freedom of man is helped if he chooses what God commands." Likewise, "Therefore he is helped because he willed it." Similarly, Hilary reports that the Semi-Pelagians held that "men by the merit by which they willed and believed they could be healed of their disease, obtain both the increase of their faith itself and the effect of their whole healing." Likewise, "Grace is not denied if such a will is said to precede," namely, by which someone wants to be healed. That is to say, grace is not denied if it is said to be given because the good merit of that will preceded. Who now does not see that the merit by which someone began, by which someone believed, which preceded, by which someone made good use of natural good, by which someone willed, by which someone chose, is opposed to conditionally future merit in the same way as what someone did is opposed to what he would have done, and what someone had is opposed to what he would have had? If, therefore, from that opposition which Augustine makes between what someone did and what he would have done, and between what someone had and what he would have had, we understand the first to signify something absolute, the second something conditional, who can doubt that both Augustine himself and Prosper and Hilary, by that merit by which someone began, by which he believed, etc., designated an absolutely real merit? And this is what they themselves say the Semi-Pelagians put before divine grace; therefore, they relied on the foreknowledge of absolute merit and consequently on absolute foreknowledge.

LXIII. Finally, these words of Prosper should be considered: "And thus, since in those who have received the time of free will there are

DISPUTATION III

two things that bring about human salvation, namely, the grace of God and the obedience of man, they (the Semi-Pelagians) want obedience to be prior to grace, so that the beginning of salvation should be believed to depend on him who is saved, not on Him who saves, and the will of man should procure for itself the aid of divine grace, not grace subject the human will to itself." In these words I ask our opponents in what sense they think the Semi-Pelagians said that man's obedience is prior to God's grace. Is it because, before grace was decreed, obedience was foreknown as conditionally future? Or because it was foreknown as future also absolutely? If the second is said, as it should be, we have our point. If the first, why did they distinguish between adults and infants, saying that this foreknowledge precedes "in those who have received the time of free will"? Did they not think it preceded also in those who did not receive it? Who does not see that an absolute precedence is signified here, which, because it could not exist in infants, they said existed only in those who received the time of free will, that is, in adults?

And these things are so clear that it is to be feared I may seem to the learned reader to have spent unnecessary effort on this question. But the error of the Doctor of Salamanca, who said that "the Semi-Pelagians did not say that the cause of the election of some rather than others stems from the foreknowledge of good works absolutely future, which are seen through the knowledge of vision, but solely from the foreknowledge of the same works as conditionally future," will easily win pardon for this fault. This will be further refuted by what will soon be said.

§ II. SECOND PROPOSITION.

LXIV. The Semi-Pelagians resorted to conditional knowledge only when they could not appeal to absolute foreknowledge. This can be gathered from the arguments by which the previous proposition was proven. For Augustine clearly indicates this when he says that there is a struggle among those of greater age against the Semi-Pelagians, but that

DISPUTATION III

their entire assertion of human merits preceding God's grace fails when it comes to infants. "For who," he says, "would listen to what is said—that infants baptized in that infantile age die having departed from this life for their future merits?" As if to say, in adults they by no means fall into such absurdity as to say that they receive grace or glory for future hypothetical merits, but only in infants, in whom no other merits could be devised except those future under a hypothesis.

Prosper clearly signifies the same when he says: "And when the countless multitude of infants is objected to them... they say that such are lost and such are saved, as divine knowledge has foreseen they would have been in their later years, if they had been preserved to the age of activity." Here you see that they only resort to foreknowledge of conditional merits when the distinction among infants, whereby some are saved while others perish, is objected to them. Prosper also clearly indicates this when he says that they "contrive the future which will not be future because the past does not exist." This they did not do in adults, in whom they believed there were past merits. Augustine again, when he says: "Into this opinion (that infants are said to be judged according to what is foreknown they would have done had they lived), which certainly every human understanding supported by even minimal reason, and especially a Christian one, abhors, those were compelled who wished to be free from the Pelagian error, yet still believed that grace is given according to our merits and moreover thought this should be put forward in disputation." And soon after: "But if this is not said, which you see with how great an error it is said, what remains except that we confess, with the fog of contention removed, that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, which the Catholic Church defends against the Pelagian heresy, and that we perceive this with more evident truth especially in infants?" Here you see both that the Semi-Pelagians were compelled by the instance of infants to resort to conditional knowledge, and that Catholics as if by more evident truth compelled them, while urging that grace at least is not given to infants according to merits. This truth was

DISPUTATION III

more evident because it concerned absolute merits, which since it is more evident in infants than in adults that there are none, the Semi-Pelagians, compelled by this instance, took refuge in conditional merits, never about to enter upon so absurd a thought unless necessity had urged it.

LXV. It is furthermore evident from the letters of Prosper and Hilary and from Augustine's two books on the predestination of the saints and on the gift of perseverance, that the Semi-Pelagians never employed that conditional knowledge except on these two occasions. First, when it concerned, as I said, that distinction among infants. Second, when it was asked why the Gospel is proposed to some adults rather than to others; for they used to this end Augustine's response to the questions of the Pagans, about which we spoke above. Indeed, since they said that initial merit, which they put before divine grace, was the will to believe and a certain beginning of faith, Catholics, as was obvious, objected that such will to believe and beginning of faith presupposed a certain preceding distinction from God's providence, by which it happens that at one time rather than another, and to one nation rather than to another, the Gospel is proposed. They, therefore, since they could not easily find some merit prior to that preaching, nor yet were willing to confess that the distinction between those to be called and those not to be called was arbitrary for God, abused conditional knowledge by saying that God's will in this regard was equal toward all. The reason why this will lacks effect in those who are not called is the uselessness of calling from their conditionally foreknown obstinacy: for God ought not to confer useless benefits on the obstinate, nor can they attribute the cause of that deprivation to anything else but their conditionally future and conditionally foreknown hardening. This is evident from Prosper's letter to Augustine, where he reports their doctrine thus: "They say that the Lord has foreseen who would believe, and that times and ministries of teachers are dispensed to each nation in such a way that the good faith of wills was going to arise. And that statement, that God wills all men to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth, does not falter, since those who could have been

DISPUTATION III

instructed in the worship of the one true God by natural intelligence, and who did not hear the Gospel because they would not have believed, are inexcusable." He adds, "The sacrament of divine mercy pertains to all men, by which many are not renewed because it is foreknown that they would not have it as useful to be renewed." It is evident that, with all other things being equal in antecedent and absolute terms, the herald of the Gospel and the minister of baptism meet one person but not another. If you ask a Semi-Pelagian the reason for this, he has nothing to say except that, granted not everyone whom the herald meets is conditionally foreseen to believe, still everyone whom the herald does not meet is foreseen conditionally not to believe, and this is the reason why God could not will the herald to meet them, since He would will the herald to meet everyone conditionally foreseen to believe. The same is evident from Hilary's letter, which states: "They agree that every man perished in Adam, and that no one can be freed from there by his own will; but they consider this consistent with truth or congruent with preaching that, when the opportunity to obtain salvation is announced to those prostrate and never to rise by their own powers, by the merit whereby they have willed and believed that they can be healed from their merit, they might obtain both the increase of that faith and the effect of complete healing." Here you have the first merit of pious belief and inchoate faith, given the preaching, which when Hilary explained more fully, he adds the Catholics' objection: "But when it is said to them, why is it preached to some or in some places, or not preached in others, or why is it now preached when formerly it was not preached to almost everyone, as it is now not preached to some peoples?" Here that prior will to believe fails, and the conception of healing from fear of punishment, about which he spoke shortly before. For these cannot exist before hearing the preaching—that is, there is a lack of something absolutely foreknown by whose merit the preaching of the Gospel might be granted, just as the increase of faith is granted. And therefore they resort to conditionally foreseen rationale: for the Semi-Pelagians respond thus: "They say it is of divine foreknowledge, that the

DISPUTATION III

truth is announced at that time and in that place and to those when and where it was foreknown that it would be believed." From which it is evidently established that to those putting forward absolute merits, such things were objected by Catholics that they could not respond except by fleeing to conditional merits, and consequently that they used the foreknowledge of conditional things only when the foreknowledge of absolute things was lacking. For if, when they said that the foreknowledge of inchoate faith obtains its increase, they understood conditional foreknowledge, would the distinction between those to whom the Gospel is preached and those to whom it is not be vainly objected to them? Who would be so dull that, when they supposed only conditional foreknowledge of those who believe or do not believe, by whose benefit grace is granted for increasing faith, he would doubt that they would apply similar foreknowledge to those of whom some are called and others are not? Was it more difficult to understand what these were conditionally foreseen to do than what those were? And who does not see that the Semi-Pelagians faced a necessity here, which they did not face there, of resorting to conditional knowledge, and thus they only resorted to it when absolute knowledge was not helpful?

LXVI. And from this it is first gathered what was that opinion of the Semi-Pelagians which Prosper represents in these words: "But those who will believe, and those who are going to remain in that faith which hereafter is to be aided by God's grace, God foreknew before the foundation of the world; and He predestined to His kingdom those whom, having been called freely, He foresaw would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end." Where when he says "in that faith which hereafter is to be aided by God's grace," he indicates that they did not acknowledge grace by which the beginnings of faith were aroused, but by which only the increases were aided; or if some grace was to be called necessary even for the beginning of faith, it was that grace of creation which suffices for asking, seeking, knocking, whereby anyone can then be admitted to the saving grace of Christ, as he reports later. Simi-

DISPUTATION III

larly, when he says "those who are going to remain in that faith," he means those who would remain or persevere without any other special benefit than that which was necessary for them to reach that state. This is clear from what Hilary says to Augustine: "As to what your holiness says, that no one perseveres unless by receiving the virtue of perseverance, they accept this only insofar as it is attributed to a preceding free will, however sluggish." And Augustine also took it in this sense in his book on the gift of perseverance, where he portrays the Semi-Pelagians speaking thus: "But these things," they say, "that they may be given to us by God, faith obtains, which begins from us, which faith, both to begin to have and to persevere in until the end, they contend is our own, as if we did not receive it from the Lord." From which it is clear that this was the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians: given the preaching of divine doctrine, God absolutely foreknew who would believe by their own power and without any internal gift of grace, and was so moved by the merit of that belief that He gave grace necessary for the increase of that faith and for the holiness of life; which once acquired, He similarly foreknew absolutely who would persevere in that state without any other special benefit, but only by the good use of their free will; and was similarly moved by the foreknowledge of this perseverance to decree glory for them. And thus both the predestination to later grace is posterior to the absolute foreknowledge of incipient faith, and the predestination to glory is posterior to the foreknowledge of that same faith persevering to the end without special grace. And because infants were immediately objected, they were thrown into this absurdity, that they said infants were distinguished by the foreknowledge of conditional merits. Similarly, when the distinction among those to whom the Gospel is proposed was objected, they devised a conditionally foreseen future obstinacy of all to whom it is not proposed.

LXVII. From this it is secondly gathered what Augustine's meaning is when he postpones the foreknowledge that was placed before predestination by the Semi-Pelagians to that same predestination. For Augus-

DISPUTATION III

tine concedes that those who would believe were foreknown, but at the same time he proves that they were not foreknown to believe from their own powers; and therefore when God foreknew faith, He foreknew His own gift; and because He could not foreknow His gift as future unless there was a will to give, which is a kind of predestination, before faith was thus foreknown, it was predestined—that is, before faith was foreknown as absolutely future, God conceived the will to give the grace necessary for eliciting faith. For this predestination of faith, to Augustine, is nothing other than the preparation of grace. Similarly, he confesses that the perseverance in faith and holiness of the elect was absolutely foreknown, but at the same time he proves that it was not foreknown without a special benefit, whereby they were not only called to faith and holiness, but moreover were placed in such an order of things that that state of holiness would coincide with death. Therefore, when God foreknew this end, He foreknew His own benefit, nor could He foreknow it unless there was a will to benefit. Therefore, the foreknowledge of perseverance is posterior to this will, which also ought to be called predestination. And thus both of those foreknowledges—namely of incipient and of persevering faith, which the Semi-Pelagians thought to be prior to predestination—are in reality posterior to it. That this is Augustine's reasoning is evident from his entire books on the predestination of the saints and on the gift of perseverance, so that it would be useless to refer to any one passage, since so many occur there. The conclusion of chapter 17 on the gift of perseverance may suffice, which runs thus: "These gifts of God, which are given to the elect who are called according to God's purpose, among which gifts are both to begin to believe and to persevere in faith to the end of this life, as we have proven by such a great testimony of reasons and authorities—these gifts of God, I say, if there is no predestination which we defend, are not foreknown by God. But they are foreknown; this, therefore, is the predestination which we defend." What could be more connected than where you have supposed that the preparation of grace should be called predestination, which Augustine often repeats, and

DISPUTATION III

at the same time also have proven that neither the beginning of faith nor its perseverance can be obtained without special grace, which Augustine also proved, to conclude that neither incipient nor persevering faith is foreknown if it is not predestined? For it cannot be foreknown if it is not future; but it cannot be future if the necessary grace is not prepared; but for grace to be prepared for believing is for faith to be predestined. Therefore, from first to last, if there is no predestination of faith, there is no foreknowledge of it, and if there is foreknowledge of it, there is also predestination. Which is most true of absolute foreknowledge, as I said. For conditional foreknowledge does not require that there now be a predestination of faith any more than that there now be intellect and will of the one whose faith is conditionally foreknown. And just as it is enough for that foreknowledge that the intellect and will of the one who would conditionally believe be involved in the hypothesis, from which faith is foreseen to follow as depending on God's freedom, whose it is to posit that or not posit it, when we say, "If God were to produce such a man with that faculty of understanding and willing in such circumstances, faith would follow"; so it is enough if in the same hypothesis there be involved, as depending in the same way on God's freedom, that predestination of faith, which is nothing other than the preparation of grace, and we say, "If God were to give grace necessary for believing to such a man, he would believe."

LXVIII. And from that connection and sequence of absolute foreknowledge from predestination, Augustine thinks it happened that sometimes foreknowledge is taken for predestination, as when it is said, "God has not cast away His people whom He foreknew." For "what he says here, 'He foreknew,' is not rightly understood," says Augustine, "except as 'He predestined.'" If anyone thinks this foreknowledge and predestination is conditional, he must be blind under the highest sun; for it is manifest that Augustine confuses this foreknowledge and predestination with the absolute election of those to be saved, which the Apostle calls "the election of grace." For thus Augustine: "In this election, therefore,

DISPUTATION III

and in these remnants, which were saved through the election of grace, he wanted the people to be understood, which therefore God did not cast away, because He foreknew. This is that election by which He elected those whom He willed in Christ before the foundation of the world, that they should be holy and immaculate in His sight in charity, predestining them to the adoption of children."

This, moreover, was the head of the whole dispute between Augustine and the Semi-Pelagians. For as to what they added about the conditionally foreseen merits of dying infants, although Augustine refutes it, yet he thinks it more to be despised than refuted, in these words: "Although, as I said, this opinion, whereby they think that in the dying or dead are punished sins which they are foreseen to have done if they had lived, I am even ashamed to refute, lest we should seem to have considered it to be of some moment, which we preferred to restrain by disputation than to pass over in silence." He also refutes by the example of the people of Tyre the conditional foreknowledge of those who would believe and those who would not believe as the reason why the Gospel is proposed to some and not to others, who both were conditionally foreseen to believe and yet were not called. "These things certainly," he says, "cannot be said of Tyre and Sidon." And because both of these instances were proposed to the Semi-Pelagians who said that the absolute foreknowledge of some merit of ours is the cause of grace, when both of their responses have been refuted, what remains unshaken is the principal conclusion against them, that there is no absolute foreknowledge of our merit that does not presuppose the absolute preparation of the grace necessary for it—that is, predestination.

LXIX. From this you may gather, thirdly, that our adversaries are deceived by a perpetual illusion when they both indistinctly interpret what the Semi-Pelagians commonly say about the foreknowledge of merits as concerning conditional foreknowledge, which for them is middle knowledge, because it follows from no predefinition; and similarly interpret whatever Augustine hurls against them to show that there is no such

DISPUTATION III

foreknowledge that is not connected with predestination, as if it were said to exclude conditional knowledge independent of the present decree of the divine will—that is, to exclude middle knowledge. This hallucination can be seen in the Doctor of the College of Salamanca, who contends that the question we are now discussing was proposed to Augustine by Prosper according to the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians, and after he has represented the place in which that proposition occurs, he adds: "Where, as you see, St. Prosper explicitly proposes to St. Augustine this same question that we are now discussing: namely, whether the divine and efficacious purpose or decree precedes and is in some way the reason for knowing those future conditional things, such that the infallibility of foreknowledge rests on the aforesaid purpose or decree? Or, on the contrary, does the infallibility of the divine decree rest on some foreknowledge that precedes it?" But to show how foreign this interpretation is to Prosper's mind, his words with which he questions Augustine should be brought forward in this way: "Whether foreknowledge of God so remains according to purpose, that those very things which are proposed are to be understood as foreknown? Or do these vary through kinds of causes and species of persons, because calls are diverse, so that in those who are saved without being about to do anything, God's purpose alone seems to exist, while in those who are going to do something good, purpose can stand through foreknowledge? Or, although uniformly foreknowledge cannot be divided from purpose by temporal distinction, is foreknowledge nonetheless in some order supported by purpose, and just as nothing happens in any affairs which divine knowledge has not prevented, so nothing of good flows into our participation that has not flowed from God as author?"

LXX. "Here," says the Doctor of the College of Salamanca, "St. Prosper explicitly proposes this question, whether the efficacious decree precedes and is the reason for knowing future conditionals?" But I do not doubt that the prudent reader will easily judge with me that this author sees what is not there. For what, I ask, is found in all those words of Pros-

DISPUTATION III

per by which that question is expressed, whether the efficacious decree is the reason for knowing future conditionals? Is there any trace in that entire oration of Prosper by which either conditional knowledge or the conditional future is expressed? "This is clear," he says, "from those words, 'Whether through foreknowledge purpose can stand?'" But I contend especially from those that the contrary is clear, and that foreknowledge is by no means conditional but absolute. For that entire part of the question must be taken, "Or do these vary through kinds of causes and species of persons, because calls are diverse, so that in those who are saved without being about to do anything, God's purpose alone seems to exist, while in those who are going to do something good, purpose can stand through foreknowledge?" Where it is manifest that infants are distinguished from adults in this, that in infants there seems to be only purpose without foreknowledge, while in adults purpose stands through foreknowledge. He is therefore evidently speaking of foreknowledge that does not pertain to infants, such that it can support the purpose of their salvation, but does pertain to adults. What other foreknowledge is there that does not pertain to infants and does pertain to adults, if not absolute foreknowledge? Therefore, he especially understands that here. And I am very surprised that this theologian, who has so diligently looked at the face of Augustine and Prosper, interprets the purpose of which there is speech here in such a way that it also embraces the decree prior to conditional knowledge, since it is necessary to be a stranger to the doctrine of Augustine and even of Prosper, who does not know that this word in these disputations, from the usage of these authors, pertains only to those to be saved, whereas the decree prior to conditional knowledge, if there is any, pertains also to the reprobate. I add Prosper's words, which are joined to the above, where he proposes to Augustine to explain, "How through this preaching of the purpose of God, by which those who are preordained to eternal life become faithful, none of those who are to be exhorted is impeded, etc." I add also Augustine's words from the book on rebuke and grace, on the occasion of which there was a disturbance from

DISPUTATION III

the Semi-Pelagians. For he speaks thus: "Therefore he wants to be understood as those called whom he called according to purpose, lest some be thought to be among these called and not elected. For whoever are elect, they are without doubt also called, but not whoever are called are consequently elect. Those therefore are elect, as has often been said, who are called according to purpose, who are also predestined and foreknown. If any of these perishes, God is deceived, etc." Again: "Nor should it move us that God does not give this perseverance to certain of His sons. For far be it that this should be the case, if they were of those predestined and called according to purpose who are truly sons of the promise." Again: "They themselves can be called, but not elect, because they are not called according to purpose." The same in the book on the gift of perseverance, where that statement, "They were not of us," is thought to be said against those "who are not predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things." He has the same in the book on the predestination of the saints, chapters 16, 17, 18, and elsewhere throughout, so that it is manifest that this purpose cannot pertain to the reprobate. Yet it will pertain, if indeed it is the purpose of conditionally justifying and saving, and even the people of Tyre themselves will be able to be considered, according to Augustine's mind, as predestined according to purpose, if indeed that purpose of which Augustine speaks pertains to that repentance of theirs which is believed would have been future on hypothesis; nor will anything remain except that they be called sons of the promise.

LXXI. Prosper's meaning is therefore to be gathered from what was said before, for since he had told Augustine that the Massilians taught that the absolute foreknowledge of incipient faith should be put before the purpose of giving grace, and the absolute foreknowledge of that same faith and grace persevering to the end without any other special benefit should be put before the purpose of giving glory; but in infants, who cannot be subject to the absolute foreknowledge of any merit, recourse must be had to conditional foreknowledge; he proposes a three-part question: The first part is, whether purpose and foreknowledge are

DISPUTATION III

so related that universally the foreknowledge of some merit precedes purpose, and whether that incipient faith itself and that persevering to the end, which Catholics would say was proposed in the preparation of grace, should rather be said to be foreknown independently of that same grace? This is the sense of the first part of the proposed question, which reads thus: "Whether foreknowledge of God so remains according to purpose, that those very things which are proposed are to be understood as foreknown?" The second part of the question is, whether a distinction should be used, and when it is established concerning infants that nothing could be foreknown except what is inept and useless for exhibiting the motive of an absolute purpose, should it be said that, as far as infants are concerned, the purpose of justifying and saving follows from no foreknowledge of merits; but in adults, concerning whom it seems possible to have a foreknowledge of merits suitable for founding purpose, namely absolute foreknowledge, should it be thought that purpose really follows from such foreknowledge? And he always understands the foreknowledge of merits independent of grace. This is the sense of the second part, which reads thus: "Or do these vary through kinds of causes and species of persons, and because calls are diverse, in those who are saved without being about to do anything, God's purpose alone seems to exist, while in those who are going to do something good, purpose can stand through foreknowledge?" The third part of the question is, whether not only in infants, in whom it is clear that the purpose of grace and salvation follows from no foreknowledge, but in adults also it should be said that the absolute foreknowledge itself of any merit is posterior to the purpose of giving grace necessary for such merit, and thus universally and with respect to all those to be saved, the purpose of saving grace has its reason in no foreknowledge of merits, but rather all foreknowledge of merits suitable for moving the divine will is posterior to the purpose by which the grace prerequisite for such merits had to be prepared. This is the sense of the last part, which reads thus: "Or, although uniformly foreknowledge cannot be divided from purpose by temporal distinction, is foreknowledge

DISPUTATION III

nonetheless in some order supported by purpose, and just as nothing happens in any affairs which divine knowledge has not prevented, so nothing of good flows into our participation that has not flowed from God as author?" This is the genuine understanding of that entire question. From which it is clear that nothing is less being treated by Prosper than that he asks Augustine whether conditional knowledge should be admitted which is not preceded by a present and actual decree. And therefore nothing can be gathered from Augustine's response in favor of that decree preceding conditional knowledge. For although the response is not in the same order in which those questions were proposed, nevertheless from the two books on the predestination of the saints and on the gift of perseverance, it is sufficiently clear that Augustine responded negatively to the first question, while he proves that grace precedes all merit and therefore the purpose of grace does not follow from the foreknowledge of any merit. It is clear that he responds similarly negatively to the second; that is, he does not approve that distinction of infants from adults, but rather from the fact that in infants the purpose of salvation cannot be said to have arisen from any foreknowledge of merits, neither should it be said in adults. Whence it follows that the rationale is the same for all, and the purpose of salvation is independent of the foreknowledge of merits in infants, which for Prosper is "to exist alone"; but in adults it is the cause of that foreknowledge, which is the response to the third part of the question, and it is affirmative. There is therefore nothing here in favor of the decree prior to the knowledge of conditionals.

LXXII. And from this it is clear that Father John of St. Thomas also did not grasp Prosper's meaning, when he says that this question about Middle Knowledge was proposed by him in these terms—whether, namely, the decree neither stands nor operates infallibly except by supposing foreknowledge of those things that are future, or whether foreknowledge itself is supported by purpose, so that by reason of decree or purpose God knows what each one will do, and what happens in any or-

DISPUTATION III

der of things. It is clear, I say, that these terms are nowhere to be found, except in the opinion of the adversaries and good will; and that they take conditional foreknowledge where absolute is indicated. And therefore they are consequently also deceived when they think that what Augustine says about the necessity of predestination for foreknowledge, about which he is questioned by Prosper, is said about conditional foreknowledge.

LXXIII. Nor do the arguments that Father John of St. Thomas adduces to this end have any force: e.g., that what Augustine says would be false, that God promised the faith of spiritual children of Abraham not from His foreknowledge, but from His predestination, as he says in the book on the predestination of the saints. For it is certain that Augustine understands there faith absolutely future; for God did not promise conditional faith, nor does he mean anything other than that God did not promise it in the way that an astrologer promises a future eclipse, which he promises only from his foreknowledge, since its cause is not in his power. But God, who has the cause of faith in Himself, namely grace, cannot promise it except from the preparation of such a cause, but this is to promise it from His predestination. And what this author objects is empty, that if without present predestination God foreknew faith as conditionally future, He would not promise it from His predestination, contrary to Augustine. This, I say, is empty. Because God cannot promise it except from that from which He knows it would conditionally follow, but He knows it would conditionally follow from grace, which He would give, and from the preparation of that grace—that is, from predestination, not which now is, but which would be. Because, as has often been said, this is what that knowledge declares. Therefore, it is always true that God cannot promise faith except from His predestination, either which is absolutely, if faith is to be absolutely, or which would be in the hypothesis, from which faith would be future. Therefore, there is nothing in that statement of Augustine against Middle Knowledge.

LXXIV. Nor is there anything in what is brought from chapters 18 and 19 on the predestination of saints, where Augustine denies that

DISPUTATION III

the beginning of faith is foreknown otherwise than because it was predestined, according to the purpose of him who works all things. For he speaks of absolute foreknowledge, which God cannot have of future faith unless He predestines it with that predestination, which he always calls the preparation of grace necessary for believing. Nor therefore does Middle Knowledge fall, as it seems to the adversary, because although it represents both faith and the free will to believe as following conditionally without predestination that now is, yet not without predestination that would be; for that predestination is included in the condition from whose supposition faith is foreknown to follow. And therefore to this predestination or preparation of grace we always subject free supernatural consent, against the Semi-Pelagians trying to exempt it.

LXXV. Nor likewise does that argument of Augustine whereby he infers that if God foreknows those who will believe and does not predestine, God is chosen by men, not men by God, run against Middle Knowledge, as the adversary speaks. For that which is so enormously lame cannot rightly run. For, to omit the fact that that election from the part of the object ought to be absolute, and it seems intolerable according to Augustine's usage that the people of Tyre and Sidon, who were conditionally to be justified and saved, should be called elect, it should always be kept before our eyes that the Semi-Pelagians felt that God foreknew faith as future both absolutely and conditionally, independently of all preparation of grace, which here coincides with election. From this, that statement could well be turned against them, that God was to be elected by men who would believe both absolutely and conditionally, not men by God. But what harm is this to us, who, since we assert that neither is faith absolutely future without the preparation of grace, which now is, nor conditionally future without the preparation which would be, consequently confess both that the absolute future faith of men is from election, which now is, and that conditional future faith is from election, which would be, and thus either all who would believe are elected or to be elected, in the way in which they are to believe? For what he further

DISPUTATION III

requires for Augustine's meaning, that we confess there is some help for the free will to believe, which is infallible and can never be frustrated, independently of the consent of our will even foreseen under a condition, we will confess that this is according to Augustine's meaning, when it has been shown to us that it is not against the meaning of Trent.

LXXVI. Finally, what this author says, that Augustine reduces all things to God's will, and hands down a general rule that no gift of God or what is to be done by His giving is foreknown by God as future, unless it is predestined; that He cannot know that He will give those things unless He predestines; that whenever among any interpreters of God's word we read God's foreknowledge and it concerns the calling of the elect, we ought to include predestination in foreknowledge—this has the same explanation: Namely, that Augustine deals with the absolute foreknowledge of things future, about which the Semi-Pelagians also were chiefly disputing, nor does he mean anything other than that we should believe that absolute preparation of grace precedes that absolute foreknowledge, which they denied, as is clear from what we said above. Nor does anything else follow from this against Middle Knowledge, than that God cannot foreknow any good as conditionally future, unless He foreknows that it would follow from the condition of the preparation of grace, and that this preparation is necessary for the foreknowledge of all future good, but in one way or another, according as that good is future in one way or another. And what he urges, from the fact that what is conditionally future can become absolutely future by the mere, as he says, purification of the condition, it follows that if some good is foreknown to be conditionally future without predestination that now is, it can also be foreknown to be absolutely future without it, contrary to what Augustine thinks—this, I say, does not help him at all. Because, since the condition that is said to be purified is the condition of grace necessary for the future good, to purify the condition is nothing other than to decree that grace absolutely, which is to prepare it absolutely. Therefore, it implies that there is purification of the condition and there is not absolute prepara-

DISPUTATION III

tion of grace, which preparation alone Augustine requires as predestination.

LXXVII. Thus is solved the argument which this Author claims is, in his view, convincing, but in our judgment, as he presents it, is formless, cobbled together from disorganized and poorly connected parts. For he says: "Whatever God foreknew He would give, He also predestined—that is, decreed beforehand. If, however, He did not predestine it, it is neither given by God, nor did He know He would give it. But those things which God knows through Middle Knowledge are to be given by God, if they are not sins, or to be permitted if they are sins. Therefore, if He knows them conditionally, He knows that He will give them when that condition is posited. Therefore, He also predestines them by His decree; or else He does not know them." The major premise is Augustine's. The minor premise is agreed upon by all. I ask you, dear Reader—for I wish to inquire about your opinion as well—does this resemble a convincing argument? But let us arrange it and reduce it to a legitimate form; thus it should be stated: "Whatever God foreknew He would give, He also predestined; but He foreknew that He would give the repentance of the Tyrians, for example, on a hypothetical basis. Therefore, He predestined it." Let the major premise be Augustine's, but does the minor premise stand with everyone? Does it stand even with Augustine himself, who so expressly denies that it was given to the Tyrians to believe, and from where they would believe? Would it be said that God foreknew He would give what He foreknew He would deny? He foreknew, they say, that He would deny it absolutely, but would give it conditionally. Therefore, for the terms in the syllogism to be consistent, that "conditionally" must also be included in the major premise, which should thus be conceived: "Whatever God foreknew He would give, whether absolutely or conditionally, He also predestined." Is this major premise Augustine's? Where did Augustine write it? And who doubts that, just as it must be said simply and absolutely in Augustine's doctrine that God foreknew He would deny the Tyrians the means to believe and the source of belief, so it must

DISPUTATION III

be said simply and absolutely that God did not foreknow that He would give them the means to believe and the source of belief? Consequently, when he says, "Whatever God foreknew He would give," this should be understood as concerning the foreknowledge of absolutes, not of conditionals. It is also manifest from that final rule which he derives from Augustine, that when we hear of "foreknowledge" among the expositors of the divine word, it is to be interpreted as predestination, which Augustine limits in this way: "And it concerns the calling of the elect." For why does he limit it thus, unless because whatever can be foreknown about them—their calling, grace, consent, merits, perseverance, and finally glory itself—are absolutely future, and therefore can be absolutely foreknown? But in the reprobate, all these things are only conditionally future. If predestination were required even for those things that are conditionally future, who does not see that what Augustine restricts to the calling of the elect would extend to the Tyrians and other reprobates? And here again I ask, dear Reader, for your opinion: does not Augustine's limitation convince us to say that, according to his mind, present predestination is required only for that foreknowledge of good things which is absolute?

LXXVIII. I conclude this Section by noting that this Author has interpreted with the same license what Faustus of Riez said about absolute foreknowledge as if it had been said about conditional foreknowledge. He does this when proving that Prosper and Hilary proposed to Augustine middle knowledge as a suitable means of reconciling freedom with divine providence, according to the judgment of the Massiliensians, based on that statement of Faustus who, although he lived later, could represent the doctrine of his predecessors. This statement is: "Unless foreknowledge has explored, predestination decrees nothing." Father John of St. Thomas takes this statement as referring to middle knowledge. But I object and ask by what right does he dare to do this, since neither in that passage, nor before it, nor after it, is there any word either about knowledge or about future events under conditions?

DISPUTATION III

§ III. THIRD PROPOSITION.

LXXIX. The Semi-Pelagians believed that freedom was destroyed by the very necessity of divine grace, regardless of how its efficacy was ultimately explained. Therefore, they fought against the necessity of grace to defend freedom, not against a specific mode of efficacy, although this also drove them to deny the necessity of grace altogether.

This is proven first from Prosper when he reports both what they believed harmful to freedom in St. Augustine's doctrine and what they proposed in its place. He states that the doctrine of election, as was reported to be taught by Augustine, "deprives the fallen of the care to rise again, and provides an occasion for indifference, because labor in either direction is superfluous if neither the rejected can enter by any industry, nor can the elect fall away by any negligence..... Thus all industry is removed and virtues are abolished if God's decree preempts human wills, and under this name of predestination a kind of fatal necessity is introduced." Here you see that they considered it fatal that divine decree should preempt human wills. How they did not want this preemption, or how they wished these to be reconciled, the same Prosper soon explains when he says, "They define the purpose of calling grace entirely in this: that God has established that no one should be received into His kingdom except through the sacrament of regeneration, and that He calls all people universally to this gift of salvation, whether through natural law, written law, or through the preaching of the Gospel; so that those who are unwilling to believe may be without excuse, because God's justice lies in this: that those who do not believe will perish. His goodness appears in this: that He rejects no one from life, but indifferently wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Here they adduce testimonies by which the exhortation of divine scriptures incites human wills to obedience, so that from free choice they either do what is commanded or neglect it; and they think it follows that because a transgressor is said not to have obeyed because he was unwilling, so too the faithful one

DISPUTATION III

should not be doubted to have been faithful because he was willing. AND WHATEVER FACULTY ONE HAS FOR EVIL, ONE HAS AS MUCH FOR GOOD, AND BY THE SAME MOMENTUM THE MIND MOVES ITSELF EITHER TO VICES OR TO VIRTUES, which mind when seeking good is fostered by God's grace, and when pursuing evil is met with just condemnation. Here you see that they exclude the fatal necessity they feared by asserting that since God has called all people universally and indifferently willed all to be saved, these people then need no divine assistance to conceive the will to accept the offered salvation, no more than they need assistance to conceive the will to reject that grace. For this is having as much faculty for good as for evil. Through this, therefore, they provide for freedom, because they suppose that, given the preaching, free will is capable by itself and without God's assistance to will salvation, which divine grace then follows, just as condemnation follows the rejection of that same salvation. Hence, it follows that when they required this to maintain freedom, they believed freedom would be destroyed by the opposing necessity of prevenient grace that elevates the will.

LXXX. This is confirmed by what the same Prosper adds next, that they believe that "each person can be called to correction and progress only if he knows that HE CAN BE GOOD THROUGH HIS OWN DILIGENCE, and that his freedom is to be aided by God's help, IF HE CHOOSES WHAT GOD COMMANDS. And thus... obedience precedes grace, and the beginning of salvation is to be believed to stand with the one who is saved, not with the one who saves; the will of man prepares the way for divine grace, not grace subjecting the will to itself."

They believed, which is true, that by the same reasoning by which freedom is excluded, correction is also excluded, and conversely, by the same reasoning that makes timely correction possible, freedom is preserved. Therefore, since they thought it necessary for correction that each person should know that he can be good through his own diligence, and should choose what God commands, and that this diligence or choice or

DISPUTATION III

obedience precedes grace, what else follows but that they believed if the elective will to obey could not exist independently of prevenient and assisting grace, there would be no place for correction, and consequently none for freedom?

This same point is proven secondly from Hilary, who reports that the Semi-Pelagians were saying that "all vigor of preaching is excluded if it is said that nothing remains in humans that can be aroused through preaching itself, and that the habit of exhortation is useless." The sense in which this was said is explained soon after, when he says, "It is fitting for preaching that when the opportunity of obtaining salvation is announced to the prostrate who would never rise by their own powers, by the merit of willing and believing that they can be healed from their illness, they may obtain both the increase of faith itself and the effect of complete healing." Indeed, for faith by which one believes one can be healed, and for the desire by which one wishes to be healed and seeks a physician, they thought free will sufficient for itself, to the extent that they required nothing else than the stimulation of external preaching. If this were denied, they thought the vigor of preaching would be excluded and the practice of exhortation would be useless, with the conviction of freedom extinguished. Indeed, free will needs divine grace both for the beginning and for the progress of healing, but the sick person's desire to be healed is not part of the healing work. Therefore, the will to believe is required from fallen humanity, whose capacity for this they had fully retained, and by its merit salvation is offered, which depends on the grace and favor of the physician. Nor can this grace be denied if the will that seeks the physician is said to precede it. Concerning this faith by which one wills and believes that one can be healed, it cannot be said, "What do you have that you have not received?" For this is completely within the power of free will. For free will exists so that one may will or not will to admit medicine, with the will preempting grace, as though if it could not do this, it would no longer be free, and thus preaching would be excluded and the practice of exhortation would be useless. From these it is manifest that

DISPUTATION III

the Massilians [i.e., Semi-Pelagians] did not seek an accommodation of divine grace or a gentle mode of efficacy to protect freedom, but thought necessary for this purpose the independence both of faith, by which one believes one can be healed, and of the will, by which one seeks the physician.

This is proven thirdly from Augustine, who takes what Prosper and Hilary had reported in precisely the same sense, as is evident from chapter 12 of *On the Predestination of the Saints*, when he says that the Semi-Pelagians "think they would be inhibited from all zeal for piety **UNLESS THEY ASSIGN SOMETHING TO THEMSELVES WHICH THEY GIVE FIRST**, so that it may be repaid to them." Why did they think this, except because they did not seem to themselves to be free unless they could do something alone and without grace?

LXXXI. And this is proven fourthly. Because, as was said before and as the Adversaries do not deny, the Semi-Pelagians philosophized about this faith and will to seek the physician in the same way as the Pelagians did regarding either the whole healing or part of it. But the Pelagians denied the necessity of divine grace for healing for no other reason than because they thought freedom would be destroyed if such grace existed, and the will could not recover by itself and independently of special and internal assistance. Therefore, for a similar reason alone, the Semi-Pelagians believed that the freedom of incipient faith and desire for salvation would be destroyed. The minor premise is proven from Augustine in his *Epistle to Sixtus*, where he speaks thus about the Pelagians: "For that which they think would be taken away from them, namely free will, if they granted that man cannot have even good will itself without God's aid, they do not understand that they are not strengthening human free choice but propelling it to move through empty spaces, etc." See what they require for human choice—not that grace should not be antecedently efficacious, but that there should be no grace at all, and that there could be good will without God's assistance. The same is found in the following *Epistle to Paulinus*, where he reports this dogma of the

DISPUTATION III

Pelagians: "There is no free will if it needs God's help, since everyone has in his own will the power to do something or not do it." Pelagius was forced to condemn this ostensibly in the Council of Palestine. And therefore Augustine demands from anyone who wants to avoid a similar condemnation to confess that there is free will even if it needs divine assistance. And he warns, "Let them not strike against the stone of stumbling by defending nature and free will in a seemingly clever way, as do the philosophers of this world, who have strenuously argued that they could or should be thought to achieve blessed life by the virtue of their own will." And in the Epistle to Vitalis, he says that the Pelagians so defend free will as to oppose that by which it is made free, because they recognized no other grace than that of external preaching, which being granted, freedom did not seem to them to remain if anything else was required.

LXXXII. But this is most clearly evident from book 2 against Two Letters of the Pelagians, where Augustine extensively refutes the calumny of fatal necessity imposed on human acts—the same calumny that the Semi-Pelagians also pressed, as I reported above. For see in what matter that fate was constituted, according to Augustine's response: "Nor do we assert fate under the name of grace, because we have said that God's grace is preceded by no human merits. But if it pleases some to call the will of the almighty God by the name of fate, we indeed avoid profane novelties of words, but we do not love to contend about words." Indeed, this was fate to them: that our will is preempted by God's will, and that it cannot do anything without the latter by which it might then merit to be helped. Hence he continues, "From these words of theirs I understood that they either think or wish to be thought not to assert fate under the name of grace, because we say that God's grace is given not according to our merits, but according to His most merciful will, who says, 'I will have mercy,' etc." And again, "But here they reveal themselves sufficiently. For when they calumniate against us, saying that we assert fate under the name of grace because we say that God's grace is not given according to

DISPUTATION III

our merits, they undoubtedly confess that they themselves say it is given according to our merits." And soon after: "Is it so, O children of pride, enemies of God's grace, O new Pelagian heretics, that whoever says that all good merits of man are preempted by God's grace, and that grace is not given for merits, lest it not be grace if it is not given freely but rendered as a debt to those who merit it—does this seem to you to be asserting fate?" Again, "Here you respond that this very benevolence of God, by which He does not follow merits but bestows undeserved goods with free goodness, is rather to be called fate." You see in all these testimonies that the suspicion of fate was by no means suggested to the Pelagians because Augustine preached some ineluctable will that predefined human actions by an infrustrable decree, independently of any use of free will, even provisionally foreseen. The fatal necessity which they thought destroyed the freedom of our acts was not placed in this, but only in the claim that it was necessary for divine grace to precede human merits, rather than these merits, acquired by the power of free will alone, preempting grace. And this is that madness which, he says, "may God avert from us, that in His gifts we make ourselves first and Him subsequent." Thus he then interprets what they were saying, that God does not implant the zeal for virtue in a reluctant man: "For they say this as though man could have a good purpose and zeal for virtue from himself without God's help, by which preceding merit he becomes worthy to be helped by God's consequent grace." There you have fate or fatal necessity destructive to free will according to the opinion of the Pelagians: that man does not have from himself, without God's help, a good purpose.

LXXXIII. Hence there is that which Augustine has in this very work against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, that the three capital errors of these heretics flowed from a fivefold praise: of Creation, of Marriage, of Law, of Free Will, and of the Saints. For from the fact that they praised too highly, that is, that they thought too well of creation and marriage, it followed that they believed they should deny original sin. And similarly, from the fact that they valued the law and free will more than

DISPUTATION III

was right, it followed that they said grace does not help except for merit, as if free will would not stand unless this previous and independent merit were admitted. From excessive praise of the Saints it followed that they thought the Saints live in this life entirely free from all sin.

LXXXIV. But others who wrote against the Pelagians report the same. Jerome in his epistle to Ctesiphon portrays a disciple of Pelagius speaking thus: "Will is destroyed which needs another's help." Likewise in book 2 against the Pelagians: "How do you preserve free will, you who say that man can do nothing unless God always helps?" That is how they were delirious, denying that free will could be free if it could not act alone.

And in the discussion on the Triune and One God by Catholic Arnobius against Serapion arguing for the heretics, when Arnobius had denied that free will could be made without sin or attain divine praise without God's help, Serapion adds, "Therefore there is no free will." From all of which it can clearly be established that the Massilians intended nothing else when they alleged the loss of freedom, except to maintain that free will could do something by itself and without grace that would contribute to salvation.

LXXXV. This is proven secondly from what Augustine reports specifically about the Semi-Pelagians themselves: "They think that the definition of predestination stands against the utility of preaching, because when this is heard, no one can be aroused by the stimulus of correction. In saying these things, they do not want it to be preached to people that it is God's gift both to come to faith and to remain in faith, lest it seem to bring more despair than exhortation, when those who hear consider that it is uncertain to human ignorance to whom God gives these gifts and to whom He does not." Here you see that Augustine does not require from them the confession of any other predestination than that by which it is said to be from God that one comes to faith and remains in it—which none of those deny who confess that for these things a gift of God is necessary, which is supernatural and internal grace. Nor did they

DISPUTATION III

think the preaching of this doctrine was impeded by any other reason than that we would not seem free for those things which cannot be obtained unless they are given—which means that we are not free except for those things we can do alone. Augustine presses them with an argument *ad hominem*: "Why, then," he says, "do they also preach with us that wisdom and continence are gifts of God? But if these, when they are preached to be gifts of God, do not impede the exhortation by which men are exhorted to be wise and continent, what cause is there for them to think that exhortation is impeded by which we exhort men to come to faith and to remain in it until the end?" As if to say they spoke with little consistency when they thought that both freedom is destroyed and exhortation to undertake and permanently retain faith is impeded by admitting the necessity of prevenient grace, which they nevertheless say is no obstacle to either freedom or exhortation to wisdom and continence and the rest of subsequent sanctity, for which, as we have seen, they admit grace is necessary. But this argument would be invalid if they denied that something else must necessarily concur for the beginning of faith than what they did not deny must necessarily concur for wisdom and continence—for which they did not say those infrustrable predefinitions independent of Middle Knowledge must concur. Hence they would not have thought of them when they said that the freedom of incipient faith was taken away by the predestination of divine grace.

LXXXVI. This is confirmed by the fact that St. Augustine thinks their opinion is refuted by the authority of the Holy Fathers Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen, whose testimonies he says "should suffice for both: that they preach the grace of God, gratuitous as it is to be believed and preached, through all things; and that they do not think their preaching is adverse to the preaching by which we exhort the sluggish or rebuke the wicked." From which I argue thus: If the Semi-Pelagians deny more than these Fathers affirm, then the testimonies of these Fathers cannot suffice to convince them; but they do suffice, as Augustine says; therefore, they do not deny more. Now the testimonies of these Fa-

DISPUTATION III

thers, which Augustine reports, affirm nothing other than that everything that helps us to salvation depends on divine grace, and that this neither impedes freedom nor preaching. For this is all that Cyprian was saying when he said, "In nothing should we glory when nothing is ours." And Ambrose, when he said, "Our heart and our thoughts are not in our power." And Nazianzen when he said, "He who gave to believe will also give to confess." "And yet these Fathers did not cease to exhort and reprove," says Augustine. Which is evidence that they were by no means persuaded that the extinction of human freedom follows from this. And therefore he reports that saying of St. Ambrose, in which he says that a man, when asked why he wished to be a Christian, can respond, "It seemed good to me, which when he says," he says, "he does not deny that it seemed good to God: for the will of men is prepared by God." Therefore the Semi-Pelagians asserted nothing more than this: namely, that freedom is so removed that exhortation and reproof are useless, if faith, even in its beginning, is a gift of God, and if some merit of good will does not precede God's grace. But this is nothing other than that the necessity of grace does not stand with freedom. For if they alleged an insuperable efficacy descending from a decree entirely independent of all foreknowledge, the Holy Fathers, who say nothing about this, would be opposed to them in vain.

§ IV. FOURTH PROPOSITION.

LXXXVII. Saint Augustine disputed against the Semi-Pelagians regarding the necessity of divine grace, not about reconciling its efficacy with liberty.

This proposition is proven first from the previous one. For these are reciprocal: that the Semi-Pelagians erred only in denying the necessity of divine grace, under the pretext of preserving liberty, and that St. Augustine, who undertook to refute them, disputed with them only about that necessity, not about efficacy.

DISPUTATION III

LXXXVIII. Second proof. Because there is no better way to understand what Augustine did in this controversy than from the proposition of the question to be disputed and from the conclusion of the disputation; and from these it is clear that this entire matter was not about the efficacy of divine grace, but about its necessity. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proven. And first, Augustine at the beginning of the book on the predestination of the saints summarizes in this phrase whatever Prosper and Hilary had proposed about the error of the Massilienses: that the grace of God is given according to our merits, which is nothing other than saying there is some merit of ours for which grace is not necessary, because it comes first. But since that necessary grace was denied both for the beginning of faith and for perseverance, in this first book, which he titles "On the Predestination of the Saints," he undertakes to prove the first part. Hence he says, "First, therefore, we ought to show that faith, by which we are Christians, is a gift of God," which is nothing other than saying that faith, even in its beginning, cannot be had without God's help, and not, as the Massilienses said, by the power of free will alone, given external preaching. Similarly, at the beginning of the later book, which is on the gift of perseverance, he says, "Now we must discuss perseverance. For in the previous book, when we were dealing with the beginning of faith, we also said something about this. We assert, therefore, that perseverance by which one perseveres in Christ to the end is a gift of God." This is the thesis to be confirmed in that entire book, which requires for its truth nothing other than that it not be said that anyone can persevere through himself and without the help of divine grace. And thus, as you see, nothing is proposed to be disputed either about the efficacy of divine grace or about divine predefinitions.

Now Augustine concludes the book on the predestination of the saints thus: "We have said many things, and perhaps a long time ago we could have persuaded what we wish, and yet we speak to such good minds as if they were dull, for whom even what is excessive is not enough. But let them give pardon: for a new question has compelled us to

DISPUTATION III

this. For when in our previous small works we had argued with sufficiently suitable testimonies that faith also is a gift of God, something was found to contradict: and those testimonies were said to show that the increase of faith is a gift of God; but the beginning of faith, by which one believes in Christ, is from man himself, and is not a gift of God, but God requires this, so that when it has preceded, the rest follow as if by merit, which are gifts of God." Behold the new question raised by the Semi-Pelagians; not whether divine decrees are given that are prior to every free consent, even future under a condition, which are of invincible efficacy, but whether the beginning of faith is from man in such a way that it is not also a gift of God, although it is required to merit thereafter those things which are gifts of God. To affirm that part of the question, the Semi-Pelagians objected that there would follow damage to human liberty, as we have seen. But Augustine immediately adds what he himself accomplished in treating that question: "On account of which we have insisted as much as we could, to show that even the beginning of faith is a gift of God." This was Augustine's entire purpose, that it might be said that divine grace is necessary even for the beginning of faith, and yet liberty would not therefore be thought to be lost. But he continues: "Even if we have done this at greater length than these for whom we did it would have wished, we are prepared to be rebuked by them for this, provided that... they confess that we have done what we have done; that is, that we have taught that the beginning of faith, like continence, patience, justice, piety, and other things about which there is no controversy with them, is a gift of God." This is the summary of both the purpose and the work: that the beginning of faith is a gift of God, just like continence and other things about which there is no controversy with them. Where then is the efficacy of predefinitions independent of middle knowledge? And where in the world is it found that the Semi-Pelagians admitted these in order to confess that continence and the other things Augustine mentions are gifts of God? But if, since they did not admit those, Augustine nevertheless thinks there is no controversy with them on that matter, and requires

DISPUTATION III

nothing other than that they say about the beginning of faith what they said about continence, what reason is there why now those who philosophize without such predefinitions and contend against the Semi-Pelagians that the same grace which is required for continence and other virtues is required also for the beginnings of faith are objected to?

Similar is the conclusion of the book on the gift of perseverance: for thus he speaks: "But why say more? I believe I have taught sufficiently, or rather more than sufficiently, that they are gifts of God both to begin to believe in the Lord, which was established in the previous book on the predestination of the saints, and to remain in the Lord to the end, which has been accomplished in this book on the gift of perseverance. But the other goods pertaining to the pious life by which God is rightly worshipped, even those for whom we do these things concede to be gifts of God." Therefore he did not do this in order to lead his opponents to the confession of a predestination other than that by which it happens that they confess that both the beginning of faith and perseverance in it are gifts of God. But they would confess this if they preached that grace is necessary for both, and did not say that free will without grace is sufficient for these goods. That, therefore, is the predestination which Augustine requires, and which he contends coheres with the preaching of the divine Word because it coheres with the liberty of the will. Whence he adds: "Therefore, just as other things are to be preached, so that he who preaches them may be heard obediently, so predestination is to be preached, so that he who hears obediently may glory not in man, and consequently not in himself, but in the Lord." And again he gathers the purpose of the entire work of disputation in this summary: "Let us pray, beloved, let us pray that God may give grace even to our enemies, and especially to our brothers and lovers, to understand and confess that after the great and ineffable ruin in which we all fell in one man, no one is freed except by the grace of God; and that it is not rendered as a debt according to the merits of the recipients, but is given freely as true grace, with no merits preceding." By which he clearly signifies what we have so

DISPUTATION III

often inculcated, that the controversy is not about efficacy but about the necessity of grace: and consequently that the Massilienses' fear of perishing liberty is proposed not against efficacy but against necessity; and this second argument can be composed in this form. Augustine contends for only this from his opponents, and when he obtains it he seems to have won his case: but with the confession of the necessity of grace preceding the beginning of faith and perseverance, and finally all merit and every salutary act, he seems to have won his case. Therefore this only does Augustine contend for from his opponents. The major premise is self-evident. The minor premise has been proven from what has been said.

LXXXIX. And it is confirmed from what Augustine says when he attacks the Pelagians who abuse that passage, "If you are willing and hear me, you will eat the good things of the earth," as if it signified that there is in the preceding will itself the merit of consequent grace. "If," he says, "they understood what was said, 'if you are willing,' in such a way that they would confess that good will itself is prepared by him of whom it is written, 'The will is prepared by the Lord,' they would use this testimony as Catholics, and would not only overcome the old heresy of the Manicheans but would also crush the new one of the Pelagians. What does it profit them that in praise of free will they say grace helps the good purpose of each one? This would be accepted without scruple as a Catholic statement, if they did not place merit in the good purpose, to which merit reward would now be rendered according to debt, not according to grace: but they would understand and confess that even the good purpose itself, which consequent grace helps, could not have been in man, if grace had not preceded." And a little before, he says that the Pelagian heresy is overthrown by one who confesses that the captive will cannot breathe into healthful liberty except by the grace of God. From which one may argue thus: Those who so understand what was said, "if you are willing," etc., that they confess that good will is prepared by God; and who say that the good purpose, which consequent grace helps, could not have been in man, if grace had not preceded: these are Catholics,

DISPUTATION III

and they interpret Scripture in a Catholic way; nor does any scruple of contrary suspicion remain; and henceforth they are so far from Pelagius that they crush him and overthrow his heresy, according to Augustine. But the authors of Middle Knowledge, who deny the absolute efficacy of divine predefinitions independent of it, not only confess, but even contend, that the "if you are willing" should be understood in such a way that that good will is said to be prepared by God; and that every good purpose is necessarily preceded by internal and supernatural grace. Therefore these same authors, according to Augustine, are both Catholics and interpret Scripture in a Catholic way; and they are Anti-Pelagians, since they crush Pelagius and overthrow his heresy: nor can any scruple remain about that matter.

XC. Now in what way are they not Pelagians when they think thus about every good will and good purpose, so neither are they Semi-Pelagians provided they say the same thing about the will to believe and the beginning of faith, and about the will to persevere; but about these they really do say the same thing. Therefore they truly should not be considered Semi-Pelagians in any way, but rather as true Augustinians, so crushing and overthrowing them, that those who doubt about this matter are too scrupulous. But to think and say this is nothing other than to admit the necessity of internal grace preceding every good will or good purpose and breathing into healthful liberty. Therefore Augustine requires nothing else but this. Therefore the Semi-Pelagians will satisfy him and will cease to be what they are called, if they confess that such necessity does not impede the liberty of the will, or if they say that no greater liberty should be required than what can be reconciled with that necessity.

XCI. Third proof from Prosper's letter to Augustine. For after he had discoursed at length on the doctrine of the Massilienses, whatever in it seemed defective, which he wished to be refuted by Augustine, he summarizes in these few words: "Therefore since in these remains of Pelagian depravity a fiber of no mediocre virulence is nourished, if the

DISPUTATION III

principle of salvation is wrongly placed in man, if human will is impiously preferred to divine will, so that therefore someone is helped because he willed, not therefore because he is helped does he will, if one who is originally evil is wrongly believed to begin the reception of good not from the highest good but from himself, if one pleases God from something other than what He Himself has given; grant us in this case, Most Blessed Pope, Best Father, as much as you can while the Lord grants, I beseech the diligence of your piety, that you may deign to open with most lucid expositions those things in these questions which are more obscure and more difficult to understand." Behold to what Prosper reduces all the fibers of the virulence of the Semi-Pelagians, namely to that from which they can be eradicated by one word at the roots, if it is said that there is nothing good in us that pertains to salvation that is independent of a special and internal and altogether unmerited benefit of God. Whoever confesses this does not place in man the principle of salvation, does not prefer human will to divine will, does not begin the reception of good from himself, nor does he think that he pleases God from anything other than what He has given; but this is only to confess the necessity of divine grace. Therefore this only is what Prosper asks that the Massilienses not oppose free will to it, and is accomplished by Augustine. Nor does anything else pertain to the heads of those questions, which Prosper proposes to Augustine to be treated for the pulling up of those fibers; for after he has asked this, that he show that this doctrine is not arbitrary, but that the Christian faith is violated by this dissension, he desires to have it explained how through this preoperating and cooperating grace free will is not impeded, which is nothing other than how it does not cease to be free, even if it must be both anticipated and helped by this grace; then concerning the order between foreknowledge and purpose, he asks those things which were explained a little before, and which contain nothing other than that it be defined whether there is some foreknowledge of merits independent of divine grace, which precedes the purpose of consequent grace; or whether, as to this, a distinction should be made be-

DISPUTATION III

tween adults and infants; or whether not only in infants should a purpose independent of all foreknowledge of merits be admitted, but in adults also that very foreknowledge of merits, which in them cannot be denied, is posterior and dependent on purpose. And all these things turn on one and the same point, whether grace necessarily precedes all merit, since that purpose is nothing other than the purpose of grace. This necessity alone, therefore, is what the Massilienses want to shake off, so that liberty may be preserved; and Augustine tries to retain it with the same liberty. And from this another argument can be gathered, by which the above proposition is proven.

Fourth proof. From the fact that Prosper, as soon as he said that faith is violated by this dissension, proposes as the first head of this dissension to be treated by Augustine: "How through this preoperating and cooperating grace free will is not impeded": and consequently he thinks that those who dissent in that they believed liberty to be impeded by preoperating and cooperating grace, violate the faith. Nor does Augustine disagree; for thereto pertains what he says, "This I know, that no one except by erring can dispute against this predestination, which we defend according to the holy Scriptures." But he speaks of that predestination of which he spoke a little before when he said, "But I do not wish to exaggerate with my words, but rather leave it to them to consider, that they may see what it is, which they have persuaded themselves, that by the preaching of predestination more desperation than exhortation is brought to hearers," that is, he speaks of that by which the Massilienses said liberty is destroyed. Therefore the mode by which the Semi-Pelagians wanted to defend liberty, rejecting that which Augustine proposed, violates the faith, as Prosper says, and as Augustine confesses, is erroneous. Whence I argue thus: A mode of preserving liberty, which does not remove the necessity of internal and supernatural divine grace, neither violates the faith nor is erroneous: a mode of preserving liberty which denies the efficacy of divine decrees antecedent to that and independent of middle knowledge, does not remove the necessity of internal

DISPUTATION III

and supernatural divine grace. Therefore this mode is neither erroneous nor does it violate the faith. The major premise is clear from Augustine, who, as we related a little before, thinks without scruple that he both speaks and is Catholic, and contrary to Pelagius, who concedes that every good will, which conduces to salvation, has been anticipated by the preparation of grace and helped by God. The minor premise is clear from the open confession of those who philosophize thus. For although they deny that efficacy, they contend nevertheless that internal and supernatural grace is necessary for every motion of the will which positively conduces to salvation. Nor do the opponents dissent or can they dissent from this whole argumentation; since they say that the Semi-Pelagians did not philosophize heretically insofar as they established middle knowledge and used it, as they think, in reconciling the efficacy of divine decrees with the liberty of the will. For thus we have heard the Doctor of Salamanca speaking. And Fr. John of St. Thomas clearly distinguishes the erroneous abuse of middle knowledge from other effects, for which the Semi-Pelagians used it, one of which was to reconcile the liberty of the will with the efficacy of divine decrees, by which distinction he sufficiently signifies that this latter use was not erroneous. I add his words, which are as follows: "Therefore it is not to be doubted that middle knowledge was proposed to St. Augustine not only with that abuse and error, with which the Massilienses admitted it. But one of the effects, for which they admitted it, was that in this way they might reconcile our liberty with the divine will and predestination or election of God. Then, etc." He repeats a similar distinction of erroneous abuse from non-erroneous, and places that mode of preserving liberty under the non-erroneous. Whence it is clear that the conclusion of the syllogism just given is approved by these authors. Having resumed this, I argue again thus: The mode of preserving the liberty of the will, by which the absolute efficacy of divine decrees independent of middle knowledge is denied, neither violates the faith nor can be erroneous, as has now been shown: The mode which the Semi-Pelagians used, and which Augustine attacks, both violates the faith and is

DISPUTATION III

erroneous, as has also been demonstrated from Prosper and Augustine: Therefore the mode of preserving the liberty of the will, by which the efficacy of divine decrees is denied, is neither that which the Semi-Pelagians used, nor that which St. Augustine attacks. It remains, therefore, that they erred only and were attacked by Augustine because they not only denied that efficacy, but absolutely every gratuitous antecedent decree, by which the divine aid necessary for good will might be prepared.

XCII. Fifth proof. Because the predestination for which Augustine fights against the Massilienses, and consequently which he contends is to be reconciled with our liberty, is none other than what is necessarily inferred from the fact that the beginning of faith and perseverance to the end is a gift of God, and that grace is not given according to merits. But the predestination which is necessarily inferred therefrom is not that efficacious one independent of the direction of middle knowledge: Therefore the predestination for which Augustine fights against the Massilienses, and which he contends is to be reconciled with our liberty, is not that which is feigned to be efficacious and independent of middle knowledge. Therefore this controversy is not at all situated in the denial or affirmation of that efficacy and independence. Both consequences are clear. The minor premise is evident: For those who deny that predestination is efficacious otherwise than because it supposes middle knowledge, still confess both that the beginning of faith is a gift of God, and that special grace is necessary for persevering, and that grace is not given according to our merits. And therefore the opponents concede that that doctrine is not erroneous, since they feel that this is erroneous, which teaches any of these, namely that grace is given according to merits, that the beginning of faith is from us, that there is no gift of perseverance. Whence it follows that there is no necessary consequence, from the fact that it is denied that grace is given according to merits, or that faith or perseverance is from us, to affirming that mode of predestination: or vice versa from the fact that that mode of predestination is denied, to affirming any of these. It remains, therefore, that the major premise be proven from Augustine:

DISPUTATION III

namely that the consequence of that predestination for which he fights, and which he contends is to be reconciled with liberty, is necessary from the fact that it is denied that grace is given according to merits, or that the beginning of faith or perseverance is from us: and that nothing intermediate is left, in which he who recedes from one can so stand as not to fall into the other. But there are very clear testimonies of this thing in the book on the gift of perseverance. For in chapter 16 Augustine speaks thus: "Either predestination is to be preached, as holy scripture evidently speaks, so that in the predestined the gifts and calling of God are without repentance: or the grace of God must be confessed to be given according to our merits, which the Pelagians think." Behold how he immediately opposes grace being given according to merits to the mode of predestination for which he fights.

The same in the following chapter, while he attacks what the Massilienses said, that supposing once the beginning of faith, which is from us, grace is necessary for the rest: "Why," he says, "do they not fear that their and others' exhortation to these very rest is impeded by the definition of predestination? Or perhaps these themselves are not said to be predestined? Therefore they are not given by God either, or He did not know that He would give them. But if they are both given, and He foreknew that He would give them, certainly He predestined them." And a little after, he says, "Let them see.... that by this definition of predestination, that error only is rather impeded and subverted by which it is said that the grace of God is given according to our merits, so that he who glories may glory not in the Lord, but in himself." Behold how he fights only for that predestination, which impedes that error only, by which grace is said to be given according to our merits. The same in chapter 20, near the end: "But what compelled passages of Scripture by which predestination is commended to be defended more copiously and clearly by this labor of ours, except that the Pelagians say that the grace of God is given according to our merits?" To this only, therefore, is predestination affirmed, that grace may not be given according to merits.

DISPUTATION III

The same in chapter 21: "But if both are gifts of God, the beginning of faith and perseverance, and these gifts of His (which who can deny?), He foreknew that He would give, predestination must be preached, so that true grace of God, that is, which is not given according to our merits, can be defended by invincible admonition."

And in chapter 23, near the end: "If he always prayed for these good things, he certainly always believed them to be gifts of God; nor was it ever right for him to deny those things always known by him. And through this the faith of this predestination, which is now defended with new solicitude against new heretics, the Church of Christ never failed to have."

And in chapter 24: "Both Him, therefore, the Lord Jesus, and us He predestined, because in Him that He might be our head, and in us, that we might be His body, He foreknew not our preceding merits, but His future works."

To this pertains what Prosper has in his letter to Augustine, that the Massilienses had persuaded themselves that grace must be denied to the beginning of faith, etc.: "Because," he says, "if they professed that all good merits are anticipated by it, and are granted by it so that they can exist, they would by necessity concede that God according to the purpose and counsel of His will makes one vessel for honor, another for contempt, because no one is justified except by grace, and no one is born except in transgression. But they are afraid to confess this, and they fear to ascribe the merits of the saints to divine work." But he adds thereafter the cause of this fear, "lest the imposition of industry and labor be superfluous, the zeal of which is to be frustrated by the cessation of election." Indeed, this only displeases them in that purpose of God, not that it is before or after conditional knowledge of future consent, but that they falsely think the election of the will ceases, if it is to be ascribed to divine work, that is, if it is dependent on the gratuitous will of God. Therefore they want this election to be altogether independent of divine purpose: and the necessity of grace to be denied in so far as they see that, with it conceded, the

DISPUTATION III

consequence to this purpose is necessary. And thus they fear no other purpose than that, for the affirmation of which there is a necessary consequence from the confession of grace: nor do they fear it for any other cause than that they think our election, in order to be free, must be independent of it: Therefore neither would Augustine have defended any other purpose than that which is necessarily connected with the necessity of grace.

From all of which it is most manifest that Augustine fights for no other predestination than that by which that error is excluded, by which the grace of God is said to be given according to merits: and the beginning of faith and perseverance to be from us: so that there is a mutual and necessary consequence from the positing of one of these to the destruction of the other, and what is consequently therefrom, that he disputed against the Massilienses not for the mode of efficacy, but for the necessity of divine grace to be reconciled with the liberty of the will, which was to be proven.

XCIII. Nor does it matter that Augustine in this disputation sometimes designates the infallibility of divine grace in eliciting the consent of the will. For it is one thing to insinuate something on occasion, and another to dispute about it expressly with an adversary, which I deny Augustine did. Just as it also does not matter that the Massilienses sometimes seem to fear that infallibility, because from what has been said it is sufficiently clear that they feared it for no other cause than because they believed liberty to be lost unless our will prior to and independently of every previous decree chose between good and evil. As if I should say, since it cannot be that the grace by which one lives rightly and acquires some merit is not in some way both infallible and efficacious; the Massilienses never disputed with Augustine, nor Augustine with the Massilienses about the mode of that infallibility and efficacy; but only about necessity: because they said liberty would be destroyed, if the will did not choose by itself alone, but needed antecedent grace, and consequently

DISPUTATION III

supposed an antecedent decree, in whatever way it might be both efficacious and infallible. And I say this has now been sufficiently proven.

XCIV. You will say, the Semi-Pelagians for the most part admitted internal and unmerited grace as necessary for the beginning of faith: Therefore there was nothing to be disputed with them about the necessity of grace, but about efficacy. The antecedent is clear from Prosper's letter, when he says, "But some of these do not depart so far from the paths of the Pelagians that, when they are forced to confess that grace of Christ which anticipates all human merits, lest if it is rendered to merits, it is vainly called grace, they wish this condition to pertain to every man, in which when he merits nothing prior, because he does not exist, the grace of the Creator establishes him with free will and rationality." For Prosper signifies by these words that many of the Massilienses were not content with the grace of creation, since he says that only some took refuge in it: Therefore those many who were not content with the grace of creation admitted another unmerited and internal grace necessary for the beginning of faith. Therefore it would have been necessary to dispute with them about the efficacy of grace, not about necessity, since they did not deny it. [Translator's response:] Blessed Prosper means nothing else than that some of the Massilienses had not so far receded from the paths of the Pelagians that they would not imitate their manner of speaking, and play with the same equivocation as they. For since from the usage of Scripture and ecclesiastical writers grace is distinguished against nature, when Pelagius was pressed, he said he admitted grace, not in that sense in which it is distinguished against nature, but in that in which it can be extended also to natural benefits: whence it happened finally that he persisted in that depraved opinion of his, that there is no grace superadded to nature, and necessary for salvation. When, therefore, some of those Massilienses used the same equivocation, and with the same fraud mocked those who were trying to elicit the confession of grace necessary for the beginning of faith and every good will: there was reason why Prosper said they had not so far receded from the Pelagian paths: to show

DISPUTATION III

that others spoke more sincerely, who absolutely confessed that the desire for grace is not from grace, just as the desire for health is not from the healing doctor or medicine, as Hilary reports from their opinion. But if you contend that there were some, or even many, who admitted the necessity of internal and unmerited help, even for the first will to believe (which by no means follows from the adduced words of Prosper), I contend that they, from that precise point, were in no way Pelagians, and therefore not Semi-Pelagians either; but as to this, Catholics and speaking in a Catholic way, and that this is to be preached without any scruple, as Augustine admonishes. He is therefore by no means to be thought to have disputed with them about the harmony of free will with that opinion of theirs, because it is clear from all the pages of the two books which he wrote on this controversy, that he attacks only that opinion which admits merit preceding grace, and human will prior to divine, and Prosper himself, as we have seen, reduced whatever he disapproved in the opinion of those Massilienses to this.

§ V. FIFTH PROPOSITION.

XCV. The Semi-Pelagians never employed the doctrine of middle knowledge to reconcile the efficacy of divine predefinitions with the freedom of predetermined actions. This proposition is proven by three arguments. The first is: Whoever strives to find a way to reconcile God's predefinition with the freedom of will, by that very effort presupposes such a predefinition exists. However, the Massiliensians never presupposed that God's predefinition existed regarding the acts about whose freedom they were concerned. Therefore, the Massiliensians never worked to reconcile the freedom of will with such a predefinition regarding acts of this kind. Consequently, they never employed the doctrine of Middle Knowledge for this purpose. The major premise is evident. For it is clear that the attempt to reconcile a predefinition that does not exist with freedom of will is, as they say, "about a non-existent subject," and

DISPUTATION III

therefore ridiculous—just as it would be ridiculous for someone to attempt to establish friendship with a person who neither exists nor will ever exist. In any discussion, one first asks whether the subject under dispute exists, so that once this is established, one can then inquire about its nature. Nor would anyone tolerate a person who, while denying that there is a man in the forum, would nevertheless contend that he is a flute-player rather than a citharist; nor would anyone consider wise someone who would argue with a person holding such an absurd position. Therefore, the Massiliensians did not labor to show how predefinitions, which they denied existed, could be reconciled with freedom. Nor did Augustine contend with them on this matter, since they rather believed that by denying these predefinitions, freedom was preserved. This is the minor premise of the proposed syllogism—namely, that the Massiliensians never supposed that such predefinitions existed, especially regarding the will to believe and persevere, about whose freedom they were particularly concerned. This is clear from what has already been said, which establishes that they admitted neither grace nor a gratuitous purpose that preceded that will, but rather placed the will before both grace and purpose, as will be explained more fully shortly.

XCVI. The second argument is: There are two kinds of free operations with which we can imagine the Massiliensians would have tried to reconcile divine predefinitions. One comprises those actions by which the Just are sanctified, namely the exercise of continence, wisdom, etc. And we have already heard from Augustine that, regarding this kind, their doctrine was blameless, and there was no room for any dispute. Therefore, if our Adversaries concede that the Massiliensians preserved the freedom of these operations through middle knowledge, they will consequently concede that this approach to preserving freedom is adequate and in line with Augustine's thinking, which they strongly resist. There remains, therefore, the second kind, which contains the first strivings of the will toward seeking salvation, such as a certain fear of damnation, some desire for salvation, the will to believe, etc., whose freedom I

DISPUTATION III

deny was ever reconciled by the Semi-Pelagians with predefinition through the use of middle knowledge. For I designate, for example, the will to believe, and I ask our Adversaries whether they want to assert that the Massiliensians acknowledged the grace necessary for such a will or not. If they deny this, since when grace is denied, gratuitous predefinition cannot stand, it follows that those who denied grace also denied gratuitous predefinition—far from wanting to reconcile it with the aforementioned will. If they affirm it, they are too favorable to the Massiliensians and make Augustine, along with Prosper and Hilary, an unjust and mendacious accuser. The consequence is proven: Because one who teaches that free will has nothing except when elevated and assisted by grace, teaches that it does not have that from itself, nor without God freely assisting; and consequently teaches that it cannot be foreknown to have that from itself, but principally also from God thus elevating and assisting. But according to you, the Massiliensians taught that free will does not have the will to believe unless elevated and assisted by undeserved and internal grace (for that is what we are discussing). Therefore, they taught that free will does not have that will from itself, nor without God thus elevating and assisting. And consequently, they did not teach that it would be foreknown to have that from itself, but principally also from God. Therefore, if anyone attributed the contrary to them, it was calumny. But Augustine attributed the contrary to them. Therefore, if our Adversaries are not mistaken, Augustine argued calumniously with the Massiliensians. I prove the minor premise from the book on the Predestination of the Saints, where Augustine introduces the Semi-Pelagians speaking and distinguishing themselves from the Pelagians: "They think," he says, "that having received the commandments, we become holy and immaculate in His sight in charity by the exercise of our own free will, and because God foreknew this would happen, they say, He therefore chose us before the foundation of the world... But we say that our God foreknew only the faith by which we begin to believe, and therefore He chose us before the foundation of the world and predestined us, so that we might already be

DISPUTATION III

holy through His grace and work." Here you clearly see how the Massiliensians distinguish themselves from the Pelagians according to Augustine, that the Massiliensians said only of incipient faith what the Pelagians extended also to sanctity—namely, that it is foreknown to be from us, with no other grace presupposed than the presentation of precepts or doctrine to be believed. And the same applies to what he says in the book *On Rebuke and Grace* about the children of promise: "For He did not promise them to Abraham because He foreknew that they would be good of themselves." This was indeed the doctrine of the nascent Semi-Pelagianism in Africa, which later grew in Marseilles and neighboring places. Likewise in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*: "What is more true than that Christ foreknew who, when, and in what places would believe in Him? But whether, when Christ was preached to them, they would have faith of themselves, which is what the Semi-Pelagians say, or whether they would receive it as God's gift, as orthodox doctrine holds—that is, whether He merely foreknew them or predestined them—I did not think it necessary to investigate or discuss at that time." Prosper clearly indicates the same when he reports them teaching that God foreknew the faith which would thereafter be helped by grace; for this means that according to them, grace was posterior both to faith and to the foreknowledge of faith. And therefore he says that they wanted grace to be a reward for human merits. Likewise, Hilary, when he reports the Semi-Pelagians approving what Augustine had once said before this matter was well examined: that "God does not choose in foreknowledge works that He Himself will give, but He chooses faith in foreknowledge"—namely because, as they indeed thought, God was not going to give faith as He was going to give works. Hence, he adds afterwards concerning this faith according to that doctrine, it cannot be said, "What do you have that you have not received?" From all these passages and many others that we cited above in proving the second proposition, it is clearly established that the Massiliensians were reproached for saying that the foreknowledge of incipient faith, which they misused, was the foreknowledge of faith inde-

DISPUTATION III

pendent of divine grace and produced by free will alone, without God specially assisting. This reproach, as I said, cannot be denied to have been false and therefore unjust by anyone who admits that they believed foreknown faith to be elicited with God elevating and assisting free will with internal and undeserved help.

XCVII. This is confirmed because it is established that the Semi-Pelagians erred primarily concerning these two things: namely, concerning the beginning of faith and concerning its perseverance, as well as the perseverance of all sanctity and grace. This is evident not only from Prosper and Hilary but from every page of Augustine's two books on the Predestination of the Saints and on the Gift of Perseverance, which were also prompted by these two errors. However, if they philosophized about the beginning of faith in the way our Adversaries claim, their doctrine would not have been erroneous. For that view which teaches that God foreknows that if such grace is given to such a person, he will believe, and from that foreknowledge predetermines his faith without harming freedom, is free from error, even according to them, as was shown a little earlier. What, then, precisely was the error of the Massiliensians regarding this? They believed, you say, that in faith thus foreknown there was merit for the grace and predefinition necessary for it. But both Prosper and Hilary and Augustine rather indicate the opposite, when they perpetually say that the Semi-Pelagians established in foreknown faith the merit of grace necessary for what follows, namely for the increase of the same faith and for the exercises of sanctity; and therefore they always call this merit of incipient faith "merit preceding grace" and merit which, with respect to the same grace, is called "past." Against this, they distinguish merit conditionally future, which they call "future which is not future," as we saw earlier. But that these Massiliensians fashioned this future merit of incipient faith to be so retrograde as to say that by the merit of faith hypothetically future, grace is given or a gratuitous predefinition is conceived, which the same faith necessarily presupposes, is fictitious. Not a single syllable will ever be found in Augustine or other authors from

DISPUTATION III

which this can be inferred. So again I ask, what was their error concerning the beginning of faith? They said, you claim, that faith is foreknown as conditionally future independently of grace, and from that foreknowledge, the predefinition of the same faith is conceived. But this too is chimerical, and nowhere is there any trace of such a doctrine. Rather, Prosper indicates that they acknowledged no predefinition except that by which it is decreed that no one is saved except by the benefit of baptism. His words are: "They define the purpose of calling grace entirely in this: that God has established that He will receive no one into His kingdom except through the sacrament of regeneration, and to this gift of salvation all people universally are called, whether through natural law, or through written law, or through evangelical preaching.. Because the justice of God is in this, that those who do not believe perish; His goodness appears in that He repels no one from life, but without distinction wills all to be saved." Behold their entire predefinition. From this you may understand that our Adversaries, while rather incautiously attacking middle knowledge, both absolve the Semi-Pelagians from a large part of their error and accuse Prosper and Hilary, and finally Augustine himself.

XCVIII. The third argument: There are only two cases in which the Semi-Pelagians were compelled to resort to conditional knowledge. Namely, to find a reason why of two infants, one dies without baptism and the other dies immediately after receiving baptism. Similarly, to find a reason why God arranged things so that the Gospel is proclaimed in one time and one place rather than another. If these cases had not been proposed, we would not know whether this knowledge, either conditional or middle, was ever known to them. Hence, if they ever needed it to protect freedom, they would have needed it in these cases. But in these cases, there is no occasion for reconciling God's predefinition with human freedom. Therefore, the Semi-Pelagians did not use Middle Knowledge for that reconciliation. The major premise is evident from what was said before. The minor premise is also clear. For as far as infants are concerned, there is no freedom for them when one dies without baptism and the oth-

DISPUTATION III

er dies with baptism. Therefore, when the Semi-Pelagians sought the reason for this distinction from the knowledge of future merits if they had lived, they were not seeking from it a reason for unharmed freedom in infants. As if I were to say, the use of Middle Knowledge contributes only to preserving the freedom of that operation which is predefined by its direction; but from the direction of Middle Knowledge, by which the future merits of infants are foreknown, none of their operations is predefined, but only death before or after baptism is predefined, which is not any operation of theirs. Therefore, no freedom of theirs is preserved by that use.

The same can be said about those adults to whom the preaching of the Gospel is said to come or not come from the direction of Middle Knowledge, by which their future belief or unbelief is foreknown. The same, I say, can be said, because the Semi-Pelagians did not say that any operation of theirs was predefined from the direction of Middle Knowledge, but only that it was discerned so that the Gospel would be proclaimed to these and not to those, which is not any operation of theirs but only of God. This is evident from Prosper's words: "They say that the Lord foresaw those who would believe, and that the times and ministries of teachers were so dispensed for each nation as the belief of good wills was about to arise." See how they do not say that faith was so predefined as it was foreknown to arise from free will, but "the times and ministries of teachers were so dispensed," that is, it was decreed that teachers of faith and doctors would be sent. And Hilary: "But when they are asked why the Gospel is preached to some or in some places but not in others... They say this belongs to divine foreknowledge, that the truth was announced or is announced at that time and there and to those when and where it was foretold it would be believed." See here also what this divine foreknowledge or Middle Knowledge is used for; not so that there may be a predefinition of faith, but so that the Gospel may be preached or not preached in certain places. Nor does what they objected to Augustine in the response to the questions of the Pagans relate to anything else. For

DISPUTATION III

there was no inquiry at all about how the freedom of will would or would not stand with the predefinition of faith; there was, I say, neither thought nor concern for such a matter. This alone was asked: why the Savior, who was so called, had withdrawn himself for so many ages. And if Christ is the way to salvation... what happened to the people of so many ages before Christ? And what happened to so many innumerable souls? What, I ask, does the harmed or unharmed freedom of predefined faith have to do with these questions? Therefore, when Augustine responds that Christ wished to appear to men at that time and in that place when and where He knew there were those who would believe in Him, who does not see that this in no way aims to preserve the freedom of faith, but only that God might not seem to be a respecter of persons?

XCIX. Indeed, the Semi-Pelagians used this knowledge only to defend their position that God offered salvation indifferently to all, and that it was placed in people's will to accept it, the reward of this will being grace thereafter necessary; if otherwise, God would be a respecter of persons. And when immediately infants were objected to them, as well as those to whom the Gospel was not announced, they sought the reason from the Middle Knowledge of conditionally future merits. Nor did they seek it in such a way as to say that faith conditionally foreknown was the cause why the Gospel was proposed to those who would believe, except as a cause that is called "removing a hindrance." For they supposed that God was induced of His own accord to will, as far as people would allow it, to save all, and consequently to make the doctrine of salvation known to all, as is clear from Prosper and Hilary. Therefore, this good will of God, which for them corresponded to Augustine's purpose, was the cause of preaching among all who were known not to impede its fruit. But those who were known to impede it, by that very fact supplied the cause or reason why Christ would not want to sow the seeds of the divine word in vain among them. This was Augustine's view at that time, as indeed the Massiliensians thought, genuine and approved by them, which has

DISPUTATION III

nothing at all to do with the harmony of divine predefinitions with the freedom of human actions.

C. This is further explained and confirmed. For whenever divine predefinition is reconciled with the freedom of human operation through Middle Knowledge, that which is said to be foreknown is this very thing, which is then predefined. For example, God foreknows that a man will freely repent if such a thought is inspired in him at such a time and place. God is therefore said to be able to predefine that free act of contrition and to make by His predefinition that which was conditionally and freely future to be absolutely and freely future, by the benefit of that inspiration. But with the Semi-Pelagians, one thing is conditionally foreknown, and another is predefined or decreed. For in infants, good and bad merits are conditionally foreknown; but the conferral and withholding of baptism are predefined. In adults, conditionally future belief and unbelief are foreknown; but the proposition and non-proposition of the Gospel are predefined. And they always philosophize in the same way about this conditional foreknowledge as about absolute foreknowledge, which they do not use to direct the predefinition of the thing that is foreknown, but say that, for example, absolutely foreknown faith is the cause why grace necessary for acquiring sanctity thereafter is decreed. And similarly, foreknown perseverance is the cause why glory is decreed. And thus they will never be found to have said that the same things that had been conditionally foreknown were predefined, which, however, is necessary for them to be considered to have reconciled the efficacy of predefinitions with the freedom of predefined actions by the benefit of such foreknowledge.

CI. For what Prosper says in that question which he proposes to Augustine, as if this were the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians, "whether those things themselves which are proposed are to be understood as foreknown," it is clear that it is said in this sense: not that the Semi-Pelagians said that certain things were proposed after they had been conditionally foreknown, but that those things which Augustine and Catholics con-

DISPUTATION III

tended were proposed in the preparation of grace, and to that extent only absolutely foreknown, the Semi-Pelagians said were absolutely foreknown independently of grace, but not proposed—such as the beginning of faith and perseverance to the end, as was shown before.

CII. And these things had to be discussed somewhat more fully because our Adversaries rely on this as a necessary foundation to present the doctrine of Middle Knowledge and its use in reconciling the efficacy of divine predefinitions with the freedom of predefined acts as if it were proper to the Semi-Pelagians and contrary to Augustine. But I hope the learned Reader will be persuaded to want to know what they respond to the above arguments, by which the contrary is proven, and also by what reasoning they prove what they assume, and how they distinguish between absolute foreknowledge and conditional knowledge. For as certain as it is that they explained through absolute foreknowledge how both the grace of justification and glory itself would be free to us—when they said that the grace of justification is obtained by the foreknown will to believe and desire for sanctity independent of grace, and glory is decreed in view of perseverance similarly foreknown and independent of grace—so certain is it that they never used conditional knowledge of any free operation to reconcile its predefinition with its freedom; nor have our Adversaries proven this so far, nor will they ever prove it hereafter.

CIII. And indeed, the theologian of the College of Salamanca nowhere gives any proof of this matter; but having supposed that the Semi-Pelagians did not misuse the absolute foreknowledge of future merits, whenever he subsequently reads the name of foreknowledge among those who either report or refute their opinion, he interprets it as conditional, as if this matter were either already conceded or not at all questionable. And from this principle, it is remarkable what and how many arguments he then deduces.

CIV. Father John of St. Thomas does indeed attempt to prove this, but see how effectively. "That the Massiliensians," he says, "reconciled our freedom with the divine will and decree and predestination

DISPUTATION III

through middle knowledge is evident both because they removed all infallibility by way of causality from the divine decree regarding our perseverance and regarding the number of the elect and other effects of grace, and only conceded the infallibility of foreknowledge; and because, etc." Behold the first argument, which can be reduced to this form: "He who removes infallibility by way of causality from the divine decree regarding our perseverance and other effects of grace, and only concedes the infallibility of foreknowledge, reconciles our freedom with the divine will through middle knowledge. But the Massiliensians remove, etc. Therefore, the Massiliensians reconcile our freedom with the divine will through middle knowledge." Where you see that the major premise is more obscure and more ambiguous than the conclusion itself. Which moreover implies a contradiction. For he who reconciles our freedom with the divine will through middle knowledge leaves in that divine will infallibility or infallible causality with respect to our consent as absolutely future, depending on the foreknowledge of it as conditionally future. Therefore, he who removes all such infallibility removes the means of reconciling the divine will with our freedom. Therefore, he who reconciles in this way does not reconcile. The term "foreknowledge" in the major premise is also equivocal, since it can be taken either of absolute or of conditional foreknowledge.

Now in the minor premise what he says—that the Massiliensians removed the infallible causality of the divine will with respect to perseverance and other effects of grace—is deceptive. For he seems to want to say that they indeed admitted causality, but not infallible causality, and similarly grace, but not efficacious grace, although it is clear from what has been said that they denied both grace and all gratuitous antecedent will with respect to perseverance and other effects which are for us effects of grace, such as the beginning of faith. This is what they meant when they said that "all industry is removed if divine decree prevents human wills." Hence, what is added—that they admitted infallible foreknowledge—is to be understood mostly of absolute foreknowledge, by which

DISPUTATION III

they said that incipient faith is foreknown, and from there grace is decreed for those things that should follow; perseverance is also foreknown, and from there glory is decreed, as was shown before. Hence it is clear that this argument is less effective than the grace of the Massiliensians themselves.

CV. The second argument is a little more distinct when he says, "And because they said that our industry and freedom are removed if the divine constitution or decree of God prevents our wills; but predestination and decree can be admitted according to foreknowledge." As if he were saying: He who thinks freedom is taken away if the divine constitution precedes our will, but not taken away if that constitution is according to foreknowledge, reconciles God's will with our freedom through middle knowledge; but the Massiliensians think this. Therefore: But I distinguish that part of the major: He who thinks it is not taken away if the divine constitution is according to foreknowledge—either that constitution tends toward our action, or toward something else consequent from the action. If it tends toward our action so that the same action is constituted that is supposed to be foreknown, then, I say, he who philosophizes thus reconciles the divine will with freedom through middle knowledge, I concede; if it tends toward something else consequent from our action, so that the foreknowledge is about one thing and the constitution about another, then he who philosophizes thus reconciles the divine will with our freedom through middle knowledge, I deny. But the Massiliensians think this, that is, they think that the divine constitution is according to foreknowledge in such a way that the same action of ours is said to be constituted that is supposed to be foreknown, I deny; in such a way that the foreknowledge is about one thing, for example, about our action, but the constitution is about something else consequent from our action, such as a reward, I concede. For they say that the foreknowledge is about our incipient faith, but the constitution is about grace to be given thereafter for the sanctity that should follow. Likewise, they say that the foreknowledge is about perseverance, but the constitution is about glory. And therefore I

DISPUTATION III

deny the consequence; nor does Father John of St. Thomas bring anything forward by which that distinction might be refuted. But it has evidence by which it might be confirmed. For let those words be considered which he recites in this place from Prosper: "But those who will believe, and those who will remain in that faith which thereafter is to be aided by God's grace, God foreknew before the foundation of the world, and predestined them to His kingdom, those whom, called by grace, He foresaw would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end." See whether he does not place the foreknowledge of one thing and the predestination of another? Does he say that either that faith which was foreknown was predestined, or that perseverance was? Does he place any predestination at all concerning either? Yet this is what should have been done to represent the Massiliensians as reconciling the divine constitution concerning faith or concerning perseverance with their freedom through middle knowledge.

CVI. And therefore what this Author adds, having recited those words of Prosper in which he says, according to the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians, that the grace of the one calling operates according to foreknowledge of human merits: "Behold the operation of calling placed alongside the foreknowledge of our consent," is nothing and proves nothing, except that he himself argues in vain. For Prosper calls those merits "human" because they were thought by the Massiliensians not to be dependent on God's gratuitous help, and the Massiliensians said that the grace of the one calling operates according to the foreknowledge of those merits, not because meritorious actions which had been foreknown were predefined—for this is not indicated in any place, and merits thus predefined would be, and would not be, human—but because in view of merits thus foreknown, something else further would be decreed, as has often been said; or because from the lack of such foreknowledge there would also follow the withdrawal of grace, as in nations which in past ages were "left to go their own ways," as Prosper says. For that according to the opinion of the Massiliensians, those nations whose belief was condition-

DISPUTATION III

ally foreknown, if the Gospel were proposed to them, would be given God's internal help to believe, and faith itself would be predefined from such foreknowledge, as this Author seems to suppose—we, on the contrary, suppose that this has nowhere been proven, and from contrary proof is false. Indeed, we contend that conditional foreknowledge of future belief was by no means adduced to defend the freedom of faith, but to show how those who would thus believe would not impede the external proposition of the Gospel, which others had impeded, to whom they said it was not proclaimed for this reason, because it would not have been accepted. Thus the Semi-Pelagians tried not to reconcile freedom with predestination, but to repel the objection of the respect of persons.

CVII. And thus finally what he proposes in the last place collapses, while he proves that the Massiliensians admitted God's decree based on that foreknowledge which they posited, from these words of Prosper: "Almost everyone's opinion is found to be the same and one, by which they received the purpose and predestination of God according to foreknowledge, so that because of this God made some vessels of honor, others of dishonor, because He foresaw the end of each, and under the very help of grace, foreknew in what will and action each would be." To these words Father John of St. Thomas applies this commentary: "Supposing, therefore, that foreknowledge of human consent or will before the decree, which is certainly middle knowledge, they admitted the purpose and predestination of God, which they said would take away freedom if it prevented human wills. Therefore, they felt that if it did not prevent but presupposed by foreknowing what the will would do, and thus decreed, freedom was not taken away. Therefore, it reconciled our freedom with God's decree through that middle foreknowledge." But you should prove, my Father, that the foreknowledge of which Prosper speaks is conditional; I contend that it is absolute, as was shown earlier in the first two propositions. And similarly, it had to be proven that that purpose is a purpose of faith or perseverance, when, however, Prosper indicates that it is a purpose of glory, which is accompanied by a decree of damnation, by which

DISPUTATION III

some become vessels of dishonor. For if it were a purpose of faith or free perseverance, it could not be directed by any knowledge other than conditional and middle knowledge; and thus it would follow that both the freedom of that faith and of that perseverance had been coordinated with such a purpose by the benefit of middle knowledge, which, as far as we know, was never a thought of the Massiliensians. But when it is said to be both a purpose of glory and a decree of damnation, who does not see that the foreknowledge which both presuppose of the final outcome is absolute, by the benefit of which the freedom of both stands because to depart from life in this or that way is supposed to be free? Therefore, it is gratuitous and fictitious interpretation by which it is said that the foreknowledge of human consent, of which Prosper speaks, because it is before the decree, is middle knowledge; for as certain as it is that the foreknowledge of human consent which is before the decree of that consent itself, or of the grace necessary for it, or even of common concurrence, is middle knowledge, so it is false that it is not absolute if it directs the decree of the reward, as it directs the decree of punishment corresponding to such consent.

CVIII. And therefore, what this Author adds, "they felt, therefore, that if the purpose and predestination did not prevent foreknowledge, but presupposed it, foreknowing what the will would do, and thus decreed, freedom was not taken away," is entirely so—they felt that if the purpose by which some become vessels of honor and others vessels of dishonor did not prevent but supposed the absolute foreknowledge of the human will in its final outcome, neither the immediate freedom of the will itself nor the mediated freedom of reward or punishment was taken away. "Therefore," he says, "they reconciled our freedom with God's decree through that middle foreknowledge," which was not middle but absolute; I concede this. And from this it follows that the use of middle knowledge in preserving the freedom of human will was never rejected by Saint Augustine while disputing against the Semi-Pelagians, since he rejected nothing other than what was proposed by Prosper and Hilary.

DISPUTATION III

CHAPTER V. WHETHER FROM THE EFFECTS OF AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE IT FOLLOWS THAT AUGUSTINE WAS OPPOSED TO MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

CIX. The Theologian of the College of Salamanca, after examining Augustine's face to read in it the condemnation of middle knowledge, also explores his footsteps by arguing from effects; so that no one can doubt that he knew him thoroughly, that is, completely, and as is commonly said, from head to toe. He pursues this argument extensively in doubt 34, disputation 10, with a greater abundance of words and repetition of thoughts than befits the precision of the school and the concise hand of dialecticians; but we must seek out and address the nerve of his reasoning.

§ I. TWO METHODS BY WHICH THE ADVERSARY ATTEMPTS TO PROVE HIS INTENT ARE REJECTED

CX. He concludes in two ways that from the effects of Augustinian doctrine it can be inferred, and indeed with great certainty, that according to Augustine's own mind, conditional knowledge that exists prior to the efficacious and conditional decree of the divine will must be rejected. First, assuming what we ourselves say, that with the benefit of middle knowledge, the reconciliation of divine decrees with human free will is easy; but without such knowledge, it is very difficult. Second, he concludes the same by himself, without taking into account what we grant him.

He argues in the first way thus: It is incredible that a doctrine which greatly favors free will would give occasion for despair, as if freedom were already lost; but the doctrine through which middle knowledge

DISPUTATION III

is transmitted greatly favors free will, as we ourselves admit. Therefore, it is incredible that the doctrine through which middle knowledge is transmitted would give anyone occasion for despair, as if freedom were destroyed by it. But Augustine's doctrine gives such occasion to the Massilienses, according to Prosper and Hilary; therefore, Augustine's doctrine is not the doctrine through which middle knowledge is transmitted. This is the first argument, by which the Adversary thinks great certainty is produced.

But first, I accept what he himself granted a little earlier: that the Massilienses were unjustifiably troubled by Augustine's doctrine. Hence I respond by distinguishing the major premise. It is incredible that a doctrine greatly favoring free will would give anyone cause for despair; justifiably, I concede; unjustifiably, I deny. But our doctrine of middle knowledge greatly favors free will; I concede the minor premise. Therefore, it would not give anyone cause for disturbance, justifiably, I concede; unjustifiably, I deny. And when it is subsumed that Augustine's doctrine gave such occasion to the Massilienses, I similarly distinguish: justifiably, I deny; unjustifiably, I concede. Therefore, it is not the doctrine through which middle knowledge is transmitted, I deny the consequence. Suarez's doctrine of predestination before foreseen merits is entirely based on middle knowledge, and yet Vasquez, Lessius, Becanus, and others, who prefer predestination to be after foreseen merits, think it less consonant with human freedom and that it engenders a certain despair if publicly proposed. Does their fear seem so insane that it could not have occurred among the Massilienses?

CXI. Secondly, I respond: I again distinguish the major premise. It is incredible that a doctrine which with great clarity preserves the freedom of will would be an occasion for despair to anyone who holds a correct understanding of the concept of freedom, I concede; to one who does not, I deny. And having conceded the minor premise, I respond with the same distinction to the conclusion. And when it is subsumed that Augustine's doctrine was an occasion for despair to the Massilienses, I dis-

DISPUTATION III

tinguish: to those having a correct understanding of the concept of freedom, I deny; to those not having one, I concede; hence I deny the conclusion. We have already seen that for the Massilienses, free will and the will not needing any assistance of grace to begin the work of salvation (at least in some desire and effort to believe) were the same thing. Since therefore they believed that freedom itself was removed precisely by the necessity of grace, whatever its efficacy might be, it follows that they hoped for freedom to remain intact only if the necessity of grace were removed. Therefore, since middle knowledge in no way removes that necessity, but rather presupposes it, consequently, they would not have thought that through the persuasion of middle knowledge one could understand the harmony of free will with God's providence as Augustine proposed it.

CXII. Thirdly, I respond: Let the major premise pass; I distinguish the minor premise. The doctrine through which middle knowledge is transmitted greatly favors free will when applied to understanding the harmony of freedom with divine decrees, I concede; when not so applied, I deny. Therefore, it is incredible that this doctrine was an occasion for despair to the Massilienses when applied to that use which I mentioned, I concede; when not so applied, I deny. But Augustine's doctrine was such an occasion. Let it be. Therefore, it was not that through which middle knowledge is transmitted when applied to the use I mentioned, I concede; when not so applied, I deny. Is this not precisely what Molina concedes, and which is usually exaggerated by opponents as arrogantly stated by him, that this way of defending freedom was not given and explained by Augustine in his dispute against the Pelagians? Does not this same author admit, "Although we strive with all our might to claim that the doctrine of middle knowledge is Augustinian, nevertheless none among us has yet been found who plainly asserted that Augustine, while disputing with the Pelagians and their remnants, used middle knowledge to reconcile freedom with grace"? Since this knowledge is helpful for understanding the harmony of freedom with grace only insofar as it is ap-

DISPUTATION III

plied to that use, what does an argument prove against those who deny it was applied by Augustine, when the argument is drawn from the fact that Augustine's doctrine did not remove from the heretics the fear of losing freedom?

CXIII. But why, he asks, did Augustine not use it? Because that method, although it could be very helpful, was nevertheless not sufficient for bringing back the heretics, who, since they said that freedom was destroyed if grace were necessary, and if man could not by himself at least begin and persevere in benefits received, consequently middle knowledge, which in no way removes this necessity, would not have removed the fear of losing freedom; yet it would have helped by persuading them of a certain mode of efficacy, from which there would be less to fear. Secondly, Augustine did not use it because he was intent on what mattered most. But it was of the utmost importance for the praise of the glory of God's grace that its necessity not be denied under the pretext of defending freedom. Therefore, since it was at least partly denied by the Massilienses, Augustine devoted himself entirely to proving it in his two books on the predestination of the saints and on the gift of perseverance. In these controversies, the main aim is to persuade that what must be believed is true, because afterward judgment must be submitted in obedience to faith, even if one does not know how it happens. Therefore, having proven the necessity of grace by the most certain arguments, and consequently its harmony with freedom, Augustine did not need to labor more to explain the mode of that harmony than we now need to labor, having proven the presence of Christ's body in the sacrament of the Eucharist, to persuade the heretics who deny it whether it is definitive, or as some Nominalists wanted, circumscriptive. Thirdly, if God left no theological thought to suggest to the Pastors and Doctors of the Church in succeeding ages, but infused all into Augustine, why do we not remain in the same doubt as he did concerning the seven days of the creation of the world, concerning the propagation of souls from the stem, concerning the nature and simplicity of Angels, and other questions of this kind, for which there is now

DISPUTATION III

an almost undoubted solution among everyone? Far be it from me to think that anyone who succeeded Augustine should be preferred to him, or even equaled; but it makes a great difference whether you say that many more gifts of knowledge were conferred on him than on others, or all of them; likewise, whether you say that far fewer were reserved for all who would succeed him, or none at all; so that it is a crime that others think they see some ray not emitted from Augustine's sun. But those who defend this mode of harmony do not even think this; for they both plainly prove middle knowledge from Augustine, and according to it, they read in him that those are efficaciously called "whom God calls in the way He knows to be fitting, so that they do not reject the caller." From this, moreover, it is not difficult to infer that God, being aware of such a congruent call, can predefine consent without harming freedom. Hence, one who uses this inference to understand the harmony of predefinition with freedom, while denying that its form is so explicitly stated in Augustine, no more prefers himself to Augustine than one would prefer himself to Virgil who said that from certain of his expressions he had composed a verse that did not appear in his works; or to Cicero, who, compiling phrases from him, would recite a period nowhere stated by him. Therefore, it is a judgment of precipitation, and of a charity less than that which befits saints, to interpret as arrogantly said that some deny Augustine used this form of solution, by which the freedom of predefined actions is now defended through the benefit of middle knowledge; while they do not deny that he used another, which was more necessary and more apt for refuting the error that existed then; and by which not just some mode of efficacy, but the very necessity of divine grace was denied. Fourthly, it should also be noted that the scholastic method, which began after Augustine's time and dominated all the Academies, by giving another form to the difficulties proposed against the received doctrine of the Church, forced Catholic disputants to find other modes of solutions as well. Those who think this invention is injurious to Augustine seem to me to do the same as those who would deny that it could be said without injustice to the

DISPUTATION III

Scipios and Caesars that there is now another way of arranging battle formations than there was in the time of slings and ballistas. Let our Adversaries tell us where the terms of the Massilienses are read, and those concepts and syllogisms by which it is now argued that freedom cannot coexist with divine predefinitions; and then we shall see which method of solution Augustine used more, theirs or ours.

CXIV. The second argument was initially entangled with the first and made one with it, but for the sake of distinction, I shall propose it separate from the other, stripped of the impediments of unnecessary words. Thus it runs: The doctrine which bears the appearance of prejudice against freedom, and is opposed to that which exhibits an easy reason for the desired harmony, is that which troubled the Massilienses. But that which denies middle knowledge, and posits decrees efficacious of themselves prior to the foreseeing of any created consent, bears the appearance of prejudice against freedom, and is opposed to that which exhibits an easy reason for the desired harmony, as we ourselves think. Therefore, the doctrine which denies middle knowledge, and posits decrees efficacious of themselves prior to the foreseeing of any created consent, is that which troubled the Massilienses. But the doctrine by which they were troubled was Augustine's. Therefore, Augustine's doctrine removes middle knowledge, and posits etc. And the author says this is evidently credible.

But if the major proposition is universal, and equivalent to "Every doctrine that etc.," it will be false; if it is particular, the argument concludes nothing, since it is in the first figure. And it is difficult to compose this reasoning in such a way that it does not have some evident defect either of matter or form. For if you conclude in this way: It is credible that the Massilienses were troubled by no other doctrine than one apparently difficult and harmful to freedom; but that which denies middle knowledge and posits antecedently efficacious decrees is apparently difficult and harmful to freedom; therefore, it is credible that they were troubled by it; an exclusive particle must be added to the minor, and it

DISPUTATION III

must be said, "But only that etc.," in which way it is false. Because, as I have already said, that which posits antecedent decrees from the direction of middle knowledge is apparently difficult and not very favorable to freedom, in the judgment of all those who teach predestination after foreseen merits. Besides, in the major premise, that distinction must be understood: if the Massilienses were justifiably troubled, I concede; if they were unjustifiably troubled, I deny. But if you wish to argue thus: Given two ways of defending freedom, one apparently easy, the other apparently difficult, it is credible that the Massilienses were troubled by the apparently difficult rather than the apparently easy one. This major premise is true. But what will the minor premise assume? That two ways were proposed to the Massilienses, one indeed apparently easy, through the use of middle knowledge; the other apparently difficult, through the negation of such knowledge. But this is false; because, as I said above, they never thought about the predefinition of a free action following a conditional, that is, middle foreknowledge of the same.

CXV. The Adversary adds in number 63 a confirmation, or rather a repetition of the previous argument, in which he says that Augustine ran no small risk to his life, on the grounds that he was taking away freedom from men. But I do not know from which documents this Author has unearthed this danger. For there was a wide enough moat between Augustine and the Massilienses, namely the Mediterranean Sea. And in Africa, those who had preceded the Massilienses with their rumors did not, as far as we know, attempt anything savage against him. Unless perhaps the Donatists are being confused with the Semi-Pelagians.

CXVI. And as to what he repeatedly emphasizes there, that those who were troubled by Augustine's doctrine were outstanding and illustrious men; and that only insane and foolish people could be troubled by that which defends freedom through middle knowledge, I have already said that what these illustrious men said about the force of conditionally future merits is called by Augustine not just insane, but most insane. I have also said that from this perspective, Lessius, Becanus, and Cornelius

DISPUTATION III

a Lapide do not seem to be more insane than those who are also troubled by predestination before foreseen merits, however much it follows middle knowledge. And so if we wish to accuse them of insanity, we will not lack Augustine's authority; if we prefer to defend their wisdom, we have the example of those who excellently uphold this name. But this also must always be repeated, that Augustine used neither middle knowledge in reconciling freedom with God's decrees, nor a doctrine contrary to it. Rather, he used that which was directly opposed to the error of the Massilienses, and which proved the necessity of grace and of decrees, without which grace can neither be prepared nor given; whatever the mode of efficacy might be, since they contended that the will, to be free, must be independent.

CXVII. The second argument, which for us is the third, amounts to almost the same thing and runs thus: Two effects followed from Augustine's doctrine, that disturbance and those complaints of illustrious men, and the zeal for collecting testimonies both from others and from Augustine against Augustine himself. But the same effects followed from the doctrine denying middle knowledge, and from that affirming the efficacy of decrees independent of it at the time of Molina. Therefore, it is a sign that the doctrine denying middle knowledge, having affirmed the efficacy of divine decrees independent of it, is in conformity with Augustine's doctrine. The consequence, he says, seems to follow with credibility and certainty from the two premises. By these words he openly admits that there is no form to this argument; since with it standing, no one should be concerned about the consequence. And indeed, this entire reasoning reduces to this argument: From Augustine's doctrine follow the recounted effects; from the doctrine denying middle knowledge the same follow; therefore, Augustine's doctrine is the same as the doctrine denying middle knowledge. The conclusion of this argument follows with as much credibility and certainty from the premises as can follow from affirmative premises in the second figure. But the form will be legitimate with this assumed principle, though false: The doctrine from which the same ef-

DISPUTATION III

fects follow cannot but be the same; but from Augustine's doctrine, and from that which denies middle knowledge, the same effects follow; therefore, Augustine's doctrine and that which denies middle knowledge cannot but be the same. Similar errors against basic logic occur elsewhere as well, from which you may gather that the Complutensians did not always stand by the Salamancans. I only warn that Calvin would argue in the same way against the Fathers of Trent and would say: "From our doctrine, that of the new Apostles, has followed the same disturbance which once followed from Augustine's doctrine concerning free will; it is therefore a very credible sign that our doctrine and Augustine's are the same."

CXVIII. In the latter mode, and without regard to what we willingly concede, the Adversary proves from the effects of Augustine's doctrine and from other signs that it can be sufficiently inferred that he absolutely and simply stands against middle knowledge. And this will be our argument in order, the fourth; if indeed it can be counted as one, since it contains nothing different from the others. The illustrious men, he says, as is clear from Prosper, were troubled by that doctrine, which said that the divine constitution precedes human wills, and which for that reason seemed to introduce a fatal necessity under the name of predestination. Therefore, that doctrine, which was Augustine's, and from which they had taken occasion for this disturbance, admitted decrees efficacious of themselves before the consent of the human will, and thus repugnant to middle knowledge. Having conceded the antecedent, I deny the consequence. And I say that the will which prepares the grace necessary for acting well from the mercy of God and not according to the merits of the recipients, is that divine constitution by which the Massilienses did not want the human will to be preceded, lest a fatal necessity be introduced, as I extensively showed in the third proposition. But that constitution in no way destroys middle knowledge. Therefore, the constitution which they thought fatal does not destroy middle knowledge.

CXIX. And when it is insisted: If God's constitution were directed by middle knowledge, and thus would suppose consent conditionally

DISPUTATION III

future, it would neither be said to precede the will, nor have anything fatal, I reply by denying the first part, and distinguishing the second. For that constitution both precedes consent as absolutely future, and presupposes grace presupposed to the same, even as it is conditionally future; which is sufficient for it to be disapproved by those who do not think the will is free in that in which it depends on grace, and that there should be no gratuitous constitution except after the absolute foreknowledge of some merit. For what is said about that constitution not containing anything fatal, in reality and if its accommodation is well understood from the direction of middle knowledge, I concede; in appearance, and with that accommodation neither proposed nor understood, I deny. But we have already seen that that mode of harmony was neither understood by the Massilienses nor proposed by Augustine, who was intent on a more necessary refutation and on defending the necessity of divine grace.

CXX. There follows the argument in order, the fifth, drawn from the authority of those thirty Doctors who, by order of Clement VIII, met to give their opinion on this controversy, and finally concluded that middle knowledge is repugnant to Augustine, with one or two exceptions. The Adversary examines all the circumstances of this opinion with many great considerations, in order to establish that we should stand by the judgment of such very grave men. But since this account will be more accurately examined in the following disputation, I will meanwhile only say this, that the praise of those Doctors is too exaggerated when they are called so very grave, because undoubtedly they would consider themselves sufficiently praised if they were only called so grave. Then I ask, where has that Augustine gone, who was then, and whose hundred tongues and hundred mouths so distinctly attacked middle knowledge, that a senate of thirty judges with almost unanimous consent pronounced against it from his testimony? Have testimonies so clear and so eloquent been eaten away by the antiquity of a few years, so that it is not now permitted to draw the same condemnation of middle knowledge from them? What reason was there, then, that when this Author with whom

DISPUTATION III

we are disputing was seeking more effective arguments, and for that reason was looking more diligently at Augustine's face, he brought forward only two, of which one is refuted with no labor of ours, but by the interpretation of those who conspired against middle knowledge; the other has a solution so manifest that the candor of the adversaries makes us hope for an ingenuous confession of its inefficacy? But if what this Author has proposed are the most apt of all that occurred to those Doctors, who would not rightly fear that instead of thirty who condemned middle knowledge, sixty might easily be found who would absolve it? Indeed, Augustine still lives, and still breathes in his books; nor can it be that either he said something then which he does not say now, or that what he says now, he did not say then. We ask, therefore, where is that contained, in which alone is contained the condemnation of middle knowledge: "That God is concerned about future things which are not future, and decrees by the present decree, not that men do something, but that they would do in time what will not be, not even evil works excepted." If this is not now found in Augustine, nor was found by those thirty men, but it is still expected that the Adversaries prove it was found, then the matter remains unproven.

§ II. ON THE NON-ANTIQUITY OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

CXXI. In the tenth disputation cited, doubts six, seven, and eight, the Adversary extensively proves these things: 1. That it is not true what Suarez says, that the opinion which defends middle knowledge is so fortified by the authority of the ancient Scholastics that it surpasses the contrary. 2. Nor is it true what Herice says, that it was hidden from the ancient Scholastics, and was brought to light by our men through the assiduous reading of the Holy Fathers. 3. Nor should Molina be heard when he says that the knowledge of middle knowledge is both new and necessary. 4. That middle knowledge was indeed known, both by the Fa-

DISPUTATION III

thers and by the ancient Scholastics, but was rejected by all, all things considered, so that it can be called the knowledge of reprobation. From which it follows: 5. That the opinion which denies it is to be preferred to that which affirms it.

CXXII. He uses in the proof of these things primarily four arguments: the authority of the Thomists, the authority of other Scholastics, the authority of the Council of Trent, and also that of the Roman Pontiff.

He uses the authority of the Thomists against Suarez thus: Because if what he says were true, it would follow that the Dominican theologians fell into madness and folly when they accused Molina's doctrine before the judges, if it had already flowed perennially from the time of Augustine and was commonly known in the schools. But the consequent is absurd. Therefore, so is the antecedent.

I reply, first, that to argue in this way is dangerous; and that this precept of military prudence should be observed in this place, never to wish an enemy to be driven into such straits in which he is forced to try what desperation can do; a bridge, even a silver one, should always be left for him to flee. And I hope that the Adversary will not deny it, since it is also necessary for him.

Secondly, I reply and return the argument: Because if it is true that middle knowledge was well known to the ancient Scholastics, and rejected by all, it follows that the Fathers of the Society, who undertook to defend it, are guilty of outstanding temerity and reckless audacity, while they embrace a doctrine rejected by all scholastics, and can be said in a way to have been given over to a reprobate sense who with such contention defend the knowledge of reprobation; moreover, they are foolish and proud to the point of folly, while they bring the old refuse of all the schools as the new merchandise of their industry and talent to this theological market. But the consequent seems absurd. Therefore, so is the antecedent. Here, my Father, I ask you which way you wish to flee; for Suarez will escape by the same bridge.

DISPUTATION III

Thirdly, neither were there many Thomists, nor were they the wisest of all others, who brought this lawsuit against us; but as usually happens in camps, that the quarrels of a few camp followers divide the army into factions, and even the leaders themselves, while they look only at the standards, without investigating the right of the quarrelers, pre-judging the equity of the cause from the color of the flags; so it happened in this matter, that a private disputation of one College became the cause of two orders, with reinforcements arriving from both sides, while neither will others suffer their Adversaries to be offended, nor will they go away undefended. But for us in this cause, it is favorable that the Adversaries confess that they were the Aggressors, because they were also the Accusers. And therefore this Doctor of the College of Salamanca thinks for this reason that ours are to be believed less than the Thomists, that ours were compelled by necessity to fortify middle knowledge, while there was no need in the Thomists to attack it. But he does not notice that while he attributes to ours the necessity of defense, he himself orders the Thomists to provide the equity of the harassment; to say nothing of how absurd that thought is, that by the prejudice of names alone one should believe the accused less than the accuser; because some necessity compels the former to deny, but none the latter to accuse.

CXXIII. But we must not forget what the same Author has professed, that although heretics might defend the Middle Knowledge, they did not do so heretically. And as Father St. Thomas adds, even if they did not make good use of it, which they had in common with us, it was nevertheless not erroneous. Indeed, Augustine also calls him a Catholic Disputant who both recognized Middle Knowledge and employed it to understand the gentle manner of providence. Our men were thus accused of a doctrine that was acknowledged to be neither heretical, nor erroneous, nor novel. And to put it briefly, what was fatal for them was that while they could not deny conditional knowledge, they did not admit certain decrees in God concerning the free acts of men, such as "I will that if the Gospel were preached to Tyre, it would be converted" or "I will

DISPUTATION III

that if the Jews married foreign women, they would be seduced by them," etc. Was denying these Wills in God a matter worthy of the Inquisitors' attention? And did none of the ancient Scholastics reject them? Hence I reply fourthly. From these considerations it is evident that there was indeed no madness or foolishness in the first Accusers of Middle Knowledge—far be it from me to wish to besmirch with such reproaches men whom I rather hold in singular honor for their profession and erudition—but what is human and sometimes adheres even to holy men, there was some haste greater than befits the gravity and maturity of the Nation. If this matter were now open to discussion, I have no doubt they would proceed more slowly and grant the most liberal opportunity for defending Middle Knowledge.

And lest they interpret it as arrogance, that either Fonseca or Molina are said to have seen something in the Fathers and Earlier Scholastics that they themselves did not see, I reply fifthly. In the Epistle read on the feast of St. Thomas, the treasure of wisdom that he explored and that is explored by all who follow in his footsteps is called infinite; it cannot therefore be exhausted by the capacity of any human intellect, which is always finite, and the infinite is not consumed by finite subtraction. Therefore, however much one might draw from it, there still remains what another might also extract: nor is that glory proper to anyone, by which they might think that they themselves have left nothing for others to take. Pride, therefore, consists not in denying that what you have found was previously discovered by others; but in vainly boasting that your portion is either greater than others' or even equal. Those who say they have found in the Ancient Fathers and Scholastics the Middle Knowledge and some use of it, which the Thomists had not found, do not say this, provided they concede to others the discovery of many other things as well.

Finally, what Suarez says, that the position asserting Middle Knowledge rests on the Authority of the Ancient Scholastics more than the contrary view, has only this meaning: that this doctrine is believed to

DISPUTATION III

have been either expressed by the Earlier Scholastics, or widely presupposed, or so connected with their principles that they would by no means have denied it, had it been distinctly proposed. If our Adversaries regret not having seen this, they can console themselves with the thought that, as I have already said, there is no one who has seen everything.

CXXIV. To the above reasoning our Adversary adds a confirmation drawn from the Authority of Scholastics even of our Society. Also from those Thirty Doctors of whom I spoke above. And even from Pope Clement. For he says that our own Fonseca, Molina, Herice, Granado, and others admit that Middle Knowledge was unknown to the ancient Scholastics; the same is gathered from the judgment of the thirty Doctors, and also of Pope Clement, who accepted the accusation against Molina, when he ought rather to have repelled the Dominicans as unjust accusers of a doctrine that was common. But neither should they have been allowed to pursue this judgment if the matter were as Suarez thought.

I respond that Suarez did not think this treasure was so openly available in the Earlier Theologians that no digging would be necessary: he does not believe, indeed, that any disputation was established on this matter, as on others. There was, therefore, a place for examining the industry of the workers in extracting and bringing into the open what was hidden: nor should those who did not approve of it be immediately rejected. If Suarez were to say that the Master of the Sentences had certain distinctions on this argument, if St. Thomas had four rather lengthy disputations on its possibility, just as our Adversary has distinguished four on its impossibility; if St. Bonaventure had some questions, if Scotus, Gabriel, Gregory, etc. also had some, then the conjecture that is objected to us would have merit: and it would have been a great foolishness to accuse of novelty something that occurred commonly among the Ancients. But Suarez asserts nothing of the kind, nor does he claim that Middle Knowledge exists among most ancient Theologians except in the way that those who began to dispute separately about the immaculate Con-

DISPUTATION III

ception of the Blessed Virgin contend that the definition of this controversy can be gathered from the Fathers: and Augustine himself found the doctrine of the necessity of grace among Ecclesiastical disputants, as he himself says: and those who once disputed against the Nestorians, Eutychians, and Monothelites about the unity of person or Wills in Christ, proved it from the Authority of previous writers. Just as, therefore, those who fight against the perpetual sanctity of the Blessed Virgin are not condemned for stupidity; nor should Augustine himself have been called foolish at the time when he did not yet understand that God's grace was necessary for the beginning of faith; nor were those heretics insane as long as their obstinate stubbornness did not resist the common sense of the Church as it then was, so also from what Suarez affirms, that Middle Knowledge was approved by the ancient Theologians, there follows no appearance of madness, or as our Adversary calls it, impudence in that concern which moved the Thomists to want to know what danger this doctrine posed: which was not thought by them, as it is not thought now, to be fortified by the Authority of the older Theologians.

And for this reason it was the highest wisdom for the Supreme Pontiff not to immediately repel the accusers of Middle Knowledge; because this very thing needed to be explored, whether this doctrine was indeed drawn from the writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, as was being claimed.

CXXV. But what, after all, does this reasoning aim at, and how does it establish that what Suarez said cannot be truly asserted, rather than that it cannot be truly denied? If it is true, you say, the Pontiff should have driven away the Thomists and not accepted their accusation. And if false, he should not have driven away the Jesuits, nor admitted their defense? Why does it better follow from the fact that something is said to have been commonly asserted in the past, that those who accuse it of novelty are impudent; than from the fact that something is said to have been commonly rejected in the past, that those who defend its antiquity

DISPUTATION III

are impudent? I am weary of refuting such useless arguments, which show nothing but a poverty of better ones.

CXXVI. Having defeated Suarez, Herice is attacked for saying that Middle Knowledge was unknown to the Scholastics and was extracted by Our Men from the darkness in which it lay through diligent and assiduous reading of the Fathers. He attacks this with two arguments. The first is drawn from the Authority of those Scholastics whom Herice says were unaware of Middle Knowledge, of whom he weaves a Catalog from Bellarmine, noting the times and places in which they lived: and since that number includes St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other leading men of those Schools which still maintain their name today; he concludes that if indeed the treasure of Middle Knowledge was hidden among the Fathers, it is so incredible that it cannot be doubted but that it would have been found by the Scholastic Theologians, especially by those leaders, and would thus have flowed continually down to these times. He pursues this reasoning for four whole Columns. But you can easily see, Excellent Reader, where the weight of this argument finally tends. Namely, we must come to this principle: St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others left absolutely nothing in the treasure of the Holy Fathers, Augustine and others, that they did not extract themselves. But in that treasure was Middle Knowledge, as Herice supposes: Therefore they extracted it. Again, they extracted nothing that they did not communicate to their posterity, and as it were hand down to them: But they found Middle Knowledge, as has been shown by argument: Therefore they handed it down to posterity. That they did not do this, however, is known.

And from what has been said, it is clear that both arguments assume something that is by no means necessary. For it is not necessary that after the diligence of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others, nothing more remains that anyone could find in the treasure of the Holy Fathers. Although about St. Thomas I will speak later. But that he harvested in this field in such a way that he left no ear of grain, I fear is to be attributed more to flattery than to true praise. The other assumption is

DISPUTATION III

also not necessary, namely, that if St. Thomas found that treasure, he handed it down explicitly, as they say, to posterity; for the transfer could have been made from one treasure to another similarly hidden; and it might lie hidden in St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and others, just as it lies hidden in St. Augustine and the other Fathers.

CXXVII. But you will say, this at least is necessary for their glory, that what they sought just as much as recent Theologians did, they should rather be said to have found. But they sought a way of reconciling providence with the freedom of will: Therefore they must have found it: Therefore if Middle Knowledge is necessary for this, it could not have escaped them. I reply that not even this is necessary for the glory of St. Thomas and others, that they should be said to have found what was sought, except perhaps in this sense, namely, because they so advanced the labor of this inquiry that what others found is owed primarily to them. For as in gold mines the greatest glory is not his who came upon a vein that had been sought for so long; but rather of those who carried the work forward to the point where they were close: so in digging this treasure of wisdom, those who find something good should attribute it more to the diligence of those who preceded them than to their own: since, entering into others' labor, and beginning from where they left off, they were able to complete what they themselves might perhaps not even have begun on their own. If our Adversary denies this, he passes sentence on all who in any kind of studies or literature wish to make the fruits of their labors public: and it will be permissible to doubt whether what the College of Alcalá has gloriously accomplished in philosophy, or what the College of Salamanca has happily begun in theology, was necessary for the completion of the universe.

CXXVIII. In the second argument, which is treated from number 110, the same incredibility is emphasized, that the Jesuits could have found in the treasure of the Holy Fathers what had escaped the Earlier Theologians. But the Authority of Trent is added, which because it had also been objected earlier, must be answered here. This author therefore

DISPUTATION III

objects that Middle Knowledge was not approved by the Council of Trent, but rather virtually rejected. He proves this, because the Council did not use this knowledge in explaining the harmony of freedom with divine predefinitions: Therefore, it is a very urgent sign that it did not admit it, therefore also that it at least virtually reprobated it. The first consequence is clear, because all who admit it use it for the aforementioned harmony which was especially sought by the Council of Trent: hence from the fact that it did not admit it, it is a sign that it at least virtually rejected it.

First of all, I ask you, Reader, to attend to these deductions. The Fathers of the Council of Trent did not admit Middle Knowledge, therefore they virtually rejected it. What? Is there no middle ground between those two? Nor even between these other two, They did not use it: Therefore they did not admit it? But I turn the argument around and prove that the Fathers of Trent virtually rejected that mode of harmony which the Thomists use, and also the Salamancans themselves, drawn from the efficacy of the divine will by reason of its insuperable and infallible predefinition of human actions in such a way as to prescribe for them the mode either of necessity or of freedom. For I argue thus: The Fathers of Trent did not use that mode: Therefore they at least virtually rejected it. Our Adversary concedes the consequence. The antecedent is clear. Because if that mode of harmony is handed down anywhere by the Council of Trent, it is especially in Session 6, where that question is treated: But in that session that mode is not handed down, unless perhaps in Ch. 5, where it is said that man can reject God's inspiration, and in Canon 4, that he can dissent from God who excites and calls. For these are very similar: God decrees antecedently to all use of freedom, and insuperably, that the will not reject inspiration, and, the will can reject it: likewise, In the same way he decrees that the will not dissent from his excitation and call: and, the will can dissent. Of which the former is asserted by our Adversary, the latter by the Council of Trent. I fear it might have been more advisable for them to turn their eyes away from the Council of Trent in

DISPUTATION III

these disputations, except insofar as necessity compels a response to the arguments suggested by its decrees.

CXXIX. Therefore to the proposed argument, I respond. The Council of Trent neither thought anything expressly about Middle Knowledge, nor needed to think about it, but presupposed it insofar as it might be necessary to defend the truth of what it was defining: besides, it had a more expeditious way by which to defend freedom against heretics, namely by removing the cause by which they destroyed it. Luther and Calvin said that God has foreknowledge of free acts and predefinition that is antecedent, which being posited, the will could neither reject the divine call nor dissent from it; Hence they concluded, Therefore the will is not free. The Council did not judge that the consequence should be denied, not even with the distinction of the composite and divided sense; but posited the contrary antecedent and said that there is no foreknowledge, no antecedent predefinition in God, which being posited, the will cannot reject divine inspiration and dissent from it. Whence follows also the contrary consequent. Therefore the will is free. What need was there to dispute further about Middle Knowledge? The Council might say, if it seems so to Theologians, that the truth of what I define cannot otherwise stand, let them admit it; if not, let them leave it. It is my task to prescribe what is to be believed and defended; I leave the mode of defense to them: whose task it will be to embrace that which seems more opportune. And if none presents itself, I command faith in the things to be believed, even if the way in which their truth is so explained that it is easy to understand is obscure. It should be recalled, indeed, what Pope Agatho once wrote, when sending legates to the Sixth General Council of Constantinople, that he was sending legates, not to contend about uncertainties, but to set forth things that are certain and immutable in a concise definition.

CXXX. What, shall we demand of the Council of Nicaea that it compose all the quarrels of Theologians about the mystery of the Trinity? Shall we demand of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon that they explain what the mode of incarnation is, whether the union is dis-

DISPUTATION III

tinct, or a certain relation, or nothing different from the extremes? Shall we demand of the Council of Trent what the body of Christ is, which by the power of the words is placed under the species of bread, whether it is composed of partial forms and matter, or matter alone, organized and disposed in a certain way? Shall we demand of the Lateran Council what is the mode of freedom in that Will of God, by which the spiritual and corporeal, heavenly and mundane creature was established in time? And yet one of these must be true. But as certain as it is that one of these is true and to be believed, so it is not necessary that it be distinctly established which one is true. There must indeed be a great difference between the private schools of Theologians and the school of Christ: which is not appropriate to fluctuate in the uncertainty of disputations, but to lead men captive in the obedience of faith, certain that under such a Master they cannot be deceived; nor is there no reason and manner of things to be believed because it is not known.

CXXXI. And from these considerations the whole force of the argument with which our Adversary refutes Herice evaporates, when he objects thus: Either those Fathers of the Council of Trent found this treasure of Middle Knowledge in Augustine and the Fathers, or they did not: but he proves that it cannot be said either that they did not find it, or that if they found it, it was not known to the other scholastics who flourished around that time. But it has already been shown that the Fathers of Trent did not even seek this treasure, as something not at all necessary to them. And so that also vanishes into thin air, in which our Adversary showed that oratorical faculty was not lacking to him either; if only he had found a suitable argument, when he says: It is most difficult to believe that at that time, when the Fathers were gathered in the Council of Trent by the Holy Spirit, especially among other things to reconcile against Luther the freedom of the created will with divine acts, he would deny them a true understanding of Augustine and the Fathers.... And that with those Fathers of the Council left behind, where such necessity pressed, where heavenly light was so earnestly sought, where the whole cause of the

DISPUTATION III

Church was being commonly pursued, where the Holy Spirit promised to be present, then the same spirit, so to speak, would fly to the College of Coimbra or Evora of the Fathers of the Society: and there to a certain particular Theologian among them, although otherwise most learned, would reveal the true and, as they themselves say, so hidden understanding about this, and reveal to them this treasure hidden in them and found by no one after the aforesaid time. Truly this is most difficult to believe, and outside the common course and manner of divine providence, as is evident from itself. An oratorical, I say, amplification and elegant one to which I, from the barbarism of the Logicians, will reply only with this, that it is entirely about a subject that does not exist.

CXXXII. And first he calculates the times badly, when he says that Fonseca testifies that he found this knowledge in the Holy Fathers in the year 1560, three years before the Council of Trent was concluded, for rather he relates that he found this knowledge in the Holy Fathers three years after. Fonseca's words are these: Thirty years before we wrote these things (and we are writing in the year of our Lord one thousand five hundred and ninety-six), when we had entered upon the subject of divine providence and predestination in public lectures, and many grave difficulties that occur in it confronted us, we thought that all of them could be explained by no easier way and method than by establishing that distinction which we made a little earlier, of the double state of those contingents which are really future, namely absolute and conditional. From which it is clear that Fonseca began to employ Middle Knowledge in reconciling the freedom of the will with divine predestination in the year of Christ 1566, the Council having been concluded three years earlier. Therefore, if the deduction of the Doctor of Salamanca is correct, the Holy Spirit flew from Trent to Coimbra three years later. Is this flying or crawling? But there is a still more enormous parachronism. For the years should be counted, not from the time when the Council of Trent was concluded, but from the time when it was treating those matters about which we are now disputing; and it was treating them at the beginning of

DISPUTATION III

the year 1547, at which time the sixth session was celebrated, in which alone these questions were agitated. But from the beginning of the forty-seventh year to the sixty-sixth, when Fonseca was philosophizing in this way, nineteen years are counted: for so long, therefore, would the Holy Spirit have been on the journey from Trent to Coimbra. See, my Father, what wings you fashion for him. Has there ever been any tortoise, not to say dove, so swift?

Then, neither do we grant that the Council was hindered by lack of Middle Knowledge from restraining Luther. There was abundantly available a way by which it could understand that what he used to destroy human freedom, namely a fatal decree, was most false: which having been removed, which mode of providence is then more suitable for human will, let the Theologians see. There will be another time, if necessity demands it, for defining that: and then too the Holy Spirit will not be lacking.

However, let no one so understand what I have said in defense of Herice's pronouncement, as if I wanted all the Scholastics who flourished after Augustine and other Fathers to have been ignorant that God knows the conditionally future acts of men: and that there are no conditional predefinitions of such acts. For this is false: nor would Herice have spoken in that sense; but only in another, in which it seems to us that what they did not set aside for discussion, or about which they instituted no disputation, no distinction, no question, no Article, no Quodlibet, indeed no investigation at all, escaped them.

CXXXIII. Now against Molina our Adversary weaves a corollary worthy of note, because he said in his primitive harmony both that Middle Knowledge is necessary for the harmony of created freedom with God's providence: and that it was discovered by him, having been unknown to the Fathers. For from this it follows that the Church had previously not known what it had sought for so long: and that heretics who fought for or against freedom, if not in power, at least in reason were superior: and thus the Church lay humiliated before heretics, and truly

DISPUTATION III

modestly confused: that what Christ had promised was without effect, "it will be given to you in that hour what to speak," and that other promise, "the gates of hell shall not prevail against it": Nor can the sweet disposition of divine providence allow that what it had concealed from the whole Church for so long, should afterwards be thought to have been willing to reveal to the Jesuits. These and other things of this kind our Adversary wished to include in the Corollary already cited.

But I respond first. He should have directed this assault of fervent eloquence against the Thomists. Let him call upon Cajetan, who although he was not unaware of what the Church's doctrine was on this controversy; nevertheless confesses that he does not know how to join these two extremes, that God's predestination cannot be deceived, and, that man is free. Let him call upon Báñez, who refers those laboring in this harmony to the mystery of the Trinity, whose explanation no one thinks should be demanded from the Church. Let him call upon Diego Álvarez, who teaches that the intellect must be led captive in this matter, as in incomprehensible things. Let him call upon Dominic Soto, who confesses the limitations of his mind on this occasion. Let him call upon Ledesma, who perpetually proclaims the difficulty of this knot and says it holds the chief and almost principal place among all the most difficult Scholastic disputations. And lest we should seem to have wanted to impede only the Thomists; Let him call upon Andreas de Vega, who indicates that he is not satisfied even by Augustine. Let him call upon Cardinal Sadoletto, who calls it the most difficult and inexplicable of all questions. Let him call, finally, upon Augustine himself, whose complaints on this matter we have related before. And what did Molina do wrong in noting that difficulty, of which both before him and after there was such and so manifest a sense?

For what is added about the Church's confusion and embarrassment, as if it had fought with heretics who were superior in the force of arguments, how empty it is! For what are those arguments with which the Church fights with heretics? Are they those that are drawn from natural

DISPUTATION III

discourse and reason? There is, therefore, reason for it to blush, that it cannot overcome in that way those who attack God's free acts, who attack the Trinity of persons in one nature, who attack the distinction of natures in one person, with Aristotelian principles. It has Scripture and the genuine understanding of it handed down from the beginning, with the prejudice of unshaken and infallible authority. With these bonds it constrains heretics, and commands faith even in inexplicable sentences. But if Doctors then seek the reason for things to be believed; it is easy for one to be surpassed by another, many even by one in some matter, the Church by none.

CXXXIV. Nor, however, does Molina prefer himself to others in this: nor has he ever denied that there were superiors who resisted heretics; since he produces a numerous series of them, who, while denying that there are absolute predefinitions of free acts, said that foreknowledge is consequently not the cause of things foreknown, but on the contrary, God foreknows future things because they are future. In which way those who have handed down the harmony of freedom are neither recent, nor few in number, nor common people, nor to be hindered by heretics. But to that very thing which has always been said, and which contains the reason for the harmony sought, Molina thought that some light could be added, from the distinct declaration and use of Middle Knowledge: which not even our Adversaries can deny, who seem to me to be marvelous in this, that they condemn what they themselves confess.

Since indeed this whole boast of Molina which they accuse consists of these three points. 1. That he indicated that there had been labor in former times in expounding the harmony of free will with God's foreknowledge and predestination. And we have already shown that our Adversaries themselves especially display a sense of this labor. 2. That he believed the mode he proposes himself is easier. But the Author of the work *On the Freedom of God and the Creature* also says that its facility is wonderful: nor does anything else explain the fact that others everywhere despise its popularity: and that Diego Álvarez indicates that its evi-

DISPUTATION III

dence and clarity ought to be suspect. So that what Catharinus said in the Epistle to the Ephesians, we can perhaps with better right use here. Hear something truly admirable, and how much ancient custom and persuasion can do. When this opinion renders the matter easy, completely removes all difficulties from pious minds, and demonstrates that all things have been disposed by the Lord sweetly and most equitably; nevertheless some are found who for this very reason reject it, as being those who delight in knowing things that cannot be known: and in saying and discoursing about those things which, veiled in obscurities on all sides, neither they themselves understand, nor do those who treat of such things.

3. That Molina said he was the first to make this mode of harmony public (for he does not deny that it was privately both devised and proposed earlier by Fonseca). But our Adversaries so far from denying this, that they make the novelty itself a crime. Is there some other crime of Molina, or bold proposition? What kind of accusation is this, then, both to accuse what someone has said: and by accusing to confess that it was rightly said, because it was truly said?

CXXXV. But what will those do whom Eugenius Philadelphus mentions in the appendix to Camerarius, who proclaim that the explanation of harmony which they propose is both the most probable of all and new: and that by it alone certain more odious offenses are avoided, and scruples from elsewhere injected are shaken off: that what was involved and implicit lying hidden in the writings of the Fathers is unfolded and explained? What will the recent approvers of condemned opinions do, who have given to the world a Phosphorus rising from the tomb, which has been plunged in darkness since the times of Augustine? To accuse in one what you praise in another, of what virtue, I ask, is that a sign?

I finish this argument, and I warn our Adversary that it is in the interest of the College of Alcalá and Salamanca, which have already begun to augment the riches of the Philosophers and Theologians with their commentaries; that no one should consider that hope proud, by which someone thinks that the day of learned men can grow in his cen-

DISPUTATION III

tury: and let that livid and swelling admiration be banished from Christian hearts, when it is said, Can anything good come from Nazareth?

CXXXVI. Fourthly, our Adversary proves that the doctrine of Middle Knowledge was both known to the Fathers and ancient Scholastics, and rejected by almost all. We grant the first and deny the second. To prove this, he always revolves the same conjectures, namely that they would have used this knowledge in reconciling freedom, which however they did not do. This deduction has already been rejected. Likewise, Because as soon as it became known it displeased the Thomists, which would not have happened unless it had been commonly rejected: which conjecture has also been refuted before. Likewise, Because Báñez's commentaries, in which he attacks Middle Knowledge, appeared five years before Molina's harmony appeared. And this indeed is true, but they also appeared about eighteen years after Middle Knowledge and its use had begun to be expounded in the Schools by Fonseca. And yet, he says, those commentaries of Báñez were noted neither by Molina nor by any other Father of the Society as containing a new, much less dangerous doctrine. Much less were they brought before the judges of the faith. I concede that too, because it shows that the Fathers of the Society were more peace-loving and less precipitous in condemning. Therefore, he says, this five-year silence is a sign of a doctrine that is not new, but perennially flowing, and received in all Christian Academies. But it has been twelve years since the course of the Salamancans appeared, during which time no one has accused them: Therefore is it a sign that whatever they teach is received in all Christian Academies? I deny the consequence: and I say that prescription law and that five-year term against the Censors of errors is absurd; and these things are by no means connected, Something is not attacked for five years, by published books, that is: and, It is commonly received in all Christian Academies. All the Thomists, he says, approved these commentaries by common agreement as truly Thomistic. Whether this is true I do not know, because I have seen, heard, and read those who even today do not approve: but nevertheless, let it be so, what

DISPUTATION III

then? Therefore they did not contain new doctrine, in their opinion I concede; in reality, I deny. What sort of procedure is this, that of two disputants one should press the other with his own authority? Since we descended into this arena, who does not see that we are subjected to judgment from another, not to each other's judgment?

CXXXVII. But, he says, What other doctrine than that of Báñez was in use among Theologians, both Dominicans and others, prior to that year 1584? I reply: That which denied absolute predefinitions of free acts, which the Nominalists used after Damascene and the Ancient Fathers: That which denies that something is future because God foreknows it; but that he foreknows it because it is future, which we have shown before, how ancient and common it is: That which says that the foreknowledge of merits dependent on grace is prior to predestination, which Dominic Soto, who should be counted among the Chief Thomists, says deviates nothing from the truth, and which others everywhere concede, except Augustine, was handed down by several Fathers: That which denies that anything precedes on the part of God which would infer a necessity of acting in the free will, than which nothing was ever more well-worn among Ancient Scholastics and Holy Fathers.

But what is this way of arguing, or what does it prove other than that what our Adversary intends is improbable? Namely, when he had undertaken to show that Middle Knowledge before Molina had been rejected by all; there was no need to use extrinsic conjectures; but since the books of those whom we praise are at hand, the testimonies of at least some of them should have been produced, in which that condemnation would be contained. This Author has not produced even one, except that of Scotus, in whose words there is no mention at all of conditional futures. And therefore Father John of St. Thomas was far more cautious, who, after relating the more recent Theologians who opposed Middle Knowledge, adds, I omit the Ancient Doctors, of whom although Villegas, Álvarez, and the Carmelite Theologians assert many; nevertheless because they did not so explicitly dispute this controversy about Middle

DISPUTATION III

Knowledge, we omit them. And in this way it is easy to respond to the empty nomenclature which our Adversary deduces in the following doubt, to show that in this controversy, if the matter is decided by authority, the negative part is superior to the affirmative. Namely, it is easy to weave a dictionary; but we demand testimonies. And see, Reader, how kindly I deal with our Adversaries, it is enough for me if they will propose even one Doctor from all antiquity who has said this either formally, or equivalently, or by necessary and indisputable consequence, on which depends the whole decision of this case, that God has predefinitions concerning those things which men have neither done, nor do, nor will ever do; but which they would do. Let them give one, I will concede that there were many. But how many there are with whom decrees of this kind cannot agree, I could easily prove, if this task of only necessary defense could bear it. Diego Ruiz is at hand, who has proved his diligence, intellect, and erudition in this part.

But it has been a long time since we were in the College of Salamanca: the School that is closer to it invites us to discussion: in which we will also fulfill what seemed to remain, concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, and concerning the reasons which are set forth in the eleventh disputation to show the impossibility of Middle Knowledge.

DISPUTATION IV.

P. IOANNES A SANCTO THOMA

I. The first volume of the Theological Course, which Fr. John of St. Thomas of Lisbon, professor at the University of Complutense and member of the Order of St. Dominic, published five years ago, has been brought to France some months ago. Since its final disputation, which is the twentieth, completely "destroys the middle knowledge" (as he himself says several times), we must attempt to find some way to save this innocent victim and avoid the blow of this deadly sword through some defensive maneuver. First of all, what I particularly appreciate about this Author is that in this disputation, he thinks that the sharpness of language and the bitterness of barbs should be set aside, without recalling if anyone has thrown anything thorny or stinging. He wishes to speak with the language of angels; he desires that all invectives, taunts, and mockeries be cut off, some of which should not even be repeated but rather endured, so that the disputation would not be filled with bile, but rather be peaceful as befits saints, as befits serious and learned men, in a most serious matter, in a disputation full of judgment and authority. These admonitions are entirely worthy of a religious man, especially if appropriate examples accompany such excellent words. But while the Author himself attributes to us trumpets and empty sounds, empty triumphs in pompous words; while he accuses us of pride and strutting about in marvels; while he makes us more attentive to rumor and fame than to sincere truth; while he ironically mocks the "Molinist light," and pursues other matters

DISPUTATION IV

to the point of oratorical invectives, he might seem to have spoken with the language of men, but not, as he had wished, of angels. However, since he himself desires it, let us forget these things, and from now on let there be a religious contest, one that would not be unbecoming to saints, who ought to clash like singers, according to the rules of charity, so that with tempered emotions we may offer a most pleasing harmony to divine ears, namely, the harmony of souls. For this is what she demands, in whose embrace we are held, His spouse, who although she cannot be entirely free from war in this state, has at least obtained that the opposing camps arrayed within her be called choirs.

CHAPTER I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE ROMAN CENSORS REGARDING MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

II. We have deferred to this place an examination of the narrative found among the Salamancans in the tenth disputation, which runs as follows: that Molina was legally accused in Spain before the Inquisitors of the faith after the publication of his *Concordia*; that the case was subsequently summoned to Clement VIII; that nearly thirty censors were selected by him—most eminent men, Cardinals, Bishops, and members of religious orders—so that all these might, with the Supreme Pontiff himself presiding as a tribunal, assist as counselors and witnesses; that when the matter was being handled, the Pontiff ordered that, setting aside arguments which natural knowledge supplies to natural science, the case should be argued solely from the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas; that then, the Fathers of the Society, deprived of natural arguments, were forced to focus solely on gathering testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas; and that they accomplished this with the utmost diligence, producing many testimonies of this kind in favor of Middle Knowledge before the Supreme Pontiff and thirty most eminent men. It seems that there was not just one actor in this scene, but that assisting Gregory of Valencia were Arrubal, Bastida, Salas—distinguished theolo-

DISPUTATION IV

gians—and furthermore that manuscripts and printed codices were sent from elsewhere, written by the most eminent theologians of the Society of that time. Similarly, the Dominican Fathers who stood on the opposing side—Thomas Lemos, Francisco de Avila, Juan Gonzalez—were assisted both by the living voice of those who were then in Rome, and by most learned manuscripts sent from elsewhere, particularly from Spain. With the lawsuit thus contested over a long time and in many sessions under Clement VIII and Paul V, all those thirty men, with one or two exceptions, delivered this judgment: that neither Augustine nor the Angelic Doctor had in any way taught Middle or Conditional Knowledge, through which God foresees, for example, the consent of the human will as infallibly future before He actually has an efficacious decree concerning its futurity; but rather, both holy Doctors opposed such knowledge and taught absolute predefinitions of God independently of such knowledge, while preserving the freedom of the created will. These things were not invented of their own accord, but received from most eminent men beyond all exception. And when an opposite rumor was spread, special diligence was applied in the Roman Curia in investigating the truth of this history, and it was discovered that things were exactly as stated. A distinguished theologian who had most attentively attended all the congregations, diligently noted everything done in them, and faithfully committed it to writing testified to this. Moreover, he was so distinguished not only in wisdom but also in holiness that he performed several miracles even after his death. "And so that his testimony," they say, "may remain even more firm and beyond all exception, we testify that this most eminent man frankly confessed what we have said eight days before his death, and before he fell into the illness by which he ended his life; and therefore, while he was in full possession of sacred theology and sanctity." This is the substance of what the Salamancans report in the cited place.

III. When I first read these things, I thought they should be placed in the same category as Pythagoras's journey to Mount Carmel, from which he is believed to have derived his philosophy, and that they

DISPUTATION IV

deserved only as much faith as should be granted to an unnamed and unknown witness. For the school is too harsh, and the intellects of the Scholastics too difficult, to feel themselves pressed when certain miracles are confusedly narrated, and when a certain saint is presented whose name is written nowhere except in the book of life. For when the Salamancans testify that he said this eight days before his death, while he was still in good health, it indeed makes us believe that he was not consumed by a long illness, nor was his speech then suspected of delirium; for the rest, they will pardon us if, as we should not be judges of each other in this dispute, so we also do not wish to be witnesses, for neither is legally permitted to the parties. And since they seem to have wanted to have something to respond to the writer of Bellarmine's life, when he speaks both of his judgment at the time of his death and of the testimony of Cardinal de Monte, they should have noted that we were not content with some domestic tradition and the faith of our own people, but had recorded and published these things in public documents, so that the truth of what is reported therein might be held as firm and unshaken.

IV. Fr. John of St. Thomas saw this gap, and therefore worked to add strength to such a weak proof. For this reason, the author of this narrative was sought and found to be Francisco de Peña, Dean of the Rota, who is said to have been one of those thirty men. His testimony was also sought and found in his diary, and excerpted from there by the hand of a public Notary, with trustworthy witnesses, who were familiar with Peña, who swear that this is his very writing from which the testimony is taken, which runs as follows: "On Thursday, the seventh of June, 1601, at the Most Reverend Lord of St. Agatha's, a congregation was held, which all the consultors attended, for examining the censure previously made on Molina's 14th proposition. And after a long and exquisite disputation, except for the Regent of the Carmelites and the Procurator General of St. Augustine, persisting in the censure, they affirmed both that the proposition had been asserted by Molina, and that the invention of mid-

DISPUTATION IV

dle knowledge was devised by the Massiliensians to minimize the grace that effectuates good will."

This testimony, which is confirmed to have been copied with the Notary's signature on June 9, 1636, did not seem to be sufficient to confirm what was sought. Therefore, it was necessary to send to Rome again, to obtain another testimony, which Fr. John of St. Thomas says was signed by the same Notary on January 10, 1637, and he adds that he saw it with his own eyes; however, he does not produce it, being content to say that those Consultors or Censors persisted in their opinion of denying middle knowledge in the congregations held before the Supreme Pontiff, as reported by the same Peña, from which he concludes: "And thus what the most wise Fathers said in the cited place of the Carmelite Theological Course should be considered firm and stable, nor is there anything by which it can be undermined, except perhaps because they did not report those things in such detail, which we have declared here from the testimonies brought forward, so that this matter might not lie forever under darkness."

V. However, I think that nothing can be gathered from this second testimony to confirm the Salamancans' narrative as long as it remains concealed; rather, I suspect that it contains something that weakens it, otherwise why would it be suppressed after such diligence in searching for it, when the first was produced?

VI. From the first, therefore, it is clearly apparent that this narrative is erroneous in many respects. First, regarding that number of thirty Censors or Consultors, you see no mention of it in Peña's words. Moreover, in the congregations that were later held before the Supreme Pontiff (for the Pontiff did not attend those earlier ones, as will soon be established), the censors or consultors are counted as only fifteen by Fr. John of St. Thomas, and about the same number are listed by the Toulouse Questioner in thesis 7. Others also, from other accounts, list fewer, like Fr. Peter of St. Joseph in his Concordia.

DISPUTATION IV

Second, they are mistaken about the quality of these censors, when they include Cardinals in that number, since it is quite evident from the Roman ceremonial that Cardinals would not have been called to meet with the Most Illustrious Lord of St. Agatha, who was only a Bishop, and John of St. Thomas distinguishes the Censors or Consultors from the Cardinals.

Third, they are mistaken when they say that such Judges judged that neither St. Augustine nor the Angelic Doctor had in any way taught middle knowledge, because, as is evident, there is absolutely no mention of either Augustine or the Angelic Doctor in that judgment of the Censors which Peña reports; and if you say that it should be interpreted according to the method of disputation prescribed by the Pontiff, who had ordered that the Parties use only the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

Now a fourth error appears. For Fr. of St. Thomas says that this prescription was sent on July 15, 1604, with the following content: "Whether it is the opinion of St. Augustine that before the absolute decree of the divine will there exists in God a certain and infallible knowledge of contingent things dependent on a free cause, such as Molina attributes through middle knowledge. Pope Clement VIII, for the first congregation." But that judgment of the Censors is much earlier, namely June 7, 1601, to say nothing of the fact that here too there is nowhere any mention of St. Thomas.

Fifth, they are mistaken in the diligence they depict of both parties in collecting testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, with even Spain contributing its share, which resulted in the judges being fully informed by both sides and thus pronouncing judgment. Because this cannot be true of that judgment of the Censors, since the Pope's decree, committing those who disputed to Augustine, had not yet been issued.

VII. Sixth, they are mistaken when they imagine that our people, feeling themselves deprived of philosophical arguments by the Pontiff's obligation to dispute from Augustine, turned to seeking testimonies of St.

DISPUTATION IV

Augustine and St. Thomas, as if they had previously used only natural arguments, or had only then begun to be concerned with reconciling themselves to Augustine and the Angelic Doctor. Let them read, I ask, Vasquez, who long before this disputation, namely in the year 1595, had completed the first volume on the first part, in which he pursues the first proof of middle knowledge from Scripture and the Fathers, especially from Augustine, whom he says, in explicit words, expressed this doctrine. Let them read Fonseca, who, writing one year after Vasquez, as he himself says, and having cited by name many places of Augustine, speaks thus: "There are almost infinite places in which not only Augustine, but also other Fathers assert both conditional foreknowledge of future free acts, which it is not necessary to report in this place: so evident was the matter in all antiquity, and it would have been more widely known now, if the Scholastic Doctors had more attentively weighed their statements, and more expressly applied them to the proposed question." Let them read Suarez, who also, some years before this disputation, published his short works, in which, after proving middle knowledge from scripture, he begins its proof from the Fathers thus: "If we carefully observe the various ways of speaking in the holy Fathers, it will be clear, I think, not obscurely, that they were no less certain of this knowledge of God than of the absolute knowledge of future contingents," and then he weaves a chain of holy Fathers, among whom St. Augustine makes more than one link. Let them read also Molina, that proud man, who arrogantly triumphs over the ignorance of all antiquity: and let them see how little it is that he claims for himself, when he gathers from the testimonies of the Fathers he has adduced that they affirm middle knowledge, if not in our words, yet in reality itself; when he says that he has corroborated this with testimonies of the scriptures and the holy Fathers (among whom Augustine is also to be counted), indeed even of the Scholastics; when he frankly confesses that he has entered into the labors of others, and, illuminated by so many debates and by the excellent words and discoveries of others, has somewhat more clearly touched the root from which all

DISPUTATION IV

these things were in agreement, and all difficulties could be easily untangled. How could it have been that those who had long before fortified middle knowledge with the authority of the Fathers, and especially Augustine, believed themselves caught when it was understood that, philosophical reasons having been set aside, the dispute was to be from Augustine, and that they then first began, compelled by necessity, to turn to reading Augustine's treatises, as if already driven from other fortifications? See how congruent and how probable is the narrative that then books were sent to Rome for the disputants, not only manuscripts, but also published books by eminent theologians of the Society; namely because they could help to understand Augustine's opinion. Were Gregory of Valencia, whom the Salamancans call most learned and very versed in the reading of the holy Fathers, and three others whom they also confess to be excellent theologians, so ignorant and inexperienced that they would descend into this arena deprived of those helps which were already prepared in books published by the Society? Did they not understand that middle knowledge had been fortified by our people with the authority of Augustine, and that books published on that argument were out in the public light? And was the diligence of couriers required so that such books could be brought from Spain, which could be useful in the imminent crisis? Who does not see that this narrative was not sufficiently thought out?

VIII. Seventh, they are mistaken in reporting the judgment of the Censors, when they describe middle knowledge as denied by them thus: "Conditional knowledge through which God foresees, for example, the consent of the human will as infallibly future before He actually has an efficacious decree concerning its futurity," which is clear that no such thing is contained in that judgment as reported by Fr. John of St. Thomas, unless perhaps they want us to hold their interpretation in the same regard as the judges' own sentence. And who knows whether those judges did not prefer that opinion which denies both conditional decrees and knowledge, whether previous or subsequent?

DISPUTATION IV

Eighth, they are mistaken when they report the same Censors as saying that both Doctors taught absolute predefinitions of God independently of the aforementioned knowledge and with the freedom of the created will preserved. See, Reader, whether there is any shadow of such a thing in that form of censure which is described by Fr. John of St. Thomas? This, however, is not so much reporting the opinions of others as composing them: not reciting their judgment, but dictating it; and making them say what we want rather than reporting with candor and faith what they wanted.

They are mistaken, ninth, when they say that a long time and many sessions were consumed in contesting this case; when it is clear from the very tenor of the censure that only one session was consumed in this disputation. But also before the Supreme Pontiff, when there were only three sessions on this matter, Fr. John of St. Thomas denies that the difficulty was treated except in the last one. His words are: "Concerning this doubt, they began to treat and dispute before His Holiness, some Cardinals, and the appointed Censors, on October 27 of the same year 1604, and it was the 33rd congregation in order, and the disputation continued through three congregations." Then he gives the reason why this case occupied three sessions: because Fr. Bastida had undertaken to prove in the first that God possesses knowledge of conditional things; in the second, that this knowledge is certain; in the third, that this knowledge is independent of the decree, which was the only contested point. And he implies that Bastida was therefore importunate with this useless partition: and thus in a single session that which was controversial was treated before the Supreme Pontiff.

Tenth, they are mistaken when they constantly say that those thirty men both discussed the case and delivered their judgment against middle knowledge before the Supreme Pontiff. Because that judgment is said to have been delivered on June 7 in the year 1601, and at that time the Pontiff had not yet begun to attend such congregations, as is clear from John of St. Thomas, when he says that both families (of St. Do-

DISPUTATION IV

minic and ours) "only provided Masters and most learned men who would dispute before the Supreme Pontiff in those 47 Congregations, from the year 1602, in the third week of Lent, in which the first congregation before Pope Clement VIII began, until the year 1606, on February 22, when the last congregation was held before Paul V." Where you see that the first congregation before the Supreme Pontiff was held in the year 1602, and from what was said a little earlier, it is clear that the first concerning conditional knowledge, which was the 33rd in order, was held in the year 1604. But the judgment of the 30 men reported by Master Peña is placed in the year 1601, in the month of June. It is therefore manifest that judgment pertains to those congregations which the Pontiff did not attend, which the same Fr. John of St. Thomas mentions, and says were likewise 47 in number; and this is also proven from the fact that that assembly is said to have been gathered at the Most Illustrious Lord of St. Agatha's. For who would tolerate it being said that the Supreme Pontiff convened there?

IX. From which it is understood that they are mistaken, eleventh, when they say that judgment was pronounced after a long contesting of the case, with each party alleging for itself and producing different testimonies of St. Augustine and the Angelic Doctor in its favor. Because we have already seen from John of St. Thomas that the judgment was delivered in the year 1601, and the disputations only begun in the year 1602, and the one about middle knowledge in the year 1604. Therefore, that judgment was delivered about three years before that contesting of the case in which both parties were heard, and not after.

X. From this you may gather that the same Salamancans are mistaken, twelfth, when they say that even the Supreme Pontiffs Clement VIII and also Paul V, as particular doctors, subscribed to the judgment of those thirty men. A truly bold assertion, which should not have lacked proof in a matter of the greatest importance, in order to create faith. For where is that subscription? What author does it have? Or what witness? But if they think this should be inferred from the fact that they were

DISPUTATION IV

present at the judgment of those thirty theologians, we have already seen that neither was present at the first judgment, which alone has been represented by Fr. John of St. Thomas; but we still do not know what the second is like, and when and how it was conceived. We only know this, that there were not 30 Censors there, but not even 20, since John of St. Thomas himself counts fewer. We also know, as reported by the same St. Thomas, that when that matter was disputed, Paul V was not yet Pope, unless perhaps they use an extension and understand that he who was going to be Pope afterwards subscribed to the condemnation of middle knowledge. But even if what they say about that judgment were true, how do they assume that to hear those who condemn is the same as to subscribe to their condemnation? And since those Censors were only Consultors, how do they have it that it is the same for the Pontiff to hear the Judgments of the Consultors and to approve them, so that they infer, given but not conceded, that those Consultors condemned middle knowledge, that the Pontiff who received their votes must have subscribed? We certainly expect some proof of this assertion: and while it is deferred, we think it permissible for us to profess openly that the Salamancans in this part wrote what they desired, not what they knew.

XI. Finally, it should not be omitted that the Salamancans' narrative is not sufficiently sincere in this, that in that exception which they often repeat, they confuse two most distinguished men (who could be worth many) in the manner of a vague individual with an uncertain disjunction, when they constantly say one or the other should be excepted, when it is clear from Fr. John of St. Thomas that those to be excepted are one and the other, namely the Procurator General of St. Augustine and the Regent of the Carmelites, whom no one could rightly deny, by their dignity and authority, represented many others from both of those most celebrated orders.

XII. It would now follow for us to say something about the miracles performed by Mr. de Peña after death, and about his sanctity, if indeed he is the one whom the Salamancans indicate in our Holy Lords.

DISPUTATION IV

But as for miracles, they will be suitable motives of credibility for us when they have been legitimately proved according to the prescription of Urban VIII. As for sanctity, I will most willingly believe what I also greatly desire, that he died as befits a Christian, in the peace of the Church, penitent for his sins, with the usual aids of the Sacraments, so that he may be believed to be now among the Saints participating in the Blessed life, and to be in perfect agreement with St. Ignatius, whose honor on earth he is said to have borne with a not sufficiently equitable mind: and yet Ignatius is a saint, and with the same certainty a Saint as St. Teresa.

XIII. And from these things it is finally understood how greatly Fr. John of St. Thomas was deceived when he hoped to confirm the Salamancans' narrative, which he confesses was suspected by some and held as an undeclared matter, by producing that judgment of the Censors of the year 1601. Since it is clear that by nothing else is it more impugnable, with such a great contrariety of times and circumstances emerging from it, that he himself seems to have lost the fruit of that prescription, by which he thought this allegation was firm, because no one had contradicted it for six years. "It has been six years," he says, "since the book was published, so that such testimony and history could be weakened or refuted by the Adversaries. But it has not been done, and so the deed holds." But, my Father, your commentaries had to be awaited, so that there would be a greater opportunity to criticize that narrative. For after the excerpts from the diary of Mr. Peña, and the attestation of John Merer, Notary by Apostolic Authority, which have been produced by you, so many difficulties have appeared in that history that it is probable that those few coins, which these expenses cost, have been more useful to us, to say nothing of the fact that it was also indicated earlier on a similar occasion, if that space of six years is sufficient for prescription, very many falsehoods would have to be approved. That presumption would rest on some reason if during that time some had written on this argument, passing over in silence the Salamancans' history, but this has not been done, and so, the deed does not hold.

DISPUTATION IV

XIV. But neither should the hesitation of that most erudite and wise Man be neglected, who noted that Diego Alvarez, who is said to have been present at the disputation on helps, in the many books which he afterwards published, both on physical predetermination and concerning middle knowledge, in which it is clear that he searched with the greatest diligence for whatever could in any way benefit his cause, never hinted at this Judgment of thirty Men, approved by two Supreme Pontiffs, than which nothing could have been more effective for proving what he intended. Add that John Gonzalez was also present, who afterwards treated the same controversies in his commentaries on the first part, and covered that event with the same silence: to say nothing of Nazarius and others from the Thomists who have written on this argument since that time most diligently. Who would persuade himself that men of most well-known wisdom and learning were either of such unhappy memory that they would not remember their victory, or of such supine judgment that they would not understand that it should be objected to those who might still wish to drag out the war, or of such small favor and authority that they could find none from that number of Censors who would bear witness to the deed?

XV. This suspicion, however, is greatly increased by the conjecture of Fr. John of St. Thomas, when he infers from our silence that the Censors by no means stood for us. "Certainly," he says, "if the Adversaries had felt that they stood in any way for their part, they would by no means have neglected to make known to all a thing so favorable to their opinion." But why, my Father, do you require greater diligence from our people than from yours, who hid their victory for thirty or forty years? But it was more in your interest that this should be made known; because it seems sufficient to us for the opinion of victory that the outcome of the disputations was such that the doctrine which you had worked to proscribe with the continuous insistence of six or seven years was granted the right of the School, with the faculty taken away of attacking and censuring it with impunity, until something else is decreed. For since in this

DISPUTATION IV

case we were only defenders of the impugned doctrine, who does not understand that we could have seemed superior on this account, that we had rendered the attack of the Aggressors ineffective and harmless? But since from this men could conjecture that the aggression had been not only violent, but also unjust, who does not see that the manifestation of that judgment would have been necessary, so that its equity might be preserved? And yet it was buried for about thirty years, which period no one denies is far longer than what is necessary for prescription against the faith of such a case obtained. For this is common to public contests, whose outcome is indubitable, that the fame of such fortune as has fallen is nowhere clearer than around those times in which the battle was fought. Because then both the expectation of men intent on the outcome of the affair, and the grief and deaths of the defeated party, and the triumphs, ovations, and trophies of the victorious, do not allow the fortune of either party to lie in obscurity. But here after more than thirty years, lo, a recent announcement of an old deed, which suddenly sounds out to men almost forgetful of the fight, "we have won, we have won." In what battle? Namely in that which was joined in the year 1601 or 1604. But where had the victory been hiding for so long? "It was," he says, "wrapped up in Mr. Peña's desk; but after his death it came out into the open, and now flies through the mouths of men, along with the miracles performed by him." If news vendors were to sell their news on this basis, who would buy it for a penny?

XVI. I add another cause for just suspicion. Because Fr. John of St. Thomas while disputing these things had in his possession the book of Congregations held before the Supreme Pontiff, which he mentions in art. 6, p. 688, and which he cites often, and from which he reports the very words of the disputants and even entire orations and dialogues between Fr. Lemos and Fr. Bastida. From this it is clear that public amanuenses and Secretaries were appointed, by whom those things which were done in the individual Congregations were written down. But if the votes of the Censors were collected in them, and counted, who does not see

DISPUTATION IV

that this should have been especially noted? And if this was noted, who does not see that from there rather should be reported which party was superior, than from the diary of Master Peña, who is clear to have been neither seen nor heard in all those Congregations or Disputations: and therefore, whose notes can be worth nothing against the public faith of the Secretaries?

XVII. But see, Reader, whether it is not sufficiently understood that the votes of the Consultors were by no means collected or counted before the Supreme Pontiff, from what Fr. John of St. Thomas reports, who thus narrates the end of Congregation 35, in which alone middle knowledge was properly disputed, as is clear from what has been said, and consequently in which alone the votes of the Consultors concerning this difficulty should have been collected: "And when the Pontiff had permitted Bastida to speak briefly, and he brought forward nothing of great importance, and Lemos referred to what had been said: and in short repeated those things which he had said according to the mandate of the Pontiff, the Congregation was dissolved, and there the disputations about Middle Knowledge were ended." The Congregation was dissolved, and ended together with Bastida's response; nor was middle knowledge disputed about thereafter; what, therefore, is that Congregation in which the votes of the Censors were reviewed, so that they could be said to have all, with one or two exceptions, condemned Middle Knowledge?

XVIII. Finally, in the account of these Congregations, this seems to be worthy of some discussion, which I will now say. Fr. John of St. Thomas says there were 47 Congregations before two Pontiffs, Clement and Paul, the first of which fell in the third week of Lent in the year 1602, the last on February 22 in the year 1606. Three of these, that is, the 33rd, 34th, and 35th, were occupied in receiving the disputation on Middle Knowledge, but in such a way that the point of difficulty was touched only in the 35th: and he signifies more than once that he saw and had the acts of all of them. Again, he says that before these Congregations began, in which the discussion was by theologians designated by

DISPUTATION IV

each side, other Congregations preceded, in which there was no disputation, but the appointed Censors themselves examined Molina's doctrine: and these, as he says he heard, were also 47 in number, but he could not see their complete acts. However, he was allowed to see that transcription of Mr. Peña mentioned earlier: and that transcription is a censure made in the 33rd Congregation, concerning Middle Knowledge. From this it is clear that one series of Congregations corresponded to the other, first as to number; second as to the subjects of the sessions; since what was treated in the 33rd session of the first series was also agitated in the 33rd Congregation of the second series. But from elsewhere, this seems to be implausible. First, because the Supreme Pontiff sometimes prescribed subjects for the disputants, hence, what was related earlier as written by the Secretaries of the Congregation and sent, "Whether it is the opinion of St. Augustine that before the decree, etc.," For the first Congregation which fell on October 27, Fr. John of St. Thomas says was "the eleventh writing": and thus the Pontiff had already eleven times prescribed what he wanted to be disputed about, when the 33rd disputation was made. Since, therefore, he sometimes prescribed the subject for the disputants, sometimes he did not prescribe it, it is difficult for these Congregations to have corresponded to each other in such a way that what was agitated in the 33rd of the first series would be agitated in the 33rd of the second. And this is confirmed, secondly, because the disputants themselves sometimes so divided the proposed questions as to extend their number, as Fr. John of St. Thomas reports happened in this very 33rd Congregation, in which Fr. Bastida, by an importunate distribution as it seems to him, distinguished three separate disputations about Middle Knowledge, when only what was treated in the last was being asked about. How, therefore, could there have been that agreement of one order of Congregations with the other, so that here there were 47, and there also 47: And in the 33rd of those, Middle Knowledge was treated, similarly also in the 33rd of these? I do not say that is impossible. But it is such a case, which makes one fear that in that account and distinction of Congregations

DISPUTATION IV

something has been disturbed, so that it would be worthwhile if it were elucidated. And when we have granted that those Congregations of both orders thus corresponded to each other, we will inquire further how it came about that after the 33rd a judgment is said to have been delivered against Middle Knowledge, whose proper difficulty was agitated only in the 35th, as Fr. John of St. Thomas reports. Shall we call those Censors Prophets, who anticipated with their judgment the discussion of the case, resolvers of future disputes?

XIX. And these things which have been adduced up to this point are gathered solely from the comparison of the narrative of the Salamancans and the confirmation of Fr. John of St. Thomas, who, there is no doubt, selected from those accounts whatever could help the cause which they undertook to defend, but omitted what would have harmed it. From this the conjecture is easy that far more things could be adduced to reduce either the force or the faith of that censure which is objected to us, if the same solicitude which moved the Adversaries had impelled us, and the same fortune had aided us in inquiring into and finding the acts of such Congregations. But they have occupied these with their diligence, by which we are easily overcome, not proposing to undertake anything at all, unless their attack should excite us.

XX. Let us generously grant to our Adversaries what is by no means owed to them, and always excepting that subscription of the Supreme Pontiffs which I have already cited from the Writer, let us assume that the credibility of the previous accounts does not waver, and that the majority of those Censors who gathered to render judgment on this matter rejected the Middle Knowledge as minimally Augustinian and minimally favorable to divine grace; nevertheless, there remain four considerations by which that judgment is rendered harmless to the Society's doctrine. The first is what the Most Eminent Cardinal Perronius reports in letters written to Henry IV in Rome at the time when these matters were being deliberated, and when he himself was present at the disputations; for he indicates that political reasons converged with theological

DISPUTATION IV

questions, and that it harmed the Jesuits among most of the Censors that it was commonly understood what disposition Henry IV had toward them, and what disposition they in turn had toward Henry IV. I quote Perronius's words: "The Pope has appointed me to three Congregations, and there are two of them about which I considered it my duty to give an account to Your Majesty: one is De Auxiliis, in which the controversy of the Jesuit Fathers with the Dominicans is being treated: concerning which, besides what pertains to the common good of Religion, Your Majesty will be able to judge from the reports you will receive about Spanish affairs WHETHER THERE IS SOME REASON OF STATE which causes the case against the Jesuits to be pressed so vehemently from that quarter. February 7, 1605. Rome." And in another letter he explains what that reason of state was: "Concerning the question that exists between the Dominican Fathers and the Jesuits, let Your Majesty have no doubt that as soon as the Pope makes any decision, I will inform you of it. The Spanish have openly taken up the patronage of the Dominicans: and this, as it seems to me, OUT OF HATRED FOR THE LOVE WHICH BOTH THE FATHER GENERAL OF THE JESUITS AND ALMOST ALL OF HIS ORDER PROFESS TOWARD YOUR MAJESTY. So that it appears that the religious controversy is degenerating into a question of state. The Pontiff will discern skillfully in the meantime, and will adjudicate the truth to its legitimate possessor. January 23, 1606. Rome." From which the prudent Reader may infer, which is also known from other sources, that Perronius preferred the doctrine of the Jesuits to that of their opponents in this controversy: because it is not probable that he either interpreted the designs of the Spanish so perversely, or favored his own opinion so little, that he would suspect a reason of state and unjust hatred in protecting that cause which he himself judged worthy of his protection solely out of love for the truth.

The second consideration is that if the Supreme Pontiff had as great an inclination to overthrow the Middle Knowledge as our Adversaries everywhere suppose, and if he was only waiting until he could be

DISPUTATION IV

seen to have done so with the maturity and prudence that such matters require, since almost all the Consultors were in agreement, as they say, and since a lengthy meditation and disputation of many years had preceded, and since nothing else remained that human prudence might reasonably require for rendering a judgment; then the fact that no such judgment followed, but rather that the assertion of Middle Knowledge was granted the same liberty as its contradiction while the final judgment is awaited, cannot be attributed to any other cause than the hidden and infallible direction of the Spirit of truth, who never abandons either the Church or the head of the Church, according to God's immovable promise.

The third consideration is that the judgments of the Censors which are brought against us, especially those that pertain to the year 1601, besides being the judgments of a lower tribunal, from which there might be a just appeal to a larger number of equals in erudition and dignity, were conceived before the complete treatment of the case. For they are referred to the 33rd Congregation, when there were still twelve remaining. These opinions, which are called interlocutory, are not sufficient for a definitive understanding of the equity of the whole case. But our Adversaries would have obtained great favor from us, if, being equipped with the acts of the Congregations as they were, they had been willing to tell us what the outcome of the final sessions was under Paul V. For there was a not obscure report at that time, which said that our side fought most effectively. Let them tell us, then, I ask, what was the attitude of the Censors or Consultors then, and what was the opinion of the Pontiff? Nor does it matter that there had been prior disputation about Middle Knowledge under Clement. For these matters are sufficiently connected that knowledge of the later ones contributes to a fuller and more certain understanding of the earlier ones.

Fourth, apart from this outcome of the disputations, we know moreover that the Supreme Pontiff was moved by the intercession of certain Academies and Prelates, and even of Princes, by which it was cer-

DISPUTATION IV

tainly established that those Censors who are said to have stood against Middle Knowledge separately from the Pontiff, or who stood before the Pontiff, could in no way have represented what was the more common opinion of Christianity.

XXI. As for the inclination of the Supreme Pontiff, that suspicion falls on Clement VIII alone. For concerning Paul V, the conjecture is rather the opposite, as I shall say presently. Moreover, beyond what is said in the life of Bellarmine, one must not omit what Father Peter of St. Joseph reports, that Middle Knowledge had been so depicted to him, that the good act which was said to be future hypothetically, was not said to be future from the hypothesis of grace, but by the power of nature alone. This became clear when the Pontiff asked the Carmelite Father who had undertaken the defense of Middle Knowledge what God foreknew through conditional knowledge. When he responded that He foreknew the good use of free will, the Pontiff followed up by asking, "Either that which grace, or that which nature was going to do?" And he added, "If the first, it is against Molina; if the second, it is according to Calvin." From which it is clear that his alienation from Middle Knowledge was most just, but arose from a less than sincere information; from that suggestion, I say, by which it was understood to be against Molina, if it were said that God foreknows the good use of free will as future from the hypothesis of grace as the cause elevating and assisting it. This is so far from being against Molina that it should rather be said to be the very opinion of Molina himself. Father Peter of St. Joseph says that this was written in the account of those things that were done in Rome in these disputations, which one of the Consultors wrote with his own hand, who, he says, openly favored the Dominicans.

XXII. That Paul V was not at all moved by any judgment of the Censors or inclined to the contrary position is sufficiently shown by what Cardinal Perronius narrates in a letter to Henry IV written on July 11, 1606. Two months before that day, and consequently one or two months after the final disputation, which occurred, as Father John of St. Thomas

DISPUTATION IV

reports, on February 22 of the same year, the Pontiff ordered that all the acts of the Council of Trent, the proceedings, and all the narrations that pertained to it, which were kept in the Castle of St. Angelo, be extracted and delivered to him; so that he could see whatever pertained to the questions that were then being disputed: that it had not been permitted to him, because of the heat and the advice of doctors dissuading him from intense study, to examine all those writings; that he hoped, as soon as he had finished, to resume the discussion of this case: at which time he would satisfy the desire and command of the Most Christian King to indicate the progress of this Matter. From these it is clearly evident, first, that the Pontiff after all the disputations and Consultations was still uncertain and by no means determined; though inclined to follow the judgment of Perronius: since he well knew him to be a man of most sagacious intellect, and beyond all comparison most erudite, and no one ever more subtly analyzed both the opinions of the Holy Fathers and the fibers of Calvinism. From which, secondly, it is evident that that which was narrated before about the subscription of the Supreme Pontiff as a private Doctor in condemnation of Middle Knowledge is a dream. For how and when could he have subscribed, who so long after all the disputations was still doubtful in mind, and was awaiting the opinion of Perronius after exploring the thoughts of the Tridentine Fathers?

XXIII. Thirdly, it is evident that such Congregations were by no means held in the manner of trials, so that after the case had been disputed on both sides, the Censors would meet with the Pontiff and the votes of each would be sought. For Perronius would not omit this, who had promised the commanding King that he would report any decision whatsoever; yet neither in the letter already cited, nor in others which he wrote on the occasion of such congregations, such as the one dated January 11, 1606, on which day he writes that there was disputation for about eight hours; likewise that which is dated the last day of November, 1605, the day after there had been disputation for about ten hours, does he hint at anything about that definition by the Censors. Indeed, that

DISPUTATION IV

judgment was deferred to another time, so that from the contention of the parties the judges might acquire that knowledge which would help at its own time to render a sentence. But that time never came, the concerns of the Pontiff being distracted elsewhere because of the Venetian movements and disturbance, and the decision having been taken to leave this controversy to the free disputation of the parties, rather than to define it. And this is confirmed from other letters of Perronius to Henry IV dated March 8, 1606, the fourteenth day after the final congregation, which Father John of St. Thomas says was held on February 22, in which he writes that on that very day the Pontiff wished to collect the votes of the Cardinals who were present at the congregations concerning certain points treated in them. See how the opinion was sought only from the Cardinals and only concerning certain points. But that nothing was concluded pertaining to the decision of the case, he clearly indicates in a later letter, when he writes, "As for the question de auxiliis, the disputations are finished: BUT NO BEGINNING HAS YET BEEN GIVEN TO A DECISION." What, then, is to be made of that picture of the Writer of the Salamancan College, which runs as follows? "Thirdly, it should be noted that with each party alleging for itself and bringing forward in its favor different testimonies of St. Augustine and the Angelic Doctor, a long and protracted time was consumed in the discussion, examination, and, so to speak, contestation of this case. For concerning this many sessions were held under both Supreme Pontiffs, Clement VIII and Paul V, with those thirty most grave men standing by: and from all of them, with one or another excepted, all the others expressed that opinion." How could a sentence have been pronounced in such a way that Perronius was unaware of it? How, if he knew it, could he not write to the commanding King, when he had undertaken to do so? How, rather, almost four months later, did he represent the Pontiff as doubtful and the case as still pending? And how had there not yet been any beginning of a decision if the votes of the consultors had been collected? Was it not a beginning of a decision that they had expressed their opinion? Certainly if these things

DISPUTATION IV

are considered with due attention, there is a risk that the Writer of the Salamancan College may seem to have indulged his own inclination too much while painting this picture. Father John of St. Thomas would have brought light to this conjecture if he had exhibited the testimony of D. Penna, by which he says that the Consultors persisted in their censure in the presence of the Supreme Pontiff. For then it would have been immediately understood from the dates and persons, what is to be thought about this suspicion. But he begrudged us that light: perhaps he himself feared it.

I wrote these things in Toulouse for the first edition of this book in the year 1645, when almost no records of this history were available except those which the Adversaries themselves produced. When a somewhat greater supply of these became available in Rome in the year 1652, I added what can be seen in the Preface to the information on the five propositions, where I also discuss that fictitious Bull of Paul V against Molina. But lest there be any future concern for responding to these objections, the most wise providence of Innocent X has taken care of that in that decree by which he proscribed all the books of Jansenius and the Jansenists in the year 1654, on the 27th day of April. It is helpful to quote his words here, which are as follows: "Furthermore, since both in Rome and elsewhere certain asserted Acts, handwritten and perhaps printed, are being circulated of congregations held before Clement VIII of happy memory and Paul V concerning the question of the helps of divine grace, both under the name of Francis Penna, formerly Dean of the Roman Rota, and of Fr. Thomas de Lemos of the Order of Preachers, and of other prelates and Theologians, who, as it is asserted, were present at the aforementioned congregations, and also a certain Autograph or copy of a certain asserted Constitution of the same Paul V concerning the definition of the aforementioned question de auxiliis and the condemnation of the opinion or opinions of Luis Molina of the Society of Jesus: the same His Holiness by this present decree declares and decrees that no faith whatsoever is to be given to the aforementioned asserted acts, either

DISPUTATION IV

for the opinion of the Friars of the Order of St. Dominic or of Luis Molina and other Religious of the Society of Jesus, and to the Autograph or copy of the aforementioned asserted Constitution of Paul V, nor can they or ought they to be alleged by either party or by any other person whatsoever; but concerning the aforementioned question, the decrees of Paul V and Urban VIII, his predecessors, are to be observed."

CHAPTER II. WHAT ST. AUGUSTINE AND ST. THOMAS SAY ABOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

§ I. ADDRESSING THE OBJECTIONS FROM AUGUSTINE.

XXIV. We have already provided a satisfactory response in the previous disputation, especially in chapters 3 and 4. But since Fr. John of St. Thomas collects the entire force of those objections drawn from Augustine into a single syllogism, it will be worthwhile to provide a methodical solution to them and briefly recapitulate what was discussed at greater length. Fr. John of St. Thomas argues as follows:

This way of knowing future conditional events prior to the decree that precedes our will, and according to it (I think it should be read as "according to that way") of admitting the efficacy of the divine decree, and of reconciling our freedom with it, was proposed to Augustine by Saints Prosper and Hilary as something asserted or admitted by the Massilians.

But St. Augustine, responding to them, did not admit such a mode of knowledge; rather, if he had previously said that God foreknows these conditional events, he says it should be understood on the supposition of God's will and His predestination.

Therefore, middle knowledge, or the cognition of conditional events prior to a preceding and absolute decree on God's part, as it is now posited, is introduced contrary to the mind of St. Augustine, and

DISPUTATION IV

thus should be rejected. The entire discourse and consequence is legitimate. The major and minor premises must be proven. Indeed, both the major and minor premises must be proven; we contend that both are false, and that nothing in that entire discourse is legitimate except perhaps the consequence. Therefore, we deny that middle knowledge was ever proposed to Augustine as a suitable means for reconciling the efficacy of the divine decree with the decreed free actions, which must be the sense of the major premise; but rather that it was only proposed to find some reason on the part of humans why the Gospel was announced to some and not to others; why one infant died after baptism, while another was taken away before baptism: that is, it was proposed to Augustine to trace back to human freedom the suitable cause for which that differentiation of nations occurred in the preaching of the Gospel, and likewise that differentiation of infants in the administration of baptism. And this was the only way, that is, the abuse of middle knowledge admitted by the Massilians, as was extensively demonstrated earlier.

To prove that major premise, Fr. of St. Thomas presupposes what is in question and begs the principle. That statement of Faustus of Riez: "Unless foreknowledge has discovered, predestination determines nothing": he says this should be understood as conditional foreknowledge, and adds: "They therefore supposed that before every preceding decree there exists an exploratory foreknowledge, which certainly cannot explore things except under a conditional state." But he is mistaken: for both Faustus must be understood as speaking of absolute foreknowledge; and the Massilians abused that more often than conditional foreknowledge, as has been shown. And what he adds about their belief that if the decree preceded foreknowledge, freedom would be removed and all industry eliminated; but if foreknowledge preceded the decree, its place would be left for freedom—Therefore, they saved freedom through foreknowledge—This is true, but through absolute foreknowledge of actions independent of divine grace. For they wanted God to foreknow absolutely who would make good use of free will, and who would believe when

DISPUTATION IV

presented with the Gospel, or who would have some sense of their misery and implore divine help, and then decree that grace be given to them, not now for willing to believe or pray, but for acquiring further holiness and perfection. Likewise, they held that God absolutely foreknows who would persevere in received holiness by the same powers of free will and without special grace: and then decrees that glory be given to them: and thus that one sinner rather than another would receive the grace of justification was to be attributed to his freedom; and similarly, that one of the already justified rather than another would arrive at glory: and with that removed, it seemed to them that even human freedom itself would be removed, and all industry eliminated.

But if someone were to object about infants taken away before and after baptism, then, destitute of the support of absolute foreknowledge, they abused conditional or middle knowledge, and they thought that conditionally future merits, if those infants were allowed to live, were worth as much as absolutely future merits: and thus from that foreknowledge they thought was decreed both the death of one before baptism and of another after baptism. From which it happened that they also attributed the good and evil of this decree to their freedom, not indeed to that which they had exercised, but to that which they would have exercised from a hypothesis never to be realized.

Similarly, if someone objected about adults, some of whom are preferred to others in the preaching of the Gospel, they said that God foreknew who would believe and who would not believe on the hypothesis of preaching, and although He wanted the Gospel to be preached to absolutely everyone, He was nevertheless hindered by the foreknowledge of their hypothetically future incredulity from sending preachers to those who would abuse the preaching: and in this way they traced back the cause of withdrawn preaching to the freedom itself of those to whom it was not preached. By this reasoning, therefore, they believed that freedom was preserved if foreknowledge illuminated the divine determination, and destroyed if it did not illuminate it: not because they thought

DISPUTATION IV

that human actions hypothetically foreknown were predefined by that determination (for they are never found to have said this) but because they thought that both the end and the means, both internal and external—that is, both glory and grace and preaching and sacraments—were so predefined that there was always in human freedom, independently of God's grace, a certain cause which demanded such predefinition: otherwise fate would be introduced and all industry removed, as has already been shown many times in that entire chapter 4, §1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of the previous disputation. The Massilians therefore were fighting not for just any freedom of humans, but for that which would be sufficient for itself independently of God's help, to provide a cause for the divine determination decreeing grace, decreeing glory after the final outcome, decreeing the application or withdrawal of baptism, and even of preaching; and they drew that cause from absolute foreknowledge as long as it could be used as a pretext; when it could not, then finally they took refuge in conditional foreknowledge.

From these considerations follows the legitimate interpretation of all the passages that Fr. of St. Thomas produces to show that middle knowledge was proposed to Augustine. For what he cites from Prosper: "Those who would believe, and those who in that faith, etc.," has been shown to be understood as absolute foreknowledge. Likewise, that statement "this foreknowledge of human merits, according to which the grace of the one calling operates": although it includes conditional foreknowledge, it nevertheless has no other sense than what we have said, namely that the hypothetically foreknown incredulity of those nations that were allowed to go their own ways was the cause of withdrawing preaching; and without some such foreknowledge, God's purpose must be rejected, not that by which He predefines human actions, but by which He predestines either grace itself, primary and prevenient, or the external means of justification, or glory. That statement of Hilary: "They understand that foreknowledge in this way," must be understood of absolute foreknowledge. But that statement: "When they are asked why it is preached to

DISPUTATION IV

some and not to others?" concerns conditional foreknowledge in the way already explained. Again, that statement of Prosper: "The opinion of almost all is found to be one and the same, etc.," has been shown to be understood of absolute foreknowledge, as also that statement: "How through that preoperating and cooperating grace, etc." From which it is clear that there is absolutely no passage either in Augustine or in Prosper or Hilary which shows that middle knowledge was proposed to Augustine for reconciling divine predefinitions with the freedom of predefined human actions, which Fr. of St. Thomas assumes in the major premise of his syllogism, which has now been denied.

XXV. But the minor premise must also be denied, which goes like this: "But St. Augustine, responding to them, did not admit such a mode of knowledge; rather, if he had previously said that God foreknows these conditional events, he says it should be understood on the supposition of God's will and His predestination." We deny, therefore, that Augustine ever rejected this mode of knowledge, but only that abuse of this knowledge by which the Massilians tried to defend human freedom even in providing, as we said, the cause for which God unequally dispensed and arranged the external means of salvation, namely baptism, for infants, and the preaching of the Gospel for adults. And thus the case is the same, as far as this matter is concerned, for absolute and conditional foreknowledge: For both were proposed to Augustine because the Massilians abused both. But just as Augustine did not reject absolute foreknowledge, but only its abuse, so neither did he reject conditional or middle knowledge, but only the abuse of this also, which was the first part of the minor premise.

We likewise deny that what Augustine said, that God foreknows these conditional events, should be understood on the supposition of God's will and His predestination, which is the second part of the minor premise. For the contrary has been extensively demonstrated earlier, and what is inferred from the book on God's predestination has been rejected, and it has been shown that what is found in chapter 9 of *On the Predes-*

DISPUTATION IV

tion of the Saints concerning Christ's foreknowledge with respect to those who would believe and not believe should be interpreted in this way: in which passage that statement, "but whether they would have faith in Christ preached to them from themselves, or would receive it as God's gift: that is, whether He only foreknew them, or also predestined them," should be understood according to the mind of the Massilians. For since they thought that, given preaching, some were conditionally foreknown to have faith from themselves and without any other grace, they consequently also thought that the conditional foreknowledge of future faith passed into absolute foreknowledge without that Augustinian predestination, which is the preparation of grace. Augustine, therefore, through that statement "that is," corrects this kind of error, and because he supposes that God did not conditionally foreknow who would believe except on the supposition of grace, he infers that He did not foreknow it absolutely except with the predestination or preparation of the same grace; which, however, he had not expressed when he was responding to the question of the pagans, because this was not then being asked. And so that "that is" does not prevent what follows from being understood as absolute foreknowledge, even if what precedes pertains to conditional foreknowledge, because it imports not merely interpretation, but also a consequence by which it happens that whoever says the first equivalently says the second: which is sufficient for the true use of that particle "that is": and that this is the mind of Augustine is proven from the following words, by which he signifies that this predestination, of which he speaks here, coincides with the election of those to be saved.

XXVI. To what he adds from Augustine in this and other places, that faith is not only foreknown but also predestined, and therefore cannot be foreknown without that predestination, that is, without predefinition, it has already been answered many times that the predestination which is necessary for faith is not the predefinition of faith, but the preparation of the grace necessary for believing, as Augustine says, from which it follows only that faith can neither be absolutely foreknown unless

DISPUTATION IV

that predestination exists absolutely, nor conditionally unless the same is involved in the hypothesis from which it is stated to follow. This is expressed by such a proposition: "If the Gospel were proposed to that person, and the grace necessary for believing were prepared and also given, he would believe." That divine gift of understanding, which Augustine says is naturally present in some people, from which it happens that they would believe "if they should hear statements or see deeds suitable to their minds": whether it signifies a certain natural docility, as Augustine seems to suppose entirely; or some supernatural gift, as Fr. of St. Thomas contends, none of us denies that it depends on God's will presupposed to exist either absolutely or conditionally, according as this gift is supposed to exist either absolutely or conditionally. But what he infers from this, that "therefore this whole matter must be referred to God's will": that is, not only that this gift exists, but also that from it would conditionally follow that those who are supposed to believe would believe; referred, I say, to the will, not which would be, but which is; which is to be referred to the present and existing predefinition of faith that is only conditionally future: this, we say, was not even thought of by Augustine: nor can any suspicion of this matter be created by those words, "they hear these things and do them, to whom it is given, etc.," which, as is clear in itself, signify absolute faith and operation, depending on the similarly absolute will of giving that gift of understanding, by which hearers become teachable, and the benefit of preaching, and the internal grace for assenting: but in no way do they signify God's present will concerning conditionally future faith. The general rule which Fr. of St. Thomas supposes to have been handed down by Augustine: "Whatever things are foreknown, and in whatever way they were first proposed, this is predefined," exists nowhere: and it has been shown earlier that foreknowledge connected with purpose, according to Prosper and Augustine, is absolute and pertains to the elect: And that question which Prosper proposes to Augustine, "whether those things themselves which are proposed are to be accepted as foreknown," has no other sense than this: whether it should be said

DISPUTATION IV

that faith beginning and persevering to the end, which the Orthodox thought was proposed in the predestination of the grace necessary for it, is only foreknown, as the Massilians wanted, that is, would be future through the powers of free will without such purpose or predestination. And therefore Augustine never solved that question otherwise than by proving that grace is necessary: and that faith, whether beginning or persevering, is predestined in the preparation of grace, which is to be proposed. With this principle supposed, Augustine rightly says of good works: "But if they are so given by God, and He foreknew that He would give them; certainly He predestined them." Also, with the necessity of grace proven elsewhere, it follows that those things which are and are foreknown to be absolutely future are also predestined by the preparation of the same grace; and that with that same predestination removed, that foreknowledge is also removed: from which nothing can be inferred for the predefinition of conditionally future events.

Finally, another general rule for the state, not only absolute but also conditional, which Fr. John of St. Thomas infers from Augustine: "When among certain expositors of God's word we read of God's foreknowledge, and it concerns the calling of the elect, the same predestination must be understood," is by no means general, because it brings its own restriction in those words, "and it concerns the calling of the elect," unless perhaps he wants the reprobate to be called elect, to whom pertains the conditional foreknowledge of any good works whatsoever. Therefore, no support can be hoped for from Augustine. Let us approach St. Thomas.

§ II. WHAT THOMAS AQUINAS SAYS ABOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

XXVII. It is agreed between us and our Adversaries that St. Thomas never explicitly discussed Middle Knowledge, either to confirm or reject it; nor can there be any controversy other than whether, in treat-

DISPUTATION IV

ing other matters, as often happens, he inserted some things by which this knowledge might seem to be either accepted or repudiated by him, either in explicit words or in common principles and suppositions necessarily connected with it. For what Father John of St. Thomas had said about St. Augustine, he repeats about the Angelic Doctor, namely that Middle Knowledge was manifestly "slaughtered" by him, which the Writer of the Salamanca College had also attempted to prove. Hence both must be answered, and it must be shown that Middle Knowledge is armed by St. Thomas with the very sword by which they think it is slaughtered; just as was previously shown regarding St. Augustine.

First, this must be impressed upon the friendly Reader, that I am disputing with those Doctors who admit that God's conditional knowledge, or knowledge of future free acts of creatures conditionally future, was both known to and approved by St. Thomas. The question is only whether he admitted the present and actual decree of the divine will concerning all these same future things. For if he admitted it, he would have completely slaughtered Middle Knowledge; if he did not admit it, he would have rather armed it. Since I follow the position in this question which denies that those decrees were universally established by St. Thomas, nothing else can be demanded of me than to show that all the testimonies of St. Thomas which the Adversaries have produced to prove what I have denied have another meaning and interpretation. Let us therefore briefly examine them.

XXVIII. First, a passage is objected from the third part, question 1, article 3 or 2, where St. Thomas reports Augustine's response to the question of the Pagans, and says it was rejected by Augustine himself in the book on the gift of perseverance, chapter 9. Hence, says John of St. Thomas, all this refers not to that foreknowledge of a future event and decree, but to divine predestination. But what does "all this" mean? If it means all that the Pagans were asking, namely why Christ chose to appear to one nation rather than another, and at one time rather than another, that this is to be referred to divine predestination, omitting the rea-

DISPUTATION IV

son Augustine had previously given; that is true. But what does this have to do with Middle Knowledge and conditional predefinitions? If, however, the sense is that all that Augustine answers, namely that God knew who and when people would or would not believe in him: that this is to be referred to divine predestination and decree; as if this decree and predestination preceded the knowledge of this future event, insofar as it remains precisely within the nature of a conditional; I deny that St. Thomas ever thought all this should be referred to predestination and decree, or that there is any syllable in his text that indicates this.

For another passage that is objected to from the Catena on Matthew is irrelevant, since St. Thomas there says nothing of his own, but only reports and connects the interpretations of the Holy Fathers. And what John of St. Thomas says about St. Augustine's exposition being preferred, even if true, would not harm us at all, since we have already shown more than enough that Augustine has nothing that suggests that conditional predefinition. But this is not even true, as you will easily discover, friendly Reader, if you go to the passage, in which there is no trace of either this comparison or preference, but the Adversary added this of his own accord.

XXIX. Second, a passage is objected from question 6 on Truth, article 3, in which St. Thomas proves that predestination is certain. For when it was objected against this certainty that predestination must be with the supposition of a secondary cause, namely the created will, and that what is certain in this way has only conditional certainty, in this manner, "this person will be saved if he prepares himself," just as this is only conditionally certain, "the sun will cause fruit in a plant if the generative power of the plant is well-disposed"; St. Thomas responds thus: "To the fourth, it should be said that the secondary cause, which must be supposed for inducing the effect of predestination, is also subject to the order of predestination: but this is not so in inferior powers with respect to some superior acting power. And therefore the order of divine predestination, although it is with the supposition of the human will, neverthe-

DISPUTATION IV

less has absolute certainty, even if in the example cited the contrary appears." After quoting these words, Father John of St. Thomas adds, "Behold the manifest slaughter of Middle Knowledge." But I respond that this sword is made of lead and thus completely unsuitable for slaughter. The meaning of St. Thomas is clear, and indicates nothing other than that although predestination does not bring about its effect, namely salvation, in adults, except with the supposition of the cooperation of free will, yet from it follows salvation with absolute and not merely conditional certainty: because it adapts and disposes free will to such an effect, or makes it infallibly cooperate by giving grace and giving it appropriately: and this is free will being subject to predestination, namely receiving from it the necessary strength and disposition to cooperate infallibly, contrary to what happens in other causes. For the sun that produces figs, for example, with the supposition of a fig tree, and olives with the supposition of an olive tree, neither makes a fig tree lively out of a dry one, nor an olive tree out of a wild olive: but it supposes both, both the fig tree living and alive, and likewise the olive tree: and therefore the supposition of the sun infers neither figs nor olives, except conditionally, and with the supposition that both the fig tree and the olive tree have a well-disposed generative power: but predestination does not depend on a similar condition, because it itself produces in free will what it requires, in the manner already stated. From this it is clear both that the predestination of which St. Thomas speaks here is absolute, and that the effect which is said to certainly follow from it is also absolute. But to infer from the fact that free will is subject to actual and absolute divine predestination, in order to an effect that is infallibly and absolutely future, that it must likewise be subject to actual predestination, in order to an effect that is only conditionally future: this is a far-fetched consequence, which fails in its path before it reaches the slaughter of Middle Knowledge. For it has already been shown above how different is the necessity of a present and actual decree for the absolute futurity and for the conditional futurity of a created free act.

DISPUTATION IV

XXX. But it is very noteworthy what St. Thomas teaches here in the body of the article: for when he had proposed that free will is subject to predestination in such a way that it nevertheless operates contingently, he immediately notes the difficulty that arises from reconciling the infallibility of predestination with the freedom of that same will. Now see what method of reconciliation he employs: "We find order to be compatible in respect to something in two ways. In one way, insofar as a single cause produces its effect in the order of divine providence; in another way, when from the concurrence of many contingent causes that can fail, one effect is reached, each of which God ordains for the constitution of the effect in place of that which fails, or so that another does not fail. Just as we see that all individual things of one species are corruptible; and yet through the succession of one to another, the perpetuity of the species can be preserved by divine providence governing in such a way that not all fail; and this is how it is in predestination. For free will can fail to attain salvation: yet in the one whom God predestines, he prepares so many other helps, that either he does not fall: or if he falls, that he rises again, such as exhortations and the assistance of prayers, the gift of grace, and other such things, by which God helps a person to salvation. Therefore, if we consider salvation with respect to the proximate cause, namely free will, it does not have certainty but contingency: But with respect to the first cause, which is predestination, it has certainty." Which kind of reconciliation I say is far more similar to that shown by the authors of Middle Knowledge than to that suggested by the Adversaries. For let these three modes be proposed. The first is that of the Adversaries. The infallibility of predestination stands with the freedom of will because it does not destroy the indifference of judgment in the predestined, that is, it does not make the cognitions by which he is governed either so perfect as is the beatific vision, which consumes the freedom of love; or so imperfect as are the apprehensions of brutes and the insane and children, which are not sufficient for acting by choice. But with that mediocrity of cognitions or known things standing, freedom stands, whatever necessity of

DISPUTATION IV

acting finally impends from wherever: and thus predestination, however much it by itself infrustrably and infallibly inclines the will A to works necessary for obtaining glory, and has that infallibility and infrustrability independently of future free consent; and man cannot by his own will retain or lose, frustrate or make effective what God gives in its execution; nevertheless it does not harm freedom, because it takes nothing away from that indifference of cognitions; and this is, that God predefines not only our acts, but also the manner in which they are done when they are done freely, because he predefines that they be done with that indifference supposed. This is entirely the view of the recent Thomists if examined stripped of verbal complications.

Let therefore the second mode of St. Thomas be proposed, the one that has already been adduced. Predestination stands with the freedom of the predestined because the infallibility it has rests on or consists in the multitude of helps that God prepares, which are so many that it cannot happen that, with the efficacy of one supplying the defect of another, the intended effect is not finally obtained: just as the conservation of corruptible species intended by divine providence is obtained with one individual being born in place of another. This is the most genuine thought of St. Thomas in the cited passage, as will be clear to one who looks at it.

The third mode is that of those who philosophize from Middle Knowledge thus. Predestination, however infallible it is, stands with the freedom of will: because that infallibility depends on the multitude of helps, with which God can assist the one to be predestined. For since it is so great that it cannot happen that most of them do not have their effect with freedom unharmed, on the hypothesis that they are given: and God knows this well; by predestining he decrees not to move the will of the predestined otherwise than by thus mixing efficacious means with inefficacious ones, so that the defect of the latter is supplied by the fruit of the former, until the predestined encounters that end of life which cannot but be connected with future blessedness. Here I appeal to the conscience of

DISPUTATION IV

the Reader, to which of those extreme modes is the middle reconciliation of St. Thomas more akin, to the first or to the third?

For what does that multitude of concurrent causes that can fail, with one supplying the defect of another, or preventing it from failing, have to do with the first mode? And what need is there to enumerate exhortations, the assistance of prayers, the gift of grace, and other such things, by which God helps a person to salvation, if all are no more or less contingent than each individually, and the whole infallibility is reduced to the efficacy of the divine will alone independently of future free consent, so that with it posited each efficacious means is so; with it removed, none at all are? If, I say, with those two supposed, predestination and indifference of judgments, there is no means that fails, none that harms freedom: but with them removed the contrary happens; it was necessary to stand in them: not to seek reconciliation of predestination with freedom from the variety and contingency of means which God uses.

XXXI. But there is something else in which St. Thomas in the same place excellently suggests Middle Knowledge, namely when he says that the Foreknowledge of God does not universally imply the relation of a cause with respect to those things of which it is; and predestination adds to foreknowledge the relation of a cause to those things of which it is. Which is nothing other than what we considered earlier, that there is foreknowledge of some things, of which there is neither predestination nor predefinition: and consequently that principle in the doctrine of St. Thomas, by which the Thomists want predefinition of futures whether absolute or conditional to be necessary to God as a reason for knowing them, is not universal, but there is something foreknown that nevertheless is not predefined, because it is not caused: on which principle Middle Knowledge stands, and all the effort of the Adversaries falls.

But that all those things by which they try to interpret St. Thomas so as to evade the force of this testimony are in vain, has been shown at length before. And in this way also the thrust of the Writer of

DISPUTATION IV

the Salamanca College (Disp. 10, doubt 4, no. 78) has been repelled, who from this passage of St. Thomas had hoped for a manifest overthrow of Middle Knowledge.

XXXII. Third, a passage is objected from question 2 on Truth, article 10, where St. Thomas, while examining that threefold division of prophecy which Jerome hands down, namely into prophecy of threat, of foreknowledge, and of predestination; in his response to 8 speaks thus, "That if prophecy of threat is referred to the order of causes which it directly regards, thus it is without any condition: for it is absolutely ordained in the causes that this happens." Where Father of St. Thomas says, "Behold," he says, "the absolute ordination and consequently decree on the part of the ordainer, who is God." St. Doctor continues, "But if it is referred to the event which it regards indirectly, thus it is to be understood under the condition of the cause," and Father of St. Thomas, "Behold the conditional object on the part of the future event." And thus he infers that those conditional things are known by God according to divine ordination and disposition. But he wanders from the mark a great deal. For the question is not whether God by some ordination of his renders knowable certain conditional future things, dependent only on his judgment, such as causes disposed to punish sin, and their effect, which is punishment. No one doubts that God can absolutely establish, in vengeance for sins, causes that inflict either diseases or sterility; yet in such a way that he wants their effect to be suspended on the condition of penance. At which time the predefinition of those causes is absolute, but of their effect, only conditional: because God wills, if penance is obtained, to prevent those evils, if it is not obtained, not to prevent them. And this is all the Holy Doctor wants in the cited passage. But the question is whether God has similar predefinitions on the part of the object that are conditional concerning those things that depend on created freedom; so that, just as sterility will not follow from the supposition of non-penance, except because God has so ordained; so also the seduction of the Jews will not follow, from the hypothesis that they marry foreign

DISPUTATION IV

women, unless because God has so ordained: and sins would not follow from the hypothesis that the one who was taken by untimely death would live, unless because God so predefined, and so on with other things. And on this matter the Holy Doctor has not even a word in the passage that is objected. But to think it is a necessary consequence: and from the fact that God by virtue of predefinition knows some conditionally future things, which depend only on him; to know similarly by virtue of predefinition what are conditionally and freely future from a created cause, this is to beg the question, and to be gratuitously wrong, and against the mind of St. Thomas, as I will soon say.

And this Father John of St. Thomas did not sufficiently distinguish in those places where the predefinitions of free acts conditionally elicited from creatures were to be proved, while he indiscriminately seeks instances from those future things which are to be produced by God alone, such as punishments, rewards, gratuitous benefits. But just as it does not follow that if God by his predefinition alone makes punishment or reward absolutely future, and does not know it to be thus future otherwise than because he so predefined; so also he makes by his predefinition alone an evil act to be absolutely future, and does not know it to be thus future otherwise than because he so predefined: so similarly it does not follow that if by his predefinition alone he makes to be conditionally future what is future from himself alone, so also he makes to be future what depends on man, whether good or evil.

XXXIII. But come, let us see whether from this passage also something can be drawn by which middle knowledge may be established by the authority of St. Thomas. And first, what we have already said, that those things which God alone does, and those which he does with secondary causes, especially with free will, are to be distinguished; and the former are properly said to be predestined, but not the latter, St. Thomas teaches here clearly, in the body of the article with these words. The fulfillment of the order of causes happens in two ways; sometimes indeed from the operation of divine power alone, as the raising of Lazarus and

DISPUTATION IV

the conception of Christ, and according to this is the prophecy of predestination, because as Damascene says, those things which God predestines are not in us. But some things are fulfilled by the operation of other causes, whether natural or voluntary: and these insofar as they are fulfilled through other causes, are not predestined, but are foreknown. Hence of these there is said to be prophecy according to foreknowledge. Because however foreknowledge is made on account of men, prophecy of foreknowledge consists especially concerning those things that are done by men with free will. Hence, passing over other created causes, Jerome, notifying prophecy of foreknowledge, made mention only of free will. There you have prophecy of foreknowledge distinguished against prophecy of predestination, because foreknowledge deals especially with those things that are done through free will, but predestination with those things that are not in us, and which God does. Hence he adds afterwards that Jerome took foreknowledge according to a certain restriction, insofar as it is only about those things of which there is not predestination, strictly speaking. And again, that our merit is not subject to predestination, except according as it is from grace, which is from God alone: hence that which is from our will is said to be subject to predestination accidentally.

XXXIV. Second, these words should be considered, foreknowledge does not exceed predestination in evil things only, if predestination is taken strictly: but also in all good things that are not done by divine power alone. For when he says, if predestination is taken strictly, by this limitation he clearly suggests that even if predestination is taken broadly for any predestination or antecedent will concerning those things that depend on free will; still foreknowledge exceeds in evil things, that is, foreknowledge is broader than predestination: Granted that in good things it does not then exceed, because there is no such predestination or will in God concerning those things that are evil, as there can be concerning those things that are good. From which it also follows that those things that are evil cannot be said to be known by God either absolutely or conditionally because willed or predefined, which is what we intend.

DISPUTATION IV

XXXV. Third, these too should be considered, which he has in the body of the article: for when he had distinguished two ways of foreknowing a future thing, one in the causes or in the order which causes have to it, in which way an Eclipse is known by an Astronomer and death by a Physician: the other by looking immediately at the outcome itself, that is, the effect of such causes; he speaks thus. But God knows future things not only by reason of the order of causes; but also as to the very outcome, or execution of the order. The reason for this is that his intuition is measured by eternity, etc. But this is impossible for a creature whose intuition is limited to some determinate time. He adds that the former way of knowing future things, and that knowledge is of a present rather than a future thing, because that ordination of causes is present: which he also repeats in his response to the second, and thus concludes. And thus it remains proper to God alone, to truly know future things. From this he takes the distinction of prophecy of threat and prophecy of foreknowledge, that prophecy of threat is derived from the knowledge of causes ordained to some effect, and in that signification only has certain and absolute truth, which it does not always have insofar as it indirectly signifies the event itself. But prophecy of foreknowledge is derived from the knowledge of the future event in itself, which it also directly signifies: hence its truth would not stand unless the announced effect really followed.

XXXVI. This is the clear doctrine of St. Thomas, from which I argue thus. The predefinition of a future effect pertains to the causes ordained for the production of such an effect, indeed it is a true and perfect active ordination of such causes to such an effect: But St. Thomas, in the opinion already explained, clearly teaches that the true and proper way for God to foreknow future things is independent of the knowledge of causes ordained to produce them: Therefore, St. Thomas thinks that even the true and proper way for God to foreknow future things is independent of the knowledge of predefinition: and therefore predefinition is not for God the reason for foreknowing future things. The major premise

DISPUTATION IV

is clear and is gathered from St. Thomas, who, as we saw a little earlier, therefore says that predestination adds to foreknowledge the notion of causality, because it adds predefinition which is causal with respect to the predefined future. But the Adversary himself in this objection infers predefinition from the ordination of causes. From which it follows that it cannot not be included in the complex of causes as ordained to the production of an effect. The minor premise, as I said, is the very doctrine of St. Thomas related here.

XXXVII. It is confirmed from what St. Thomas says, that the knowledge of a future thing which someone has from the present ordination of causes to produce it, is rather knowledge of a present thing, than properly called foreknowledge of a future thing; for thus I argue. To know a future effect in the present ordination of causes to produce it, is not properly to foreknow the future, but is to know what is present: but to know a future effect in its predefinition, is to know it in the present ordination of causes to produce it: Therefore, to know a future effect in predefinition, is not properly to foreknow the future, but to know what is present: Therefore, there must be in God some other way of foreknowing a future effect which is proper, besides that by which he can know it in predefinition. The major premise is from St. Thomas here. The minor premise is manifest. For both the predefinition of future things is a certain ordination of them, even by the admission of the adversaries, as already said: and nothing is more present to God from eternity than that, and St. Thomas contends that besides that way of knowing future things, by reason of the connection they have with something present, another way must be admitted, more noble, more perfect, and worthy of God alone, by which the divine intuition is carried directly and immediately to the very presence which future things have in eternity.

XXXVIII. 4. An objection is raised from Part 1, question 19, article 1, reply to objection 2, where St. Thomas says that God sometimes wills both alternatives—namely, that something be future and that it not be future; that it be future according to the order of inferior causes,

DISPUTATION IV

and that it not be future according to the order and disposition of superior causes. From this, Fr. John of St. Thomas infers that what would be future according to an inferior cause, but will not actually occur, is a conditionally future event, which indeed would happen unless the superior order determined otherwise; and yet St. Thomas says that God wills this and it was thus ordained by God. I concede that such a future is conditionally future, and I further concede that it was ordained by God to be thus future, but it was ordained to be thus future according to the disposition of nature, as the Holy Doctor states, in the way that it was future that Lazarus would remain in the tomb (for he uses this example), or according to the disposition or demands of merits, in the way that what God predicts when speaking against a nation and against a kingdom—to uproot, scatter, and destroy it—would be future; that is, how the punishment that human sins deserved would be future, which the Holy Doctor had also raised as an objection to himself. And thus by God's will, some effect of natural causes becomes only conditionally future, insofar as He Himself has decreed both to establish those causes and to impede their effect in certain cases. For then, from those two absolute decrees, even regarding the object itself, it follows that the effect is only conditionally future. Likewise, by God's will it happens that some punishment is only conditionally future, namely the overthrow of a kingdom, unless human repentance were to forestall God's vengeance. And thus both what depends on natural causes and what depends on God alone can become conditionally future by some preceding decree of God. But what, I ask, is the subject of our dispute? Is the question about natural effects? Is it about those things which are done by God alone? Is it not rather about free acts to be elicited by the created will? And from where on earth are these consequences drawn: "What follows from a necessary cause becomes conditionally future by God's will; therefore, what follows from a free cause is also conditionally future by God's will"? "God decreed that Lazarus would have remained in the tomb under a certain hypothesis; therefore, God decreed that Lazarus would have freely done this or that

DISPUTATION IV

under a hypothesis"? "Pestilence and famine will occur conditionally in some kingdom by God's decree; therefore, moral corruption will likewise occur conditionally by God's similar decree"? Do those who reason in this way even understand the state of the question? To the same point belongs what...

XXXIX. A fifth objection is raised from Sentences I, distinction 46, question 1, article 1, reply to objection 2, where St. Thomas says that God's antecedent will can be called conditional, yet without imperfection on the part of the divine will, but rather on the part of the thing willed, which is not conceived with all the circumstances required for the right order to salvation. St. Thomas discusses the true understanding of the proposition: "God wills that all men be saved." Thus, he concedes that if the question concerns antecedent and conditional will on the part of the thing willed, this proposition is universally true; he therefore admits such a will in God. And consequently, says John of St. Thomas, this dissolves all the objections against the middle knowledge that cannot stand with such a will. But what, I ask, does "dissolves" mean here, if not that it freely dismisses it, with the difficulties by which they try to constrain it vanishing? God by His decree makes the reward of a good life, which is salvation, conditionally future on the hypothesis of that same life. Therefore, does He also by His decree make that very good life similarly future on the hypothesis of His grace? I deny the consequence. For that reward is the effect of God alone, while the good life is of both God and man. Hence, although the present will of God is necessary to understand the reward as conditionally future rather than not future, it does not follow that it is similarly necessary to understand a good life as conditionally future rather than not future. For besides God's will, there is the will of the human person who, on the supposition of grace, is going to determine this, and just as God's present will would be necessary for a good life, it is not necessary for an evil life, which is equally conditionally future.

DISPUTATION IV

XL. Finally, he objects from On Truth, question 2, article 12, reply to objection 9, where the Holy Doctor says it is not inappropriate to posit that God knows something will be future that will not occur, insofar as He knows certain causes are inclined toward some effect that will not be produced. Fr. John of St. Thomas adds: "Behold how St. Thomas admits knowledge of futures that will not be but are only conditional, namely by seeing inclined causes, which inclination he himself [God] certainly wills and has decreed." But the objection suffers from the same confusion; and what can be understood concerning the inclination of natural causes in first act is, by a gratuitous yet forceful extension, applied to the predefinition of free causes, of which in St. Thomas, at least in these passages, there is absolutely no mention. Thus, it is easy to understand from all these arguments that the Adversary has been unable to attack middle knowledge from St. Thomas's doctrine, except with testimonies that partly miss the point and partly even confirm it.

XLI. But the writer of the Salamanca College comes to the rescue; after attempting to extract from that earlier testimony, which was already resolved, a manifest overthrow of middle knowledge, he attacks it again: first, from those passages where St. Thomas teaches that God's knowledge is the cause of things when joined with the will; then from those where he states that absolutely future things are not knowable by God before the decree of His will; third, from the fact that the two modes by which St. Thomas teaches that some future is knowable—namely, either in itself or in its causes—fail regarding conditionals unless God's decree is added. For they do not have a certain connection with their causes, and they will never exist in themselves: Therefore.

I respond first, beginning with this last point, by asking this Doctor how he makes those two modes of knowing futures apply here through the benefit of predefinition. Let us suppose, I say, that such a predefinition of conditional futures is given. I ask: Does God know them only in their causes, or in themselves? If only in their causes, which is to say that predefinition pertains to the nature of a cause, then God does

DISPUTATION IV

not know these futures in a perfect and proper way, that is, in the divine way, because, as we cited earlier from St. Thomas, that mode proper to God alone does not perceive futures in the ordination of causes; and one who understands only through the ordination of causes should not be said to foreknow the future, but rather to know the present. If [He knows them] in themselves, then God knows what is not knowable, because what will never be cannot establish knowability according to the real being that they have in themselves, as this Doctor says; but conditionals, even after predefinition, will never be; therefore, even after predefinition, they cannot establish knowability according to the real being that they have in themselves. Thus, the entire burden of solving this argument falls on the Adversary.

As for what we should otherwise answer to him, it has already been explained in the earlier disputation against the anonymous Doctor. Namely, that what will never be something in itself cannot establish knowability whereby it is stated of it that it will be something in itself; but it can establish knowability whereby it is stated of it that it would be something in itself if some condition were posited. And middle knowledge knows or states nothing other than this, namely that its object would be something in itself if the condition were posited. Therefore, middle knowledge knows or states nothing that does not have a foundation in its object.

XLII. Regarding the second objection, what should be said is clear. Namely, that in St. Thomas's work, that principle is never found—that absolutely future things are not knowable to God before the decree of His will—if such a decree is understood as tending immediately and determinately toward the very thing that is said to be future. The contrary is proven by all those passages in which we have shown from St. Thomas that foreknowledge exceeds predefinition. Therefore, St. Thomas intends only this: that absolutely future things are neither thus future nor, consequently, thus knowable before the decree of the divine

DISPUTATION IV

will by which He absolutely determines to posit the cause of such futures and to offer it appropriate concurrence.

XLIII. Regarding the first objection, when St. Thomas says that God's knowledge is the cause of things when joined with the will, and that things are not known by God because they are future, but rather are future because they are known in that way—that is, with the will joined to knowledge—this must be understood differently for absolute futures and for conditional futures. For regarding absolute futures, it has this meaning: the knowledge that God has of their possibility, joined with either effective or permissive or impulsive will, or tending to the future itself determinately, or only disjunctively—that is, either to it or its opposite, but always determinately to its cause as to be applied to act—this knowledge, I say, joined with such a will, is the cause of things. Because it is both the cause why good things exist at some time, and it is the cause without which even those things which are evil would never exist. But I say that there is in God a knowledge which, joined with a predefinitive will immediately and directly toward evil action, is the cause why that action will absolutely be future—I say that no passage has yet been found in which St. Thomas asserts this, nor, God willing, will one be found hereafter.

Regarding conditional futures, I have already said that no more actuality should be required in their cause than is in themselves. Since they are such futures of which nothing other is asserted than that they would be—that is, whose entire existence for any time, present, past, or future, is suspended—it is enough if the cause which they necessarily require is similarly suspended. Therefore, for them, God's will which is [actual] is not required, but which would be, if God were eternally determined to produce them. And just as it is sufficient that in the hypothesis from which they are said to follow, created freedom and grace and other necessities are involved, not as having existence in some difference of time, but as suspended from God's freedom, when we say, "if God were to create such a will and give it such grace, etc.," so it is sufficient that the

DISPUTATION IV

very volition of God which is required for such futurity be equally suspended from that same freedom of God, and we say, "if God were to will to produce such a cause, and were to will to offer it appropriate concurrence, etc." And thus God's will is indeed the cause of such futures, but not God's will which is, but which would be, if God were to determine Himself differently from eternity. Or you may say that of no cause of a conditional future can it properly be asserted that it is a cause now, but that it would be; consequently, something should not be assigned that is now a cause, but that would be a cause. For just as regarding a conditionally future effect, we understand nothing other than that it would be, even if it is not now, so it is sufficient if something can be understood that would be its cause, even if it is not its cause now. This, moreover, is understood in the antecedent of the conditional proposition when it is said: if there were such a free agent and if there were God's will accommodated to concur, etc. St. Thomas intended nothing else.

XLIV. And these are all the arguments that the Adversaries have been able to gather from St. Thomas against Middle Knowledge. These will undoubtedly seem trivial if compared with others that are clearly presupposed by the same Holy Doctor, such as: 1. That something is foreknown which nevertheless is not predefined. 2. That foreknowledge does not hinder freedom precisely because it relates to the foreknown just as our eye relates to the object seen. 3. That all necessity which follows from the fact that something is foreknown is reduced to this principle: That which is, when it is, necessarily is. 4. That a contingent future is knowable to God independently of the knowledge of any ordination of causes to produce it, and according to that being which it has in some difference of time, or which it would have from supposition; which is to be knowable independently of the knowledge of any predefinition. 5. That there is in God some foreknowledge of good or evil things that never existed, which presented to God a motive on account of which He decreed to do or omit certain things; e.g., He did not will that the Incarnation be hastened, because He foreknew that from it would be impeded

DISPUTATION IV

that sense of sin and necessity which befits sinners, and it would follow that the faith of the good would become lukewarm with the length of time. Likewise, He did not will that it be deferred to the end of the world, because He saw that with such a delay, the knowledge and reverence of God and moral integrity would be totally abolished. But He chose the time when He knew help ought to be given and the benefit would be welcome. For St. Thomas philosophizes thus in Part 3, question 1, articles 5 and 6. Nor can it be said that this foreknowledge, which was truly the knowledge of conditionally future things, was subsequent to their predefinition. For the teaching of the Holy Doctor would be illusory if, when asked why He absolutely decreed that the Incarnation should be deferred, the answer is given that the reason is because He had conditionally predefined that certain greater evils would follow if it were not deferred. For immediately a greater doubt arises: why did He predefine that those evils would follow? And when that doubt arises from the apprehension of divine goodness—why He delayed His benefit for so long—who does not see that a solution is given which the same apprehension of divine goodness renders more incredible, when it is said that the cause is that God had predefined that those evils would follow, which otherwise would not have followed at all? For it is more repugnant to divine goodness to predefine evils than to defer goods. Therefore, St. Thomas would never have thought of that conditional predefinition of future evils. And these and other such things which have been observed by Suárez, Herice, Diego Ruiz, Fr. Peter of St. Joseph both in the concord and in the defense of St. Thomas, if compared with those which have been objected, I do not doubt that a fair judge of these matters would reach the same conclusion as I have, namely, that if Thomistic doctrine is that which has a greater connection with the principles of St. Thomas, then the doctrine which defends Middle Knowledge is Thomistic, not the opposing one. Thus, it is a vain pretext to attack Middle Knowledge out of obligation or purpose to adhere to the Angelic Doctor, since from that very obligation follows rather an honorable necessity of defending it.

DISPUTATION IV

XLV. But what the Writer of the Salamanca College had done with Augustine, he has also observed in St. Thomas, whose mind he has scrutinized from his writings, and attempts also to show from effects that Middle Knowledge was rejected by him. "The first and fundamental reason," he says, "is that which was treated earlier concerning the Censure of thirty Doctors." This reason has already been examined, and it has been shown with certain conviction that this Doctor builds on sand when he lays such first and fundamental reasons.

Secondly, he proves it because the Fathers of Trent rejected Middle Knowledge, "in the manner," he says, "to be proven below." Therefore, it is not found in St. Thomas. But we have also shown above that there is no such manner of Middle Knowledge being repudiated by the Fathers of Trent, and that it has never been proven, nor will it be proven, nor is it probable.

Thirdly, he proves it from the authority of the Dominican Fathers, a reason which he surrounds with many varied considerations and confirmations. I respond first that the authority of those Fathers is indeed of great weight with us; but it is reasonable that they, when entering into this contest, renounce such prejudice; otherwise, the terms of debate would be unfair. As for his claim that the Dominicans have never found this Middle Knowledge in their doctor, if the question concerns the ancient ones, I respond that they did not even look for it. For since none of them asked whether Middle Knowledge exists, it follows that none of them asked whether it was in St. Thomas; but just as St. Thomas had presupposed it, so they likewise presupposed the same. Regarding the more recent Thomists, I concede that they sought Middle Knowledge in St. Thomas, but in the manner of one who, having lost his breviary, searched for it while fearing to find it. Hence it is easy to turn back the argument which this doctor uses when he contends that the Thomists should be believed rather than the Jesuits in this cause, because the Thomists never, the Jesuits sometimes, depart from St. Thomas; the former being driven by no passion or necessity, the latter not by any passion,

DISPUTATION IV

but nevertheless by some necessity impelled to seek the authority of Middle Knowledge. I say that I turn that argument back thus: When two people seek something, one of whom is driven by no necessity of finding it, no desire, but rather by fear, while the other is both compelled by necessity and carried by a great desire of finding it, it is evident that the latter will be more diligent in seeking; and therefore, other things being equal, it should be hoped that what is sought by the latter will be found rather than what is sought by the former. But the Thomists and Jesuits are two parties who seek Middle Knowledge in those different ways—the Thomists in the former way, the Jesuits in the latter. Therefore, we have reason to believe that the Jesuits were more diligent in seeking, from which similarly it should rather be hoped that the thing sought would be found.

XLVI. Finally, regarding his addition that the Thomists would not have accused Middle Knowledge before the Inquisitors and the Supreme Pontiff if it existed in St. Thomas, I respond that it is the right of litigants that before judgment is rendered, the one who is accused can say that he was not justly accused. Furthermore, St. Thomas's corpus is now common property and in the public domain, a most rich and fertile ground with many treasures. When all Scholastics dig into it, it is by chance that someone finds something overlooked by the Thomists; if the Adversary wishes to deny this, let him beware lest he pass judgment on the labors of the College of Complutense and Salamanca.

CHAPTER III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

XLVII. Father John of St. Thomas attacks Middle Knowledge with two principal arguments, one common and one specialized. He further demonstrates by multiple inconveniences that it must necessarily be rejected. All these objections must be addressed here as concisely as possible.

DISPUTATION IV

§ 1. THE COMMON ARGUMENT AGAINST MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

The common argument is the same one we previously resolved against Twisse, so there is hardly any need to add anything to what was explained there. That David, he says, would be handed over by the people of Keilah if he remained among them is in fact a certain truth, and the opposite is in fact false. Moreover, this truth is not suspended or dependent on a condition with respect to its status as truth, although its existence depends on a condition. And it is evident because it is in fact knowable, and in fact there is knowledge about it. Therefore, that truth is in fact determined, certain, and infallible. And although its existence under the condition is future, it is certainly thus future, and does not remain in the state of pure possibility and indifference like its contradictory. Therefore, it arises from some principle and cause. However, no sufficient cause can be assigned excluding an actual decree of God, which being posited, Middle Knowledge collapses.

Therefore, three propositions must be examined here. First, The truth of the future betrayal by the Keilites is in fact [true] and is not suspended or dependent on a condition, as is the existence of that betrayal itself. Second, Even if the existence of that betrayal is future only conditionally, yet it is certainly thus future, and does not remain in the state of pure possibility and indifference, like its contradictory. Third, That extraction from the state of pure possibility cannot but arise from some principle, and there can be no such principle excluding God's will.

XLVIII. The first proposition, properly speaking, is false. For that truth is objective, not distinguished from the thing that is called true, and therefore it is contradictory that the existence of a thing be suspended on a condition while its truth is not suspended on the same condition. The truth, I say, of the future betrayal by the Keilites is not something distinct from the future betrayal itself; therefore, it implies a contradiction that

DISPUTATION IV

the betrayal be suspended and not the truth. But if you contend that by the name of truth, besides the entity of the thing, there is also signified a certain non-repugnance of cognition concerning such a thing, which might be called its knowability, I concede that by reason of this non-repugnance, it can be said that there is in fact that truth of future betrayal, and that it is not suspended on a condition. For just as, although the existence of the Antichrist is only future, that nevertheless does not prevent there being in fact a non-repugnance to knowing that he will be future—which non-repugnance is not only future but also present, and therefore the knowability of a merely future object is said to be present—so although the existence of the betrayal by the Keilites is suspended on a condition, nothing prevents the present non-repugnance of the cognition by which this very thing is enunciated, namely, that it would be on that hypothesis, not that it is. And this is the present and absolute and in no way suspended knowability of a futurity suspended on a condition, which is: of a non-existent objective truth there can be an existent formal truth in the cognition that represents it. Hence nothing can be inferred against Middle Knowledge.

XLIX. The second proposition, insofar as it says that the existence of the future betrayal is certainly thus, that is, conditionally future, signifies nothing other than what was just said: namely, that although that existence is suspended on a condition that is not yet understood to be posited, nevertheless there is no repugnance to there being a present and in no way suspended cognition in existing by which this very thing is enunciated, namely, that the existence of that betrayal is suspended on such a condition, and that it would certainly happen if the condition were to be fulfilled.

As for the part where it says that such a betrayal does not remain in the state of pure possibility, like its contradictory, this can be understood in two ways. First, that it does not in fact remain or will not remain in the state of possibility, speaking absolutely; and this sense is false, because in fact and speaking absolutely, it has nothing beyond mere possi-

DISPUTATION IV

bility, nor does it differ in this from its contradictory. Second, that it would not remain on the hypothesis; that is, that if the supposition of David remaining in Keilah, and Saul approaching, and God accommodating His providence to the freedom of the Keilites, which is only possible, were to become actual, then also the betrayal, which itself is also in fact merely possible, would similarly become actual, and would differ from its contradictory, from which it now does not differ absolutely speaking. And this sense is true, and this is what Middle Knowledge declares. Namely, if that antecedent of the conditional proposition, if David remains in Keilah, etc., which is only possible, were to become actual, it would also be the case that this consequent would become actual, he would be handed over into the hands of Saul, and therefore it would differ from its contradictory, which is, he would not be handed over, from which it now does not differ, speaking absolutely. Because then, with that contradictory remaining under the mere possibility under which it now is, the opposite would become actual and not merely possible, as it is now.

L. The third proposition, that the extraction of the future betrayal from the state of mere possibility is or arises from some principle, is equally equivocal. For it can be enunciated thus: it is from some principle, and thus it is about a non-supposing subject. Because neither is it in fact and speaking absolutely, nor does it arise; but it would be and would arise. Hence what is added, from some principle, can be understood either as a principle that is in fact, and thus it is false, for that of which it is said only that it would be does not require a cause or principle of which it is said, it is; or a principle that would be can be understood, and thus it is true. For that actuality would then arise from a cause and principle that would be. For there would be that whole antecedent of the hypothetical proposition, if David were to remain, etc., which involves whatever can be required to give actuality and determination to that consequent, he would be handed over. And this is what conditional knowledge expresses. Namely, if that whole antecedent were to become actual, there would be a cause and principle from which the actuality would be derived into that

DISPUTATION IV

consequent rather than into its opposite. But from this no necessity follows for a present predetermining cause, since it is sufficient to designate a cause that would be, not one that is. Or certainly if some cause of the present is to be designated, it must be said that it is sufficient that the supposition of that antecedent is made possible. For just as the mere possibility of fire and providence accommodated to its nature is a sufficient cause why heating is and is said to be actually future, if that which is understood to be possible were to become actual, so the mere possibility of this will and these circumstances, and providence accommodated to the free cause, is a sufficient cause why, if this which is possible were to become actual, it is and is said to be future that such effects would follow from it, as was said before.

LI. And hence it is clear that that principle which would be, and from which the existence of what is said to be conditionally future would arise, does not exclude God's will. For that is always involved in the antecedent of the conditional proposition by which these things are said to be future; but what is involved is not a present will that is, but a will that would be, and which can be said to be in a certain way possible, in the sense in which it is said that it does not absolutely imply a contradiction in God to have the will to create another world, which will nevertheless is nowhere, and thus is something which both is nowhere and absolutely speaking can be. In this way, therefore, we say that it does not imply a contradiction for God both to will to place a created will in these circumstances, and to accommodate His concurrence to its freedom, even if in fact He wills neither: which is to say that there is some willing of God which can be, and nowhere is. We say this abstracting from that variety of opinions by which the free acts of God are usually explained. For whichever side one follows, it is always true that there can be absolutely some willing of God which now is not and never will be. Therefore, we say that such a divine will is necessarily involved in the antecedent which is the cause of the conditionally future; and therefore we do not say that it becomes future independently of the will of God which would be,

DISPUTATION IV

granted that it is independent of the will of God which now is, as has been said many times.

LII. From these things the solution is clear to that argument which Fr. John of St. Thomas proposes and turns over through many columns, but in such a way that it is evident that he does not sufficiently distinguish the conditional from the absolute, since he always urges that the conditional is already true, that it is in fact and in reality, that it is freely determined and from free principles; that that determined truth under the conditional state is created, that it is participated, that it has its causes; therefore it ought to be reduced to the first cause, and be subject to divine power and freedom; therefore God ought to look to His will as the first cause and root of that determination, which thus in fact is proper to what can not be proper, etc. But I have already said how all those modes of speaking are to be understood, and how discourse is to be formed. Namely, that truth, taken for the thing that is called true, is not already in fact and in reality, but would be; it is not determined freely and from free principles that already are, but would be determined freely and from free principles that would be if the possible supposition were to become actual. That truth is not created and participated, but to be created and to be participated on the hypothesis. That is, if this hypothesis were to be, that determined truth would be created and participated. It does not have its causes, but would have them; hence it need not now be reduced to the first cause, but would need to be; and then it would be subject to divine power and freedom, in the way that other free acts which exist in some difference of time are subject to it. Therefore God, while knowing these conditionals, ought to look to the act of His will, not which He has now, but which He would have if He were to will the hypothesis signified in the antecedent of the conditional proposition to become from possible actually existing. For then God would be, by benefit of that act, the first cause and root of that determination, in the way He is wont to be of all free things that at some time exist absolutely. Wherefore that horrible thing which he says in all theology and philosophy by

DISPUTATION IV

no means follows from this doctrine, that there is given some state in creatures that cannot be participated by God or by any of His attributes. For we acknowledge nothing that we do not assert to be participated in the same way in which it is. Whatever is, is participated; whatever was, was participated; whatever will be, will be participated; whatever would be, would be participated. What more does he require? But, he says, that conditional state is in fact given although the thing is only under a condition. I, however, would very much like him to distinguish that state from the thing for us, and show how it can happen that some state in fact is, separated from the thing whose state it is. In fact God is; in fact it is possible for David to remain in Keilah, for Saul to approach, for God to have ordinary providence concerning the will of the Keilites in that coincidence of things. Likewise it is in fact impossible that from that hypothesis two contradictorily opposed things should follow, such as the betrayal of David and non-betrayal, and there is a necessity that either one follow. Finally, there is also not only a non-repugnance, but a necessity that the most perfect intellect should attain this: if the aforesaid hypothesis were to become actual, after both cannot follow, and one or the other disjunctively necessarily follows, which would it be, betrayal or non-betrayal? If he calls this the conditional state, the conditional state is in fact. But the real and free consequence or emanation of the betrayal from that supposition neither is, nor was, nor will be, but only would be; nor is anything else perceived by the divine intellect except this which we say, would be; and therefore since the state of this betrayal cannot be any more than the betrayal itself, consequently it is nothing of which anything else can be affirmed than that it would be, in which way it is simultaneously affirmed that it would be caused and depend and be participated by God, etc.

LIII. You will say 1: That state or that betrayal would not be caused by God otherwise than through a decree. Therefore God must know that He will have such a decree given that condition, just as He knows that the will of the Keilites will operate thus. But God cannot now in fact know that He will have such a decree, unless in fact it pleases Him,

DISPUTATION IV

and if it pleases Him in fact, by that very fact some present will of God is granted, to which the truth of the conditional future is ultimately reduced. Thus Fr. John of St. Thomas in the place cited. I reply: That state would not be caused otherwise than through a decree, I concede; therefore God must know that He will have, or rather that He would have such a decree: I distinguish: God must know this by asserting, I deny; by supposing, I concede; for a conditional judgment does not assert that from which it says something will follow, to be, but supposes it. When I say if the sun were shining it would be day, I do not assert the sun is shining, but I suppose it, and from that supposition I say that day would follow, because of the necessary connection which that antecedent has with this consequent. And what the natural determination of the sun does, to be a foundation from which it is infallibly and necessarily inferred that day will follow, this the active indifference and dominion of the free cause over act and non-act does, to be a foundation from which it is inferred that the act rather than the non-act will be future, or the non-act rather than the act, always supposing the connatural providence concerning either cause.

But when it is said that God cannot know that He would have such a decree unless this pleases Him, I distinguish: unless this pleases Him with some free complacency, I deny; with a necessary complacency which pertains equally to this decree and to the opposite, I concede. It pleases God that He can decree this, just as it also pleases Him that He can decree the contrary; the knowledge which He has about such a possibility pleases Him, and also that which He has about the hypothetical consequence from such a supposition, just as also that which He has about the contrary. But beyond this there is no free and efficacious act in God concerning such a decree which can be said to be prior to middle knowledge.

LIV. You will say 2: God could arrange things differently, and make it so that the non-betrayal of David would follow, with the freedom of the Keilites preserved; therefore [there is] some present decree by which that other arrangement is excluded and thus the betrayal is made

DISPUTATION IV

to follow. I distinguish the antecedent: God could make it so that the non-betrayal would follow from the same hypothesis from which the betrayal will follow, I deny; from some other different hypothesis, which is to say that another hypothesis is possible, and from it [would follow] the consequence of non-betrayal, I concede. And I deny the consequent. The hypothesis from which the betrayal will follow is the hypothesis of concurrence indifferently offered, excluding all predefinition anterior to conditional knowledge. For we suppose that all such predefinition takes away freedom. What therefore can God do so that non-betrayal follows without changing that hypothesis? He would have to either not exhibit indifferent concurrence, or positively not will that there be betrayal, or positively will that there be non-betrayal; and whichever of these is decreed, the hypothesis which excludes all these is changed.

LV. You will say 3: That conditional decree, or the decree to be had if the condition is fulfilled, is a decree supposing the truth of the conditional future; therefore it cannot be the principle from which such truth is derived. Thus Fr. John of St. Thomas in the place cited. I deny the antecedent. But he proves it thus: Because such a decree is only a decree about concurring with the created will by general concurrence, or by indifferent concurrence, to be determined by the will itself, in case the condition is fulfilled. But the truth of the conditional future is that the will, if the condition is posited and the general concurrence of God is not lacking, will determine itself. Hence he thus infers: Therefore such truth is not participated from that conditional decree but is supposed by it. I, however, do not see the probability of this consequence, and I fear this reasoning has not yet been sufficiently digested, which if it develops into a suitable argument, it will be easy to apply a distinct solution to the distinct difficulty. But, he says, when such a decree comes about, of concurring indifferently, the determination of such concurrence supposes that it will be done by the will, and thus it is foreseen, not determined and caused by the decree itself, although the will will not cause and operate without it; therefore in vain is that determination said to be caused and

DISPUTATION IV

derived from the decree, since rather it is supposed by it. Here again complex and unexplained thoughts are proposed. While there is actually and absolutely a decree of exhibiting indifferent concurrence, the determination is supposed as only hypothetically future, as something prior in the consequence of subsistence, whence in that sense the actual and absolute positing of the decree can be said to suppose the hypothetical futuration of the determination. But it is necessary also to compare the absolute positing of the decree with the absolute positing of that determination, and the hypothetical with the hypothetical, and the possible with the possible. Namely, the possible determination of such concurrence supposes that possible decree; its actuality suspended on condition supposes the actuality of the decree likewise suspended on God's freedom; its absolute and actual positing [supposes] the absolute and actual positing of the decree; and in all ways in which the determination of the will is conceived to be, the decree of God from which it is participated is also supposed. What more is required? And what else is it that the Adversary says, although not without it will the will cause and operate, than, although there will be no actuality of its determination which is not participated from the decree? But if it is so, why is the decree of God said to be posterior and the determination of the will prior? Should not the Adversary rather have concluded the contrary from this and said: The decree of God is a necessary concause without which the created will will cause nothing, will operate nothing, will not determine itself; therefore its determination, and operation, and effect, is posterior to the decree of God?

§ II. SPECIAL DIFFICULTY.

LVI. To the previous difficulty against middle knowledge, P. John of St. Thomas adds a specific challenge derived from the way in which we must necessarily formulate the object of this knowledge. For it is clear that when we say, for example, "If David remains in Keilah, the people of Keilah will hand him over," in the hypothesis from which the betrayal

DISPUTATION IV

is said to follow, God's concurrence must be included, without which neither the betrayal by the people of Keilah nor anything else could possibly happen. Consequently, God's decree of concurrence must be included—not a decree that actually exists, because we reject that, but a decree that would exist, which is therefore called conditional on the part of the act, from which we cannot abstain. From this, he says, a difficulty arises: How is that conditional object formulated so that it serves middle knowledge? For God knows that the people of Keilah will do this if placed in such circumstances, and similarly if they have concurrence, such that God does not suspend it. However, once concurrence is posited as part of the condition, the object becomes necessary and pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence. For if God's concurrence is posited, it is entirely a necessary truth that such an effect will occur; but if God's concurrence is not posited as a condition, God cannot see the effect as future. For if He suspends His concurrence, nothing will happen. This is what he says, to which he adds that this difficulty severely troubles defenders of middle knowledge, and shortly thereafter, that from this falls a shower of projectiles upon them, and that their solutions are discordant. And concerning the discord he mentions, perhaps it pertains more to the manner of speaking and explaining than to the matter itself, which being the same among all, is nevertheless not conceived in the same way. For the rest, we must see if we can, either by filing or with pincers, render toothless that difficulty, so that it does not bite us so severely. Also, if perhaps no umbrella would suffice for that shower of projectiles, some shield must be constructed under which we can live safely.

LVII. In the first place, P. John of St. Thomas seems to make a special difficulty out of a common one. For it is a common difficulty, even setting aside middle knowledge, how God concurs with free causes, and what decree He established from eternity to provide them with His concurrence. If this is correctly resolved by our side, separate from middle knowledge, and concerning those things that really and absolutely exist at some point in time, no difficulty can remain regarding conditionally fu-

DISPUTATION IV

ture things, since nothing else is required except that in the hypothesis from which they are said to be future, such a decree is involved as is said to actually exist concerning those things that absolutely exist.

Therefore, I respond that in the hypothesis from which the betrayal by the people of Keilah is said to follow, concurrence in the second act is by no means included, as if the sense were "If I concur with the people of Keilah in betrayal, there will be betrayal"; nor is there included the will or decree to concur determinately in the same betrayal, as if the sense were "If I decree to concur determinately in betrayal, betrayal will occur"; but included is a decree of concurring as befits free causes, and the sense is "If I decree to offer concurrence to the people of Keilah for betrayal in a way that is consistent with their freedom, from which He immediately sees the consequence would freely follow, and He asserts, they will betray." And in this consequence He also sees His concurrence in the second act, so that He can say, "If I decree to offer concurrence to the people of Keilah in a way that their freedom demands, I will in reality and determinately concur in the material aspect of betrayal."

LVIII. It remains for us to explain the manner in which free causes demand that concurrence be offered to them, which has already been accurately provided by many. And briefly I say that free causes demand, if God wishes to accommodate Himself to their freedom, that God offer indifferent and non-determined concurrence. As if to say, "I will concur with either of the opposed acts," or "I will concur in such a way that it is attributed to the freedom of such a cause why there is an act rather than no act, or why there is no act rather than an act." And I add that the very same will concerns two causes of this kind, of which one really performs one act, and concurrence is determined to it, while the other either does not operate or performs the opposite, and thus either no concurrence is posited or a determinately different one is posited. For from this, the indifference of concurrence or of this decree is especially understood. Therefore, I say that God sees in the antecedent of the conditional proposition this decree, or the will to concur with the free cause,

DISPUTATION IV

but He does not see any determined concurrence; rather, He sees that in the consequent, in which He sees that the free act will follow.

LIX. Against this mode of philosophizing, P. J. of St. Thomas first objects that God's concurrence should not be given with that suspension and indetermination, and be determined by the created cause, because indetermination arises from potentiality and imperfection, and divine concurrence should be more perfect and more actual, and should perfect and determine the potentiality of the created cause. I respond that concurrence must be given with that suspension and indetermination, and be determined by the created cause, because it should be given in a manner that is consistent with the nature of the free cause, and only that mode is consistent, not another. Now what is said about this indetermination arising from potentiality and imperfection is denied. For God's act that deals with an indeterminate object is just as much an act and just as perfect as is an act that deals with a determinate object. Does God lack the knowledge by which He says that either of my two eyes is necessary for me to see? Does that have more potentiality and imperfection than that by which He says that my tongue, which is one, is necessary for me to speak? And he who, having only one garment to give to a poor person, orders it to be given to either of two people who come along, according to the freedom of the servant to whom he entrusts this, how is he less actual or perfect than if, with only one person coming along, he ordered it to be given determinately to him? The potentiality that is repugnant to God's actuality and perfection is that which looks to an act that is either informative or entitative, of which He is supposed to have a lack; and thus, if created freedom, when it is said to determine God's concurrence, added to Him some perfection, either inherent or identified, it would certainly be an argument for imperfect divinity. But when it is said to be the cause why, of two effects outside God that God's will indifferently regards, one is posited rather than the other, what is added to God? What form or entity accrues to Him? He remains, of course, what He is, without yet understanding such a determination of

DISPUTATION IV

the created will. Furthermore, when it is said that God's concurrence, as being more perfect and more actual, must determine the potentiality of the created cause, if this is understood concerning the potentiality of the created cause to exist or not exist, and to have or not have all power and activity and prior application, this is true and undoubted among us. But if it is understood concerning the potentiality to act or not act, I respond by distinguishing: For God's concurrence must determine it in natural causes, which He wants to have a necessary inclination to act, but not in free causes, which He wants to be actively indifferent, that is, determiners of their own operation.

LX. Secondly, P. John of St. Thomas further proves that this way of speaking cannot be maintained because in indifferent and suspensive concurrence, or indeterminate concurrence, there is no greater connection with consent than with dissent. Therefore, although that indifference contributes to consent being seen as free, it does not contribute to the determination of the will to consent rather than dissent being seen, unless determined simultaneous concurrence is also seen. In this, he says, lies the hallucination of this opinion, that it tends only to what is required for the nature of freedom in consent, but not to what is required for consent to be determinately rather than dissent, which cannot in reality proceed from both concurrences offered to the will, because it is for consent and dissent, but from only one, namely from that which is for consent. Therefore, this must be seen rather than the other in that conditional object, if consent is determinately seen as future under the condition rather than dissent. This argument creates difficulty only because of obscurity and confused notions of things.

First of all, what he says about concurrence, which he supposes to be necessary so that consent rather than non-consent is determinately seen, must be understood concerning the will to concur. For concurrence in the second act is that very consent, and it is not something that is for God a reason for seeing consent, but it is that very thing whose free and determinate consequence is seen through Middle Knowledge, of which

DISPUTATION IV

this is the object: "If I wish to concur indeterminately or indifferently with the will of the people of Keilah for betrayal or non-betrayal in these circumstances, it will happen through their freedom that I concur determinately in betrayal." Hence, what he says about simultaneous concurrence, which is nothing other than concurrence in the second act identified with the action of created freedom, that it must be seen so that such an action is seen, is true; but it must be seen in the consequent of the hypothetical proposition, not in the antecedent, and it must not be seen as a reason for seeing such an action, but as something necessarily included in it and visible and knowable simultaneously with it, because it is or would be freely future from the hypothesis.

LXI. Now, that the will to concur indifferently does not have a greater connection with consent than with dissent is true, but what follows from this? Therefore, it does not contribute to the determination of the will to consent rather than to dissent being seen? I distinguish: it does not contribute alone, I concede the consequence; it does not contribute when joined with created freedom, which determines its indifference, I deny the consequence. I have already said that this is the object of Middle Knowledge: "If I wish to concur indifferently with the will of the people of Keilah, it will be the cause why I determinately concur in betrayal, not in the opposite act." Or what is the same, "If I offer them both concurrences, they will accept this one"; or, "If I give them the option of accepting or not accepting, they will actually accept and act, and there will not be pure omission."

LXII. And therefore there is no hallucination in us, but it all resides with the one arguing. First, because he seems to suppose that God's concurrence must be the reason why consent is determinately seen as going to follow, but this is false, whether concurrence is taken in the second act or in the first act. For if it is taken in the second act, that concurrence is the thing itself that is known, and if here we distinguished the objective reason for knowing and the thing known, which is the material object and the formal object, that concurrence would pertain to the ma-

DISPUTATION IV

terial object, not to the reason for knowing, or the formal object. But if concurrence is taken in the first act, for the decree to concur, its supposition is indeed a reason without which nothing can be known as conditionally and freely future, but it is not a reason for knowing this future rather than that; but neither is there any other such reason. For these freely future things, whether absolute or conditional, have nothing that is for them a reason why they are determinately seen, and therefore they are said to be seen in that presentness which they either have, if they are absolute, or would have, if they are conditional.

Secondly, he also hallucinates when he speaks of concurrence in the second act as of a cause from which consent proceeds, when he denies that consent can proceed from both concurrences offered to the will, but only from one, namely from that which is for consent. But consent proceeds neither from both nor from one, because it is identified with this one, but it proceeds from the decree to concur and from divine omnipotence applied through it. But if he contends that determined consent cannot proceed from a decree to concur indeterminately, this remains for him to prove, and by the same effort he will prove that the determined possession of this book cannot proceed from the indeterminate offering by which the seller offered this or that to the buyer; likewise, that the determined donation made to this poor person cannot proceed from the indeterminate legacy, by which this gift was bequeathed to this or another.

LXIII. This hallucination of the Adversary is revealed by another reasoning, which is objected to us.

Thirdly, so that consent under a condition is seen as determinately future, all causes without which it will not proceed in reality, once that condition is posited, must be seen... Therefore, that concurrence through which it will proceed, and with which it has commensuration, must be seen, that is, concurrence determined to assent. Where you see that under that antecedent before this conclusion, no other minor can be assumed than this: But that concurrence is a cause, which, as I have already

DISPUTATION IV

said, is false; and its falsity is proved from the following reasoning of the same author, by which he seems to destroy what he had begun to prove, when he says: And especially this is pressing because concurrent concurrence for consent is not distinct from the very operation by which the second cause influences its act, but in the object of conditional knowledge, the knowledge of the determinate influx of the created will must necessarily be reflected... Therefore, determinate concurrence must also be seen. For with this not seen, it is impossible to see determinate consent, because something is not seen on which it depends per se and with which it is identified. From this he concludes that determinate concurrence must be seen from the part of the condition, and as something pre-required proceeding from God: Therefore, he says, antecedently to knowledge and not subsequently, because the object precedes. In this discourse, it is amazing how many things are entangled, which seem to be said in a way that is not very philosophical.

LXIV. For 1. he says that this reason urges in confirmation of the superior one, when it is clear that it rather destroys it. For there he was assuming God's concurrence to be the cause through which consent would proceed; here he asserts that it is identified with the same consent. Hence it follows that it cannot be its cause. 2. From the fact that we suppose consent to be seen, he infers that determinate concurrence must be seen, because of the identity of both; and yet he wants concurrence to be seen from the part of the condition: therefore he must suppose that consent itself, or the influx of the will in its act, is seen from the part of the condition. Let him therefore compose, I ask, the conditional proposition, and put the operation by which the will influences its act from the part of the condition; what will emerge? It will thus have to be said: "If the will of the people of Keilah, placed in these circumstances, works its consent to handing over David, it will consent to the betrayal and will hand him over." Is this the object of knowledge? 3. Again he says that determinate consent cannot be seen without determinate concurrence because it depends on it and is identified with it. But nothing properly speaking de-

DISPUTATION IV

pendes on itself; how, therefore, does consent depend on concurrence, if it is identified with it? Or how is it identified if it depends? 4. What is it that he says, that determinate concurrence must be involved in the conditional object from the part of the condition, as something prerequisite proceeding from God and belonging to the part of the object? Therefore antecedently to knowledge, and not subsequently, because the object precedes? What, I ask, in the whole signification of the hypothetical proposition, behaves subsequently to knowledge? What does not belong to the part of the object? And therefore if what is the object behaves antecedently, what does not behave antecedently? But if the future itself that is signified in the consequent, which is also an object, behaves antecedently to knowledge, why will this causal statement be denied: "It is known because it is future"? These things sufficiently show that this reasoning was handled too carelessly to be able to bite anyone.

LXV. The sum of our doctrine and solution is that God's determinate concurrence, identified with the consent of the will, is known through Middle Knowledge as that which is hypothetically future, and therefore in the conditional proposition it belongs to the part of the consequent, to which also belongs the consent itself of the will. But from the part of the condition, that is, from the part of the antecedent of the same proposition, belongs the decree to concur indifferently, not the determinate concurrence itself, just as neither the consent with which it is identified. The sense of a proposition of this kind is not illative, and therefore what is the condition, or what is supposed in the antecedent, is not and should not be the objective reason for understanding the consequence of the consequent. Therefore, it is not necessary that it have a determinate connection with the consequent more than with its opposite. It signifies only the concomitance of both the consequent and the antecedent, with the free dependence of one on the other, concerning which concomitance and dependence nothing else is asserted than that it would be if the condition were posited. For asserting this, the truth that would be is sufficient, supposed in God an infinite power of understanding, to which it

DISPUTATION IV

pertains to attain not only what is in some difference of time, but also what would be.

LXVI. And as for what the Adversary says, that the arguments already made run, if the condition or antecedent does not have a determinate connection with the consequent, for it will be that God does not see all the determinate causes on which that consent depends; either he understands that those causes must be determinate in themselves, that is, certain, and in this sense we do not deny that they are determinate, for they are this, and that, and that; or he wants them to be determinate in relation to the effect, that is, determinately productive of this effect and not that one. And this, we say, is foreign to the concept of a free cause, whose nature is to be a determiner, not determined to produce this rather than that.

LXVII. What he also adds, that God will not see how the created will determines itself if He does not see how the divine will determines itself, on which the determination of the created depends, is in vain. The determination of the divine will is to concur indifferently. For since it was free for God to concur in this way or not to concur, He determines Himself to concur in a manner accommodated to created freedom, and on that determination of God depends the determination of the created will, which is to consent from the hypothesis, which is why God does not see the created determination without the uncreated, but He sees the created determination for consent, the uncreated for indifferent concurrence. But if the Adversary wishes to say that there cannot be a created determination for consent with uncreated indifference, this always remains for him to prove.

LXVIII. For what he finally objects, that it will be that created freedom determines God's concurrence from itself and out of itself, not participatively from God and from God's determinate concurrence, we deny that this follows. For what created freedom does not do except dependently on God, it does not do from itself and out of itself. But it does not determine God's concurrence except dependently on God; for if

DISPUTATION IV

there were not that decree of concurring, by which divine omnipotence is offered to the creature for either alternative, the will would do nothing and would determine nothing. Perhaps he wants to obtain that from the will of God, by which His power is efficaciously offered to created will for either of opposites, one of them determinately cannot depend, and therefore this is to be attributed only to the same will to which it is offered; and this we always deny. But if he only infers this, that in the concurrence of both principles to one determinate effect, although God is the cause of the fact that it happens, and indeed with a prior right than the created will, He is nevertheless not the cause why it happens rather than another; but this is rather to be attributed to the created will, we will not resist, because this is nothing other than saying that in God's concurrence with fire, although heat depends more on God than on fire, nevertheless the cause why heat rather than cold is produced is fire rather than God; and in God's concurrence with water, although cold depends more on God than on water, nevertheless the cause why cold rather than heat is produced is water rather than God—which, I ask, would seem absurd to whom? Namely, this which is to produce heat rather than cold involves two things: one positive, which is that heat is produced; the other negative, which is that cold is not produced. And similarly, this which is to produce cold rather than heat involves two things: that cold is produced, which is positive; that heat is not produced, which is negative. That positive in both examples is attributed entirely to God; the negative to the impotence of created causes. For the impotence of fire is the cause why God does not produce cold with it, and the similar impotence of water is the cause why He does not produce heat with it. What, therefore, the impotence of these causes does, so that the non-production of some effect is attributed to them, this does the freedom and dominion of the free cause in opposed acts, namely that the non-production of one is attributed to it, which is that it itself is the cause why one is produced rather than another.

DISPUTATION IV

LXIX. And this is that shower of projectiles by which we were to be overwhelmed, had not suitable solutions averted the tempest. There is, however, one projectile from so great a number, which the Adversary, when he saw it would be turned back on himself, tried to evade. Namely, it seems to him an arduous and difficult business to constitute the object of conditional knowledge according to our opinion, so that the connection of the consequent with the antecedent is not ridiculous. For it is necessary that from the part of the condition, determinate concurrence be involved, which being supposed, to infer that a determinate effect will follow from it is so obvious that God in this matter can scarcely know more than children, for this is the appearance of this knowledge: "If I call Peter, and I have concurrence identified with or simultaneously existing with his consent, his consent will be given." With this established, he presses thus: What is so useless? Therefore we attribute to God knowledge that even children have, which pertains to simple and necessary knowledge? This difficulty, however, which as can be understood from what has been said, is nonexistent in the opinion we defend, seems conceived only against the doctrine of our Adversaries. For they themselves admit conditional knowledge of free acts future from a hypothesis, the object of which they must so constitute that from the part of the condition is supposed everything without which it is impossible for that which is said to be future to follow. And because it is impossible for anything to be future without the will to concur, that must be posited from the part of the condition. Again, because the will to concur indifferently, as they indeed want, is in vain, the will to concur determinately to assent, for example, and not to dissent, must be posited. Again, because the will to concur determinately is the will to predetermine physically, this will have to be supposed from the part of the condition. Let the object of that divine knowledge be constituted now, and let it be said: "If the people of Keilah are placed in such circumstances, and I wish to concur determinately with them for the betrayal of David, and not for the opposite act, there will be betrayal." With this supposed, who would not retort: What is

DISPUTATION IV

so useless? Therefore we shall attribute to God knowledge that even children have, which pertains to simple and necessary knowledge? And this, moreover, must be added: What need is there for a present and actual decree of God, so that this may be known? Cannot it also be known without it?

But indeed they admit such conditional knowledge by which what is to be done by created freedom is not so much seen as what is to be done by uncreated freedom from a hypothesis. And if one wishes to know what object of conditional knowledge is constituted by them, it is to be conceived thus: "If David remains in Keilah, it will be that God predetermines the people of Keilah to betrayal, and that from that predetermination betrayal follows." And this is future by virtue of the present decree by which God says, "I will, if David remains in Keilah with Saul approaching, concur determinately with the people of Keilah for betrayal, not for non-betrayal." In this way, God knows His will to concur from that hypothesis, that determinate and predetermining one, and from it again the future betrayal.

LXX. And thus, what in this knowledge exceeds children's comprehension by no means pertains to the knowledge of human acts future from a hypothesis. For what child would not see that from a conditional predefinition, or predefining and predetermining will, that which has been predefined and predetermined will follow? But it pertains only to the knowledge of God's free act conditionate on the part of the object, when it is said, "If David remains in Keilah, it will be that God predetermines the people of Keilah to betray him."

Again, when they make those conditional propositions composed of a double consequent, so that there is understood first in God the will to concur determinately from the hypothesis, which will is to predefine and predetermine; secondly, there will be in man the predefined act; I accept the simple conditional, consisting only of the former part of the consequent, which is thus: "If David remains in Keilah, there will be a predetermination of the will of the people of Keilah to betray him."

DISPUTATION IV

Here I say from the part of the condition or antecedent, everything that is necessary for the consequent to follow must be posited, and according to the thoughts of the Adversaries, something is necessary that has a determinate connection with the same consequent. And since that consequent is that a predetermination will be future, and nothing can have a determinate connection with it except the present and actual decree of positing it, that must be involved from the part of the condition, and it must be said: "Supposing the decree that I have to predetermine the people of Keilah to betrayal if David remains with them, there will be, if he remains, that predetermination." In this object there are two things, one of which pertains to the knowledge of vision, namely, that there is in God that actual decree which is supposed; the other is the object of conditional knowledge, namely, that from that hypothesis the predetermination of the people of Keilah will follow. Which consequence, how does it not pertain to simple and necessary knowledge, as the adversary objected, and therefore what does God see through conditional knowledge, insofar as it is conditional and distinguished from absolute knowledge of vision, that children cannot see?

LXXI. The Adversary responds that the reason is different, and the argument is effective against us, not against them, who do not put God's concurrence, whether simultaneous or predeterminative, or even God's efficacious decree by which He wants not only such an act to follow, but also to follow with its freedom, as a condition, nor from the part of the conditional object, but as a medium or formal reason, which God uses to know that conditional object infallibly in it. For example, in the case of the Tyrians, that which has the nature of an object as an effect is only conversion; the condition is the preaching of Christ; and from these two that conditional object, which is contingent, is integrated. Against this response, I first ask, does the Adversary want that by changing only the Authors, the nature of opinions is changed; and a proposition which is true when uttered by him becomes false when we pronounce the same? Whose, I ask, is that proposition which was adduced a little earlier, that

DISPUTATION IV

for consent to be seen under a condition, all causes without which it will not proceed in reality once that condition is posited must be seen? Whose also is that one, that all determinate causes on which consent depends must be seen? And that one, that something must be seen from the part of the condition that has a determinate connection with future consent, and therefore an indifferent and suspensive concurrence is not sufficient? And that one, that under the conditional state, consent must be seen as so determinately future that only the purification of the condition is lacking for it to pass into the absolute? And that one, that these must be seen from the part of the condition and as something prerequired proceeding from God and antecedently? Is the preaching of Christ all the causes without which the conversion of the Tyrians will not proceed? Is it a determinate cause, or does it have a determinate connection with that conversion? Will the mere purification of the condition, or the positing of that preaching, suffice for the conversion to become absolutely future? Since, therefore, predetermination also pertains to the nature of cause with respect to that conversion, and is the only thing that both has itself a determinate connection with it and gives it to preaching and other causes, and without which no purification of the condition would suffice for the conversion to be future, who can doubt that it must be seen from the part of the condition, and as something prerequired?

LXXII. Then I also ask how these things cohere: that God's concurrence, even predeterminative, is not posited from the part of the conditional object, and yet is the medium and formal reason in which that conditional object is seen? For what, I ask, is more an object than the medium and formal reason in which something is known? But if this is predeterminative concurrence, why is it not posited from the part of the object? Namely, we must attend not so much to what we ourselves express through that speech by which we signify conditional knowledge, as to what is presented to God having that knowledge. But who would deny that the medium in which He sees something, and which is the cause why what He sees will be future, is presented to Him? But if it is presented,

DISPUTATION IV

therefore it is an object; and because it cannot be except from the part of the antecedent or from the part of the consequent, it must therefore be reduced to one or the other. But it cannot be to the part of the consequent; therefore it must be reduced to the part of the antecedent. And thus the object of conditional knowledge in the contrary opinion must necessarily be formed in such a way: "I have a decree from which would follow in the Tyrians a predetermination to conversion, if the Gospel were preached to them; and if there were predetermination, both conversion would follow," or, "I have a decree from which both the predetermination of the Tyrians would follow and thence conversion," or, "From the supposition of the decree that now exists, and of the preaching that could be, the predetermination of the Tyrians would follow, and from the predetermination, conversion." All these amount to the same thing, and whether we want it or not, they must be conceived by us in this way, if we conceive what is. Nor does it matter that we ourselves truncate the speech, cutting off words that signify God's decree and predetermination. Because we cannot therefore truncate God's knowledge, or subtract from it the object in which He sees the future effect, and without which He cannot see. But with that decree and predeterminative concurrence expressed, the consequence, says P. John of St. Thomas, is necessary, and the conditional is rendered necessary, and pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence. What, therefore, is free in such knowledge of God is the knowledge by which He is conscious of His present decree; but the consequence to the future conversion of the Tyrians from that hypothesis no more pertains to the knowledge of vision than the consequence of the future day from the hypothetically future light of the sun.

§ III. INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

LXXIII. From the numerous inconveniences of Middle Knowledge, and these of no small importance, Father John of St. Thomas col-

DISPUTATION IV

lects the more serious ones. The first is that through Middle Knowledge, the path is paved to those two positions that the Semi-Pelagians held regarding the beginning and the end or perseverance of justification, and all the arguments of Augustine and Catholics against them in this matter are weakened. He proves this by recounting the errors of the Semi-Pelagians, because through Middle Knowledge something is offered to the divine vision that has sufficient goodness to be able to move God to give grace. Given this, there is no foundation for denying that God used such a motive in giving grace, which is what the Semi-Pelagians wanted. And he demonstrates that it makes no difference whether this "something" is only conditionally future, or whether it is future dependently on grace. For from this perspective, this doctrine does not differ from the doctrine of the Semi-Pelagians. And this pertains to the beginning of justification. Now concerning perseverance, the same is similarly demonstrated. Because from the doctrine of Middle Knowledge, it follows that there is no gift which, insofar as it descends from God alone, is such that it cannot be lost or retained by human will. And since it does not have infallibility of causality as it precisely descends from God, it remains that it has only infallibility of direction and disposition from presupposed foreknowledge. This, however, is exactly what St. Augustine wished to avoid in the Semi-Pelagians. This is the summary of what is more extensively discussed by this author.

LXXIV. But from what we have said previously about the doctrine of the Semi-Pelagians, it is evident that these inconveniences are imaginary. For when he says that through Middle Knowledge something is offered to the divine vision that can move him to give grace, it is true that something is offered that can move in the manner of a final cause. And if this favors the Semi-Pelagians too much, St. Thomas is guilty, who explicitly teaches that the foreseen use of grace is the reason for conferring grace, according to the nature of a final cause. Also guilty will be anyone who admits in God the knowledge of simple intelligence. For what Middle Knowledge does when it represents the good use of grace

DISPUTATION IV

hypothetically future, this very same thing is also done by the knowledge of simple intelligence when it represents the same use as possible, and even as future on the hypothesis of predefinition. Let there be, I say, on one hand, Middle Knowledge representing the conversion of the Tyrians as future under the hypothesis of grace; let there be on the other, the knowledge of simple intelligence representing the same conversion as possible and as future under the hypothesis of predefinition. Who does not see that the same good is represented in both cases? And consequently, just as God can be moved to will to give grace because of the good represented through Middle Knowledge, so also can he be moved to conceive predefinition because of that same good represented through the knowledge of simple intelligence. Therefore, both we and our Adversaries are under the common necessity of confessing that both predestination and predefinitions of good acts, and any decree of giving grace, are preceded by knowledge in God which represents some good on the part of humans, because of which God can decree what he decrees. This, however, is to represent a good that moves God in the manner of an end. And since the Semi-Pelagians should not be considered to have erred in that in which we perceive truth, it remains that their proper error was that they admitted a foreknowledge whereby some human good was represented to God, achieved by the powers of nature and excluding special help, by which he could be moved to give grace in the manner of an efficient moral cause, namely meritorious in some way, or impetrating. This cause differs from the final cause in that the latter invites to its acquisition, while the former, as already acquired and obtained, demands the gift of something else by a certain right of its own. The final cause, by the very fact that it is to be acquired, both can and should depend on and be effected by those means to whose application it moves, and consequently by divine grace if it is an act pertaining to salvation. The efficient cause, by the very fact that it is already supposed to be acquired, obtained, and existing, is understood to be independent and unsuitable to be further caused by anything, especially by its own effect, since mutual causality in

DISPUTATION IV

the same genus of cause is by no means to be admitted. Therefore, it is repugnant that the merit should depend on the same grace to whose donation it moves.

LXXV. Hence it is clear that what the Adversary assumes is by no means true, that by admitting Middle Knowledge, the arguments by which Augustine and other Fathers pressed the Semi-Pelagians are weakened. For those arguments all aimed to establish that grace is necessary to precede the beginnings of faith. But this entire necessity persists even if it is said that good use is foreseen conditionally, and can move in the manner of an end, and indeed does move as has already been said. And therefore, that foreknowledge of human merits which the Semi-Pelagians were thrusting forward was absolute, as shown before, which presented merits already existing that obtained grace. The consequence was that they said such merits were independent of divine grace, and thus they were beaten by Catholics in all the ways by which the necessity of grace is proven. To this error they added foolishness, according to Augustine, when, where pre-existing merits were lacking, they thought conditional merits had the same force, although it is manifestly clear that these are unsuitable to move in any way except in the nature of an end. Nor do I press this point, although it is true that they thought these conditional merits were independent of divine grace, because even with that error removed, their insanity would be no less, since it would follow that the principle of merit would fall under merit. For they would say that merits conditionally future move in the genus of efficient moral cause to give the same grace on which they depend, thus causing the grace by which they are caused.

LXXVI. And from this I finally infer that, since the Semi-Pelagians abused absolute foreknowledge more than Middle Knowledge, and it is easier to convict the abuse of Middle Knowledge than of absolute foreknowledge because the absurdity of one is more evident than the other, if the defenders of Middle Knowledge are thought to favor the Semi-Pelagians, the defenders of absolute foreknowledge should be con-

DISPUTATION IV

sidered to favor them more, since they pave a smoother and less impeded way. And conversely, just as no one thinks that absolute foreknowledge should be denied lest it favor them, so neither should it be thought that Middle Knowledge should be denied.

LXXVII. Concerning perseverance, we deny what the Adversary assumes, that the Semi-Pelagians erred in saying that there is no gift of perseverance which, insofar as it descends from God alone, is such that it cannot be lost or retained by human will, and that it does not have infallibility of causality as it precisely descends from God, that is, excluding conditional foreknowledge. And again, we deny that there is any word either in Prosper, or in Hilary, or in Augustine himself, by which that "insofar as" and that "precisely" are implied, just as nowhere is implied the exclusion of conditional knowledge contributing to giving infallibility to the grace necessary for perseverance. Their proper error was to deny the grace necessary for perseverance, as we previously reported from Augustine saying, "This faith, both to begin to have it and to persevere in it to the end, **THEY CONTEND IS OURS, AS IF WE DO NOT RECEIVE IT FROM THE LORD.**" But if some gift of God were to be acknowledged in it, they said it was due to the merit of free will, as Hilary clearly testifies: "What your Holiness says, that no one perseveres except by receiving the virtue of perseverance, they accept in this sense: that to whom it is given, although they are inactive, **IT IS ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR PRECEDING FREE WILL**, which they assert is free only to this extent, that it wills or does not will to receive medicine." And soon after: "But they do not want perseverance to be preached in such a way that it cannot either **BE MERITED BY SUPPLICATION** or be contumaciously lost." Where that phrase "merited by supplication" is to be interpreted as said in the same sense in which they said we obtain the first grace by asking, knocking, seeking, all of which efforts of the will they said were independent of grace, as we reported earlier. For that we can obtain and merit in this non-condign way the gift of perseverance by those prayers and pious works which proceed from grace, Catholics also

DISPUTATION IV

confess. Hence what Hilary adds, "Nor do they wish to be led to the uncertainty of the will of God, where, as far as they think, for obtaining or losing, the beginning of the will, whatever it is, is evident to them." Namely, as in faith, so also in perseverance, they thought that our will begins, but divine grace follows. What wonder then if, when they thus subjected the gift of perseverance to the contingency of human will, they resisted Augustine saying that not only is perseverance to the end a gift of God, but such a gift that human freedom cannot lose it, and in opposition they established that whatever gift is given to the predestined, we can both lose and retain it by our own will? Namely distinguishing proper will and also human will from that accepted and flowing from divine grace. How Middle Knowledge paves the way for these errors, neither can I see, nor can the Adversary prove. Rather, it is clear that it paves the way for Augustine's doctrine, while it suggests a reason by which the gift of perseverance can be said not to be able to be lost by human will. For that Augustine is to be interpreted so that that phrase "cannot be lost" indicates consequent necessity, and in some way depending on the supposition of free determination, is proven by the decree of Trent and the sense of the whole Catholic Church concerning the resistibility of free will against the efficacy of grace.

LXXVIII. That this may be understood more clearly, it must be noted that the gift of perseverance in most people involves two things. First, the efficacious grace of internal inspiration to overcome the temptations that occur in mortal danger. Second, the grace of external protection, consisting in the fact that this victory happens to be followed by death itself, with God disposing all things thus. For if either were lacking, it would not be the gift of perseverance. Since, therefore, the first can fail through one's own will, because that consent of the will is free, and the inspiration can be rejected according to the Council of Trent, it follows that, speaking absolutely, it must be admitted that at least in most cases the gift of perseverance can be lost through one's own will. Therefore, when it is asserted by Augustine that it cannot be lost, it should not be

DISPUTATION IV

taken universally as if the sense were absolute. It is therefore true only from some supposition depending in some way on free will, which since it cannot be unknown to God, lest he be thought to be ignorant of the quality of his own gift, and since it is known only through Middle Knowledge, it follows that Middle Knowledge confirms Augustine's doctrine against the Semi-Pelagians, and destroys the Semi-Pelagians' doctrine against Augustine.

LXXIX. From this it is further understood how that statement of Augustine is not contradicted, in which he says that perseverance is given only by him who predestined us to his kingdom and glory. For although free will contributes to the infallibility of the effect of that inspiration which I mentioned, because this would be of no use, nor would it be the gift of perseverance, unless death made that victory eternal; therefore this gift is to be attributed to God alone, who alone also has our times in his hands. Likewise, because free will contributes only to this, that this victory is hypothetically future; but it is God alone who, as they say, purifies the condition, and makes what was only hypothetically future, to be absolutely future as well. Finally because he alone is the Author of that gratuitous predestination, which although most Catholics deny, and need not necessarily be admitted to avoid Semi-Pelagianism, nevertheless it is more probable that it is Augustinian and true. That therefore is the cause and origin of that conjunction and concurrence of death with the good state of the dying, in which precisely the good of perseverance is placed, which therefore is to be referred ultimately to that election alone, which so employed these means by which one perseveres, that it would have employed others if these had failed.

LXXX. And thus finally is solved that other point, in which Father John of St. Thomas thinks that Middle Knowledge is favorable to the Semi-Pelagians, namely that they said that God predestined to his kingdom those whom he foreknew would end their life well under the help of grace itself. For that they said "under the help of grace itself" clearly shows that they abused the foreknowledge of merits even of those

DISPUTATION IV

which depended on God's help. But such are the merits which are said by us to be conditionally foreknown. Therefore from this perspective, we seem to differ in nothing from the Semi-Pelagians. But here first the good faith of the Adversary must be appealed to, who thinks that what Prosper attributes to Catholic writers is said of the Semi-Pelagians, although Prosper's words are clear: "We also ask you to demonstrate by bearing with our ignorance how that is refuted which, after reviewing the opinions of earlier writers on this matter, the opinion of almost all is found to be the same and unified, in which they understood the purpose and predestination of God according to foreknowledge: that because of this God made some vessels of honor, others of contempt, because he foresaw the end of each, and under the help of grace itself, he foreknew in what will and action each would be." This, says Father John of St. Thomas, Prosper says about the Semi-Pelagians. But both Prosper and Hilary, when speaking of the Semi-Pelagians, speak of them as of people present, and they do not review the opinions of earlier times, they who think they are announcing new things almost unknown to Augustine. But because the Semi-Pelagians were attacking Augustine's doctrine on the grounds that it was new and alien to the ancient Fathers, as is clear from what was previously narrated by Prosper, when he says that the people of Marseilles objected that none of the ecclesiastical writers had ever understood the words of the Apostle to the Romans about the manifestation of divine grace preventing the merits of the Elect, as Augustine had understood them; the same Prosper, towards the end of the Epistle, while gathering what he wants to be explained by Augustine, also proposes to be refuted what, from the common, as it seemed, opinion of ancient Fathers about predestination from foreknowledge of good final outcome, could be opposed to his opinion, which placed predestination before such foreknowledge. And this, says the Adversary, he says about the Semi-Pelagians, involving Ambrose, Jerome, Chrysostom, and other Holy Fathers in the same cloak as the Semi-Pelagians. But suppose that those who thought thus were Semi-Pelagians. What follows against Middle Knowledge, and

DISPUTATION IV

not rather against absolute foreknowledge? For that foreknowledge of good final outcome which they placed before the divine purpose was absolute, as has often been shown. Therefore, if any is to be said to pave the way for them, let it be said to be absolute rather than conditional foreknowledge. Meanwhile, it should be noted in passing the difference between the ancient Fathers and the Semi-Pelagians, whom I have already shown to have denied the grace necessary for perseverance, while the ancient Fathers said that a good death, by which the gift of perseverance is completed, happens only under the help of grace itself.

LXXXI. The second inconvenience is that through Middle Knowledge, the way is paved to affirm that predestination is made according to foreknowledge of the good use of free will, and from foreseen merits of human will. In this matter he thinks Molina to be very entangled and unable to extricate himself, sometimes even stumbling, unmindful of himself. I am not here treating Molina's cause, nor reducing the common doctrine to his peculiar views, if he has any, although at this point I have no doubt that a man of his intellect and erudition would easily escape from these snares, and not stumble on level ground. That predestination is made according to foreknowledge of the good use of free will anticipated by divine grace, and from foreseen merits which human will, cooperating with the same grace, will have acquired, I first deny that this is such an inconvenience among most Catholic Doctors, both ancient and modern, that there is no greater in the contrary doctrine of the Thomists. And I have as a guarantor of this opinion a Thomist of the first magnitude, Dominic Soto, who says that the authors of predestination after foreseen works do not deviate from the truth in this sense, namely that "God establishes to bestow glory on account of works which come from the grace of God." In this sense, he explicitly professes that it can be correctly said that "the foreknowledge of good works, which are present in God's eternity, is the cause for God of predestination." But if the foreknowledge of merits prior to predestination is understood to be that which represents merits independent of grace, this

DISPUTATION IV

indeed was the error of the Semi-Pelagians, but one which Middle Knowledge favors less than absolute foreknowledge, as has often been said, and must be said more often, since the Adversary does not cease to inculcate a thing never proven, namely that Middle Knowledge is that which Prosper proposes to Augustine as the cause of predestination according to the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians, even in that very passage, in which not the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians, but of the more ancient Fathers is reported, where Molina may have seemed to him to have stumbled, where he himself could seem to have fallen.

LXXXII. But if that doctrine should be suspect, whether it places grace before merits or not, why is the way paved to it through Middle Knowledge and not rather through absolute foreknowledge? For it does not need Middle Knowledge to reconcile the freedom of salvation or perdition with divine predestination; but it does especially need absolute foreknowledge, which places merits before predestination as absolutely future. And so, to briefly sum up the solution to his long and confused argumentation, I say that predestination posterior to the absolute foreknowledge of merits independent of divine grace is erroneous, and renders suspect any doctrine that seems to have a necessary connection with it. But I add that the Adversary has neither proven yet, nor will prove hereafter, that Middle Knowledge has any necessary connection with that opinion; therefore it is unjustly brought under suspicion on that account. Next I say that predestination posterior to the absolute foreknowledge of merits necessarily dependent on divine grace is blameless, even on the authority of the Thomists themselves. And yet I add that there is no one who can take from Middle Knowledge a necessary occasion for defending it. Thirdly, I say that predestination prior to the absolute foreknowledge of merits necessarily dependent on divine grace is more probable, because it seems more conformable to the Scriptures, to Augustine, and to the more approved Scholastics. And I add that Middle Knowledge by no means compels one to embrace it, but greatly helps, because it far better and more distinctly preserves those privileges which

DISPUTATION IV

seem to be contrary to each other, both of grace and of created freedom, which in the opposite opinion, that is, in that which both rejects Middle Knowledge and places predestination before the foresight of merits, are inexplicable, and demand blind faith, just like the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as we reported earlier from our Adversaries. Hence I do not deny that they have consulted both themselves and universal Theology well, and have deserved extremely well of the Catholic cause, who have proposed predestination as posterior to the conditional foreknowledge of merits, that is, to Middle Knowledge, but prior to absolute foreknowledge.

LXXXIII. Against this manner of philosophizing, Father John of St. Thomas briefly collects the inconvenience which he has long pursued against Molina, "That the whole reason of predestination insofar as it is predestination, that is, special providence, is taken from us, and from our foreseen good use as from cause and reason, whence it also follows that at least in itself, it is not repugnant that it be taken as foreseen merit, if indeed it is taken as the reason of predestination itself, for this, that it be special providence." Here the author supposes from St. Thomas that predestination is special providence, which differs from common providence in that from common providence the order to an end follows certainly and infallibly, but not the event itself or the attainment of the end, which is sometimes impeded by other intervening causes. And thus it pertains to the common providence of all men to be ordained to attaining beatitude, which nevertheless many do not attain, either through their own fault or that of others. But from predestination, which is special providence, not only does the ordination of men to an end follow certainly and infallibly, but also the event, or the end itself, that is, beatitude follows certainly and infallibly. Therefore, he now says that from our manner of philosophizing it follows that that infallible connection of predestination by which it properly becomes predestination, and contracts common providence, is to be sought from our foreseen good use as from cause and reason, contrary to what St. Thomas thinks, who considers it wrong to say "Predesti-

DISPUTATION IV

nation adds nothing to the certainty of providence except the certainty of foreknowledge, as if it were said that God ordains the predestined to salvation just as he does anyone else, but of this predestined person, he knows that he will not fail of salvation. For in saying this, it would not be said that the predestined differs from the non-predestined on the part of the order, but only on the part of the foreknowledge of the event, and thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, nor would predestination be through the election of the predestinator." Hence he concludes that besides the certainty of foreknowledge, the order of predestination with infallible certainty must be admitted.

LXXXIV. But which of these, I ask, is not preserved in this opinion which we defend? Besides that will which pertains to common providence by which God wills all men to be saved, between Middle Knowledge and absolute foreknowledge of good final outcome, cannot there be posited an efficacious and absolute will certainly and infallibly connected with the salvation of the predestined? Is it denied that such a will pertains to the reprobate? And consequently, does not the predestined differ from the non-predestined by it? Is it not consequently discriminatory of one from another, and thus by election? Can it therefore be said of him who is thus predestined, that God ordains him to salvation just like anyone else? Is not the same will the cause why infallible means of the intended salvation are chosen and applied? And consequently, does not this predestination add to common providence and the certainty of Middle Knowledge which it presupposes, the relation of cause which St. Thomas requires? In what sense, then, will foreknowledge be said to be the cause of this predestination? If they understand absolute foreknowledge, as St. Thomas undoubtedly understands, absolute foreknowledge is posterior to this predestination. If conditional foreknowledge, it is now clear that through it nothing is exhibited to the divine vision on the part of men that impels to predestining in the manner of an efficient moral cause, which alone St. Thomas excludes. For that something is represented which allures in the manner of an end, insofar as with the goodness of

DISPUTATION IV

the end is understood and invites to predestining the very opportuneness of the means, St. Thomas is our authority not to fear this foreknowledge, lest the benefit of gratuitous predestination be diminished, as was seen before. Nor can it be otherwise.

LXXXV. For how do you want God to intend some good, without being moved both by its loveliness, and by the suitability of the causes from which it is to arise? Since therefore he wants to give glory infallibly as a crown to this predestined person, and cannot give it except through merits, who can prevent him from being pleased not only with the glory itself which he wants to give, but also with the graces which he understands are infallibly connected with merits, and with the merits themselves, as infallibly future from the hypothesis of graces? And who can prevent that this entire knowledge is required to render this mode of predestination possible? But who also does not see that these things are very different and must be carefully distinguished: that the futurity of merits so pleases as to render glory lovable, and that glory so pleases as to render the futurity of merits lovable? For we assert the latter, and we say this is what St. Thomas signified when he says that "the good use of grace foreseen is the reason for conferring grace according to the nature of final cause." But we deny the former, and we say this is what it means for the use of grace foreseen to be the reason for predestination according to the nature of an efficient cause. For this moral efficiency of merit consists in the fact that while it demands that what one merits be posited, it consequently renders that lovable to the rewarder; and so if merits conditionally future were to concur in the manner of an efficient cause, they would make the glory which they merit lovable to God, whereas on the contrary they themselves are not loved otherwise than on account of glory previously loved.

LXXXVI. What the Adversary says, therefore, that in this opinion which we defend "the whole reason of predestination insofar as it is predestination is taken from us, and from our foreseen good use as from cause and reason," must be precisely denied. Nothing else follows except

DISPUTATION IV

that from us and from our conditionally future good use something is taken that is necessary for the possibility of this mode of predestination. But given that possibility, we say that God's will to predestine or not to predestine is most free and supremely indifferent, and to predestine this one but not that one, whose predestination is equally possible. In this equilibrium, we deny that one side is preponderant by any merit of men, or that there is any other reason which inclines God, than that which is covered by the depth of the riches of his wisdom and knowledge, and incomprehensible judgments. For just as the very perfection and goodness of human beatitude is not so desirable to God that it determines his freedom, so neither will the usefulness of conditionally future merits, that is, of suitable means, which has no desirability except from the loveliness of the end, determine it.

LXXXVII. Nor did Molina intend anything else in those passages which are attacked by the Adversary when he denies that "there is given a reason for predestination on our part, even though there is given a reason for foreknowledge." Namely, because this which is conditionally future merit is the reason why it is known to be future, and consequently is also some reason why this mode of predestination is possible, which without such foreknowledge could not exist at all. But what is some reason why some free act is possible in God, cannot be said also to be a reason and cause why that act exists. Since, given that possibility, there still remains intact and full freedom for the opposite. However, what is said to be the reason why there is foreknowledge, can also be said to be the reason or condition without which there would not be this mode of predestination, since being itself presupposes possibility. And to that extent we approve what Molina said, "That that decree and that providence have been given the nature of predestination, depended on it as on a condition without which it would not be, namely on that on which foreknowledge depends, which is, that the good use of grace, and therefore merit, will be future *ex hypothesi*." At which words, as if they contained a manifest confession of error, Father John of St. Thomas exclaims, "What further

DISPUTATION IV

need have we of witnesses? Behold the reason or condition of predestination is the good use of free will," and all but the Jews respond, "He is guilty of death." But what if it be a common crime, and the same accusation presses both Molina and the Thomists at this point? How could even the Thomists themselves deny that human freedom is some reason without which there could not be, and therefore without which there is not, that mode of predestination which we suppose? How likewise could they deny that that condition is the conditionally future merits of men? Can God intend someone's crown without knowing that the merits by which it is owed are possible? Can he also do so without knowing that they will be future from the hypothesis of his predefinition? Therefore that foreknowledge both of possibles and of futures from the hypothesis of predefinition of merits is a condition without which there cannot be in God that predestination. And consequently this which is that merits will be future from the hypothesis of predefinition, will be something which, if removed, implies that the predestination which we have spoken of could not be. Again, predefinition in the opinion of the Thomists is not the total cause of merit, but has another cause subordinated to it, namely the free will of the creature. Therefore what is said to be future merit from a hypothesis is not future from the hypothesis of predefinition only, but also of free will. Therefore free will contributes something to this which is that this merit be future. Therefore also to all that which would not be, unless merit were thus future, of which kind is that mode of predestination which we have spoken of.

LXXXVIII. Furthermore, that it may be clear what was Molina's sense, it is appropriate to report what he says in the cited passage: "This must be greatly noted, that it is quite different to ask, whether, with the full foreknowledge pre-existing in God of the quality of the use of free will future in whatever order of things, of which we have spoken until now, the eternal predestination of God on the part of the will was in this sense according to the foreknowledge of the use of free will future, as if on account of the quality or because of the quality of the foreseen use,

DISPUTATION IV

God established either to distribute his helps and gifts in one way or another, or to predestine these rather than those; and to ask, whether of that foreknowledge there is given some reason or rather condition on the part of the quality of future use, without which it would not have pre-existed in God; as if although predestination was not made because of the foreknowledge of the quality of foreseen use, nevertheless it was made not without such foreknowledge, and as if account was taken of the quality of the use of future will: not indeed so that it would be in any way the measure or quasi-measure of God's gifts, even as a condition which being foreseen they would be conferred, and which not being foreseen they would be denied, but as of that on which just as in time it depended that an adult with these or those helps and gifts in particular would arrive or not arrive at eternal life, so also it depended that the will of helping him and providing through these same helps and gifts would have the nature either of predestination or of providence only to beatitude." And in the former sense, he immediately adds, "PREDESTINATION IS NOT ACCORDING TO THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE QUALITY OF THE USE OF FREE WILL." But in the latter sense, he thus concludes: "In the second sense explained, the predestination of adults was according to the foreknowledge of the good use of free will, and God had account of it in the explained manner in predestining them." What the Adversary says, that Cassian also did not think otherwise than that divine grace and predestination depend on the good use of free will, than as on some condition or occasion, it is easy to see what occasion or condition he understood, namely one independent of divine grace and positively conducive to it, and absolutely pre-existing. For these propositions of his are well known: "Through some right act and good will, we can from ourselves somehow be prepared for grace, so that the motion of the Holy Spirit is sometimes preceded by our will. Some beginning of penitence, or purpose of changing life, or counsel of returning to God, is from ourselves. Some motion of faith begins from us. God's

DISPUTATION IV

grace is sometimes preceded by our prayers." And other things of this kind, the antidote to which is found in the Observations on Cassian.

LXXXIX. The third inconvenience which Father John of St. Thomas urges consists in this, that it follows from our doctrine of Middle Knowledge that God does not foresee what is to be done by us in his predestination: not only as regards conditional futures, but not even as regards absolutes. For it suffices only the decree of purifying the condition under which something was foreknown to be future. But that this is absurd, he proves by many arguments. That no absolute future can be seen by God without some prior decree of his, and that most free. For that is required to purify the condition, as the Adversaries say that such a decree alone suffices for whatever was foreknown through Middle Knowledge to be future from a hypothesis to be seen as absolutely future, which implies a contradiction, and that what was future from a hypothesis, by the very fact alone that the hypothesis is absolutely posited, is not also absolutely future. That in reality, however, there is not only in God a decree of purifying the condition or of absolutely positing the hypothesis from which the good merits of the predestined were to follow, but there is an efficacious decree which certainly and infallibly tends to the reward of those merits, from which then follows the decree of positing the hypothesis foreknown to be infallible with respect to such an end; or what is equivalent, there is in God a decree which is carried to that condition to be purified, not in any way, but insofar as it has an infallible connection with glory; and thus God sees differently the glory of those to be saved, and the punishments of the reprobate. For he sees the punishments of the reprobate in the decree or through the decree of purifying the hypothesis taken materially and specifically: because God has not chosen it either from the intention of damning or as infallibly connected with damnation, which to him always displeased antecedently and absolutely. But the glory of those to be saved and also their merits he sees in the decree, or through the decree of purifying the hypothesis formally and reduplicatively: insofar as it is certainly and infallibly connected with the event

DISPUTATION IV

which God intends. And this is more than enough for the mind of Augustine and others, who suppose that the reason for absolute foreknowledge is to be sought from predestination.

XC. Fr. John of St. Thomas separately proposes these inconveniences and demonstrates that they diminish: 1. God's omnipotence, 2. His supreme liberty, 3. His supreme providence, which is independent of anything outside Himself, since free determinations in the conditional state are removed from His jurisdiction, 4. His supreme dominion over creatures under whatever state they are considered. He proves all these with a single argument. Given that God, through this Middle Knowledge, sees that Peter will be seized with fear in the courtyard of Caiaphas and will deny Christ if the servant girl questions him, and that the people of Keilah would betray David if he remained with them when Saul arrived: the divine will either can or cannot, given that condition with all its circumstances, will that Peter not fear and that the people of Keilah not betray him. If God can will this, then that knowledge was not infallible, since it is clear that God's will would falsify it. If God cannot will this, then God's power, freedom, dominion, and providence are undermined. The solution to this argument has already been indicated, and I answer again: When it is asked whether, given that condition with all its circumstances, God can still will that Peter not fear and the people of Keilah not wish to betray David, it is the same as asking whether, supposing that God does not will something, He can nevertheless still will it. For one of the circumstances is that God does not efficaciously will the opposite; likewise, that He wills that the will of Peter and the people of Keilah be in the hand of their own counsel, and although one option is more pleasing to God than another, that they themselves be the cause of why one is chosen over the other. Therefore, the question is whether, on the hypothesis that God wills in this way, He can will otherwise. The answer is easily given: He cannot. And I add that those who think this cannot be denied without injury to divine power, providence, freedom, and dominion, are binding divine perfections to chimeras.

DISPUTATION IV

XCI. You will object first: What is possible for the created will is possible for God. But in that moment of reason in which there is Middle Knowledge of Peter's future fear, before any decree or decision of the divine will, it is possible for Peter's created will to fear or not to fear. Therefore, this same possibility exists for God, and it remains possible as long as it is possible for the creature. Therefore, it cannot become impossible merely from a created supposition, without some supposition of the divine will, unless it does injury to those divine attributes we have mentioned. I answer: This argument does not prove what has been denied. For what we deny is that it is possible for God, on the hypothesis that He wills something in one way, to not will it in the same way. On the hypothesis that He does not will antecedently and efficaciously that Peter not fear and that the people of Keilah not betray David, but rather prefers that both depend on the choice of their own wills, we deny that it is possible for God to will antecedently and efficaciously that Peter not fear and that the people of Keilah not betray. However, the proposed argument proves that both Peter's fear and lack of fear, the betrayal and non-betrayal by the people of Keilah, are possible for God given that hypothesis, and remain possible as long as they remain possible for the created will. Therefore, just as it does not become simply and absolutely impossible for the created will through its determination to one option, neither does it become impossible for God. None of this do we deny.

You will object secondly: Given a hypothesis under which it is possible for God to do something, it is also possible for Him to will it. But given the hypothesis we are discussing, it is possible for God to make Peter not fear and the people of Keilah not betray David, as has been conceded. Therefore, given that hypothesis, it is also possible for God to will both. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: it is possible for God to will it with a will that would destroy the hypothesis that is supposed to stand—I deny the major; with a will that would not destroy it—I concede the major. And having conceded the minor premise, I similarly distinguish the conclusion: it is possible for God to will both with a will that

DISPUTATION IV

would destroy the hypothesis supposed to stand, both on Peter's part and on the part of the people of Keilah—I deny the conclusion; with a will that would not destroy it—I concede. It is possible for Peter not to fear, given the hypothesis from which it is said that he will freely fear; and God can bring it about that he freely does not fear, insofar as He has in His power the hypothesis from which this is said to be able to follow. But this hypothesis consists in God's will not being more antecedently and efficaciously determined toward non-fear than toward fear. Therefore, if He were to add a will determined to non-fear, and an antecedent and efficacious one, He would destroy the hypothesis which we nevertheless want to stand. Say the same about the hypothesis regarding the people of Keilah.

You will object thirdly: After God can make Peter not fear, given that hypothesis, let Him do so. I answer: Let Him do so. For this is nothing other than saying that Peter, given that hypothesis, would never have been seized with fear, and God would never have known this through Middle Knowledge, but rather would have known the opposite. But if they wish, given that hypothesis and supposing the free consequence of Peter's fear from it, and consequently the Middle Knowledge of that same fear, that God make Peter not fear, I say this implies a contradiction. Because it would create a composition of non-fear with fear, and knowledge of one opposite with knowledge of the other for the same time, which is repugnant. Here, however, the final effort immediately emerges, and

You will object fourthly: That something possible in itself becomes impossible based on a supposition that depends only on a created cause, and not on God, derogates from Him. For it seems that in this way, created power binds God's hands and sets limits to His power. But that Peter does not fear, given the stated hypothesis, is possible in itself, even with respect to God. However, this very thing becomes impossible from the supposition that fear is conditionally future. And this fact—that fear is conditionally future—is a supposition that depends only on a created

DISPUTATION IV

cause, namely, on Peter's will, and does not depend on God, because no divine decree is supposed by which it becomes conditionally future. Therefore, this derogates from God. I answer to that part of the minor premise: "And this fact—that fear is conditionally future—is a supposition that depends only on Peter's created will, and not on God": I deny it. For in the same way that it depends on Peter's will—conditionally, that is—it also depends on God's will. It has already been said often about that fear that it is not said to be in any other sense than that it would be; and that it depends, only in the sense that it would depend; and that it is determined by the created will, only in the sense that it would be determined, if the condition expressed in the antecedent of the hypothetical proposition were fulfilled. But it would neither be, nor depend, nor be determined except with God's concurrent action as the first cause. Therefore, it is false that this supposition depends only on Peter's will and not also on God. For the fact that there is no present divine decree on which it depends does nothing to prove the point, because neither is there any present power or dominion in Peter's will by which it is determined. For we suppose this to be true from eternity, while Peter's will is produced in time. Hence, just as with no existing principle of determination on Peter's part, we nevertheless assert that Peter would fear in such an occurrence of events due to the freedom he would then have; so, with no existing actual decree of God, we can assert that this fear would depend on Him as the first cause by reason of the decree that would then exist, and without the supposition of which it is not foreknown as future.

XCII. On this occasion, the Adversary raises another difficulty, which asks how God's will relates to the fact that something is conditionally future from the created will—whether this pleases or displeases Him, and whether that complacency or displeasure is free. But first, from what has been said, it is clear that the divine will is not carried by any antecedent and efficacious act toward such objects, considered under that state. However, consequent to the knowledge He has of them, I do not doubt that what is supposed to be future both pleases and displeases Him,

DISPUTATION IV

according to the nature of good and evil. For it is far more probable that these things please and displease Him as they are merely possible; and they seem no less suitable for the termination of such acts insofar as they are hypothetically future. And because these acts follow Middle Knowledge, it follows that what is said about that knowledge—namely, that the object is not future because it is known, but rather it is known because it is future—should be said about these acts as well: the object is not future because it pleases, but it pleases because it is future. This is evident because it can happen that it displeases God that something is future in such a way, if, for example, it is a sin. In this case, we can neither say that it is not future because it displeases God, for it is future although it displeases Him; nor that it is future because it pleases Him, for it is false that it pleases Him; nor because it displeases Him, since displeasure is more apt to impede futurity than to cause it. Therefore, these acts are entirely inefficacious with respect to that conditional futurity. But neither are they free in any other way than in the way that Middle Knowledge itself, which they follow, is free, because they are necessarily excited by it, and nothing else remains whose termination could impede their contingency and freedom, except the very object of Middle Knowledge toward which they are directed. Its contingency makes it absolutely possible that what is known would never have been known; likewise, that what pleased would never have pleased, although it is necessary by hypothesis both that it be known and that it please.

And from this it is better evident that divine attributes are better accounted for in this view, inasmuch as God is presented to us as One whose Power presides over even free causes, while He provides a concurrence that is both necessary and consistent with their indifference; whose Liberty is so presupposed to all their movement that nothing can be said either to be or to would be except on the supposition of a divine decree that either is or would be—to such an extent that if He were unwilling to permit or impel, according as the determination of the created will is supposed to be future as good or evil, nothing at all would be future. Nor

DISPUTATION IV

could God dispose of that will less than He could dispose of His own. His Providence is understood to be all the more perfect for not being ignorant of the treasury of divine omnipotence, which contains infinitely infinite combinations of things, from which all possible free acts derive their origin, and thus for not being ignorant of all means infallibly apt for permitting or procuring them. His Dominion is such as Scripture requires, which presents God to our faith as the Lord of lords, and not as He only seems to be in the contrary opinion, merely the Lord of servants.

CHAPTER IV. THE HARMONY OF OUR FREE WILL WITH GOD'S PREDESTINATION AGAINST THE HERETICS.

XCIII. This title was affixed by Father John of St. Thomas to the seventh article, with which he concludes both this twentieth disputation on Middle Knowledge and the first volume of his Theological Course. In the penultimate article, he complained that Calvin is too stupidly attributed to the Thomists, and that they are inappropriately and falsely accused of supporting a Calvinist decree. In both places, he attempts to demonstrate that the opposing doctrine is closer to Calvin, and shows through many arguments how great is the discrepancy between themselves and the heretics regarding the harmony of divine predestination and divine predefinitions with the freedom of the will, even reciting what Father Lemos argued on this subject before the Supreme Pontiff when this controversy was being addressed in Rome.

Far be it from me to accuse the most religious Order among Catholics of Calvinism, either out of reverence for the Apostolic decree, which strictly cautions against attaching any mark of infamy to either party, or because Calvin cannot be attributed to anyone who neither thinks nor wishes to adhere to him, and who is always prepared to change his opinion as soon as suspicion of such association arises. But

DISPUTATION IV

just as they disapprove of the doctrine of Middle Knowledge on the grounds that it seems to favor Semi-Pelagianism, so we believe we are permitted to investigate how far the contrary doctrine is removed from Calvinism. We do not do this by defining or pronouncing anything, but by raising objections and asking questions. And since the solution given thus far is hardly satisfactory, we meanwhile suspend judgment in expectation of a better one. It is now worth examining how stupidly we are said to do this.

§ I. WHAT THE CALVINISTS THINK ABOUT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEIR OPINION AND THAT OF THEIR ADVERSARIES.

XCIV. By Calvinists, I mean only the rigid ones who remained with Calvin when Arminius and his followers departed in this controversy about divine predestination and predefinitions, so that there can be no doubt that their opinion and Calvin's are essentially the same. Thus Peter Du Moulin in his "Anatomy of Arminianism," where he attacks Arminius along with the Pontificals as opposing Calvin, when explaining who these Pontificals are who oppose his doctrine (that is, Calvin's), says they are those who have repackaged Pelagianism, just as the Arminians have repackaged Papism. He calls "Papism" that doctrine of the Arminians which, recoiling from absolute predefinitions of both good and evil acts, attempted to reconcile God's providence with human freedom by either completely denying that free acts are predefined, or only through the direction of Middle Knowledge. Du Moulin therefore calls this Papism because he does not think the opposite differs from Calvinism. Hence later (referring to the same Arminians), he says that these Innovators have drawn from the pools of the Jesuits certain unknown terms of resistibility and irresistibility, with which they entangle minds. The Minister of the ancient faith, of course, calls the Arminians Innovators—as if departing from Calvin were not a sufficient argument for antiquity!

DISPUTATION IV

Would that the Arminians had innovated on other aspects of that Hierarchy's teaching, just as they have on this doctrine of the harmony between providence and free will—then antiquity would reign everywhere. But when he attributes to the Jesuits' pools that by which the Arminians seem to have rejected Calvinism and repackaged Papism, who does not see that for him, Papism—that is, non-Calvinism—converges with the doctrine of the Jesuits? So his judgment seems to have been the same as Twisse's, who, as we reported in the first disputation, found Pennot's doctrine suspect because it, having been conceived in Rome under the shadow of the Antichrist, smelled of his genius.

XCV. The same thought was expressed even more clearly by Amesius, who, as Father Peter of St. Joseph reports in his "Sweet Harmony," wonders that Bellarmine attributes to Calvin and Zwingli what is, as he thinks, the Thomists' position. For he speaks thus in volume 4 of his "Bellarmine Unnerved": "Has Bellarmine never read this except in Zwingli and Calvin? Alvarez among others, disputation 22, number 7, says: 'God, by His eternal decree and absolute and efficacious will, pre-determines all our acts in particular before foreseeing them, **AND INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE** of future free cooperation based on a hypothesis.'

And in book 3, chapter 3, number 7, having reported this opinion from Alvarez, disputation 83, conclusion 3: 'God, through the efficacious help of grace, physically or in the manner of a physical cause, pre-determines the created will to freely and infallibly consent and cooperate with God who excites and calls,' he adds, 'this opinion thus explained **IS OURS.**'

He repeats the same in book 4, chapter 3, number 1, where he approves what Alvarez says about the way in which it is or is not true that free will can dissent from God when moved by Him. At this point it should be noted that Calvinists are heretics not only because they attack freedom under that form of opinion by which one can verbally conclude, 'therefore freedom does not exist,' but also under that form which denies

DISPUTATION IV

that mode of freedom whereby a person is said to be able to dissent from God when moved by Him. Nor is the Council of Trent satisfied if freedom of will is granted in so many words, unless that mode of freedom prescribed by it is also approved, whereby free will is said to consent to God when moved in such a way that it can dissent. For there is no other reason why the Council of Trent was not content with a bare assertion of the definition that free will is said to exist, or with a bare condemnation of the denial that it exists, but further wished to express a certain proper understanding of freedom which the heretics it condemns would deny, and which they would have to accept to be orthodox on this question. Therefore, unless we wish to concede that the Council of Trent was chasing shadows by condemning what heretics did not affirm, and unless this decree of the Council has nothing to do with Calvin and Calvinists, we must acknowledge that Calvin and Calvinists did not believe, in the same sense as the Council of Trent, that free will consents to God when moved in such a way that it can dissent. They are heretics not only because they explicitly deny that freedom of will exists, but also because they do not admit that understanding and mode of freedom which the Council of Trent expresses.

Now one might reason as follows: Calvin and Calvinists dissent from the Council of Trent on the aforementioned mode of freedom; Amesius is a rigid Calvinist in this controversy and adheres to Calvin; Therefore, Amesius dissents from the Council of Trent on the aforementioned mode of freedom. Only the minor premise seems to need proof, but in reality it does not need it, for Amesius wrote after the schism of the Arminians who departed from Calvin in this controversy, and he wrote in such a way as to attack them and to try to restore and confirm Calvin's opinion which they rejected. Nor do other defenders of Calvin note or suspect any softening in Amesius's position. There is, therefore, no reason to deny that he is truly a Calvinist on this point.

Again, one might reason as follows: That mode of freedom which Amesius admits as most true seems to belong to Calvinism and

DISPUTATION IV

consequently not to be in accordance with the mind of Trent, as has already been proven; The mode which he admits, as he himself confesses, is taken from Diego Alvarez; Therefore, in his judgment, the mode of Diego Alvarez seems to belong to Calvinism and consequently not to be in accordance with the mind of Trent. In his judgment, I say—for I do not assert this, but only report what others think, so that it is necessary to use here and henceforth those words of John of St. Thomas, disputation 10 on the first part, article 4, page 659, where, having cited the Louvain Censure against the doctrine of predestination after foreseen merits, he adds: "We report the words, we do not censure them, nor do we report them for the purpose of censuring, nor do we accept the censure."

It can be answered, however, that heretics, being prone to fabrications, dissimulate their own doctrine and corrupt that of others, especially when some patronage and excuse for errors is hoped for from it. Therefore, either Amesius is not a Calvinist on this point, or he is not, as he seems, an Alvarist, but pretends to be one or the other. But regarding the former, I have already shown there is no reason to suspect that he departed from Calvin; regarding the latter, since we cannot judge internal matters, and since the nature of this judgment is such that no one can rightly condemn except a confessing defendant, to say that Amesius believes one thing and professes another must be proven from elsewhere. It is incumbent upon our Adversaries to show what he has said or written that contradicts this opinion of Alvarez which he claims to embrace. This one opinion, I say—for I do not inquire how much he agrees or disagrees with others. But as for the claim that the will follows God when moving it such that it cannot but follow, in the sense that Alvarez says, I ask where has Amesius ever denied this? And if never, then he really agrees with Alvarez.

It remains for us to say, which is not very foreign to the nature of heretics, that Amesius both speaks and believes contradictory things, if he both says and thinks that he follows both Calvin and Alvarez here. Since this cannot happen except through a wrong interpretation or understand-

DISPUTATION IV

ing of one or the other, and since what he reports from Alvarez is by no means obscure or intricate, what reason is there for us to think him so slow and stupid that he has not grasped Alvarez's meaning here? What, I ask, is so equivocal or recondite in this statement: "The power not to operate exists simultaneously in the same subject with the grace and help that is required for operating," that it would deceive a man who is neither inexperienced nor completely dull? For while we may admit that Calvin's thoughts are better known to him than to us, which is not a great compliment, the direction of his religion and life justly requires it. Indeed, he imbibed that doctrine, as they say, with his nurse's milk; he grew up with it; he lived by it; he always fought for it, both by word and by pen. It would therefore be a gratuitous suspicion to doubt that Calvin is well enough understood by Amesius. And this will have to be proven from Calvin's own doctrine, of which more later. Meanwhile, I contend only this, that Amesius, conscious of and professing Calvinism, confesses that Alvarez's opinion is most true, as is that interpretation of the Tridentine definition according to which man is understood to be free in such a way that only the power of dissenting is said to remain with the help by which he is moved to consent.

XCVI. But we should also hear him when he philosophizes about providence concerning evil acts, which we say presupposes Middle Knowledge. Thus he says: "As for the matter itself, our people (not the Arminians, since they want something else and do not approve of the Thomists, but the pure Calvinists, and as they are called, the Counter-Remonstrants) want nothing other than what the Scholastic Thomists teach. God by prior motion efficaciously applies the created will so that it freely and infallibly operates, just as He also applies secondary causes to operate naturally. Alvarez, disputation 23, number 3."

And again: "The meaning of our people is none other than what is approved by the Thomists: man's will is in a certain way God's instrument, not pure and mere, but free. Alvarez, disputation 68, number 5." And later, on indifferently offered concurrence: "This new invention of

DISPUTATION IV

the Jesuits is solidly refuted by the Thomists, as can be seen in Alvarez, disputation 22, number 21."

And finally, concerning the knowledge on account of which we are discussing these matters: "The Jesuits have invented a knowledge which they call middle, by which they say God, before the decree of His will, certainly knew what Peter would do from his innate freedom if conversion were persuaded to him in such a place and time."

From these it is clearly evident whom this Author, who is a pure Calvinist, follows and whom he disapproves of, and consequently who seem to him not to oppose Calvin very much, and who do otherwise. We report the words, etc.

XCVII. After Amesius follows William Twisse, about whom many things can be seen brought forward in the first disputation, especially chapter 1, so that there is no need to repeat much. But that which I referred to from the preface, in which he professes to adhere to Calvin as to a Saint of God, must be stressed again and again. "But let the Learned Reader, and the student of divine truth, know that the question which is discussed here is by no means trivial, but of the greatest importance. For the Adversaries of the truth, whether JESUITS or Arminians, perceive that unless that doctrine of Middle Knowledge is kept safe and sound, their opinion concerning grace and free will cannot stand, **NOR CAN OURS OPPOSED TO THEM BE UNDERMINED**: But with that opinion concerning the knowledge of future events which they call middle overthrown, **BOTH OUR OPINION CONCERNING GRACE AND FREE WILL STANDS UNSHAKEN**; and their opinion **OPPOSED TO OURS** completely collapses." See whether it seems to this Doctor that the doctrine which rejects middle knowledge, and yet establishes absolute predefinitions of free acts, differs much from the doctrine of his Saint.

For what he says, "for they perceive, etc.," is not intended to suggest that he merely thinks we believe this, as if we were mistaken in that. The usage of speaking and the force of the words is altogether different;

DISPUTATION IV

nor do we say that someone perceives what is not. But his intention is this: in this most serious and, as he says, momentous question, we are not so imprudent and incautious as not to see what the reality is, namely, that it is of such importance that Middle Knowledge be kept safe and sound, that if it is overthrown, Calvinism in this part—that is, when it concerns the harmony of divine predefinitions with the freedom of the will—cannot be undermined, as if its ruin would be very doubtful if Middle Knowledge stands. These are his words. We report the words, etc.

XCVIII. To these Authors I will add Theophilus Brachet, commonly called Mileterius, who, although he might seem worthy of a class other than that of heretics, on account of his zeal for the concord which he has tried to promote in so many books published by him, yet because he retains communion with those whom he cannot draw to agreement with the Roman faith, is to be counted in the same order. So in the book which he entitled "A Plan for Establishing Christian Concord between Catholics and Evangelicals," while discussing predestination and the gift of faith through Christ's grace, he represents the differing opinions of Authors in this way: "A singular and not common power of internal grace applied to those who are converted by God is asserted by **SOME CATHOLICS ALONG WITH MOST EVANGELICALS** who have suffered secession from the Roman Church. Although in this part indeed the ancient and not yet changed opinion of the Roman See, embracing the definitions of Blessed Augustine, seems to retain the defense of singular grace. But that a common and equal grace is communicated to those among whom a different outcome sometimes follows, is contended for by **ALMOST ALL CATHOLICS, AND NOW NOT A FEW EVANGELICALS**, partly from those who in Germany, deserting Luther as Master, have returned to the common opinion of Catholics; partly from those who in Belgium, following Arminius as Doctor, called Remonstrants, support the same opinion and defend it tenaciously."

In these words it is not difficult to guess what that singular grace is which is distinguished from the common one because it never has dis-

DISPUTATION IV

parate outcomes in those in whom it is equal—namely, that grace whose infallibility is in no way sought from the direction of Middle Knowledge. Hence it is also clear who those Catholics are who, as he says (for we only report the words), agree with most Evangelicals in asserting this kind of grace, and which Evangelicals he means, namely those who have suffered secession from the Roman Church. From these differ other Evangelicals who, deserting Luther and Calvin as Masters in this question, have to that extent returned to the common opinion of Catholics. He indicates, namely, that the Thomists agree with the more rigid Calvinists in asserting that singular grace, while the mild Lutherans and the mild Calvinists, that is, the Arminians, agree with the Jesuits and with today's Roman Church in asserting the common grace. He explains this sufficiently later when he says, "Whence it happens that among Catholics, though for the most part agreeing in other matters, the most bitter fights remain about these things, between those who profess to follow St. Thomas as Master, and those who embrace the common opinion of the school: in which on one side the Franciscans and Jesuits, on the other the Dominicans and Oratory Priests, lead the family."

In this judgment, which signifies that our doctrine is the same as that of the Arminians and the mild Lutherans, we easily allow it, since he himself confesses that in this they, departing from their Masters Luther and Calvin, have come closer to the Catholics. But what remains, namely that the Thomists, in his judgment, agree with the Evangelicals in that in which they do not at all depart from Luther and Calvin as Masters, nor adapt themselves to the Catholics—this indeed is what we wish the learned Reader to observe. For that he says this was the ancient faith of the Roman Church, established from the time of Augustine, supports his cause. For he follows that side; indeed, he suspects that in this there is something different in the opinion of the Roman Church in these and in ancient times, and that the Council of Trent favored the other side too much. Here is what he says in another work written in French, entitled "The Medium of Christian Peace," chapter 5, "Elucidations concerning

DISPUTATION IV

the doctrine of justification": "Therefore I did not hesitate to say that these words should be deleted from that definition of the Council: 'through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts'; likewise these: 'according to each one's disposition and cooperation,' because a little leaven leavens the whole lump." And then, having indicated the dissension of Catholics, some of whom follow the ancient doctrine against Pelagius, while others divide the praise of good operations between grace and will, he says the Council so tempered its definitions that it both assigned the true causes of justification, which the former require, and, favoring the latter, left conclusions which are referred to the opinions of those "who divide the cause of good between grace and free will, and in that sense receive the words of voluntary reception and disposition and cooperation." He adds that "the precise definitions of St. Augustine, saying that the power of divine grace operates in us not so that we may act if we will, but so that we may will, and therefore makes us do what we do, remove whatever poison and tares there are in that way of speaking which signifies one's own disposition and cooperation." And finally, "As for the anathemas, certainly if the Fathers of Trent had precisely defined the cause of the justice which is in us, and had prescribed what opinion concerning grace should be held according to Augustine's interpretation, the canons issued by them on this doctrine, in which their anathemas are contained, would have been conceived in other words."

From all these it is not obscurely understood that in this Author's judgment, not only do the Thomists follow the same doctrine as the Evangelicals in this dispute, but both also have something in the definitions of the Council of Trent which they wish to be deleted. Though he attributes this to the prudence which seemed necessary to maintain the unity of Catholics and avoid Schism, he is nevertheless mistaken and fosters an opinion unworthy of so great and such a Council, when he thinks that the Fathers were led by empty fear to mix tares and the leaven of poison with the Catholic and ancient doctrine. This must be forgiven to a mind noble indeed and learned, but philosophizing according to its own

DISPUTATION IV

standard, and not yet subdued. But I did not expect that the Medium of Christian peace would be proposed by him so easily, namely, that which consists only in the erasure of a few words in Trent. This is indeed a splendid way of achieving concord, like a harpist breaking a string that he cannot tune. In this way he will indeed sing nothing discordant, but neither will he sing anything harmonious. What, pray, has come into the mind of this learned and clever man? Is he seeking a rule of beliefs, or is he forging one himself? If he is seeking one, let him consider it inflexible, and not wish to bend it; if he is forging one, does he think so well of himself, or so ill of the whole world? Why does he court the Roman faith if he thinks it mutable? If necessary and always the same, why does he correct it? But how untimely and ungrateful an office he performs for the Thomists, when he so commends their opinion that he nevertheless thinks it expedient that some things be removed from Trent to maintain it!

For that he says this faith which does not easily allow the reception of gifts to be called voluntary, and disposition and cooperation to be free, is ancient, he is very much mistaken. For it is older than Augustine, even according to Calvin's testimony, who condemns the other Fathers in this place as unfair patrons of free will. And that he excepts Augustine, he does so with some design, namely lest he should have no authorities except the Manicheans; but he does it without any reason, since the cooperation of free will with grace is nowhere denied and nowhere more often inculcated than in Augustine, as has been shown before. I add only this, that Calvin is insane when he tries to separate Augustine from the other Fathers in this matter, in which Augustine professes himself inseparable in his books against Julian.

I wrote these things for the first edition of this book, when they could be written without injuring anyone. Now the change that has happened since that time, Mileterius's conversion to the Catholic faith, demands that I write and speak differently. Mileterius abjured the communion of the Calvinists many years ago to embrace the Catholic faith, and

DISPUTATION IV

he is now entirely Roman, entirely Pontifical. And not content with his own good, he takes care with all zeal that this proper gift of the Holy Spirit becomes common to those whom he left behind, by writing, by disputing, by proving his faith from his works through the example of an entirely Christian and truly pious life. I owe this testimony first to public truth, and then to the friendship of a Most Distinguished Man, who therefore does not demand that I retract what I had written about him formerly, because he himself has most clearly retracted what he then was.

XCIX. To the testimony of these Authors can be added those whom Campanella mentions, who write treatises on this matter entitled "The Harmony of Calvin and St. Thomas," a chimerical title indeed, but taken from the occasion that the Thomists reiterate that the opinion they follow today is the genuine one of St. Thomas. In which matter if they themselves were not deceived, the Calvinists seem to themselves, from the fact that they think they philosophize in this part neither differently from Calvin nor differently from the Thomists, to conclude with some reason that there is therefore agreement here between Calvin and St. Thomas, according to that principle of Euclid: Things which are equal to the same thing, etc.

And we must always return to this, to say that today's Heretics either do not know or do not understand what Calvin thought, or do not know what the Thomists think, or gratuitously lie and dissimulate their faith in this part. The first and second are not very probable; for although the persuasion of what either Calvin or the Thomists teach in this part is difficult, yet the apprehension and understanding of it is easy. Therefore, the third will have to be proven, and it will have to be shown that those who glory in dissenting in other matters want to appear to agree with Catholics in this part.

DISPUTATION IV

§ II. WHAT CATHOLIC AUTHORS THINK ABOUT THE CONSENSUS OF DOCTRINE AMONG CALVINIST ADVERSARIES.

C. Before Calvin was born, Thomas Waldensis, Provincial of the Carmelites in England, in the first volume of his *Doctrinal of the Faith*, complained that certain great men were dangerously philosophizing by admitting a necessity of action that was beyond human power and exclusively in God's control. It is not difficult to conjecture what that danger was, or who those great men were. Waldensis was clearly attacking Wycliffe, who was already prefiguring those ideas that Luther and Calvin would later amplify. He suspected an affinity of doctrine among those who admitted that necessity which was not in man's power, but in God's. If one inquires more diligently into who those great men were, I do not doubt that one would easily conjecture with me that they belonged to the same School from which emerged, around that time, Bradwardine, whose doctrine Twisse so greatly and so often praises, as if he were already favoring the nascent Calvinists. Therefore, we can justifiably count Waldensis among those who fear that absolute predefinitions, independent of Middle Knowledge, might favor a doctrine alien to Catholic teaching.

CI. I would very much like to know who those people are to whom Dominic Soto refers when he says: "Indeed, there are among Catholics those whom we have heard asserting this dogma in person and defending it despite our objections—namely, that God draws us to Himself by a certain force and necessity, such that in our conversion we behave purely passively and receptively, concerning which the Holy Synod [addressed in] session 6." Here you see from this author that not only heretics but also the doctrine of certain Catholics was condemned by the Council of Trent. But whose doctrine? Clearly those whom Dominic Soto was accustomed to hearing in the Schools, and against whom he had the right to object. When they said that we are drawn by a certain

DISPUTATION IV

force, they by no means understood coercion properly so-called, which they knew implicated a contradiction. Likewise, when they said that we behave passively and receptively, they did not exclude any action other than that which proceeds from free and unimpeded dominion. For they did not deny that those dispositions were vital acts. Doubtless they were the same people whom the same Soto mentions in chapter 16 when he says: "There are, therefore, among the Scholastics those who teach that, given God's concurrence, it is not in the power of the will to both act and not act. And for this reason they say, secondly, that this kind of concurrence is not counted among the prerequisites for acting; indeed they say, to use their own expression, that it accompanies the action itself. Of these two propositions, either I have never understood either of them, or I shall never believe either of them." He had explained what he believed a little earlier in these words: "In adults, the proximate cause must be given as to why, when God is most ready to convert two people, and inspires both with an equally present mercy, He draws one and not the other. The reason for this truly cannot be given except that one gives assent and cooperates, while the other does not."

This was Soto's belief, entirely the same as that position which other Thomists think they press with Paul's question: "Who makes you different?" For what he says later—that, given God's requisite concurrence, the will can not-act only in the divided sense—he himself indicates sufficiently that he is not speaking only of previous concurrence, but as it implies also simultaneous concurrence identified with the operation of the secondary cause. For he distinguishes two kinds of aids: some are prior, and these he admits can be greater in one who is not converted than in one who is converted, and consequently, with these, even in the composite sense, a person can not-act; others, he says, indicate a free change in us, with which, therefore, non-action itself cannot be composed, and thus only in the divided sense can a person with these not operate.

This, therefore, is that position whose contrary Dominic Soto can neither grasp nor believe. Namely, that which says that prior aids, which

DISPUTATION IV

do not signify a free change in us, are such that with them, the absence of that free change cannot be composed; and this is that force and necessity against which he himself protested, both on other occasions and especially at the Council of Trent, if we believe the History of the Council. Finally, against that position, he thinks the definition that is contained in session 6 was conceived.

And this testimony of a most distinguished man among the primary Thomists makes us believe that Bellarmine wrote what we read in the first book on free will out of a love for truth greater than partisanship. If I relate his words, it will be necessary to repeat that of John of St. Thomas: "We relate the words, we do not censure them, etc." But some labor in vain to show that certain other things can be read in Bellarmine that seem to be contrary to this position, because they will never achieve this, and it is well-known and well-attested from his life that this was the position in which he both grew old and died, so that from this it can be understood what was this disposition that showed itself and flourished in a man who was, without envy, most learned and most pious, at a time when even worldly things that pertain to this life are usually objects of disgust.

CII. That Cardinal Perron held the same opinion is proven by Eugenius Philadelphus from the account of the Most Illustrious Bishop of Cahors, D. Habert, who approved a book in which this is reported, published before his eyes in Cahors. And credibility is added by what is reported about him in Gallia Purpurata. As for what Father John of St. Thomas relates, that when in the 38th Congregation, where this matter was being discussed before the Supreme Pontiff, Cardinal Perron objected something about Calvin's opinion; then Father Lemos began to speak about Calvin and to show what his opinion was, and after these explanations Cardinal Perron fell silent and seemed to nod in agreement—I fear this will not be credible to those who have heard anything about such a great man. I do not deny that Father Lemos was an accomplished Scholastic; but that Cardinal Perron would learn from a Spanish man

DISPUTATION IV

who had spent his life in the shadow of the Schools and in peace, without any commerce with heretics, what Calvin's opinion was—a man of such intelligence and memory, who from boyhood had dealings with heretics and was engaged in continual warfare with them, whether in public or private encounters, whether by voice or by pen—is the kind of thing that among our French countrymen might provoke laughter.

And see, dear reader, how knowledgeable Father Lemos was about Calvinist doctrine in this very place, where Father John of St. Thomas reports him speaking with Perron. For he begins thus: "Most Illustrious Lord, I will tell all that Calvin said on this subject... For concerning Adam before sin, he said that he had freedom, and that God did not determine what he would do." See how Calvin denies, according to Father Lemos' report, God's decree preceding Adam's sin. But now listen to Calvin himself: "Indeed, I will freely concede that foreknowledge alone imposes no necessity, although not all agree... But it seems to me that Val-la has perceived more acutely and prudently when he showed that this controversy is superfluous, since both life and death are actions of divine will rather than of foreknowledge. If God merely foresaw human events, and did not also dispose and order them by His decision, then the question would not be raised inappropriately, whether His foreknowledge has any value for the necessity of things. But since He foresaw future things for no other reason than because He decreed that they should happen thus, it is pointless to raise a dispute about foreknowledge, where it is established that all things happen rather by His ordering and nod. Therefore, no one will be able to deny that the Lord foreknew what outcome man would have before He created him: **AND HE FOREKNEW IT BECAUSE HE HAD SO ORDAINED IT BY HIS DECREE...** Nor should it seem absurd what I SAY, that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and in him the ruin of his posterity, **BUT ALSO DISPOSED IT BY HIS OWN DECISION**, etc." By His decree God ordained what outcome the first man would have, says Calvin; nor did He foresee his fall and the ruin of the whole human race in any other way

DISPUTATION IV

than because He himself had decreed it. And yet Father Lemos teaches Cardinal Perron that Calvin believed that God had not determined what Adam would do before that fall. Listen again: "They (the Papists) deny that this decree explicitly exists, that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his defection." And after he proved that it does exist, he adds: "A horrible decree, I admit, yet no one will be able to deny that God foreknew what outcome man would have before He created him: **AND HE FOREKNEW IT BECAUSE HE HAD SO ORDAINED IT BY HIS DECREE.**" And Calvin repeats this more often, both in that chapter 23 of the third book, and in the preceding chapters 21 and 22, where he denies that any cause of reprobation should be sought on the part of humans; recourse must be had to God's good pleasure alone, where this good pleasure of God reigns, no works come into consideration; if we cannot assign a reason why He deems some worthy of His mercy except that it so pleases Him, neither should anything else be considered in the reprobation of others than His will; nor is it appropriate that preparation for destruction be transferred elsewhere. None of these things would be said by him if he believed that original sin, which could have been a sufficient reason for reprobation for him, should be referred to anything other than that antecedent decree from which Adam's sin followed. Therefore, Father Lemos did not have a sufficiently clear understanding of Calvin's doctrine when he denied that, according to Calvin's opinion, God determined what Adam would do; and Cardinal Perron would never have nodded in agreement to someone narrating such things except in jest, since Calvin was far better known to him than to Father Lemos. But I return to my purpose.

CIII. The Most Illustrious Bishop of Belley, in a work recently published in Paris concerning the Accession of Protestants to the Roman Church, has made a most candid confession of the matter we are discussing. For after having adduced two opinions of the Romans, namely those adhering to the Thomists and to the Jesuits, he adds: "The Protestants willingly join themselves to that party of Romans in which are the

DISPUTATION IV

Thomists, but they differ in this, that they accuse the other part of error in faith, which those very Romans whom they follow do not do, who consider both opinions probable until something else is established by the Church." See what difference he places between the doctrine of Protestants and Thomists: namely, that Protestants accuse those who disagree of error, while Thomists neither wish nor are able to make similar accusations. But if the condemnation that was so strongly urged had occurred, since it would then be lawful for Thomists to accuse their adversaries of error, consequently there would be no difference between them and Protestants according to the Most Illustrious Bishop of Belley. And thus, when a definition of this opinion was sought for the benefit of the Thomists, this is what was being sought: namely, that the Pope should declare that the doctrine of the Thomists and the Protestants is the same. I prove this consequence as follows. Because to make it possible for Thomists to accuse Jesuits of error is to remove the distinction by which Thomists are distinguished from Protestants, according to the Most Illustrious Bishop of Belley; but to pronounce in favor of the Thomists is to make it possible for Thomists to accuse Jesuits of error; therefore, to pronounce in favor of the Thomists is to remove the distinction by which Thomists are distinguished from Protestants. That point should be repeatedly emphasized: We are only reporting the opinions of others, in imitation of Father John of St. Thomas.

CIV. To these it is helpful to add Campanella. Although his authority is too slight to establish a theological position, nevertheless, where attention is paid not so much to judgment as to testimony, and not to what he reasons but to what he narrates, I do not know if it is prudent to reject his testimony in such a way as to dare to say that he lied. And the authority of the narrative increases from the approval of his Thomist associates. For Fr. Julian Joubert, Vicar General of the Gallican Congregation, not only commends the book himself but also reports that it was seen as worthy of commendation by Sorbonne Doctors. The endorsement of Fr. Anthony Mallet of the same Order is also added, who desires

DISPUTATION IV

that this work be constantly in the hands of all students, as it will be very beneficial for the doctrine of faith and good morals. Paris, in the College of St. James, July 21, 1635.

Therefore, Fr. Thomas Campanella in his book on Predestination and Reprobation, article 1, thus prepares himself to attack the common doctrine of modern Thomists: "Pay close attention, I beg you, dear reader. And since some think that these opinions of theirs are proven from St. Thomas, the Prince of Scholastics, and they tear him apart in wondrous ways and drag him unwillingly; and the Calvinists now boast, writing and publishing, of a harmony between St. Thomas and Calvin; we have decided to proceed from the sayings of St. Thomas alone, who elsewhere we have honored as the most distinguished of all Doctors, to an exposition of errors: and thus to make a Thomistic patchwork against pseudo-Thomists, as I had promised to the most holy and wise Lord Pope Urban VIII when he was very anxious and fervent against such a great evil of our time; and at the same time to the Most Excellent Ambassador of His Most Christian Majesty, the Count of Brassac, who confessed that he could not respond to the Huguenots from any other source, nor to our own who even unwillingly favor them, except from this small work and another which I had written in his name on chapter 9 of Romans. And about this he often consulted the Supreme Pontiff in Rome, and was consoled as he testifies (as do I) that he was driven to despair by other theologians. The Most Learned Cardinal Scallia also encouraged me to the same purpose, thinking that St. Thomas, thus understood, could restrain not only the tricks of heretics but also all those of our own sophists. It was also necessary to satisfy our own people, to supply arms from the storehouse of the Holy Doctor, from which enemies promise themselves help due to the carelessness of our own. And very many people asked this of me, especially truth-loving Dominican and Minim disciples, and clergy and Roman princes, especially the Colonna family, who worked hard at this. But among the Masters, especially Fr. Cosmas Morellus, distinguished in doctrine and probity, Inquisitor of heretical depravity for a

DISPUTATION IV

long time in Cologne, saying that he could not respond to the Calvinists without this doctrine, and he promised to publish a pamphlet about this. Similarly, Master Augustinus Ruffus, Dominican Regent of studies in Palermo, and Fr. Forest his colleague, and Lord Simon Raus with him, to whom I gave a copy of this booklet. And formerly Master Seraphinus Rivaldus, later a Bishop, often asked me for this work, even for the honor of St. Thomas, which we wish to connect to the exposition of the ninth chapter of Romans, in accordance with the desire of the Count of Brascac." Thus far Campanella. From these things you can easily understand that even among the disciples of St. Thomas themselves, there is some suspicion of this harmony with the Calvinists of which we are discussing; and that the solution to this difficulty is not so straightforward that one who does not immediately perceive it is stupid. We relate the words, etc.

CV. But if there is some exception against the testimony of Campanella, what shall we say to Gonzales de Albelda, who sometimes attacks the Junior Thomists? He attacks them, moreover, on the grounds that their opinion destroys freedom and does not safeguard the truth of the Tridentine definition. Therefore, according to Gonzales, the Junior Thomists are implicated in that condemnation of the Council of Trent which was conceived against the Calvinists. And it is established that by this designation of Junior Thomists, Diego Alvarez is included, who leads a large part of the family in this disputation.

And it is he himself whom the same Gonzales attacks again, and indeed by name, when he says: "It is astonishing that the Most Reverend Alvarez, where above, on the one hand often admits that God alone concurs in the act of sin as a universal mover through general concurrence, but on the other hand asserts that God concurs by producing in the will a quality physically pre-moving and inclining it efficaciously, determinately, and by itself and directly to such an act here and now. For these two things do not seem to cohere with each other. Hence, the first is said according to the mind of St. Thomas, but not the second." This is for the reason that "IT SEEMS A MANIFEST CONSEQUENCE THAT

DISPUTATION IV

GOD IS THE AUTHOR OF SIN," which is the very objection we are accustomed to raise against Calvin's opinion. Hence you see that the doctrine of Alvarez and the Alvarists—that is, of a large part of recent Thomists—as Gonzales indeed thinks, by necessary consequence falls into that error of Calvin, by which God is believed to have been made the Author of sin.

CVI. What also to John Vincent, a most learned and wise Master of the same Order according to Ledesma, who thinks that the now common opinion of the Thomists cannot be reconciled with the words of the Council of Trent? That there is in it a certain great difficulty, and in his view an insoluble one? That the passage from Trent is convincing against the predefinition of an evil act even according to its entity (though the conditional foreknowledge of it is not denied), and that he cannot be severed from the contrary opinion except by the Authority of the Church alone? Therefore, there is no stupidity in that suspicion which fears an affinity of the contrary opinion with the opinion of the Innovators; or if there is any, it falls also on certain Thomists, and indeed distinguished ones. We only relate their words and thoughts, etc., as above.

§ III. WHAT ACTUALLY SEEMS TO BE THE CORRECT VIEW.

CVII. It is worth investigating what might be the foundation of that opinion in which Heretics glory concerning the agreement with the Thomistic position, and also of that fear by which distinguished Catholics suspect, as I said, too much affinity between both positions. On this matter, I first state that I am defining nothing definitively, but with suspended judgment I am opening up the difficulty in the manner of those who doubt, awaiting a solution. Therefore, two things must be supposed. First, Calvin's and the Calvinists' error consisted of two elements: one concerning free will, which they destroyed; the other concerning the cause of sin, which they attributed to God's will, thus making Him the Author of evil.

DISPUTATION IV

This matter is so certain that if anyone should wish to oppose it and say that Calvin erred in neither point or in only one of them, he would necessarily have to accuse the Roman Church, whose common and undoubted persuasion this has been until now. Nor would the authority of the Council of Trent stand firm, whose decrees and anathemas for defending the freedom of the will and the equity and innocence of divine providence regarding evil human actions arose from nowhere else than from the prejudged opinion of both errors. Nor has it been understood otherwise by the Heretics, who do not deny that they were targeted by those thunderbolts of the Tridentine Fathers, as is evident both from Calvin's Antidote and from their other writings everywhere. And we have already seen that he who labors for concord finds it here only by introducing a few words by which the Council expressed the necessary freedom for humans. Indeed, it would be not only astonishing but also ridiculous for someone to contend that in the very place where both the Roman Church claims to thunder against Heretics and Heretics confess they are struck by the Roman Church, there is nevertheless an agreement in doctrine between them. It would be as if an army running into itself through uncertain darkness were to cease fighting and embrace once dawn revealed that those thought to be enemies were in fact allies. Who would not see that such a harbinger of dawn, who believed his light was necessary to the world so that the Roman Church might understand there was nothing in the Heretics' views concerning free will that it should rightly disapprove, and Heretics might understand there was nothing in the Roman Church's doctrine concerning the same question that greatly opposed their own views, and that the entire dissension of both parties arose from ignorance—who would not see that such a person should be met with the laughter of all wise men? This, therefore, is our first supposition.

CVIII. The second supposition is that this error does not pertain only to the manner of speaking, but to the thing itself. That is, Heretics did not merely deny that the thing which Catholics call free will should

DISPUTATION IV

be so called, but denied it altogether. Likewise, they did not merely assert that the name "Author of sin" applies to a certain mode of concurring with evil which Catholics do not deny, but they asserted that the mode itself exists, which Catholics deny and which, if granted, they think would make God the Author of sin. It is as if I were to say, since one who contradicts another can err in two ways—either by denying the thing asserted by the other, as if someone were to deny that an Ethiopian is a rational animal, or by obstinately denying that it should be so called, as if someone were to acknowledge that an Ethiopian is this, but deny that he is a human, because he might wish that name to signify only a white rational animal—Heretics do not dissent from Catholics and are not condemned only in this latter way, but primarily in the former.

This is proved first from the common sense of Catholics, whose conscience, if anyone were to interrogate it, could not be led to confess that Calvin's opinion is correct but only his manner of expression improper, nor that his judgment concerning the things themselves should be condemned or is damnable, but only his way of speaking, as if he were not a heretic in this matter except in the way that, for example, one who denied that the second person of the Trinity is generated, while conceding that he proceeds as living from living in the likeness of nature, by which reasoning he would contradict not so much the Church's doctrine as its phraseology, requiring not theology but grammar.

It is proved secondly because the Council of Trent, in its decrees and anathemas against Heretics, clearly signifies that it is not condemning those who deny only the name of free will, but indeed those who deny the thing itself. Nor does it contend about the name, but about the thing itself, when it explains it in such a way that for a man to cooperate freely with God's grace is for him to act, and to act in such a way that he can reject that illumination. This is to act with dominion and power not to act. Hence afterward it pronounces anathema on those who deny that free will, when moved and excited by God, cooperates with God who moves and excites, and that it can dissent if it wishes. Here you see that

DISPUTATION IV

the thing itself signified by the name of free cooperation is required, namely that the will acts and acts with the power not to act. But nothing is more evident than what it adds: Anathema to those who say that free will is a thing in name only, indeed a title without substance. For in what way could the Council have more explicitly signified that it is not discussing the title of free will, but the thing itself? And therefore, to explain what freedom it requires for sinning, it adds anathema to those who deny that it is in man's power to make his ways evil. But only that which one does in such a way that he can not do it is said to be in someone's power. Hence no one thinks that it is in a horse's power to eat hay placed before it when it is hungry; for it cannot abstain. This is what Damascene expressed when he said: Those things in us which we have received free power TO DO AND NOT TO DO, AS TO LIE AND NOT TO LIE. The same is evident in the other question about the Author of sin. For the Council never defines that God should not be called the Author of sin, but that what is designated by that name should not be believed, when it defines that God does not work evil deeds as He does good ones, and not properly and per se, but only permissively. Likewise, that no one is predestined by divine power to evil. By these decisions, it is clearly established that the Council was looking primarily at the thing itself, not the words.

It is proved thirdly from the confession of Heretics. For Calvin, in this very dispute about free will, testifies that he hates logomachy, which is to say that he does not wish to contend about words. I quote his words: "Man is therefore said to have free will (by ancient Scholastics and Lombard, as he thinks) not because he has a free choice of good and evil alike, but because he acts evilly by will, not by coercion. This is excellent indeed, but what was the purpose of marking such a trifling matter with such an impressive title? For it is really a remarkable liberty if man is not coerced into serving sin, but yet serves it so willingly that his will is bound by the fetters of sin. Indeed, I abhor logomachies, by which the Church is needlessly fatigued. But I think that words which sound absurd should be

DISPUTATION IV

religiously avoided, especially where the error is pernicious. When free will is attributed to man, how many, I ask, do not immediately conceive that he is the master of his own mind and will, **WHO CAN TURN HIMSELF IN EITHER DIRECTION BY HIS OWN POWER?** But such danger will be removed if the people are diligently instructed about the meaning." And then: "Thus if anyone permits himself the use of this expression, provided he does not understand it in a wrong sense, I shall not trouble him for it. But because I judge that it cannot be retained without grave danger, and that it would greatly benefit the Church if it were abolished, I would not wish to use it myself, and I would prefer others to abstain from it if they ask my advice."

Here you see first that Calvin does not wish to forbid the use of the term and title of free will, although he is more inclined to the view that this name should be abolished. Calvin is not, therefore, obstinate in this matter, nor consequently to be condemned as a heretic because his mind is firmly set on denying that name. Therefore, if there is any obstinacy in him, it would rather be in the fact that, as he himself says, he believes the understanding which underlies that name among Catholics to be wrong. And what this wrong and dangerous understanding of Catholics is, Calvin explains when he says that by this name is aroused the thought of dominion, by which the will can turn itself in either direction by its own power. This is therefore that thing which Calvin thinks is asserted by Catholics when free will is asserted by them, and which he himself denies when he denies it as well—namely, that the will, which is called free, not only is not coerced or forced, but is so much its own master that it can do either one thing or the other—act or not act. Therefore, if anything in Calvin has seemed worthy of condemnation, it would be the fact that he denied that the will has dominion over its own act and that it can act or not act—which is the thing signified by the name of free will.

CIX. The same must be said about the Author of sin, namely that Calvin was by no means condemned for contending that this name

DISPUTATION IV

should be attributed to God; rather, he explicitly denies this in many places and complains that he is burdened by the calumny of Catholics attributing this to him. For to omit what is in chapter 2 of the Institutes, according to the ancient form and partition of the year 1545, that "we must be careful lest when we demonstrate the natural evils of man, we seem to attribute them to the author of nature," he thus interprets that saying of the Apostle in Ephesians 2:3, "We were by nature children of wrath, etc.," that "nature there is understood not as it was created by God, but as it was corrupted in Adam, because it would be most inconsistent for God to be made the Author of death." And when he discusses the invasion of the Chaldeans against the shepherds and flocks of Job, he says: "How can we attribute the same work to God, to Satan, and to man as its author without either excusing Satan by God's partnership or proclaiming God as the Author of evil? Easily, if we first consider the end of acting, and then the manner." And after he distinguished this end and manner of acting in God, the Demon, and the Chaldeans, he concludes thus: "Therefore we see that it is not absurd that the same deed is attributed to God, Satan, and man; but the variety in the end and manner causes the blameless justice of God to shine forth, while the wickedness of Satan and man reveals itself to their confusion." From these passages it is clear that Calvin by no means approves that God should be said to be the Author of sin. And if at any time he indicates that He is the Author of His own vengeance when He punishes sin with sin, he would say this in the same sense which their opponents do not deny, namely that to Him is attributed the just and legitimate use of evil, as he himself says, while all the evil is found in men. This is the very confession of faith of the Calvinists, article 8: "Not that He is the Author of evil, or that blame can be imputed to Him... But He has admirable ways of so using demons and the wicked that He knows how to convert the evil they do, and of which they are the cause, into good."

From these it is evident that, if indeed we look only at the use of words, both Calvin and Calvinists are quite scrupulous in avoiding saying

DISPUTATION IV

that God is the Author of sin. Therefore, if they err in this part, as all Catholics thus far agree they do, it remains to be said that their error is that they affirm in reality what they deny in word, and while they fear the term, they are not frightened by the wrong understanding which underlies it. Nor do the Salamancans deny this after Didacus. For they say that Calvin, as far as the sound of words is concerned, holds that God is not the Author of sin, but in reality he attributes to Him the nature of the aforementioned cause.

CX. Fourthly, it is proven because no one would rightly deny that Calvin's opinion on free will has been condemned, as was proved before. But this view that the will should not be called free because it acts without coercion, if nevertheless it acts with some necessity imposed from outside, has not been condemned. Therefore, Calvin did not say only this; and thus he did not deny only the use of the term, but the thing itself signified by the term. The assumption is proven. Because a large part of Catholics freely and with impunity assert this, namely that an operation which the will elicits without coercion but nevertheless not without some necessity imposed from outside, or if you prefer, following from divine predefinition, should not be called free. From which it follows evidently that there is no definition of the Church by which that statement is condemned, that this should not be called liberty or free faculty of acting. Therefore, either nothing in Calvin is condemned, or something else is condemned.

Similarly, since it is certain that Calvin's opinion by which he made God the Author of sin has been condemned, if someone interprets this to say that this alone in Calvin is condemned—that he thought that mode of acting which he conceived should be expressed in such a way that from it God would be said to be the Author of evil, but not that this mode is truly false or unworthy of divine goodness and wisdom—he will be convicted by the same reasoning. Because the majority of Catholics judge the same, and yet do not err or oppose the Church. The majority, I say, of Catholics believes that the name "Author of sin" is rightly at-

DISPUTATION IV

tributed to any cause that concurs with evil in the way Calvin thinks God concurs. Therefore, if anything in this part is condemned in Calvin, what is condemned is his judgment about the way in which he thought God concurs with evil acts, not about the words by which he thought that mode should be expressed.

CXI. Having established these points, we now ask our Adversaries to show what difference there is between the thing which they either assert or deny and that which heretics also assert or deny. For if there is none, then there is no difference between their doctrine and that which has been condemned.

And first, concerning the nature of a free agent or free action, we ask what exactly it means for a man to be free in acting, or for his action to be free? And after examining everything, we find nothing else in the Adversaries' position than this: that there is God's absolute, efficacious, infallible, and unfrustratable predefinition, from which follows the will's action with all coercion and violence excluded, and with such a mediocrity of cognitions supposed which, neither by reason of the object they represent nor by the manner in which they represent it, introduce any necessity of acting, which they otherwise call the indifference of judgment. This is the species of liberty which is found both in the will and in its action, and which, when it stands, the entire thing called liberty stands. I ask, then, what Calvin erases from this picture, and consequently, what does he remove of that thing which for Thomists is liberty? For if he removes nothing, he errs only in not wishing to call that thing which is liberty by the name of liberty, in which matter, however, as I have shown, he is not obstinate.

CXII. Fr. John of St. Thomas responds in various ways, both in art. 5, disp. 20, and especially in art. 7, where he reports what Fr. Lemos once explained before the Supreme Pontiff when this case was being debated. Let us therefore briefly consider these solutions and see how skillfully Fr. Lemos resolved this difficulty in that most grave disputation.

DISPUTATION IV

Calvin, says Fr. John of St. Thomas, posited God's decree as not merely antecedent but as necessitating the will. What necessity he understands, Fr. Lemos then explains when he says that Calvin erred because he did not distinguish between the necessity of the consequent, which removes liberty, and the necessity of consequence, which preserves liberty. Let us hear Calvin, then: "Meanwhile, what God has decreed must necessarily happen, yet it is not precisely or by its own nature necessary. A familiar example occurs in the bones of Christ. Since He assumed a body like ours, no sane person will deny that His bones were fragile, which nevertheless could not be broken. Hence we see again that the distinctions were not rashly invented in the schools of NECESSITY ACCORDING TO QUALIFICATION AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY, LIKEWISE OF THE CONSEQUENT AND OF CONSEQUENCE." See how Calvin both recognizes that distinction by which the Adversaries think themselves saved, and according to it teaches that the divine decree does not influence the necessity of the consequent in the action following from it, but only the necessity of consequence, just as it did not induce in Christ's bones a firmness by which they would not be absolutely fragile in themselves, but only one by which they would not be fragile conditionally and according to qualification. As if he were saying that in itself and absolutely or precisely apart from God's decree, the predefined action is contingent; according to qualification and on the supposition of the decree, it is necessary. And thus the consequence of the action from the predefinition is indeed necessary, but it is the consequence of a contingent thing, or one that is not necessary in itself precisely and by its own nature and absolutely. We inquire how this doctrine differs from that of the Adversaries by arguing in this way:

The necessity of consequence that excludes the necessity of the consequent is a necessity not destroying but preserving liberty, as Fr. Lemos says. The necessity which Calvin thinks is derived from God's decree into our actions is the necessity of consequence, which excludes the necessity of the consequent, as we have just seen. Therefore, the necessity

DISPUTATION IV

which Calvin thinks is derived into our actions from God's decree is not one that destroys but rather preserves liberty. But, they say, Calvin nevertheless thinks that liberty is destroyed by this necessity. I answer: That he thinks your liberty is destroyed, or that thing which for you is liberty, I deny; for he supposes it entirely, if indeed this is nothing other than for the will to operate with an indifference of cognitions from a predefinition inferring only the necessity of consequence. That he thinks the liberty of other Catholics is destroyed, or that thing which for them is liberty, I concede. Hence he seems to oppose them in reality, but it is not apparent how he opposes you, except only in the contrary use of terms, and even this without obstinacy.

CXIII. But Fr. John of St. Thomas continues. Calvin posits a decree that does not predetermine while preserving liberty, as the Thomists say, and opening the heart, but by coercing the will and closing its indifference. And then he reports the words of the Archbishop of Armagh, who was present at the disputations before the Supreme Pontiff. For when Fr. Lemos was explaining this knot in the 38th Congregation, he added, "In this Calvin erred especially, in that he did not admit the efficacy of grace except as **COERCING AND NECESSITATING**." But about necessity it has already been spoken; concerning coercion, let us hear Calvin. "But the distinction prevailed in the schools which numbers three kinds of liberty: the first from necessity, the second from sin, the third from misery. Of these, the first so naturally inheres in man that it can in no way be taken away, while the other two have been lost through sin. I willingly accept this distinction, except that **NECESSITY IS WRONGLY CONFUSED WITH COERCION**, between which how great is the difference and how necessarily it should be considered will appear elsewhere." See how Calvin admits liberty from necessity insofar as necessity is confused with coercion, which is to admit liberty from coercion, and indeed such that it cannot be taken away. Hence he adds afterward what we have already quoted: "Man is therefore said to have free will, not because he has a free choice of good and evil alike, but because

DISPUTATION IV

he acts evilly by will, not by COERCION. This is excellent indeed, etc." Then he reports and approves what was said by Augustine, that God draws men by their wills, and as he says in French, "Sans contrainte," which is, without coercion. Hence he elsewhere rejects the comparison by which men are said to be moved by God like stones. There is, therefore, no error of Calvin on this point. Nor can it be said that he ever admitted coercion otherwise than as coercion broadly taken, which is equivalent to necessity, nor necessity other than, as we have seen, that of consequence, in which matter we expect them to explain how much he differs from the Adversaries.

CXIV. Now as to what Fr. John of St. Thomas says, that Calvin's decree is not predetermining while preserving liberty, that is, it is not predetermining to act freely, and in this differs from the decree of the Thomists—this pertains to what the Thomists say, that God does not predefine only the actions of the will as to their substance, but also as to the mode of liberty, and therefore by such predefinition liberty is by no means removed, but rather preserved. But first, we must beware here of an inept circle of words and thoughts, such as would exist if, when I ask what the thing is for Thomists when the will is free, they should answer that it is, in the end, for the will not to be subject in acting to any predefinition other than that by which it is impelled to act freely. For this is what I am asking: what is it in reality for the will to be impelled by predefinition to act freely, or for an action to be predefined as free, or with the mode of liberty? To which they have nothing else to respond than that this, which is for the will to act in such a way that it derives no necessity either from objects or from their presentation, nor from God's prior decree any other than what is called that of consequence, but not what they call that of the consequent—this, I say, is to act freely, and to be predetermined to act in this way is the same as to be predetermined to act freely. But Calvin does not acknowledge any decree other than what predetermines to act in this way, because he always derives all necessity of acting from the divine will, and never from objects or from the way in

DISPUTATION IV

which they are represented. And that necessity which he thinks arises from God's will, he denies is the necessity of the consequent, but says it is the necessity of consequence only, as he himself says and explains by the example of the fragility of Christ's bones, as we related a little earlier. Therefore, Calvin in reality thinks that God predetermines the will to act freely, with that mode of liberty which can remain in the Thomists' position, and differs from them only in the use of words, and this not obstinately. Which I always note is said by me in the manner of those who object and by questioning rather than affirming.

And because what the Thomists say that God opens the heart and does not close its indifference by the predefinition which they admit, setting aside the involutions and tropes of words and taking it plainly, is nothing else in reality than what I said—namely, that God predefines that the will should necessarily deal with proposed objects in such a way that this necessity arises only from predefinition and is the necessity of consequence, not of the consequent—it follows that in Calvin's view, which holds the same opinion, the heart is also opened and its indifference is not closed, no differently than in the Thomists' view, since both seem to have the same key.

CXV. Indeed, what the Thomists both formerly and recently teach about the indifference of judgment must always be kept in mind, concerning which Bañez speaks thus: "Whenever an act of the will arises from the aforementioned root of judgment, it will always be free. Hence I further conclude that whatever may have preceded, or accompanied, or followed the act of the will, if it does not remove that judgment concerning the means with respect to the end, it will not destroy the freedom of operation. This consequence is evident because, given the definition of a free act, the act must be free." But Calvin, by his decree or predefinition, does not remove that judgment. Therefore, in his view, the definition of a free act stands, and consequently the act is free.

Diego Alvarez, while explaining how, along with the predefinition to act, there simultaneously stands the power of the will not to act,

DISPUTATION IV

offers this reason: "Because although liberty is formally in the will, nevertheless it is radically in the intellect, and is founded on the indifference of judgment, by which the intellect judges that the good proposed to the will does not have a necessary or natural connection with the good in general, to which the will is naturally determined. And since the intellect, in this state, proposes whatever good to the will, proposes it with an indifference of judgment, therefore the will remains free with respect to such an object as regards its exercise." Again, while giving the reason why beatific love is necessary and not free, he says it is "Because it is directed to God by means of a judgment by which the intellect judges that supreme good to have a necessary connection with the good in general, to which the will is naturally determined... This reason, however, does not apply to acts which the will produces in this life, even if they are necessary by supposition of the divine will. For the decree of God does not predetermine or move the will to those acts by means of a judgment naturally determined to one thing, but by means of a judgment of indifferent reason, by which the intellect judges that the good to be pursued does not have a necessary connection with the good which the will is naturally determined to love, etc."

CXVI. Similar things can be read in Gonzalez. "Although Suarez," he says, "turns in both directions, he cannot prove that liberty can be lost while the indifference of judgment remains. For I judge it utterly impossible for the will to be necessitated even from outside with respect to an object indifferently proposed to it."

From these it is easy to argue in this way: Predefinition of acts to be elicited while there remains an indifferent presentation on the part of the intellect of the objects around which those acts revolve, is predefinition of acts as free, or with the mode of liberty in reality, and is predetermination to act freely in reality. But Calvin's predefinition is predefinition of acts while there remains an indifferent presentation on the part of the intellect of the objects around which those acts revolve. Therefore, Calvin's predefinition is predefinition of acts as free, or with the mode of

DISPUTATION IV

liberty, and predetermination to act freely in reality. The major premise is from the Adversaries; the minor is evident. Both because Calvin never in any place denied that indifferent presentation of objects, and because he always attributed the necessity of acting which he admitted to God's decree and not to our thoughts, which is to suppose that no necessity of acting arises from our cognitions or judgments, and consequently that objects are indifferently proposed by them. Nor was he ignorant of what Didacus says, that in this state, whatever good is proposed, it is proposed with the aforementioned indifference.

CXVII. Father John of St. Thomas adds, from Father Lemos's explanation, that the Thomists admit a divine decree that is not only exciting (as Pelagius held), not only moving (as Calvin held), but both exciting and moving simultaneously. This, therefore, is another distinction: that Calvin introduces a decree that only moves but does not excite. Let us hear him directly. "In this manner, the Lord both begins and completes the good work in us, so that the will conceives a love of what is right, is INCITED and moved to pursue its practice." If anyone thinks that "to incite" is not the same as "to excite," Calvin speaks again: "God operates in His elect in two ways: internally through the Spirit, externally through the Word. By illuminating their minds through the Spirit and forming their hearts to love and cultivate righteousness, He makes them a new creation. By the Word, He EXCITES them to desire, seek, and attain this same renewal. In both ways, He manifests the efficacy of His hand according to the mode of His dispensation." Does not Calvin here openly combine excitation, which the Pelagians recognized only through the law and externally sounding preaching, with his notion of divine motion? What, then, is the difference between the two positions, and what is Calvin's error? For Twisse has shown that there is nothing in the Calvinist position on this point that adversaries could reasonably find wanting, when he says that physical predetermination was given to the angel in conjunction with MORAL EXCITATION.

DISPUTATION IV

CXVIII. Father John of St. Thomas responds that Calvin's entire error consists not in his antecedent claim that there is an efficacious decree antecedently moving the will (provided it also excites it), but in his inference that such a decree removes freedom. The Thomist position directly contradicts this by affirming that even given such an antecedent, it does not follow that freedom is removed; rather, it is preserved by the divine decree. However, such an inferential error is not an error against the basic principles of dialectic, but against true philosophy and faith. It should therefore be reduced to an error in one of the premises, which in Calvin's case might be as follows: "For an action to arise necessarily by necessity of consequence from God's antecedent predefinition means that action is not free; but in fact all our actions arise in this way; therefore, in fact they are not free." Since the Thomists refuse to locate the error of this conclusion anywhere except in the error of the major premise, I ask them to show how, between them who deny that major and Calvin who affirms it, there is any question other than one of mere terminology. For the entire question rests on whether an action described in such terms should be called free. This reasoning is entirely similar to saying, for example: "For an Ethiopian to be a rational black animal means the Ethiopian is not human; but in fact an Ethiopian is a rational black animal; therefore, in fact an Ethiopian is not human." Here you see that the error of the conclusion must be traced back to the error of the major premise, about which those who affirm it can only dispute with those who deny it over the understanding of terms. For some think "human" signifies a rational white animal, others simply a rational animal. Hence, one who concludes that an Ethiopian is not human takes away nothing that the other posits, because he thinks nothing is missing in a human except whiteness. And one who concludes that an Ethiopian is human likewise posits nothing that the other does not also posit, because he simply posits a rational animal. In precisely the same way, Calvin, when through the above reasoning he concludes that human actions are not free, takes away nothing of freedom except what not even the Thomists themselves posit

DISPUTATION IV

—namely, the absence of necessity of consequence arising from God's antecedent decree. Thus I continue to ask in what way he contradicts them, except in thinking that the term "free action" should not be used where such necessity exists. And this, as I often remind you, he declares he says without obstinacy, and thus without heresy. It is also pointless for Father John of St. Thomas to report from Father Lemos that Calvin erred in denying sufficient grace. For we are not now inquiring what other errors of Calvin might be, but rather in what precisely consists that error from which no Catholic has hitherto absolved Calvin—namely, that by which free will is destroyed by God's predefinition.

CXIX. Finally, these same authors reproach Calvin for saying that there is no exciting grace or moral attraction, but only a physical force moving as brutes are moved and as a horse is moved by its rider, for he uses this example. Concerning exciting grace and moral attraction, we have already spoken. But regarding this physical force and the similarity of rider and horse, let us hear Calvin himself: "The question to be resolved is whether God should be attributed any role in evil works, in which Scripture intimates some action of His intervenes. Augustine somewhere compares the human will to a horse awaiting the command of its rider, with God and the devil being the riders... For the present, we shall be content with this comparison WHEN A BETTER ONE DOES NOT OCCUR." You see that this comparison was taken from Augustine, and consequently, if it were sufficient for just suspicion, Augustine himself would be suspect. You see, moreover, that not even Calvin himself was entirely satisfied with it, as he complains about the lack of a better one, thus testifying to it being less than suitable. I omit that he is speaking only of evil acts. But to make clear what his meaning is, and so that no one can say he is being accused falsely when there are so many true charges against him, let us hear him again: "What Augustine says elsewhere, that grace does not remove the will but changes it from evil to good, and helps it when it has become good, means only that man is not drawn in such a way that he is carried along by an external impulse with-

DISPUTATION IV

out any movement of the heart, but that he is internally affected so that he obeys from the heart." And again, concerning good works, he presents Augustine's passage from the book on correction and grace thus: "How, says Augustine, do you tell me that we are acted upon and do not act? On the contrary, you both act and are acted upon, and you act well when you are acted upon by the good. The Spirit of God, who acts upon you, is a helper to those who act, and the name 'helper' indicates that you also do something." Then Calvin adds his own commentary: "In the first part, he warns that human action is not removed by the motion of the Holy Spirit, because the will, which is required to aspire to good, comes from nature. But when he adds that from the name 'helper' we can infer that we also do something, this should not be taken to mean that he attributes anything to us separately; rather, to prevent fostering laziness in us, he reconciles God's action with ours by saying that to will comes from nature, but to will well comes from grace."

And then, having said that whatever good we do is entirely due to divine grace, he adds: "Meanwhile, we do not deny the very true teaching of Augustine that grace does not destroy the will but rather repairs it." And shortly after: "Nothing now prevents us from saying that we rightly do what the Spirit of God does in us, even though our will contributes nothing that can be separated from His grace. Therefore, we should remember what we have cited elsewhere from Augustine, that some people labor in vain to find something good in man's will that is properly his own. For whatever mixture from the power of free will men endeavor to bring to God's grace is nothing but its corruption... And although whatever good is in the will comes from the mere instinct of the Spirit, yet because it is naturally implanted in us to will, we are not inappropriately said to do those things which God rightfully claims as His own, first because whatever He works in us is ours by His kindness, provided we understand it is not from ourselves; and second because our mind, our will, and our effort, which are directed by God toward good, are ours." Does not removing human action, not destroying his will but

DISPUTATION IV

repairing it, acting and not merely being acted upon, being affected to act from the heart, acting in such a way that the mind works together with the will—do these sound like being moved in the manner of brutes?

CXX. These are almost all the main points of that response which was delivered by Father Lemos before the Supreme Pontiff. Having recounted them, Father John of St. Thomas concludes thus: "Behold how Calvin's position was explained before the Supreme Pontiff, so that from this we may know how groundlessly our position is criticized on the grounds that it agrees with or does not oppose the Calvinist position in some respect, when in fact no doctrine contradicts it more diametrically than ours." But it is clear from what has been said that this narration should have been concluded with the opposite demonstration, saying instead: "Behold how poorly Father Lemos understood Calvin's doctrine, and how improbable is what Father John of St. Thomas relates—that when he had finished speaking, Cardinal du Perron, who had interrupted him, fell so silent that he even seemed to nod in agreement." Indeed, this too should have been added: "Behold how just is the petition of the Defenders of Middle Knowledge who, after such a long dispute over so many years, still ask what the real difference is between the doctrine of their Adversaries and that of Calvin, precisely on the question of whether there is or is not some use of free will in humans."

Therefore, I conclude this chapter with the syllogism whose major premise is suggested by Father Lemos according to Father John of St. Thomas: "If Calvin admitted that the necessity of consequence arising from God's efficacious will is perfectly compatible with human freedom, he would not be in error but would hold truly Catholic doctrine. But he does admit that this necessity of consequence is perfectly compatible with freedom—that is, with that thing which the Thomists call freedom and which he himself permits to be so called, as has now been shown in many ways. Therefore, either that thing is not true freedom, or Calvin is not in error but is in this respect Catholic." This, as I always point out, is proposed by me not so much for the sake of assertion as for inquiry.

DISPUTATION IV

CXXI. But there remains another topic concerning the Author of sin, about which the defenders of Middle Knowledge also ask what the Adversaries have said that is less objectionable than the Calvinists. And this is properly that objection which Father John of St. Thomas calls stupid. He says that Calvin, according to Belcarius, Bishop of Metz, believed that God necessitates the wretched to commit crimes; and that Beza says everything necessarily happens according to God's immutable decree: Christ was necessarily betrayed by Judas, condemned by Pilate, etc. But these matters have already been resolved when we showed that Calvin understood no other necessity than that which the Adversaries do not deny, namely, the necessity of consequence.

CXXII. Father Lemos adds that Calvin erred because he said that God moves toward evil just as He does toward good; that he did not know how to distinguish between action and entity as entity and action, and between sin; that he would not have erred if he had said that God concurs with the entity but in no way moves toward sin. But let us hear Calvin, who poses this objection to himself thus: "In this way is solved, or rather spontaneously disappears, another objection: if God not only uses the works of the impious but also governs their plans and affections, He is the Author of all crimes, and therefore men are unjustly condemned if they execute what God has decreed." He resolves this objection by presenting the example of the defection of the ten tribes from Solomon's son to Jeroboam, which God seems to Calvin both to have decreed and to have condemned. And he speaks thus: "We see, therefore, how God, while not willing perfidy, yet justly wills defection for another end." See how acutely he distinguishes the malice of perfidy from the entity of defection, and consequently in that sense denies that God moves toward evil actions in the same way as toward good ones, because He does not intend their malice as He intends the goodness of the latter.

But come, let us produce other testimonies of this distinction, among which this one seems especially clear, where he says: "FOR INSO-FAR AS THEY ARE EVIL, what men perpetrate with evil intent, I ad-

DISPUTATION IV

mit by no means pleases God." This reduplication is clearly a sign of distinction between the material and formal aspects of an action. This is also expressed: "The blinding of the impious and whatever crimes follow from it are called the works of Satan, the cause of which, however, should not be sought outside the human will, from which arises the root of evil, in which resides the foundation of Satan's kingdom, that is, sin. Far different is the nature of divine action in such acts, and to make this clearer to us, let the calamity inflicted on holy Job by the Chaldeans serve as an example." Then, having described Job's devastation, he says: "How shall we attribute the same work to God, to Satan, and to man as its author without either excusing Satan by God's partnership or calling God the Author of evil? Easily, if we first consider the purpose of acting, then the manner. The Lord's design is to exercise His servant's patience by calamity; Satan strives to drive him to despair; the Chaldeans seek to gain profit from another's property unlawfully. **SUCH GREAT DIVERSITY IN PURPOSES ALREADY GREATLY DISTINGUISHES THE WORK. THERE IS NO LESS DIFFERENCE IN MANNER.** The Lord permits Satan to afflict His servant... Satan is properly said to act in the reprobate, in whom he exercises his kingdom, that is, of wickedness. God is also said to act in His own way, because Satan himself, being the instrument of His wrath, turns this way and that according to His will and command to execute His just judgments... Therefore, we see that it is not absurd to assign the same deed to God, Satan, and man. **BUT THE VARIETY IN PURPOSE AND MANNER CAUSES GOD'S SPOTLESS JUSTICE TO SHINE FORTH,** while the wickedness of Satan and man betrays itself with its own confusion."

Is not attributing the action to God and the wickedness to man or Satan a way of distinguishing malice from the entity of the action? Is not distinguishing the same work, and insofar as it is from God assigning it an honorable end and manner, while on the contrary, insofar as it is from man and the devil, assigning it a shameful end and manner—is this confusing turpitude with action? When God concurs with the demon, He

DISPUTATION IV

acts in His own way and executes just judgments; the demon also acts in his way and exercises the kingdom of wickedness—is this for both to concur indistinctly, with God toward that action even as it is evil, or the demon toward the same action as it is good? Will that work be said to be viewed by God as evil, in which His blameless justice shines forth? Will it therefore be regarded by the demon as good, although in it his wickedness "betrays itself with its own confusion"? And after such a clear distinction between action and malice in Calvin, Father Lemos, in the face of this sun, was not afraid to say that he erred because he did not know how to distinguish between action and entity as entity and action, and between sin? Let the fair reader see and judge, and let him also recall what Father John of St. Thomas says—that when Father Lemos, who had begun by addressing Cardinal du Perron, "Most Illustrious Lord, I will state everything that Calvin said on this matter," had been heard, du Perron fell silent and seemed to nod in agreement. I pass over another passage from Calvin where he says that men, by doing evil, serve God's just ordinance, who in the greatness of His wisdom knows well and properly how to use evil instruments for good purposes. And that men find all evil in themselves, while with God there is nothing but the legitimate use of evil. By these statements he indicates the very thing we said before: that in an evil human action there is goodness insofar as it is God's action, but malice only insofar as it is man's. Therefore, no distinction should be sought from this point between his opinion and that of the Adversaries.

Nor should it be sought on the grounds that he thought man sins necessarily and not freely. For as shown earlier, he understands necessity only as the necessity of consequence, which is also approved by the Adversaries; for the rest, he holds that man sins not unwillingly nor under coercion, but with the most willing disposition of mind, not by violent compulsion. And if anyone thinks that this is precisely what it means to sin freely, he does not resist, since he detests verbal disputes. Let this, then, be the summary of this argument.

DISPUTATION IV

CXXIII. Calvin verbally denies but in reality confesses that God is the Author of sin, which he cannot do without conceiving in God a certain way of relating to evil actions that properly fits the description of being the author of sin. We ask, therefore, what this way is, and what it adds beyond the way that the Adversaries largely conceive. For they say that God antecedently, absolutely, and efficaciously decrees that man should perform an action that is evil, and that he should necessarily do so with a necessity of consequence arising from such a decree, and that he should do it with knowledge of the prohibition and malice, and therefore in all circumstances from which it is impossible for malice to be absent; and to this end, God impresses upon man an efficacious motion. And although man wickedly follows that motion, God nevertheless does this justly and holily, because He has suitable reasons for doing so in the depths of His wisdom and intends suitable ends, and also observes suitable methods in executing this work. We ask, I say, what more or less Calvin says than this. For as to his denial that man's action is free, it is clear that he does not reject that thing which, according to the Adversaries, is freedom—namely, that which excludes only coercion and, as they think, the necessity of the consequent, while preserving the indifference of judgment. As for the other respects in which the two opinions differ from each other, we inquire.

CXXIV. And let no one say that, given the varied, uncertain, and versatile character of heretics, Calvin says contradictory things, and what he establishes in the passages we have adduced, he destroys elsewhere. For those testimonies that destroy the earlier ones would have to be presented, but they do not exist anywhere. And since we openly produce one part of the contradiction, unless the Adversaries produce the other, the case must be adjudicated in our favor. Especially since even the rigid Calvinists, who adhered to Calvin in opposition to the Mild ones, eagerly embraced the method of solving this difficulty that was exhibited by those against whom we are disputing, as can be seen in Amesius against Bellarmine and in Molinaeus in his "Anatomy of Arminianism" (whom

DISPUTATION IV

you would think had heard Diego Alvarez in his School when they treat this question), and some recent Thomists admit that they struggle to find a distinction between these two positions, as is evident from John Gonzales cited above.

CXXV. But not even Gonzales himself seems to correct his colleagues' doctrine in a sufficiently apt way when he says that God is not the Author of sin, although He predefines men's evil actions insofar as they are actions, because He does not predefine purely positively but both positively and permissively, and not directly and determinately per se, but as a universal mover cooperating with some created cause. This reason, I say, is not adequate. For we immediately return to the first sin of the Angel and of Adam, and ask what created cause it was that required God, as universal Mover, to predefine the act underlying malice? Did Calvin deny this? And consequently, did he deny that in this sense God concurs both positively and permissively? But if there was some nature that required determination to evil from the universal Mover, was it not itself evil before sin? And consequently, was not God, who created such a nature, the Author of evil natures, so that Calvin cannot be displeasing unless Manichaeus is appealing? But if Father Lemos had spoken the truth when he said that Calvin asserted predefinitions of evil acts only after foreseeing Adam's sin, could not Calvin now claim that his position and that of Gonzales are the same, since, only given nature's depravity, he would say that God assumes the role of universal Mover and does not predefine evil actions except by cooperating with some created cause that seems to be disposed to this? There might be one way to untie this difficult knot: if we were to follow the opinion of those Thomists whom Gonzales mentions, and whom Ledesma says are most wise men who precisely deny the predetermination of the divine decree with respect to the sinful act; and if we were to listen to Francisco Zumel saying that this opinion is neither true nor consistent with sound doctrine, according to the same Ledesma. We only report the words of others; we do not censure them, following the example of our Adversaries.

DISPUTATION IV

CXXVI. But since Father John of St. Thomas not only repels the suspicion of conspiracy which we have objected, but tries to cast it on us, we must briefly examine what he retorts. He says, therefore, that in the 37th Congregation before the Supreme Pontiff, Father Lemos showed that our position opposes and contradicts Calvin less than that of the Thomists, by this argument, which concludes that we go to the extreme errors of both Pelagius and Calvin: "That position whose principle is that to which both Calvin's and Pelagius's errors are reduced must be considered more favorable to both; but such is the position of the Defenders of Middle Knowledge; therefore, etc." The minor is proved thus: "This principle, 'God's will efficaciously moving antecedently and human freedom do not stand together,' is the principle used by the Defenders of Middle Knowledge. But Pelagius's error is resolved into this, as he subsumes this minor premise, which is a matter of faith: 'But human freedom must stand.' From this follows the heretical conclusion," says Father John of St. Thomas, "'Therefore, there is no divine will efficaciously moving antecedently.'" Calvin's error is resolved into the same principle, as he subsumes this minor premise, which is held to be a matter of faith: "But there is a divine will efficaciously moving antecedently." From this follows the heretical conclusion: "Therefore, human freedom is not preserved."

My response: The Adversaries should consider how they can prevent this argument from ending either in rash censure, when it calls heretical a proposition that the Holy See has granted the same right as its contradictory, prohibiting any note; or in a useless equivocation, when it takes "efficaciously and antecedently moving" in different ways; or in palpable ignorance, when it thinks that Calvin believed things he never imagined. For I accept that conclusion which they call Pelagian and heretical, "There is no divine will efficaciously moving antecedently"; and since there are two modes of motion—one physically predetermining that necessarily infers the action of the created will independently of any foresight of it, even conditional, such as the Thomists admit; another that has neither that mode of predetermination nor that mode of inference,

DISPUTATION IV

such as is admitted by the Defenders of Middle Knowledge—I ask in what way they understand that conclusion, "There is no divine will moving antecedently and efficaciously"? Only in the first way, or also in the second? If the first, it is, as I said, a rash censure, because it is forbidden to brand with a note those who deny the Thomist doctrine on this point. If the second, let us now ascend to the major, which is that principle in which Calvin is said to agree with Pelagius, "God's will efficaciously moving antecedently and human freedom do not stand together," and I ask whether "moving" here also signifies that mode of motion which the Defenders of Middle Knowledge understand. If not, then the argument labors in equivocation, as they say, and "moving" is taken in one sense in the major and another in the conclusion. If it does, then it is false that this is Calvin's principle. For the motion which he understands, and by which he thinks freedom is destroyed, is not that milder and more temperate one which he thinks was approved by the Fathers and Scholastics many centuries ago. "God," he says, "so moves the will, not in the way believed for many centuries, that it is afterward our choice to consent, etc." Here you see that not just any motion seems to Calvin contrary to freedom, but only that one which he alone thinks true, rejecting that which the Catholics followed. And this concerning the first argument, which was said to be that of Pelagius.

Concerning the latter, which is Calvin's, I similarly ask about that minor premise which they say is a matter of faith, "But there is an antecedent will efficaciously moving": which mode of moving do they understand—that of those who deny Middle Knowledge, or that of those who affirm it, or either one indifferently? If the first, the Adversaries go too far when they say their doctrine on this point is a matter of faith. If the second or third, then either they argue equivocally because the major cannot be understood in that way, as I said; or, if they contend that the major can be understood in the same way, they are ignorant of Calvin's doctrine, who, as has been shown, never in that sense denied that God's motion is compatible with freedom.

DISPUTATION IV

CXXVII. There remained an examination of what the Salamancans advance to show that distinction which we so diligently seek between the Adversaries and the Calvinists on this question of the Author of sin. But what we have said is sufficient to refute these too.

The summary of this doctrine is, namely, that an evil act is first distinguished into the material, which is the entity itself, and the formal, which is the malice itself; then the material itself is further distinguished. For it can be taken either materially, so that it is precisely and specifically the entity, or formally, so that it is understood as the entity not precisely but insofar as it grounds malice reduplicatively. Therefore, neither does God by His predefinition, nor man by his action, directly tend toward the formal aspect of sin. Toward the material taken materially, God tends by His predefinition according to the Thomists. Toward the material taken formally, according to the true opinion, man tends by his action, and therefore indirectly tends toward malice. Toward the same material taken formally, according to Calvin's opinion, God tends by His predefinition, and consequently also tends indirectly toward malice itself, just as man does—although God does not sin because He is not subject to the law as man is. And thus the difference between the opinions of the Thomists and Calvin is this: although Calvin denies that God predefines the formal aspect of sin, he says that He predefines the material aspect of sin taken formally, while the Thomists say only that God predefines the material aspect of sin taken materially. Thus they argue.

CXXVIII. However, since it would be lengthy to pursue the other defects of that distinction, I say only this: First, Calvin never used such words; whether he used their equivalents, it will be for the Salamancans to show. Meanwhile, I clearly demonstrate that he did not use them. Because for God and man to tend toward the material aspect of sin taken formally, which is to tend indirectly toward malice, is to tend in the same way, as is self-evident. But according to Calvin, God and man do not tend in the same way. Therefore, etc. The assumption is proved from the passage already adduced, in which it is manifest that in the raid of the

DISPUTATION IV

Chaldeans on Job's flocks, Calvin distinguishes God from the Chaldeans based on different purposes and ways of acting, so that from this "God's spotless justice shines forth, while the wickedness of the Chaldeans betrays itself with its own confusion." With what fidelity, then, shall we now say that according to Calvin, God and the Chaldeans behaved in the same way regarding that raid?

But enough of these matters and of the entire Defense of Middle Knowledge, which the onslaught of adversaries rushing in together has wrested from us. It remains for us to embrace in a brief epilogue what has been discussed in scattered fashion.

**EPILOGUE. OF THE PRECEDING
DISPUTATIONS, AND A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE
DOCTRINE CONCERNING MIDDLE
KNOWLEDGE.**

I. THE QUESTION is whether God, before it has been determined whether Paul, for example, will attend such a sermon, or even after it has been determined that he will not in fact attend, knows with certainty what affection his will would freely conceive, if he were nevertheless to attend: Likewise, whether before it has been determined whether John will attend such a comedy, or even after it has been determined that he will not in reality attend, God knows with certainty what affection his will would freely conceive, if he were nevertheless to attend. The proponents of Middle Knowledge contend that God knows both with certainty, and even the Thomists generally do not wish to appear to have ever denied this. Hence the entire controversy remains about the basis upon which this knowledge of God rests. The Thomists indeed contend that God knows this only through a decree that is conditional on the part of the object, but absolutely existing on the part of the act, by which He says, "I will that if that person hears such a sermon, he freely conceives such an affection," and, "if that person attends such a comedy, he is also freely moved by such a motion." And although they admit that this knowledge of God is conditional, they nevertheless deny that it is middle knowledge, solely because it is posterior to those decrees. On the contrary, others think there are no such decrees preceding that conditional

EPILOGUE

knowledge, and because this means conditional knowledge is middle knowledge by common consensus, they therefore assert absolutely that Middle Knowledge exists in God.

II. THUS, as you see, Reader, this entire controversy revolves around whether or not these decrees exist. The proponents of Middle Knowledge contend that they do not exist, based on the following arguments. The first argument is derived from the novelty of the doctrine asserting such decrees: we prove this novelty by asking, who before these years of the beginning of this century or the end of the previous one, either expressed or presupposed this theology? Who, I ask, has thought of God as so concerned about things that will never exist, that part of His providence would even direct those acts of men that will never be, making some conditionally future and others not? Who has thus far imposed such cares upon God, saying, "I will that if I wished Peter to go to such a sermon, he would freely determine himself to such an affection. I will that if I wished Paula to attend such a comedy, she would freely conceive such a will"? By the same reasoning, we prove the antiquity of Middle Knowledge. For the ancient doctrine of this knowledge is nothing other than that it was once believed that there is knowledge of conditionally future free acts, and that the decrees upon which it depends were not believed to exist. But truly it was once believed that this knowledge exists, and these decrees were not believed to exist: Therefore, etc. The major premise is clear. Regarding the minor premise, the first part, namely that this knowledge was once known and approved, is now freely conceded by our Adversaries; the second part, that the decrees were not known, we prove by requiring that some traces of them be shown to us: for if none appear in ancient writers, it remains that we may rightly marvel, as at the sight of new fruits. And in this way we shift the entire burden of reconciling authority onto our Adversaries. For since our position contains two points, the first of which is affirmative of conditional knowledge as formerly recognized, and the second is negative regarding those decrees: The first, which alone required proof from the testimonies of the an-

EPILOGUE

cients, is now conceded. The second, about which the entire controversy exists, and which we defend by simple negation, should await the proofs of our Adversaries, none of which have yet appeared sufficiently suitable, as will be evident from the resolution of objections.

III. But secondly, we prove positively that these decrees do not exist by inverting and turning back the conjecture of our Adversaries, which assumes that nothing is future in any way that is not future by some preceding will of God. For it is established among the Fathers that even concerning things absolutely future, the contrary should rather be said, from these two pronouncements which occur frequently among them. The first is that foreknowledge extends further than predestination or predefinition: and it should not be believed that whatever is foreknown by God as future has been predestined or predefined by Him. The second is that Divine foreknowledge is not the reason why those things that men freely do are future; But on the contrary, because these things are freely future, that is the reason why God foreknows them: which idea can be neither true nor probable if predefinition is necessary for all future things. And this is so clear that William Twisse does not doubt that this was the opinion of the Holy Fathers who preceded Augustine; and even of Augustine himself before the Pelagian heresy sharpened him: in which it is certainly not surprising that a Calvinist agrees with Calvin, who excepts only Augustine from the censure of the other Fathers in this controversy concerning free will and God's foreknowledge, but it is remarkable that this judgment has so pleased the recent Patrons of Pseudo-Augustine that, after conceding that Origen's Epistle to the Romans and even Augustine's own opinion before he assumed the Episcopate was perfectly Semi-Pelagian, they continue to say that it is not surprising that other Writers positioned between the times of both Origen and Augustine, as being of inferior note and perspicacity, stumbled upon the same rock. They mean those about whom Prosper wrote to Augustine when he reported that the Semi-Pelagians were objecting to the opinion of the Fathers and the ecclesiastical sense. Therefore they surrender to that objec-

EPILOGUE

tion, while admitting that other Writers who came between Origen and Augustine fell into the error of the Semi-Pelagians: and thus that the ecclesiastical sense was erroneous throughout that entire interval. Whether this can be said without error, and without serious injury to the Church, let those whose concern it is decide. But since they wish this case to be decided at the tribunal of Augustine alone.

IV. Thirdly, it is proven that Augustine held the same view, namely, that not all things which are foreknown as future are foreknown because they are predefined. This is established first from those ten testimonies that were proposed in disputation 1, number 32, the force of which Twisse attempted to evade when he said that Augustine indeed denied that whatever is foreknown by God has been predestinated, but not that it has been predefined; because the acceptance of predestination is stricter than that of predefinition. But this is in vain. For it has been extensively demonstrated that not only is the name of predestination denied, but the thing itself, that is, the antecedent and absolute will of God concerning all things that are foreknown. And that this is the genuine sense of Augustine can be understood from his two disciples, Prosper and Fulgentius, in those disputations which they undertook to defend the doctrine of their Teacher by refuting the imposition of fatal predefinitions with which he was burdened by heretics. Then this same point is established from that doubt which Augustine, like the other Fathers, frequently had to resolve: Why did God create Angels whom He knew would sin? Why did He create Adam whom He knew would fall? For this is to ask how the foreknowledge of sin to follow did not impede the will to create the sinner? And because there was no other foreknowledge that could impede except conditional foreknowledge, consequently Augustine understood only that. Again, if that knowledge had been preceded by conditional predefinition, no reason for doubt would remain, and the question would be useless and absurd. For since the whole reason for doubting is derived from the fact that it seems to be contrary to divine goodness to do good to those whom He foreknows will abuse His benefit and thereby

EPILOGUE

become more miserable and unhappy, to whom would this contradiction seem probable who thinks it does not contradict divine goodness that He predefined that abuse? Suppose, I say, that Augustine was persuaded that by God's decree it was established that if an Angel were created, he would conceive a will which is known to be possible only as evil; and that it would not be otherwise future from the hypothesis of creation than because it was thus decreed by God; could it seem strange to him or unworthy of God that He wished to create such an Angel? And should it not rather have been asked why God, who is good, beyond and above all requirement by His decree made that will future, rather than why after He had both made it and knew it would be future, He did not abstain from creating the Angel? What evil is there in creating one whom you know will sin, that is not in making it so that he would sin? And how can one who suspects nothing of this, that it could be done by God, hesitate about the former? And since the sense of that doubt is, why did God not prevent sin from being future by not creating the one who would sin; could God have seemed to Augustine to have had to prevent the one who would sin, when He knew He should have had to predefine that he would sin? But if there were any predefinition of such acts, why would God seem to have had to prevent sin by not creating the sinner, rather than by not predefining sin? And why would Augustine rather ask why God made sin, that is, the evil action, future from the hypothesis, than why He created the sinner himself? That is, why would he not rather have suppressed sin by omitting its predefinition, than the sinner by denying creation? For that way was more economical, easier, and better, to prevent the harmful effect while preserving the cause, than to cut off both the cause and the effect. Nor if it were in the power of a farmer to make either good or bad fruits grow from the same tree according to his discretion, would anyone ask him why he does not cut down the tree that bears bad fruits, rather than why he makes it bear bad fruits when he could by the same means procure good ones. But Augustine asks in this way when he seeks why God created the Angel or man whom He knew would sin. Evidently be-

EPILOGUE

cause he never believed it was done according to His discretion that they were known to be going to sin rather than not going to sin. And therefore in that production of evils on God's part, he recognizes nothing other than this: to Allow, that is, not to prevent evils from existing, when he says that God created those who would sin because He saw it was better to do good from evils than NOT TO ALLOW evil to exist. And thus he proposes the fruit to be gathered on the occasion of evil acts, not as a motive for which God could have predefined them, but only for which God could have allowed them to be, which is to permit. By which thought it is sufficiently established that Augustine supposed that futurity of evil acts by no means has a cause in any present decree of God, but in the possible supposition of a free cause equipped with all prerequisites for acting.

3. This is further proven from the fact that Augustine infers from the conditional futurity of the repentance of the Tyrians, namely, that some naturally have the divine gift of understanding, if they hear words or see deeds suitable to their minds, which is that some are naturally teachable, or not so resistant to the divine calling. But he would doubtless say of those who would be conditionally hardened, that from this it appears similarly that in some there is an unteachable nature, and a certain naturally inherent impediment to obeying. But this entire observation vanishes if neither that obedience of the Tyrians nor this obstinacy of others is future otherwise than because it was efficaciously and inevitably predefined by God. For it follows that with that predefinition removed, neither would the Tyrians have been converted nor others hardened; but with it changed, both the Tyrians would have been hardened and any others softened and converted: so that no reason remains to infer from this the various dispositions and different conditions of natures.

4. It is proven from the fact that these kinds of predefinitions were unknown to other Fathers positioned between Origen and Augustine, and at least tacitly disapproved by them, which is so well known that therefore they are thought by the Jansenists to have stumbled into the error which later belonged to the Semi-Pelagians: from this it manifestly follows that these

EPILOGUE

predefinitions were neither known nor approved by Augustine: the consequence is proven. Because it is established from the books against Julian, and from the responses to Prosper and Hilary, that Augustine, attacking the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, used the testimonies of those Holy Fathers whose opinion he explains at length. But who would think him so incautious and imprudent as to object to his adversaries an authority to which he himself would not yield; nor would he see that he would be condemned by that precedent, when it would be established that they had stood for free will against gratuitous predefinitions, while he fought for gratuitous predefinitions against the powers of free will? 5. In the same way one may argue from what they assume, that the Latins followed Augustine in these controversies, just as the Greeks had followed Origen. From which I infer that conditional predefinitions were not known to Augustine, if they were not known to the succeeding Doctors in the Latin Church: but it is established that they were by no means known to these from the whole of § 4, chapter 2, disputation 1, where it is shown what was the mind of the Principal Fathers and Doctors who flourished from the time of Augustine: which Catalog we can augment from the confession of our Adversaries, who, while reciting various opinions on these questions and their Followers, name many of the ancients, especially Scholastics, who opposed the predefinitions of free acts. Their enumeration can be seen in Ledesma.

V. And these should be valid not only to reveal Augustine's mind, but also to prove fourthly and directly what we intend, that these conditional predefinitions are by no means to be admitted. For since the infallibility of the Church is always the same, and its authority is the same at all times; it follows that whatever approaches more closely to the ecclesiastical sense should also be considered by the faithful to come closer to the truth. Furthermore, to attain the sense of the Church, that conjecture is, I think, the best which is derived from the common opinion of the Fathers and Doctors, when they declare a matter to be in no way controversial among the Orthodox. And for this reason alone we are accustomed

EPILOGUE

to press heretics, who promise that they will listen to the Ancient Church. We ask, namely, that they investigate the sense of that Church in the monuments of the ancient Fathers in such a way that they do not doubt that what most of them have affirmatively stated was in accordance with the doctrine of the Church. By the same right, we can now demand that we look at what was the mind of the Church from the time of Augustine to these times, in the writings of those Fathers and Doctors who are known to have learned and taught and written and lived in the bosom of the Church. And because it is established from Leo the Great, from Prosper of Aquitaine, from Fulgentius, from the Fathers of Orange, from those of Valence, from Eucherius of Lyons, from Leo IX, from Anselm, from the Master of the Sentences, from St. Thomas, to whom can be added, with the agreement of our Adversaries, Cardinal Sadoletto, Archbishop Osorius, and, although they omit him, Bishop Belcarius, and other Scholastics both Nominalists and Scotists; because, I say, from these authorities it is established that there are some things foreknown which are not predestined, predetermined, predefined; we ask that they produce either any, or as many, or such great Orthodox Writers of the same periods who have made controversy for others about this matter: which if they cannot provide, it remains that they confess that the doctrine which states that not all things are predefined which are foreknown, that is, not all things are predefined which are future, is more in accordance with the sense of the Church. Now if they concede that this is to be understood only of things conditionally future, we have our intention and Middle Knowledge is accepted; if of absolute futures, a necessary deduction from them to conditionals is required. For conditional predefinition, when the condition is posited, passes into absolute predefinition, and makes what was only conditionally predefined to be absolutely future, so that it is impossible to deny that what is absolutely future has been predefined, if it is conceded that that very thing had been predefined so that it would be conditionally future. Not to mention that there is either no reason, or less reason, to say that predefinition is necessary for things condi-

EPILOGUE

tionally future, than for things absolutely future. But this argument is treated more extensively in the place already cited from disputation 1, where the escapes of useless distinctions are also refuted, especially that by which it is said that not all things are predefined according to some formality, e.g., under the aspect of evil, but they are predefined according to substance, concerning which see what has been said before.

VI. Fifthly, conditional predefinitions are also excluded by the words of Christ in that passage of Matthew 11:21, "Woe to you, Chorazin... because if in Tyre, etc.," by which our Adversaries now do not deny that the conditionally future repentance of the Tyrians and Sidonians is signified. With this established, it is first evident that those words contain a certain rebuke of the obstinacy of the Jews, as compared with the obedience and docility of the Tyrians that would have been from the hypothesis. Then it is also certain and a matter of faith that this rebuke is just and entirely consonant with reason, as coming from the most fair and wise God. Thirdly, it is manifest by the light of nature that those rebukes are unjust by which the worse are reprimanded in comparison with the better, if there is not an equal ratio both of obligation and ability to act well, and of all aids, so that the one to whom the other is preferred can truly object, "if I had had all the aids that he had, I would have done no less than he did," and the other, "if he had not been helped more than I was, he also would not have done more than I did." Hence it remains fourthly that we see whether the Jews have such an excuse, if it is true that the repentance of the Tyrians was conditionally predefined, and would not be future otherwise than because it was predefined: which argument is treated in disputation 1, chapter 5, § 3, especially from number 60.

VII. Sixthly is the argument which is commonly proposed, and for which a solution is still awaited. Namely, that those efficacious predefinitions of free acts involve a contradiction, in that they destroy their own object, and while they tend toward free acts they make them necessary. For it is contradictory for an absolute and efficacious predefinition of

EPILOGUE

God to be frustrated in its effect: and therefore there is none which does not have attached to it the necessity of effecting what it predefines. Therefore if it predefines a free act, there is in it the necessity of effecting that the act be free: and thus it necessarily makes the act free. But now it is contradictory that any cause should necessarily produce a free act, unless the free act is necessarily produced by it, as is clear from the terms: but predefinition necessarily produces a free act, from what has been conceded: therefore the free act is necessarily produced by it. This, however, I say involves a contradiction. Because it is of the nature of a free act that it not be produced necessarily by any necessity which is not made by the will to which it is free, or which does not descend from such a will, as Anselm says: hence if a free act is necessarily produced by a necessity arising from predefinition, it both is and is not free. This is further explained. Because predefinition does not cause only the mode of freedom in the act, but also the very substance or existence of such an act: nor through it does God only say, I will that if man operates, he operates freely; but absolutely He says, I will that both man operates and operates freely. Therefore this predefinition necessarily provides and effects both, namely, that both the operation exists and is free, which is contradictory. Because in order to be free, it must not be necessary, by any necessity which does not descend from the will to which it is free. And thus there can be no other sense of a decree predefining a free act, excluding Middle Knowledge, than this: I predefine that that act is elicited by such a cause, without any predefinition. Because in order to be free, it must be done without any cause which is distinct from the will acting freely, and which nevertheless necessarily infers the act itself: But predefinition is both distinct and necessarily infers the act: Therefore in order to be free, it must be done without such predefinition: Therefore to be predefined to be done freely is to be predefined to be done without predefinition. But see what has been said before, where the usual evasions about the necessity of the consequent and the consequence, etc., are excluded.

EPILOGUE

VIII. Seventhly, the argument concerning the predefinition of evil acts is pressing. For they too are conditionally future, and as such are known by God: But God neither absolutely nor conditionally makes them future by His predefinition, because this would be contrary to His goodness and justice, and it would follow that He is the author and cause of evil: Therefore something is known as conditionally future independently of predefinition, which is to have Middle Knowledge. But because it has been shown before how much foundation this argument has both in the doctrine of the Holy Fathers and in the common sense of the faithful, and even in natural reason itself, and how vain is the distinction which our Adversaries are accustomed to oppose when they say that the act which is evil is predefined, but not as it is evil; I will only add now that Master Fr. John Vincent of the Order of St. Dominic, whom Ledesma of the same Order almost always names with the eulogy of a Most Learned and Wise man, according to the same Ledesma, held that an evil act is not predefined even as to the substance and entity of the act, and that the passage from Trent proves this: and that he adheres to this opinion so tenaciously that he could be moved from it only by the authority of the Church. I will also add what Francis de Araujo of the same Order has in 1. 2. on question 3, article 5, where he says in doubt 6, number 43: Without doubt it is hardly probable that God predetermines human wills to evil works even as to their material entity. I will also add Francis Cumel, who embraces the other conclusions of the Thomists in this matter, similarly confesses that he is convinced by the passage from Trent: and that the contrary is consonant neither with true nor with sound doctrine. Indeed, other most wise men who also follow the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor deny predetermination to the substance and entity of an evil act, as the same Ledesma says: to omit John Gonzalez, one of the Princes of our Adversaries, who was also present at the disputations held before the Supreme Pontiff. For he, while explaining God's concurrence in evil acts, expressly denies that God premoves to them as Diego Alvares had believed, namely as a special Mover. For He premoves only as a universal

EPILOGUE

Mover, and indeed by cooperating with some created cause. It would be worthwhile if he explained to us what is the created cause which in all conditionally future sins both requires the conditionally future premotion and the present and absolutely existing predefinition. But indeed these show that predefinitions of evil acts, even according to their entity, are not so easy that they have not terrified most of our Adversaries: so that their reprobation can have sufficient authority even among them. Now it is established from Fr. John of St. Thomas that evil acts both exist and are known by God as conditionally future, this is so manifest that he does not wish there to have been controversy about it. If therefore these things are joined together—that it is not to be doubted that evil acts both exist and are known to be conditionally future, which almost all suppose; and that there can be no predefinition of them, which not a few and noble and of the first note among them contend—what remains except that we say that Middle Knowledge, which is nothing other than the knowledge of things conditionally future independent of present predefinition, is sufficiently safe by the authority of the Thomists themselves.

IX. The eighth argument confirms the two preceding ones, insofar as it proves that freedom is not destroyed by heretics in any other way than how it is destroyed by our Adversaries, by the predefinition of free acts without the direction of Middle Knowledge; and sin is not referred to God as to the Author by them in any other way than how it truly can be referred, if it is true that evil acts are predefined by Him. This argument, which is two-headed, is treated above in disputation 4. And this is the summary of the first chapter. If heretics deny nothing of that thing which among our Adversaries is freedom, they cannot differ except verbally, the opinion of both being the same. But they deny nothing of that thing which among the Thomists is freedom: Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proven. For an act to be free according to our Adversaries is nothing other than to be exercised by the will neither extrinsically coerced nor necessarily determined by judgment or cognition: and to be predefined that it be done freely and without necessity is nothing other

EPILOGUE

than to be predefined that it be done both without coercion and without judgment necessarily determining to one part, but rather that it be done from the direction of indifferent judgment. But heretics deny none of these things, that is, they do not deny that the act about whose freedom they dispute is exercised by the will without coercion, and with indifferent judgment not necessarily determining the will: for whatever necessity they admit in such an act, they by no means say it comes from judgment, but only from God's predefinition, nor do they admit any necessity whatever, since they exclude that which is called of the consequent, and absolute, and necessity simply, as we have seen from Calvin in the place already cited. Therefore when they deny that such an act is free, or is predefined by God as free, they deny nothing of that thing in which our Adversaries place the nature of the free. Therefore the contention is only about words: And it is so contended that through Calvin it is permissible to call that thing freedom, as has been said. That which is proposed by me is done with the cautions previously stated.

X. As for the second head, I argue similarly. If heretics attribute nothing in reality to God, when they say He is the author of sin, which is not also attributed by our Adversaries who admit predefinitions of evil acts, it follows that they are blasphemous only in word, not in any thought unworthy of God. But they attribute nothing in reality to God when they say He is the author of sin which is not attributed by those who admit predefinitions of evil acts, Therefore, etc. The major premise is clear. The minor premise is proven from Calvin, who nowhere affirms, but rather denies that God's will and efficacy ever tend to an evil act as it is evil, so that evil can be attributed to Him, which he wants to reside entirely with man, and not at all with God: that God and man are concerned with the same action in entirely different ways, when that action is evil; and indeed in such a way that God does not will the perfidy of men, that evil acts do not please Him insofar as they are evil, that in them God's justice remains blameless; that He has only suitable ends, good, holy, worthy of God, for which He decrees acts which are evil, and effica-

EPILOGUE

ciously moves toward them. The Calvinists will complain that they are being misrepresented if anything else is attributed to them. But what less our Adversaries say, who admit predefinitions of evil acts, we await. And thus let them see what they wish to contend with Calvin about, for there will not even be a contention about words, since he expressly denies to God the name of author of sin: and the Calvinists in all ways try to remove the odium of such a nefarious term, both from themselves and from their parent.

XI. The ninth argument can be derived from natural reason by which the uselessness of these predefinitions is proven. For if they were necessary, it would be either on the part of the predefined act, as if indeed it could not be conditionally future if there were not a present predefinition of it: or on the part of God, who perhaps would lack some perfection, if from eternity He did not predefine that which is suspended from some condition: Neither can be said, Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proven: and first, that they are not necessary on the part of God for His perfection, is clear from the very apprehension and intuition of the terms, as it were. For what great or worthy of God do these decrees have: I will that if I willed this, that would follow, or, I do not will that if I willed this, that would follow: I do not will that there be another world, but if I willed that it existed, I will that men in it would behave themselves in such a manner. I will that there be an incarnation, but if I did not will that it existed, I will that men would use their free will thus or thus? What does that superfluous solicitude about futures that are not future confer on God? Would God be less if by one decree He embraced all those imaginary cases in such a way that He said, I do not will to establish anything about them? or if something is to be established, I will that free causes would have my concurrence prepared, in the way that is suitable to their nature? For that a present predefinition of God is not necessary for the free act itself for conditional futurity is clear. Because if it is not necessary to suppose that there would be a complete free cause, absolutely it is not necessary: but it is not necessary to suppose that there

EPILOGUE

would be a complete free cause: Therefore absolutely it is not necessary. I explain the argument. For when we say, if Saul comes the inhabitants of Keilah will surrender David, we suppose that the inhabitants of Keilah would have freedom complete in the first act to surrender David or not surrender him: and that is the supposition from which we say it would follow that they surrender. I say that for this no present predefinition of God is required, which is manifest in itself. For just as we do not suppose that the freedom of the inhabitants of Keilah is already complete, but that it would be; so neither should we suppose that there is now some complement of it, but that there would be. And if some predefinition of God is necessary for that complement, we should not suppose that it already exists, but that it would exist, and say, if the freedom of the inhabitants of Keilah were complete in such circumstances, with the concurrence of all things necessary for acting (in which words a predefinition is also included if that too is necessary), then the inhabitants of Keilah would surrender David. But if for that possible supposition of the complete freedom of the inhabitants of Keilah, the present predefinition of God is not required, I say that neither is it required for the conditional futurity of surrender or non-surrender: because the supposition of a free cause so necessarily infers one or the other exercise of freedom, that is, to act or not to act, that it is not more impossible to suppose the existence of an animal that is neither rational nor irrational, than to suppose the existence of a complete free cause which neither freely acts nor freely does not act: hence just as after we have truly said of that will which we could designate, it is complete for loving freely, we necessarily infer, either it loves freely or it freely does not love, and God to whom hearts are open sees which it is; and of another of which we say, because it was complete for loving freely, we necessarily infer, either it loved freely or it freely did not love, and God who has a perpetual memory of past things sees which it was; and of another of which we say, because it will be complete for loving freely, we necessarily infer, either it will love freely or it will freely not love, and God who has a present foreknowledge of future things sees

EPILOGUE

which it will be; likewise because we truly suppose that the will which we designate would be complete, if God willed, for loving freely or freely not loving, we must necessarily infer that either it would love freely or it would freely not love: and that God, from whom that which would be cannot be hidden, knows which it would be, although we cannot know it unless He reveals it. So that to assert that one or the other exercise of freedom would be, we need nothing else than to be able likewise to assert that such a cause in such circumstances would be complete for acting freely, if God willed. But to assert this, it is clear that no present predefinition is required. And these are the principal arguments against predefinitions of conditionally future free acts, which being excluded our Adversaries now do not doubt that Middle Knowledge is to be admitted. But let us see what they in turn set up to establish these same predefinitions.

XII. They object first that the conditional statements of Holy Scripture contain rewards or punishments or something else to be provided by God alone. But none of these arguments is relevant. For we do not deny that there is any conditional divine will with respect to its object, or that God pre-defines punishment and reward when He proposes commandments, under the condition of transgression or observance, or that He pre-defines grace on the hypothesis that a sacrament would be properly applied to this or that person. For this is necessary for Divine providence concerning human beings. The question concerns conditional pre-definitions of those things which people have never done, do not do, and will never do, but which they would do if it pleased God to posit this or that condition. We contend that no trace of these exists in Holy Scripture, and that there is no valid inference from necessary pre-definitions to idle and useless ones, nor from pre-definitions of what God would do either alone or with some necessary cause, to pre-definitions of what He would not do except with the concurrence of a free cause.

They object secondly that the Salamancans cite that passage: "Who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received? If you have received it, why do you boast?" From this text, the argument

EPILOGUE

should proceed thus: God distinguishes the one who acts well from the one who does not act; and the one who acts has nothing that he has not received, compared to the one who does not act. Therefore, there are conditional pre-definitions of free acts to be elicited by humans. But who does not see that so great a distance lies between that antecedent and this consequent that no chain of consequences could be long enough to properly connect these extremes? For if the consequent is denied, there are still many ways of understanding how every person who acts well is distinguished by God's beneficence from every person who does not act, and that the former has nothing more than the latter that he has not received: either by admitting absolute pre-definitions dependent on Middle Knowledge, or without these by acknowledging a special beneficence in the fact that God, through the positing of a condition, causes the conditionally future to become absolutely future, or even by sometimes admitting complete antecedent parity between those of whom one, by his freedom, makes good use of divine grace while the other does not make good use of it by his freedom. Since these matters have been thoroughly addressed earlier, they need not be repeated here.

XIII. They object thirdly to an illustrious passage from Augustine's book on the Predestination of the Saints, where, concerning what is said in the Book of Wisdom about the one who was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding, Augustine denies that this was said "according to foreknowledge," but only "according to the dangers of this life." For God did not foreknow what was not going to happen, namely that he would sin, but foreknew what was going to happen, namely that he would die an untimely death. They say, therefore, that Augustine, while denying the foreknowledge of conditionally future wickedness, denies it for the "sign of reason" that precedes pre-definition, as if it were established that he concedes it for the "sign of reason" that follows. But besides the fact that the Salamancans gratuitously attribute to Augustine's thoughts these kinds of "signs of reason," of which there appears neither mention nor trace in this passage, they do not see that in

EPILOGUE

the same sign and in the same sense that the wickedness of the one who is taken away in youth is denied to be foreknown, in that same sign and sense his untimely death is said to be foreknown. But is this foreknown in the sign that precedes the free decree? And is it said to be foreknown in any other sense than through absolute foreknowledge? Augustine, therefore, denies absolute foreknowledge of future wickedness, that is, only that foreknowledge which is suitable for presenting a merit in view of which God would be moved to grant some benefit. This opposes the false notion of the Semi-Pelagians, who indiscriminately used absolute and conditional foreknowledge of merits to find in us some beginning and merit of first grace, so that when absolute foreknowledge was lacking, they said conditional foreknowledge worked just as well. And in this interpretation of Augustine, P. John of St. Thomas agrees with us, so that our opponents seem to provide us with a shield against one another for our protection. But more about these matters was discussed above in the third disputation, chapter 3, section 3.

They object fourthly to an outstanding passage from the same Augustine, who, correcting what he had formerly answered—namely, that Christ appeared when and where He knew there would be those who would believe in him, without prejudice, however, to other hidden causes—adds these words: "What is more true than that Christ foreknew who, when, and in what places people would believe in Him? But whether they would have faith of themselves when Christ was preached to them, or would receive it as God's gift—that is, whether God merely foreknew them or also predestined them—I did not then think it necessary to examine and discuss." By these words, Augustine seems to assume that Christ foreknew those who would believe because God had predestined those who would believe. And since the question concerns conditional knowledge, it follows that their faith was conditionally foreknown because it was predestined, that is, conditionally pre-defined. John of St. Thomas agrees with the Salamancans in this interpretation, so much so that he thinks Middle Knowledge is here refuted by Augustine. But since

EPILOGUE

the vanity of this argument has already been abundantly demonstrated, I briefly respond that by those words, "whether He merely foreknew them or also predestined them," Augustine understands predestination not as that which precedes but as that which is added to the foreknowledge of conditionally future faith, making it absolutely future from being conditionally future. And I say this is evident from what he immediately adds, that this answer could have been expressed in other words: that Christ willed to appear to men when He knew there were those who had been ELECTED in Him before the foundation of the world. For it is clear from these words that this predestination is conflated with this election. And it is so absurd to conflate this eternal election before the foundation of the world, which according to Augustine certainly belongs properly to those who are to be saved, with conditional pre-definition, which, if it exists at all, is common to both the reprobate and the elect, that anyone who doubts this may seem not to have read Augustine.

XIV. They object fifthly to the doctrine of the Massilians presented to Augustine, which contained two points: first, that there is Middle Knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge independent of pre-definition; and second, that it is useful and presents to God suitable merits for decreeing grace. Both points, they say, were rejected by Augustine in his books on the Predestination of the Saints and on the Gift of Perseverance. The principal tenet of the Massilian doctrine was that there is absolute foreknowledge of certain merits independent of divine grace or the preparation of grace. But because they felt pressed by certain objections which they could not solve through absolute foreknowledge, they took refuge in conditional foreknowledge. Augustine, therefore, consistently denies all foreknowledge of merits that do not depend on divine grace, whether actually decreed or hypothetically to be decreed, whether that foreknowledge is imagined to be absolute or conditional. But the conditional foreknowledge of merits that would come about on the hypothesis of grace, independent of the present pre-definition, was never rejected by him, but only its abuse was rejected as most inept, most insane, and most

EPILOGUE

absurd, insofar as it was thought to suggest to God a suitable motive for predestination and grace, so that there would be a cause dependent on a condition which nevertheless would be the cause of an effect absolutely posited. And nothing has been produced by our adversaries to the contrary thus far, but they are perpetually mistaken when they interpret what is said against the absolute foreknowledge of the Massilians as referring to conditional foreknowledge, and what is said against the perverse use of conditional foreknowledge, they distort against its substance, as is evident from what was said earlier.

XV. Sixthly, after Augustine, St. Thomas is brought forward as an objection, who is known never to have discussed Middle Knowledge in any place. It remains only for us to see which part of this controversy he assumed, and which has the greater and more necessary connection with his principles. But since he holds that there is no other necessity in free acts of existence than that by which we are accustomed to say that it is necessary for Socrates to run when he is running, that is, the necessity which the very existence of the thing makes, and which descends from the freedom of the cause itself, as Anselm says, not from eternal pre-definition; since he says that the knowledge of vision by which future things are foreknown is related to them as the sight of men is related to things that are present to them, which means that the divine intuition does not depend more on the pre-definition of future things than men's sight depends on an antecedent will of present things; since he seeks from the presence of future things in eternity the reason why they are foreknown, because he does not think there is anything else in God with which they are connected and by reason of which they can be foreknown, and consequently there is no pre-definition of them prior to foreknowledge; since he denies that in a free cause equipped with all the requirements for acting, a future effect can be known in the same way as it is known in a necessary cause—e.g., that in a will equipped with all the necessities for loving, future love can be known in the same way as future heat can be known in a fire equipped with all the necessities for heating—which pre-

EPILOGUE

supposes that the will to concur with free causes, which is one of those requirements, is not at all determined, and consequently is not pre-definitive, as the will to concur with necessary causes is determined and pre-definitive; since he explicitly says that divine foreknowledge exceeds predestination in certain things, which means that not everything that is foreknown as future is pre-defined; since he seeks the infallibility of predestination from the multitude of aids by which someone can be helped, with one perpetually supplying the inefficacy of another, which should rather be derived from predestination itself in whatever means, with none of the means that divine pre-definition would employ being ineffective; since pre-definition joined to foreknowledge gives it the relationship of a cause with respect to what is foreknown just as well as predestination joined to it, and yet St. Thomas openly denies that all foreknowledge implies the relationship of a cause with respect to what is foreknown, but only that to which predestination is added, which clearly shows that he does not think that pre-definition of what is foreknown is joined to all foreknowledge; since, I say, these and many other things of this kind that are found throughout St. Thomas cannot stand with an actual and absolute decree on the part of the act and efficacious decree concerning any future thing, even conditional, from which it would follow that such a future thing both exists and is known without pre-definition, which is to admit Middle Knowledge, who does not see that this same knowledge is as conformable to the principles and mind of St. Thomas as it is alien both to the principles and to the mind of the Thomists?

For what they usually allege will easily vanish if you take care not to interpret what St. Thomas says about some foreknowledge as being said about all foreknowledge; nor what is to be understood about absolute foreknowledge as being said about conditional foreknowledge; nor what is said to be conditionally future dependently on God alone as extending also to what is future dependently on God and a created free cause; nor that God's will or God's grace, which is included in the hypothesis or condition from which something is said to be future, is under-

EPILOGUE

stood to be actual and actually posited; nor finally that what Pennotus complains about and what Twiss laments happened to Diego Alvarez, who collect these arguments, that they suffer something human and do not represent St. Thomas's opinion faithfully enough. See what was said above.

XVI. Seventhly, the Salamancans object to the Council of Trent, by which they think Middle Knowledge was tacitly rejected when it was not employed to explain the harmony of free will with God's providence. But we respond that by the same argument it would also follow that the efficacy of pre-definitions by which God is said to effect not only the substance of free operations but also the very mode of freedom was also tacitly rejected by Trent. For it is evident that Trent never used this reasoning to show that human freedom is compatible with God's decrees. Indeed, one can easily conjecture that such pre-definitions were rejected not just tacitly, but more than tacitly, if one examines that sixth Session, where not only is the freedom of will established, but at the same time it is declared in what it consists, namely in the fact that one can dissent, that one can reject God's motion. Since these clearly designate the faculty of acting and not acting, which by another name is called indifference, therefore those who have now lifted their heads, recent offspring of Baius who was once condemned by the Popes, opponents of indifference as being contrary to pre-definitions, grumble against Trent. And Milleterius, who wanted to be a conciliator, thought it necessary to erase a few words of Trent to achieve harmony between both opinions, so that it is certain that our opponents should rather think about how to defend their pre-definitions against Trent, than for us to think about how to follow Trent without them.

XVII. Eighthly, the Salamancans object that Middle Knowledge has been both known to the Fathers and ancient Scholastics since the time of Augustine and rejected by common agreement, which is why they think it should be called the knowledge of reprobation. They weave a very long catalog of such authors, designating the times in which each

EPILOGUE

lived. But that this is an empty calendar is shown first by what P. John of St. Thomas says: "I omit the ancient Doctors, of whom, although Villegas, Alvarez, and the Carmelite Theologians cite many, nevertheless because they did not discuss this controversy about Middle Knowledge explicitly, we omit them and refer to the aforementioned authors," by which words he sufficiently indicates that he does not wish to vouch for the Salamancans' citations.

Secondly, because as has already been often said and must often be repeated, since this whole doctrine asserting Middle Knowledge is contained in this joined proposition, "There is in God conditional knowledge of future things, and there is no pre-definition of them," it is necessary that those who reject it either deny the first part of this copulative or affirm the second. But the first part is so certain that P. John of St. Thomas does not want to dispute about it, nor to gather testimonies of the ancients to prove it. It would be necessary, therefore, to see whether nearly all those whom the Salamancans cite in number 104, and by whom they say Middle Knowledge was rejected in numbers 119 and 120, admit pre-definitions of human acts conditionally future, whether they are good or bad. And because those who say that foreknowledge extends more widely than pre-definition, that the freedom of human acts cannot stand with pre-definition, that God would be the author of evil if He were to pre-define even the material element of sin, that future things are foreknown because they are future and not vice versa, that God does not have in Himself or in His decrees the reason for knowing future free acts, nor even in their causes, that the necessity of acting which is not made by the will or which does not descend from its freedom cannot fall on a free cause, and similar things, should not be thought to hold this opinion; there is no doubt that the learned reader who is not ignorant of what was the opinion of the ancients on these placita, will not only deny that nearly all admit pre-definitions of conditionally future things, but will further judge that hardly any have philosophized in this way. And both in this catalog of the Salamancans and in the citations of authors who are

EPILOGUE

thought to approve absolute and efficacious pre-definitions of all free actions (tr. 4 on the will of God, disp. 10, num. 56), writers are named perhaps more by chance than by providence. This can be confirmed by the fact that the very same people whom the Salamancans praise as agreeing with them are numbered by Ledesma, whose opinion the Salamancans follow, among their adversaries, such as John Vincent, Waldensis, and Cumel when it comes to the pre-definition of an evil act. What's more, someone is even found who is listed by the same Salamancans both among those who defend pre-definitions of all free operations in the cited number 56, and among those who deny pre-definitions of bad actions even as to their substance, such as Machin. And these things certainly show sufficiently that those proofs and citations lack refinement.

XVIII. And from these considerations, the response is clear to what the Salamancans repeatedly emphasize about the authority of the Thomistic School, which it is not credible either could have been ignorant of what was contained in Augustine and St. Thomas and other ancient writers, or if it was not ignorant, would have wanted to accuse them. The response, I say, is clear. For since one part of the Thomists, and that the largest, if we believe John of St. Thomas, teaches absolutely that God knows conditionally future things, while the other part absolutely denies pre-definitions of such future things, as is gathered from the same author and also from the Salamancans, who can attribute more to the Thomists than one who embraces and approves both parts: while asserting both with the former that God certainly knows what things are conditionally future, and with the latter, that there are no pre-definitions of such future things? But this is all that those who stand for Middle Knowledge say: therefore they say nothing that is not Thomistic. As for diligence in perusing the writings of the ancients, especially Augustine, it will perhaps not be an arrogant suspicion to think that someone might be more perceptive in this study, when one sees that among the primary disputants of this controversy, which is said to be entirely Augustinian, there

EPILOGUE

are those who cite Augustine from the fifth book against Julian the Apostate.

They object ninthly to the judgment of 30 censors who, together with the Supreme Pontiffs Clement VIII and Paul V, condemned Middle Knowledge, as is clear from the testimony of that man whom both the opinion of sanctity while he lived and the miracles performed after he died prove to be a witness above all exception. But we respond first that this argument labors under the same suspicion as all recent and unprecedented narratives of ancient events, such as was once the fable of Pope Joan, and what was heard some years ago, that Xavier was not a Jesuit, that Ignatius, when he most wanted to be a Theatine, could not be, which repulsion the Abbot Caetanús, who wrote recently, undoubtedly pitying, received him into the Order of Benedictines, soon to become, I think, a Camaldolese.

Secondly, concerning miracles I have already spoken: the rays should also be added, which Hyacinth Coquetius writes shone from the face of Father Lemos while he was opposing Middle Knowledge in that famous disputation before the Supreme Pontiff Clement VIII and Paul V, and he calls a certainly wealthy witness of such a great miracle their successor Urban VIII. Who nevertheless responded to the appellant otherwise than he had hoped, and did not allow the memory of this matter, which he had never known, to be persuaded to him. One can see the documents of the Roman Inquisition of the year 1642.

Thirdly, I respond that when P. John of St. Thomas wanted to confirm that entire rather vague and dependent narrative of the Salamancans, he made it more confused, as will be apparent to anyone comparing everything, according to what we have discussed previously.

XIX. Tenthly, the common argument which Twiss constantly maintained is objected, that nothing can be future and distinct from what is merely possible without some cause, nor can there be any other cause of a conditionally future effect than its present pre-definition in God. But the solution is obvious, that it is enough if the existence of the cause has

EPILOGUE

a proportion with the existence of the effect; and just as it is necessary that for an effect that exists, a cause is assigned that also exists, so it suffices if for an effect that will be, a cause is assigned that will be, even though it does not exist now; and for an effect that would be, a cause is assigned that would be. Middle Knowledge consists of this double assertion: God can will that such a cause exist with such circumstances, even if perhaps He does not will it in fact, and if God were to will this, the cause that would then exist would be the cause why this and that would follow. Why this? Because it would be a free cause and determining one of the opposites. Therefore, just as nothing else is affirmed about that which is said to follow than that it would be, so nothing else should be affirmed about its determining cause. Unless perhaps someone prefers to say that the present possibility of the supposition of a free cause is a sufficient cause of the hypothetical futurity of that effect, concerning which more was said in the first disputation, numbers 19 and 21.

XX. They insist that what is absolutely future requires a present cause; therefore, so does what is conditionally future. I respond that the reasoning is different. For because it is necessary that every will of God that will be, already is, it cannot happen that what is absolutely future, which necessarily requires some will of God for that time when it is future, does not already presuppose that same will as present. But because it is not similarly necessary that God actually will whatever He could will, therefore what would follow from that will of God which could be, should not presuppose it as present, and therefore a present decree is fictitiously contrived.

XXI. Eleventhly, P. John of St. Thomas raises a special difficulty drawn from the decree of concurrence which must necessarily be involved in the antecedent of the conditional proposition that expresses Middle Knowledge: for it cannot easily be explained what or of what kind that decree is, without many difficulties immediately arising that severely trouble us. For either God concurs in a blind manner, if He offers His concurrence into uncertainty, or if He determines it, the sequence of

EPILOGUE

the consequent from the antecedent becomes necessary, and so obvious to anyone that God can hardly be more learned than man in this respect, and furthermore this knowledge becomes useless for those ends for which we contend it is beneficial. For who does not know the same thing that God knows when He says, "If I were to will determinately to concur with Peter for love, he would love"? And how does this help to make his pre-definition of that love more gentle and more adapted to freedom?

We respond that this special difficulty is the common one, namely how the decree by which divine concurrence is prepared for free causes is to be conceived. And we say it is to be conceived in such a way that that concurrence is offered indifferently and is not determined by God to love rather than to hatred or non-love, in this manner: "I will that my power be so in the control of this will in these circumstances, that it may, by its freedom, either use it for love, or use it for hatred, or for non-love." And given such a decree, we say that God sees that now the pure omission of love will determinately follow, now love itself, now hatred.

Therefore, in the antecedent of a conditional proposition, we say that such a decree is involved by which God says, for example: "Although I do not now will that preaching and miracles be presented to the people of Tyre and Sidon, nor that the grace necessary within for repentance together with the necessary concurrence be prepared, nevertheless I can will this; and if I were to will it, and thus offer my concurrence indifferently for repentance or non-repentance, I see that the Tyrians would determinately use it for repentance." God understands, therefore, in the antecedent of the conditional proposition by which Middle Knowledge is expressed, His concurrence indifferently offered to the Tyrians; and He can in another hypothesis determinately see it suspended, or rejected, or accepted rather for impenitence. Nor should God be said to offer His concurrence in a blind manner, who as soon as He understands the supposition of the offering in the antecedent, so soon sees the event of the acceptance in the consequent, or certainly of rejection, as the truth of the matter carries. In which matter we think God to be far more clear-

EPILOGUE

sighted than our adversaries, according to whose opinion, before an actual and present decree, God sees nothing in these future things, but after the decree, He sees only that which, I almost say, even owls could see. For explain, I ask, whatever is turned over in the divine mind concerning this conditional knowledge, and this form will appear: "I efficaciously pre-define that if the Gospel were proposed to the Tyrians, efficacious grace would be given to them, and that from it repentance would also efficaciously follow." What, I ask, is there in that knowledge that commends the eyes of God? Is it that He is conscious of His pre-definition? What mortal is not also conscious of his own? Is it that He sees that from that pre-definition, on the hypothesis of grace, efficacious grace would follow, that is, physically predetermining grace, and from that grace, repentance? But who among men could be ignorant of this? Is there anyone who could not know that from an omnipotent pre-definition would follow what has been pre-defined?

XXII. Indeed, this alone is singular and worthy of God, and towers far above all the efforts of finite intelligences, to occupy with knowledge all the inclinations of the created will and to hold it so besieged by the comprehension of His knowledge that however much it may be permitted to itself, that is, to its mutability and caprice, it cannot, however, incline itself to either part without all its movements being immediately struck by the ray of the divine intuition. And not only what were, or are, or will be its counsels, but also what would be from various hypotheses are subject to God as spectator, and always stand under the stroke of divine judgment. And this is that sole divination which, according to Tertullian, is a suitable ARGUMENT of divinity. These are the other shadows over which God is said to preside, according to Minutius Felix. For to divine what you yourself have arranged, that is, to know your own secret, not another's, what is exceptional about that? Not even children play so ineptly that he who divines what he himself has hidden is considered fortunate. But what more does God do when He only divines what He Himself has pre-defined? Let the reader see, therefore, whether

EPILOGUE

this objection has any teeth except those by which our adversaries are bitten. But these matters were discussed more fully above in disputation 4, chapter 3.

XXIII. Twelfthly, the anonymous author of the book *On Order* objects that God cannot see conditionally future things either in Himself, or in themselves, or in their other causes; therefore, in no way. I respond that this argument demands what is the objective reason for knowing conditionally future things, and I say that there is none distinct from themselves, and in this sense God sees them only in themselves, insofar as He does not see them in Himself, nor in their other causes as in a known medium.

And when they insist, "But these future things in themselves are nothing," I respond that neither is it known that they are something, but only that they would be; but this, which is understood when it is said that they would be, is true, or what is the same, is affirmable and knowable by an infinite power of understanding. See above, disputation 2, chapter 2 and following.

XXIV. Thirteenthly, there remains that trite objection that since God's knowledge has already been divided by ancient scholastics in two ways, into the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision, and since this which is called Middle is so called because it cannot be recalled to either of the aforementioned members, this is a very probable argument of novelty, and of doctrine contrary to antiquity. But the solution of this argument will be easy if it is granted by the Thomists that conditional knowledge depending on a similarly conditional pre-definition finds a place in that common division. For by the same right, conditional knowledge that excludes such pre-definitions can also find one. And I add that since this knowledge was supposed rather than explained by the ancients, it is not surprising if they did not give it a separate place in the aforementioned division. But it was fitting that those who dug it out from the monuments of the ancients for distinct proof and defense, should assign it a place in the number of Divine Knowledges; and a mid-

EPILOGUE

dle place between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision might seem most apt, because it expresses a little more than the knowledge of possibles, which is said to be the knowledge of simple intelligence, and a little less than the knowledge of things absolutely existing for at least some difference of time, which is called the knowledge of vision. Therefore it also obtained a suitable name when it was called Middle Knowledge. These are almost all the arguments that are usually made for conditional pre-definitions and against Middle Knowledge. It will be for you, excellent reader, having weighed all these in an equal balance, to see which side preponderates: whether that which, by rejecting present pre-definitions of all conditional things, makes conditional knowledge Middle; or that which, by obtruding such pre-definitions, rejects Middle Knowledge, while being forced to accept conditional knowledge.

EVGENIUS OF PHILADELPHIA
THE ROMAN A TRIPARTITE
SCHOLASTIC EXERCISE

AGAINST THE NEW METHOD OF DEFENDING THE
PHYSICAL PREMOTIONS OF FREE AGENTS AND OF
EXPLAINING THEIR LIBERTY, WHICH THE AUTHOR OF THE
WORK "ON THE LIBERTY OF GOD AND CREATURE" HAS
RECENTLY INTRODUCED.

OF WHICH WORK IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT NEARLY ALL
PARTS ARE PARTLY SUSPECT, PARTLY CONTRADICTORY
AMONG THEMSELVES, AND PARTLY SUPPOSITIOUS.

WITH AN APPENDIX ADDRESSED TO WILLIAM CAMERON
THE SCOT

SECOND EDITION, REVISED BY THE AUTHOR.

ACCOUNT GIVEN OF THIS SECOND EDITION

The current controversy raging against the Jansenist Heretics has prompted the thought of republishing this small work, which was issued nearly thirty years ago. The Learned Reader will notice in it that, a decade before Jansenius's "Augustinus" appeared, certain twilight glimmerings of Jansenism had already manifested, and that the treatise "On the Liberty of God and the Creature" served as a kind of forerunner to that grand work whose massive weight first shook the Belgian Church and subsequently the French Church. Nor were the endorsements of two leaders of the new sect—Jansenius and Saint-Cyran—among the other supporters of that treatise, included in vain. Evidently, they preferred their views to be first observed in others' writings rather than their own, in order to test readers' reactions and to conduct a kind of experiment on the preliminary taste of error. What they primarily approved in that work is something the Reader ought not remain ignorant of. For Saint-Cyran begins thus: "The indifference which not Platonic (that is, divine) but Aristotelian discourse long ago introduced as pure and simple liberty, this Author eliminates in such a way that it is surprising it has pleased the younger school for so many centuries past." And Jansenius writes: "This book establishes with many excellent and solid reasons that true freedom of will, as known to ancient writers, is not situated in that philosophical indifference of action which is commonly proclaimed, and it refutes the defenders of the opposing opinion."

ON THE SECOND EDITION

Others praised other aspects of the work "On the Liberty of God and the Creature." Saint-Cyran and Jansenius approved only this one element, upon which the entire machinery of Jansenism depends: namely, the necessity of action opposed to indifference toward either option by free causes—an indifference which not only Aristotelian philosophy (as Saint-Cyran claims) but also Platonic philosophy recognized and embraced, and what is far superior to Platonic philosophy, Christian theology has acknowledged from the very cradle of Divine faith. The errors that subsequently sprouted from that egg, Eugenius's small work had anticipated and forewarned against, as proven by Jansenius's "Augustinus" published several years later, and the entire Jansenist theology spread throughout the Church and subsequently condemned—so that this little work might be considered the very first to note the doctrine of Jansenius while he was still unnamed and unknown.

I nevertheless owe this testimony to the Writer of the work "On the Liberty of God and the Creature," a good man approved by those who lived in closer familiarity with him: namely, that he became entangled in these nets unwarily. He had extensive association with Saint-Cyran and also with Jansenius, and even some exchange of private writings that were sent from Louvain to Paris. Thus it happened that before they openly declared war on the Catholic Schools and indeed on the Church itself, through a kind of contagion of affections, he began to favor that doctrine whose authors he loved. Yet the delusion did not persist. I have learned from trustworthy men that when Saint-Cyran had already revealed himself more openly and confirmed by his manifest errors the suspicions about his faith and doctrine that had until then remained somewhat obscure, this Author opposed him, and by that disagreement dissolved the intimacy that had bound them both, and consequently cooled his association with Jansenius. Some believed this to be the reason why Jansenius, who had initially praised the Work "On the Liberty of God and the Creature," ultimately rejected it in his "Augustinus," at

ON THE SECOND EDITION

Saint-Cyran's instigation, in the entire sixteenth chapter of the seventh book on the grace of the Savior.

It was necessary to inform the Reader of these things so that if anything appears in this small work that seems stated too harshly against the doctrine that required correction, he should understand that it reflects this Author's earlier thoughts, which were amended by later ones; and that it was primarily Jansenism that was being refuted—a doctrine from which the Author of "On the Liberty of God and the Creature" recoiled toward the end of his life.

PREFACE TO THE READER AND SYNOPSIS OF A NEW DOCTRINE

When I came across the work "On the Liberty of God and Creation" last autumn, Excellent Reader, captivated by the fame of such an important argument, I was easily persuaded to want to know what new insights might be brought to this question, which has kept all Orthodox thinkers engaged in disputes both among themselves and with heretics for so long. As I investigated this repeatedly, I discovered in reality that a new doctrine was being introduced, one that has virtually nothing in common with the old and long-accepted teaching; new and unusual concepts in explaining the nature of Liberty; an equally new method of defending physical premotion, hitherto unknown to Thomists; a new method of discourse, confused with the embellishments and colorings of Platonists. Finally, a new manner of speech in refuting the opinions of those whom the Author of this work considers his adversaries. For while until now Scholastic Doctors generally held that malicious speech should be left to the contentions of Critics, while modesty should be maintained by Theologians, this author seems to have mixed the rights of both, and to have usurped among Theologians the license of detraction that Critics cultivated as if their own. For he not only continually triumphs over those alien to his own opinion, but also stings, criticizes, and gnaws at them, so that it easily appears that he was driven to undertake such work by a spirit far from equitable. Added to this was the fact that although he expressly disputes about the necessity of divine premotions and their harmony

PREFACE

with freedom of will—a subject that the Holy Apostolic See has forbidden to be published—no trace of having obtained permission was apparent. And yet he dedicated his work to the Vicar of Christ. Perhaps so that through him it might already be permissible to have transgressed? Therefore, setting aside the controversy about predeterminations, which ought to remain untouched without the approval of the Supreme Pontiff, I nevertheless thought this exercise against this Doctor's own Theology would be opportune: 1. So that a work brought forth improperly into the light, and therefore illegitimate, might not be allowed to roam unpunished. 2. So that no one might be deceived by the appearance of a doctrine new and different from what has generally settled in the minds of the wise. 3. To protect the reputation of those whom this Author treats injuriously, contrary to what they deserve. 4. Because since he bids us hope for richer commentaries on Divine Grace soon, it was necessary to warn the man, so that the very many errors he has made in these preliminaries might be avoided there; so that the theological community might receive from him a work complete in all its parts. 5. Because here the issue at stake is not only the cause of those who deny physical predetermination, but also that of the Thomists themselves, whose doctrine is tacitly condemned by this author when he indicates in his dedicatory letter that this path he follows is new, and that in all others there are minor offenses and scruples that turn minds away. And in the final chapter of book 1, near the end, he claims that what had until now been hidden in the principles of others is now coming to light. And the Author of "Selected Philosophical Questions" who soon followed him, in the second part of Question 9, after having rejected the common solutions of the Thomists in the second doubt, then pronounces in the fourth doubt that the method of defending physical prelections contained in this work is the most probable of all. Here you see that something more is conceded to the opponents of prelections than they themselves would wish to take. Namely, that they have until now been superior to the Thomists, if not in the justice of their cause, certainly in the fortune of battle. But with their corpses, as it

PREFACE

were, ordered to be carried away, new champions enter the arena, renew the fight, and exact penalties from the victors. Be present, therefore, brave men, be present, and prove to us your spirit, your skill, and your strength. And first, indeed, we desire to hear what error the Thomists have committed in this discussion that would require your correction? I shall resolve the whole matter in a few words.

The Thomists, because they did not know that Liberty consists in Amplitude, fought unsuccessfully, soon to be crowned if they had known this. O blind Theology of the previous age, upon which the day of such an excellent and necessary meditation did not dawn! But whether liberty is placed in Amplitude or in narrowness is irrelevant; we always ask this: how is the predetermined will free with the Liberty of contradiction and exercise?

This question, they say, pertains only to those acts that concern means; for in those concerning the end, there is no liberty of exercise or contradiction. Away with this! Not even in wayfarers?

Not even in wayfarers, they say. For the intention of the end is itself the predetermination of Free Agents, which therefore God must necessarily operate in us without us. Therefore, all freedom of will is circumscribed by the choice of means. Who here would not be astonished at this unheard-of and unexpected manner of philosophizing? But let even that be granted. But at least explain this: how is the will free when predetermined to this choice of this means, e.g., to the choice of today's fast? How, I ask, can it not choose that, if it is predetermined to choose it?

The freedom of will, they say, is twofold: one pure and perfect, the other impure and imperfect. For an election to be free with pure and perfect liberty, it is not necessary that the will be able not to choose under that supposition by which the means belongs to the order of the end, with God, for example, willing and predetermining that we use it; but it is sufficient that it can refrain from choosing under another supposition by which the means would no longer belong to such an order. Therefore,

PREFACE

although predetermination is so efficacious that it removes the power to inhibit that choice for the time during which it exists, it nevertheless does not remove liberty; rather, it makes it pure and perfect, because there remains the power to inhibit for the time when such a means will not belong to the order of the end, that is, for the time when God will no longer predetermine to it, but will rather predetermine to the opposite. Of this kind was the predetermination by which Christ the Lord was impelled to act, and the Blessed Virgin, and the more excellent Saints.

For an election to be free with impure and imperfect liberty, the will must be able to deviate from the order of the end, and consequently be able not to choose the means it has chosen, even when it belongs to such an order. The faithful people have this liberty and power, and it is not removed by predetermination, because predetermination is not so powerful in them as to consume defectibility, although it is impossible for these two to be combined: for there to be predetermination to some act, and simultaneously for the act to which it is given not to exist.

You see therefore, Erudite Reader, that as far as the common faithful are concerned, the difficulty in this opinion is the same as in the opinion of the Thomists, and it is not alleviated by any other method than by that well-worn distinction: Although the will cannot withhold assent to which it is physically premoved in the composite sense, it can nevertheless do so in the divided sense, and this is sufficient.

You see, secondly, that as far as those few excepted from the common law are concerned, a greater difficulty is encountered, one that not even the Thomists would want to swallow, namely, that the power to act and not to act which liberty requires is not for the same time, but with succession: there is indeed the power to act when there is predetermination, because whenever it exists, the means is placed in the order of the end; and the power not to act when it does not exist, because then the means is rejected from that order.

You see, thirdly, that an even greater danger is undertaken when it is denied that the acts of wayfarers that directly regard the ultimate end

PREFACE

are free with the liberty of contradiction and exercise, contrary to Catholic doctrine. Therefore, to undergo the common and greatest difficulty of the Thomists, and to heap upon it another and yet another much more serious one; this finally is to have raised up the afflicted cause of the predeterminists, this is to have come to the aid of the faltering Thomists. Who, therefore, would not gladly seize the opportunity now first offered to dispute both for the Thomists and against the predeterminists? But if the Adversary receives this attack with the same spirit with which I deliver it, there will be no reason for anyone to doubt that in this contrariety of opinions, charity has remained unharmed and untainted.

Approval of the most Illustrious Bishop of Cahors, and other Distinguished Men and Doctors:

I have seen this Scholastic Exercise, and I willingly permit it to be published for the sake of public utility. At Cahors, June 7, 1632.

P.E. Bishop of Cahors

I have read the Scholastic Exercise of Eugenius Philadelphus against the new method of defending Physical Premotions, in which there is nothing contrary to right faith or good morals; rather, true and good doctrine is explained and defended. At Cahors, June 8, 1632.

De S. SULPICE, Archdeacon of Cahors and Vicar General

I have read the Scholastic Exercise of Eugenius Philadelphus against the new method of defending Physical Premotions of Free Agents, and I certify that there is nothing in it contrary to faith or good morals; but rather the doctrine is useful and worthy of public knowledge. At Cahors, June 7, 1632.

PREFACE

G. CARBONEL, Doctor of Theology and Archdeacon of Tornez

I, the undersigned Fr. Jacques Gratias of the Augustinian order and Professor of Theology in the Academy of Cahors, have carefully examined the book entitled "Scholastic Exercise of Eugenius Philadelphus against the new method of defending physical premotions," and because I found nothing in it contrary to faith or good morals, I judged it worthy of publication. Therefore, I have subscribed to this my judgment, on the 8th day of June, 1632. At Cahors, in the house of Saint Augustine.

Fr. JACQUES GRATIAS, Augustinian, Professor of Theology.

CHAPTER ONE

ON THE ERRORS CONCERNING PHYSICAL PREMOTIONS AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

I remember that caution was advised against affixing any mark of disapproval on that opinion which maintains physical premotions alongside the freedom of the will, just as no mark should be affixed against the opinion that rejects them. But since that mode of philosophizing which the Author of the work "On the Liberty of God and Creation" followed in their defense is new and entangled in opinions whose condemnation would not prejudice the doctrine of premotions, I thought it would be in the Catholic interest if I were to disclose certain suspicions of my mind regarding those kinds of views that seem less coherent with the doctrine of right faith and the common sense of the wise. And I do this all the more willingly because I know it does not displease the ordinary proponents of premotions. Indeed, they are compelled to admit that this Doctor's ultimate contribution is not only invalid but even detrimental to their cause: since he judges physical predeterminations to be admissible only under a condition that is not permissible, and he thinks they can be rescued from dangerous judgment only by what amounts to a confession of error. And yet that opinion still had an untarnished reputation and had no reason to fear the full light or the eyes of the Orthodox, after the Apostolic See had forbidden censure of either party. What kind of service was it, then, under the pretense of doing a favor, to publish it accompanied by an odious retinue of opinions that do not accord with

CHAPTER ONE

long-accepted faith? Indeed, even to bring it to Rome before the supreme tribunal of faith, when even if it were true itself, it would still deserve rejection when surrounded by such a chorus?

FIRST therefore, the PRONOUNCEMENT that seems not sufficiently Orthodox is that God operates our conversion "in us without us." Thus in book 1, chapter 14, number 4, where he speaks as follows: "If we speak of the order of grace, in which the ultimate end is God according to Himself, His causality is the love of God or conversion to God: WHICH ALL THEOLOGIANS, AND ABOVE ALL OTHERS ST. THOMAS, SAY IS DONE BY GOD IN US WITHOUT US." He says the same in chapter 9, number 7: "There is no legitimate conversion to God unless it anticipates our counsels and thoughts, and therefore unless God inspires it: Which St. Thomas also confirms in I-II, q. 109, art. 5, where he expressly teaches that our conversion to God CAN ONLY BE FROM GOD ALONE." And soon after: "But the conversion to God that follows that struggle, insofar as it is conversion, does not have its source in our thoughts that intervened during the entire time of the contest, but FROM GOD'S GRACE ALONE: which suppressed our senses and reason, and remained victorious."

Why he cites St. Thomas and other theologians as witnesses, I simply do not know. One thing I do know is that it is unknown to me who among Catholics has ever said this. St. Thomas, above all others, denies this in many places, but expressly in that very passage which is designated as Prima Secundae q. 109, art. 6. For nothing could be more explicit than these words: "To the first objection therefore it must be said that THE CONVERSION OF MAN TO GOD IS INDEED DONE THROUGH FREE WILL, and in this respect man is commanded to convert himself to God. But free will cannot convert itself to God unless God converts it to Himself, according to Jeremiah, etc." If it is done through free will, is it done without us? I fear that when he mentioned St. Thomas and the other theologians, he may have wanted to name Calvin and Calvinists. For Calvin professes himself to be of that opinion many times, but especially

CHAPTER ONE

in Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, number 5: "Because therefore the will is bound fast by the slavery of sin, it cannot move itself toward the good, much less apply itself to it. For such movement is the beginning of conversion to God, which in the Scriptures is attributed **WHOLLY** to God's grace." And in number 6: "When God converts us to the pursuit of righteousness, He abolishes whatever is of our own will: What succeeds in its place is wholly from God. I say the will is abolished, not insofar as it is will, because in man's conversion what belongs to the first created nature remains intact; I also say it is created anew, not so that the will begins to exist, but so that it is turned from evil to good. **THIS I AFFIRM IS DONE WHOLLY BY GOD**, etc." The same again in number 8 and in chapter 5, also number 8. Where you see 1. that both Authors are dealing with the actual conversion of the will from good to evil; 2. that nothing different is asserted by this one than by that one: by both, that such conversion is the work of **GOD ALONE**, excluding the cooperation of free will; 3. that both say in the same way that they have drawn this opinion—this one from the Scriptures, that one from St. Thomas and all the Scholastics.

The Calvinists assent with great clamor; indeed, they even decree it. For thus states the Synod of Dort in chapter 3, article 12: "And this is that regeneration so highly extolled in the Scriptures, that new creation, resurrection from the dead, and vivification, **WHICH GOD WORKS IN US WITHOUT US**." For them, this means that our vivification is done in us without us; for this Author, it is our conversion. And in the same sense later in chapter 4, article 9, those are condemned who teach that grace and free will are partial causes concurring simultaneously at the beginning of conversion. Namely, because that conversion is from God in us without us, as this Author speaks.

It is remarkable, however, that Calvin continually indicates that all Catholic Doctors oppose him on this point, while this author thinks they agree with him. For Calvin accuses Peter Lombard in that chapter 3, number 7, of attributing to free will its own role in man's conversion and

CHAPTER ONE

of perversely distorting what was said by St. Augustine when he joins to Divine grace a will that follows, not one that leads; a handmaid, not a mistress. But he had said before in chapter 2, number 6, that he differs by an even longer interval from the more recent Sophists than from Lombard and the older Scholastics. And again in chapter 3, number 13: "Let us now hear Augustine speaking in his own words, lest the Pelagians of our age, that is, the Sophists of the Sorbonne, accuse all antiquity of being against us, as is their custom." What is the matter here? Was Calvin so obtuse that he did not understand that all the Catholic schools agreed with him in denying the concurrence of free will in man's conversion to God? Was he so insane that he thought he should dissimulate their agreement, and even fabricate disagreement, in order that his doctrine might be received with less applause and greater suspicion by those whom he wanted to persuade? Were the Doctors of the Sorbonne pure Calvinists on this question, concerning which he petulantly calumniates them as Sophists? I certainly do not think so. Rather, I hold it as certain that the perpetual doctrine of the schools has been that in the actual conversion of a sinner, he always concurs with his own free will. Thus it has been unheard of until now among Scholastics that our conversion to God is done by Him in us without us.

The same is the very clear opinion of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, where it thoroughly unites both the necessity of Divine grace and the cooperation of free will in the matter of conversion, and derives both from the sacred Scriptures. "For when it is said," it says, "turn to me, and I will turn to you, we are reminded of our liberty. When we answer, turn us to you, O Lord, and we shall be turned, we confess that we are preceded by God's grace." With what confidence, then, is that said to be done without us, to which we concur with free will, as the Church ordains?

SECOND is found in chapter 30, number 7, which passage I thought it appropriate to quote here in full, as it reads: "That very inclination and conversion to God, which is sometimes more, sometimes less

CHAPTER ONE

obscure; sometimes more, sometimes less illustrious: is both vocation and premotion. The same also according to reality and entity is our conversion to God or operation: ours in strict terms that at some time before was in us, but was not ours. Therefore the same motion is sometimes in our soul for some time, but is not ours; its approach, so to speak, walking around and trying it, if perchance it might obey, and then it is inefficacious and not yet at all ours: since we are resisting and contradicting it. But afterward, when it so seems good to God, it penetrates our interior; and it is not only a Divine motion residing in us, but it becomes ours while through it we are so disposed toward inferior things that we are superior to them, and no longer as before inordinately adhere to them, and then it is efficacious; not from the event of our consent, but because it is then sent by God with the purpose of our conversion." Behold, excellent Reader, a truly astonishing picture: in which one can discern conflicting opinions, gaps in reasoning, fleeting shadows of thoughts that mock those who wish to embrace them, and finally the entire appearance of doctrine, varied and multiform, which represents neither this, nor that, nor the other, but I know not what. There is one thing that shines forth from those shadows, namely that Divine premotion, that is, prevenient and exciting grace, is the same in reality and entity as our conversion to God. This, however, can be affirmed by someone in two ways: 1. If one chooses to call what others call premotion or prevenient grace our conversion. 2. If one chooses not to distinguish what others call our conversion from prevenient grace or Divine premotion.

This Author philosophizes in the second way, for which there are three available arguments: 1. Because he confuses our conversion to God with supernatural love of God in chapter 14, number 4. 2. Because in the same place he asserts that our conversion in the order of grace corresponds to the efficacious and perfect intention of the end. The third is because in chapter 9, number 8, in the same conversion, which he calls the act of the sinner, he finds a twofold aspect: one of conversion to God precisely, the other of aversion from creatures, and under this latter as-

CHAPTER ONE

pect he says there is also inherent some merit, which is proper to the one who is converted. From which it is evidently clear that this Author agrees with others in the proper acceptance of conversion; namely, that it is understood to be an act of the will of the one who is converted, torn away from sins and the allurements of sins, embracing God and adhering to Him.

Therefore, he says that conversion thus taken is the same according to reality and entity as prevenient and exciting grace. Which opinion is very suspect to me: 1. Because it contradicts the common sense of all Scholastic Theologians, who conceive that the will is prevented and excited by prevenient and exciting grace so that it may be converted: and thus they distinguish that conversion from grace: which makes it ridiculous to say that prevenient grace is necessary for that which is prevenient grace, and that Divine motion is prerequisite for that which is the motion itself, that man's conversion is presupposed so that there may be conversion, and that he is first excited by God before he is excited. All these things happen if conversion is confused with premotion, that is, with exciting and prevenient grace.

2. The same opinion destroys the doctrine of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapters 5 and 6, and canons 3 and 4, where the same real distinction between Divine Motion and Conversion is continually signified and presupposed. For first of all, it says that through vocation, or prevenient and exciting grace (for it takes these as the same), the sinner is disposed to convert himself, than which nothing could be said more ineptly if this Conversion is the same as that Grace. Furthermore, it considers prevenient grace to be separable from conversion and from all consent of the will, when it defines that man can reject that prevenient inspiration and illumination and can dissent if he wishes. But the separation of two things is a most certain sign of distinction.

3. The fact that this Grace is called illumination is evidence that it pertains to the intellect, and thus is distinct from Conversion, which belongs to the will. 4. The Council teaches that with the help of that

CHAPTER ONE

grace faith is conceived; then follows fear of Divine justice, and furthermore hope from the consideration of Divine mercy; finally, some love of God, and a certain hatred and detestation of sins. That the distinction and subordination of acts is signified by this speech is so clear that no one of sound mind can deny it. But Divine grace is prerequisite to faith: therefore our Conversion to God is prerequisite to faith—if indeed it is supposed to be the same as that grace. But faith precedes fear, hope, charity, hatred, and detestation of sins: therefore our Conversion precedes all these same things. Therefore a sinner would be understood to be converted to God although he might not yet be understood either to fear Him or to love Him or to hope for anything from Him or to be turned away from his sin through hatred and detestation of it. Since this involves obvious contradiction, it follows that either the Council of Trent must be abjured, or this opinion of this Author must be condemned, by which he teaches that our conversion to God and Divine motion are the same according to reality and entity.

THIRD is that dominion over its acts should not be attributed to free will. Thus especially in chapter 9, number 6, where he speaks as follows: "Dominion is not over acts, but over things to which we apply ourselves through them: nor can one be master of acts unless he is master of things. But there is no dominion with respect to God: therefore neither with respect to the love of God." He adds afterwards that we are said to dominate and serve our desires metonymically, taking acts for objects, and earlier in chapter 1, number 5, he says that the liberty of exercise in us means dominion over our acts **OR RATHER OVER OBJECTS**. By all of which he at least manifestly shows this much: that those who have said that dominion over its acts belongs to free will do not seem to have spoken properly. This he openly professes in chapter 27, number 4: "The solution will be more illustrious and complete," he says, "if it is recalled that, as said elsewhere, dominion properly does not regard acts, but things about which we deal through them. Although if this is also referred to acts, which is done only improperly, etc." But if the discussion is

CHAPTER ONE

about those acts that concern God, he thinks such dominion must be denied altogether.

And yet both of these views seem suspect to me: 1. Because by this Luther is praised, and the Faculty of the Sorbonne is corrected. Luther's article is: free will is not master of its acts. The judgment of the Sorbonne, in its censure of Lutheran propositions, title 18, on free will, is: "This proposition is false, contrary to the sacred Doctors and all moral doctrine, agreeing with the error of the Manicheans, and heretical." But now this Doctor, initiated into the rites of the Sorbonne, as if he had forgotten his oath, whatever Luther's mind may have been, thinks he spoke properly in that wherein the Parisian Faculty said he was Heretical, Manichean, contrary to the sacred Doctors and all moral doctrine. And therefore the same faculty, which by that censure requires that dominion over its acts be said to belong to free will, whatever its right mind may be, he nevertheless thinks compels the Schools and all Scholastics to speak worse than Luther spoke.

2. The judgment of the same Author seems suspect in that he not only approves Luther's manner of speaking, but also partly the opinion itself, namely when he absolutely denies that dominion over those acts that concern God belongs to free will. For it seems very credible to me that the question between Luther and Catholics was especially about those acts by which men tend toward God, and I fear that it may not be safe enough to think and say that that impious Apostate was orthodox insofar as he denied to free will dominion over acts of love of God, contrition, etc.

FOURTH, Not only is there no dominion of free will over acts that directly tend toward God, but there is absolutely no free will with respect to these same acts, even in wayfarers [those still on earth]. For 1. he perpetually denies that the intention of the ultimate end is an operation of a free cause, and indicates that the first exercise of it is choice. Note, he says in chapter 18, number 2, these words and observe that the action of every secondary cause is its inclination: which is especially evi-

CHAPTER ONE

dent regarding the action of a free cause as such, or regarding choice. And in chapter 28, number 3, he says, One who acts freely, or what is the same, one who chooses well. And in chapter 27, number 4, There are two things which we receive from God, or which God operates in us. One indeed which He operates in us WITHOUT US, such as the intention of the end; the other, etc. And in chapter 29, number 3, Intention indeed is NOT OF IT (the free cause) BUT IS GOD'S MOVEMENT IN IT. And in chapter 4, number 5, he teaches that the name of free will properly belongs only to that part of the will which concerns means. And most clearly in chapter 9, numbers 5 and 6, where, dealing with the interior occupation of the wayfarer concerning the end and concerning God, he denies that it is true what is commonly said, that we are indifferent to the exercise of those acts, or that it is of our will that as long as we are wayfarers, we are sometimes engaged in it, sometimes not at all, for no indifference concerning the ultimate end befits a person who stands upright. And finally he concludes in this manner: Therefore there is no indifference or liberty of contradiction concerning the end. Many other similar statements could be produced, but from these it is sufficiently evident that this Author denies that the intention of the ultimate end, the love of God, and any other act that directly tends toward God, is free with the freedom of will, or of contradiction, or of exercise. He only concedes to them some other mode of liberty which he calls "of state," which he finds both in beatific love itself and also in the Divine processions, namely the generation of the Eternal Son and spiration.

But this doctrine is very suspect to me 1. Because what he acknowledges is commonly said, that we are indifferent and free regarding the exercise of those acts, is so true that I cannot remember ever seeing or hearing any Catholic author who would suggest the contrary. Calvin indeed, and Luther, and men of the same quality, universally deny the freedom of will for good acts, and specifically for those that regard God, such as acts of faith, hope, and charity; but outside those causes, one can scarcely find those who would wish to make such utterances. And be-

CHAPTER ONE

cause this Author has selected for himself five men from all the schools, so that from their vote it might be understood what is the common sense of the scholastics—St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Henry, and Durandus—it is desirable to add here the testimonies of each of them. St. Thomas, in question 6 on evil, disputes about human choice, and he gives the single article this title: Whether man has free choice of acts, or chooses from necessity. Afterwards, when he had defined that man desires Happiness from necessity, he immediately adds: "I say from necessity as far as the determination of the act, because he cannot will the opposite, **BUT NOT AS FAR AS THE EXERCISE OF THE ACT,**" etc. And in response to objection 7, when he had said that the will cannot not will the perfect good which is Happiness, he immediately corrects this: "that is, in such a way that he would will its opposite; **NEVERTHELESS HE CAN NOT WILL IT ACTUALLY,**" etc. You see that the opinion of St. Thomas is very clear, and it is also the unanimous opinion of all Thomists, that regarding the ultimate end we do not have the freedom which is called of specification or of contrariety; we do, however, have that which is called of exercise or of contradiction, which pertains to contradictories, namely to act or not to act. He has the same doctrine in part 1, question 82, article 2, and in part 1-2, question 10, article 2.

ST. BONAVENTURE in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 25, part 2, article 1, question 2, says: "In free will one must consider the act of willing and the thing willed, and insofar as free will is deliberating, there must be contingency concerning either both of these, or concerning one of them. Concerning both, as when someone deliberates whether he should enter Religious life, or love a friend; concerning one of them, as when someone deliberates whether he should be pleased or displeased with the evil he has done; or whether he should consent or dissent to the naturally implanted appetite, namely to the appetite for happiness. Therefore, the act of deliberating free will, although it can be about something necessary, **IS ALWAYS CONTINGENT.**" Two things are clearly asserted here. The first is that in the act of the will which concerns

CHAPTER ONE

a necessary object, of the kind that is the act of love of God, the intention of the ultimate end, and similar acts, there is contingency, which means that the cause from which they are elicited elicits them in such a way that it could not elicit them; but this is to be free with the freedom of exercise and of contradiction. The second is that acts of this kind are acts of free will, even as deliberating whether or not the act should be elicited; which is to attribute those acts to free will insofar as it is indifferent to acting and not acting. For it is the mark of a madman to deliberate whether something should be done or not, when there is not the faculty for either. Therefore, according to St. Bonaventure, there is indifference and freedom of will, and of exercise, and of contradiction in the acts of the will by which the wayfarer is occupied concerning God.

SCOTUS in Book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 1, section "regarding the first article," says: "The will, just as it does not necessarily enjoy those things which are for the end, **SO NEITHER DOES IT ENJOY THE END OBSCURELY APPREHENDED.** Regarding the second article, I agree with the first opinion, **THAT IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY ENJOY THE END APPREHENDED PARTICULARLY AND OBSCURELY.**" And then he responds to the arguments as follows: "To the third I say in one way, that although there is not there any defect of any good, or any malice (he is speaking of the ultimate end obscurely apprehended), and therefore perhaps the will cannot not will it, because the object of the act of not willing is evil or defective; **NEVERTHELESS IT CAN NOT WILL THAT PERFECT GOOD,** because it is in the power of the will not only to will this or that, but to will or not will, because its freedom is to act or not to act," etc. You see here that it concerns the internal occupation of the will regarding the ultimate end in general, that is, regarding the common notion of the highest good; also regarding the ultimate end in particular, that is, determinately regarding God; moreover, regarding both obscurely apprehended, that is, apprehended by wayfarers, and consequently regarding the occupation of the will of the wayfarer concerning God and the highest good. Scotus denies that

CHAPTER ONE

occupation of this kind is necessary. Thus, therefore, the will tends toward these objects in such a way that it can stop, which is to be indifferent and free with the freedom of exercise of contradiction; and he indicates this more clearly when he says that the will can not will that good, because its freedom is to act or not to act. But it is superfluous to dwell longer at this point on investigating the opinion of Scotus, since it is agreed that freedom of contradiction is defended by him even in the act of beatific love.

HENRY of Ghent, Quodlibet 9, question 5, says: "Regarding any good proposed short of the ultimate end manifestly seen, the will can be moved by itself, and without movement from anything else, just as it can also be diverted from it. Also, the weight which the will imposes on the intellect is not so great, but that the will as free in decision, can will the contrary of that to which it is inclined: **WHATEVER THAT MAY BE, SHORT OF THE CLEAR VISION OF THE ULTIMATE AND FINAL GOOD.**" Also, "however much a proposition causing through good is proposed, unless it is concerning the highest good clearly seen, it does not necessarily immediately operate; rather, it can freely repel what is proposed." He adds afterwards that the will is indeed moved freely toward the highest good presentially seen; but is moved through free will toward anything else, **AND TOWARD THAT SAME THING WHICH IS NOT PRESENTIALLY SEEN.** As if he were saying, The blessed who see God indeed love freely with some liberty, namely that which excludes coercion and misery; but wayfarers who do not see, love Him freely, with that liberty which properly constitutes free will. And nothing could be devised more explicitly than these testimonies to establish both the indifference of the will and the freedom of exercise or contradiction in those acts by which we are occupied concerning God known by faith.

DURANDUS in book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 8, number 17, says: "If Happiness is taken specially, for that in which it truly consists, **THUS THE WILL OF THE WAYFARER DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL HAPPINESS,** but can not will it negatively, and

CHAPTER ONE

also not will it," etc. He adds in number 18: "With such an appetite (he is speaking of the efficacious one) we do not necessarily will Happiness proposed merely according to the common notion of Happiness," etc. Now in number 9, he opposed "willing necessarily" to "willing freely." And thus Durandus fully agrees with the others in asserting the freedom of the will, both concerning the highest good in general, and particularly concerning God known by the wayfarer; in such a way, however, that concerning God, there is freedom of contradiction, by which he can either pursue or not pursue, and of contrariety, by which he can either pursue or positively flee; although concerning the highest good taken confusedly, there is only freedom of contradiction.

WHAT then remains, except that we accuse the eyes of this Doctor, who, while in the preface of his work boasts that he has been alienated from the opinions of more recent theologians and converted to the older theologians—St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, the man of Ghent, the brightest lights of the Paris school—could not see in such great light that he alone is the one who denies all indifference, all freedom of contradiction and of exercise, in short, all proper nature of free will in the internal occupation of wayfarers concerning God? But what I marvel at more is that species of triumph which he exhibits in chapter 9, number 3, where, having already praised the aforementioned doctors for proving that there is true freedom concerning the end, he thus recollects them in parade: "If therefore you seek authors by whose vote this doctrine may be confirmed, behold for you St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Henry, Durandus, the brightest stars of Scholastic Theology, who do not merely taste it in passing, but lay foundations and defend it professionally." What is this so stupendous change of things? You triumph, my Father, where you are conquered, and you think the leaders of Theology are smiling on you, when they are repelling you! And what freedom is established by them concerning the ultimate end known by faith except that which you yourself deny? And what freedom is there concerning what is openly seen, about which no judgment is exercised,

CHAPTER ONE

because there is no one who would think it should be contradicted? The love with which the Blessed love God is free, they say, but not with the freedom of will or of contradiction. The love with which wayfarers pursue Him is also free, but with the freedom of will and of contradiction; why are you alone opposing? You throw their judgment in the face of others, and you alone argue? And finally, you say they are the brightest stars, which are nothing else than the arguments of your nights? Therefore, the vote of these Doctors, and the consensus of all others, is the first cause of my suspicion.

THE SECOND is derived from the perpetual custom of the Holy Fathers, proving the freedom of will from the use and fruit of counsels, precepts, admonitions, reproofs, and reasons of that kind, by which one is accustomed to persuade another of something; because there is no sane person who would not see that it is absurd to impel a person by exhorting and admonishing to do this, which he either does in such a way that he does not have the power of omitting it, or omits in such a way that there is no faculty of doing it. Therefore they think that for things which are of this kind, there is the power of doing or not doing, that is, indifference and freedom of contradiction. I would prove this with an ample and numerous array of testimonies, if it could be done as briefly as it can be done easily. But, as I think, there will be no one so inexperienced as to desire my effort at this point. But it is also equally manifest that both the same Holy Fathers and God Himself in the sacred books almost perpetually propose counsels and precepts of this kind concerning the intention of the highest good and the love of the Divine goodness, and by every means impel us by exhorting, commanding, rebuking, admonishing, to be occupied in these acts. Therefore it cannot deservedly be doubted that they think we have the power of expressing and suppressing such acts, that is, the indifference of doing and not doing, and the freedom of contradiction. Therefore the opinion which denies this ought deservedly to be considered suspect.

CHAPTER ONE

THE THIRD cause of suspicion is that it seems clear that it is primarily by those acts by which our will tends directly to God that a person's preparation for receiving the benefit of justification consists. But it is also very well known that preparation of this kind is attributed by the Council of Trent, after Divine grace, to free will in such a way that it is also said to be able to impede it, which is to be indifferent and free with at least the freedom of exercise or contradiction. For the Council speaks thus in session 6, canon 4: "If anyone says that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, does not cooperate by assenting to God who excites and calls, whereby he disposes and prepares himself for obtaining the grace of justification, and that he cannot dissent if he wishes, but that, like something inanimate, he does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema." You see how it calls the disposition which is premised to justification free with the freedom of will? You see how it asserts that free will divinely aided expresses acts by which this disposition is formed, in such a way that it consents to Divine grace with the power of dissenting? What then remains except that we say that the opinion which denies that these same acts are properly from free will, or that there is any indifference to them, or freedom of contradiction, has already been struck from heaven?

THE FIFTH position of this Doctor that is suspect to us is that our will not only is not a free cause of the intention of the highest good, but is not at all its efficient cause. For in chapter 20, number 2, where he compares moral causes with natural ones, "in moral ones," he says, "the second act NEVER SIGNIFIES ACTION, OR PRODUCTION; but if indeed you compare it to the end, it imports movement, according to which moral causes are perfected by a more intimate union to the highest good," etc. And then, "If we are ordered rightly and as is fitting, we are never compared to the end otherwise than as inferior to superior, potency to act, perfectible to perfective, WHICH IS A PASSIVE NOT AN ACTIVE RELATION." Again, "Furthermore, that adherence to the end can neither be first made nor increased by us, but only by Him whose it is

CHAPTER ONE

to direct to the end. It will be clear to one who observes," etc. And in number 5, speaking of the intention of the end, "God," he says, "through it moves man, as the one giving and impressing it, but man moves himself AS THE ONE RECEIVING IT. FOR HE RELATES TO IT PRECISELY TAKEN ONLY PASSIVELY; although through it as through a form now residing in himself, he relates actively to the means."

To tell the truth, I cannot at this point propose Calvin's agreement to defend my suspicion. For the philosophy of Luther seemed to him to be too crude for him to follow it in this case, as is clear from Book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, number 14, and chapter 5, number 14 as well. But nevertheless doctrine of this kind ought to be suspect, because it has a certain affinity with that error both of Luther and of the rigid Lutherans, by which, as Bellarmine reports in book 2 on penance, chapter 2, they affirm the same thing about contrition that was just said about right intention toward God. 2. The unanimous consensus of all the Scholastics also moves me, among whom not even one has ever existed who believed that the entire productive power of these acts is situated entirely outside man and in God Himself. 3. I am moved especially by the authority of the Council of Trent, by which I find precisely what this Author denies affirmed in so many words and fortified with an anathema. For it cannot be doubted that the intention of the ultimate end, especially taken definitely and insofar as it is God (in which sense this Author also speaks, as is clear from chapter 19, number 3), is one of those principal dispositions concerning which it is treated in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 6, where it becomes clear that these dispositions depend on human freedom in such a way that, when God touches the heart of man, the man himself does something. And in canon 4 anathema is spoken to one affirming that free will relates merely passively to the preparation prior to justification. What then do you think of him who affirms that man relates not merely passively to it precisely taken? That his relation is passive, not active? And that it is neither made by us, nor can be increased, but only by God? Finally, that the second act of a moral cause

CHAPTER ONE

never signifies action or production? Is it a rash suspicion that fears lest one who brings forth these things has been noted by the Council of Trent, or has already been struck by lightning? But you will say, I only speak differently; I do not think differently. I confess it is a lesser sin if you only present yourself as a teacher of speaking to an ecumenical Council, and if you voluntarily undertake to moderate the tongue of the Church, which is the function of the Holy Spirit.

THE SIXTH, connected with the two previous ones, is that man merits, and is worthy of praise, by that act of which he is not a free cause. For in chapter 9, number 5, he speaks thus: "Man the wayfarer by his occupation concerning God merits, and is worthy of praise and reward, as all concede; therefore that occupation, which nevertheless is concerning the end, is free." And soon, "But if we examine the matter exactly, we will find that no indifference concerning the ultimate end befits a man standing and upright." And finally, "THEREFORE THERE IS NO INDIFFERENCE OR FREEDOM OF CONTRADICTION CONCERNING THE END; and yet concerning the end there is some true freedom, as also merit, which is never found without freedom; whence it is further inferred that there is given a freedom superior to freedom of contradiction." As if he were saying, this internal occupation, by which man both merits and is worthy of praise, has freedom like that found in beatific love, and in the eternal emanations of the second and third persons of the Holy Trinity, which he has been pleased to call the freedom of state; but it does not have that freedom which is indifference to acting and not acting, and which constitutes a properly free cause, and which converts with the freedom of contradiction from chapter 14, number 7, just as this converts with the freedom of exercise from chapter 9, number 8; therefore this freedom is not required for merit. That this is the genuine opinion of this Author is clear both from these things and from those which he teaches at the end of chapter 9 and the beginning of chapter 10, and in book 2, chapter 3.

CHAPTER ONE

But this doctrine is suspect to me, not only because it is new and singular, but because it is adverse to the old and common one. For it has not been celebrated in all times, and is still celebrated today, only that merit is never found without freedom, but the mode of freedom is further expressed, namely that it is the power of doing or not doing, impatient of necessity, determining to either one separately, which is to be indifference, and freedom of contradiction and of exercise. It is not my purpose to gather the testimonies of individuals into this place; Coccius has relieved me of that burden in volume 2, book 1, on the nature of man, article 5; Ruiz on the science of God in the entire book 3; and many others. Nevertheless I cannot omit one passage of St. Augustine, to whom when Pelagius had objected that Jerome had said that there is no crown where there is necessity of action, approving the saying he adds in chapter 65 on nature and grace: "Who does not recognize this? Who does not accept it with his whole heart? Who denies that human nature was created otherwise?" Who indeed? In your times perhaps, most holy Bishop, no orthodox person; for the seventeenth century from Christ was awaited, the twelfth from yours, in which, with Theology illustrated by recent stars and more abundant light, there would come forth a work On the freedom of God and the creature, in which it would be said that man merits and is worthy of praise even when he has no indifference to acting or not acting, and what is the same, no freedom of contradiction or exercise.

MOREOVER, this doctrine ought to be suspect because of the censure of the Faculty of Theology of Paris on title 16 of the Erasmian propositions. For when Erasmus had said that Augustine could scarcely establish merits, the Sorbonne adds: "Merits are established by Christ, also by the Apostle, also by the Wise One in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. And after them," it says, "conformably to the rest of the Catholic Doctors, Augustine, asserting that merit consists of free will that is changeable, and Divine grace; so that merit is the work both of grace and of changeable free will." Therefore the School of Paris thinks that changeable free will is required for constituting merit in such a way that this is

CHAPTER ONE

the doctrine both of St. Augustine and of the rest of the Catholics. But changeable free will can be nothing else than free will operating in such a way that it can not operate, or not operating in such a way that it can operate, which is indifference to acting or not acting, and freedom of contradiction and of exercise. Therefore, if indeed the Sorbonne is to be believed, without this, merit is not established by Catholics.

FINALLY, I add the judgment of St. Thomas, question 6 on evil, article 1, in the body. For after he had reported the opinion of some who say that the will of man, although it is neither coerced nor suffers violence, is nevertheless moved by necessity to choosing something, he pronounces absolutely that "this opinion is heretical. For it takes away," he says, "the notion of merit and demerit in human acts. For it does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious that someone acts from such necessity that he cannot avoid it." To assert necessity of acting is the same as denying indifference of acting and not acting, as is clear from the notion of the terms. Therefore, if one seems heretical because it takes away the notion of merit and demerit, the other also ought to seem heretical for the same reason. Therefore it is not Catholic to think that with that indifference removed and necessity substituted, the notion of merit and demerit nevertheless remains. And St. Thomas explains this even more when he requires that what is meritorious be done by the one meriting in such a way that it can be avoided. Since it is manifest that what someone does in such a way that he can not do it, is done by him freely with the freedom of contradiction and of exercise. Therefore the doctrine which we say is suspect, namely that merit can stand without freedom of contradiction, St. Thomas expressly pronounces to be even heretical.

THE SEVENTH is also connected with the previous ones, namely, that it is meritorious not only what someone does without freedom of contradiction, but even what he does not do at all, but only receives. It is clear that this Author thinks thus, because in that internal occupation of man concerning the end, about which was spoken above, he

CHAPTER ONE

doubtless includes intention, since that is either the only or the principal occupation of the wayfarer concerning the end. That, therefore, is that through which the wayfarer merits and is worthy of praise. But we have heard before that man relates only passively to it, that it is made and increased in us by God alone, that the relation which we express through it to God is not active but passive. Therefore there is merit in that which we do not do. And this appears more clearly from chapter 9, number 8, where after he had distinguished in our conversion to God a twofold notion, namely the precise notion itself of conversion to God, and the notion of separation from creatures, he adds that this aversion from creatures, insofar as it relies on God as our end, to whom we adhere, is meritorious as our act; but that conversion precisely taken, although it is meritorious of eternal life, nevertheless not as our act (because, he says, as St. Thomas excellently says, we do not move ourselves to the end), but as the work of God through Christ in us. What else, I ask, does this signify, except that conversion precisely taken is meritorious, not as an act elicited by us but as an act sent by God and received by us? And soon, "Although those meritorious acts, insofar as they concern God, are not properly ours, nevertheless they are acts which are found in us and not habits." That is, although they are not done by us, nevertheless they are received. Similarly, although we do not properly merit by them, namely because we do not produce them, nevertheless they are meritorious. And then, "this freedom, namely of those acts, since it cannot pertain to exercise, nor is it freedom according to which man moves himself, do you see how he denies man's action? it must pertain to the inchoate state of freedom." I omit the very many other faults of this doctrine. For he imposes on St. Thomas, and in many things contradicts himself; but these things elsewhere. I point out this one thing: Merit is in that which we do not do, and this which is precisely to receive a benefit from God is meritorious. For this is the sum of what we have related.

BUT besides the fact that at first glance this opinion seems to be most absurd, it is also suspect in faith. 1. Because, to omit that it is new

CHAPTER ONE

and singular, and adverse to the old and common opinion, it is clear in the sacred scriptures that the crown, reward, wages, and other things of this kind, by the proposition of which the notion of merit is established, are promised to one who strives, conquers, labors—in a word, to one who does something; and it is not right to hope for goods of this kind on any other condition. But this is both in vain and false, if they are also given to one who ceases and does nothing. 2. The judgment of the Sorbonne is the same. For among the errors condemned at Paris, the revocation of this one also is contained, made according to the prescription of the Academy in the year 1354: "5. I said that good merit is from God, in such a way that nothing is from the will." It adds, "I revoke this as false, scandalous, and suspect in faith." How therefore will that Doctor clear himself, who both acts as a Sorbonnist and teaches that some good merit is from God, IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WILL RELATES ONLY PASSIVELY? 3. The decision of the Council of Trent is express in session 6, canon 26, requiring for merit "that the just person act well," and in canon 32, "Good works are so gifts of God that they are also the good merits of the justified person; they are done by him; through them he truly merits an increase of grace." Where now is that, "The acts by which we are occupied concerning God are not properly ours; we do not properly merit through them?"

Nor is there any excuse for anyone to take from what we related before, that there is no freedom of contradiction and indifference of acting and not acting in an upright man who stands; as if it were conceded that there is in one who has fallen; because the question is, as is clear from number 8 of that chapter 9, about the conversion of the sinner, which is an act of fallen nature, not of one standing.

EIGHTH, The choice by which someone, after deliberation about entering a state of life, decides for God rather than for the world, is not absolutely praiseworthy, indeed is not even free from fault. Thus in chapter 9, number 6, where it was answered that the choice of a sinner who prefers to serve God rather than the world is praiseworthy and meri-

CHAPTER ONE

torious; "But contrary to this," he says, "is that even if one who in deliberation about the state of life concludes rather for God than for the world is less blameworthy than one who settles the dispute in favor of the world, nevertheless he is not absolutely worthy of praise, indeed is not even free from fault: but operates in that perversity which, etc."

This doctrine, to speak most gently, ought to be highly suspect. And this is so self-evident that no wise and learned person would seek a reason for suspicion. Does not the entire Wisdom of Christianity exhort us to take counsel concerning both other matters and especially about entering upon a state of life? But why, if not that we might always decide for God? Therefore, in order to sin? To whom has it ever been heard that one acts prudently who ensnares himself in the necessity of sinning? And yet this is what anyone who enters into deliberation about a state of life will do. For it will be necessary that he concludes either for the world, or for God, or for neither. If the first, he is blameworthy; if the second, although he is less blameworthy, he is nevertheless not free from fault; if the third, what will happen? Can one who concludes for neither be more innocent than one who concludes for God? Away with such an absurd thought. What thanks would Luther not render, when he sees that what he had said—that all good acts whatsoever are infected with wickedness—has been partly retained and approved by this Author, at least in those acts which seem to be the best of all? For what better can be done than if, with pleasure and impurity proposed on one side, and with honor and burdens on the other, one decides for honorable labors rather than for base allurements; for God rather than for the Devil? And is one who does this not free from fault? Would that I might always sin in this way: I will die in final impenitence, as they say.

NINTH. The peace and tranquility of mind that one who turns to God seeks is not an object good in itself, and with the intention of which it is permissible to act without sin. Thus in that chapter 9, number 6, where this reason is given why one who concludes for God in deliberation about choosing a state of life is not free from fault: "Because he sets

CHAPTER ONE

himself as his own end, and uses worship and obedience to God for his own peace and tranquility."

This doctrine is suspect to me, because it does not seem to differ from one which would hold that it is illicit to wish to obey God in order to avoid an evil the fear of which disturbs the mind; an evil, I say, that threatens from an angry God, and constitutes either eternal or temporary punishment: likewise that it is illicit to wish to obey God, so that trust in Divine mercy may be strengthened, and hope of pardon and reconciliation may shine forth. Nothing else, I say, can wishing to obey God, so that there may be peace and tranquility of mind, be than wishing to obey so that flight from those evils and attainment of these goods may be certain. And thus if one is not free from fault, as this Author believes, neither can the other be. But it has "been defined by the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 8: If anyone says that the fear of hell, through which we take refuge in God's mercy by repenting of sins, or by which we abstain from sinning, is a sin, or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema." And canon 31: "If anyone says that the justified person sins when he acts for the sake of an eternal reward, let him be anathema." Likewise it has been defined by the School of Paris in censure of propositions of Erasmus, title 16, where it is said: "It is lawful to be moved by reward to act well, and to assert the opposite is erroneous." And in censure of Luther's propositions, title 2, on contrition, the proposition which asserts "Contrition which is prepared when one reconsiders his years in the bitterness of his soul, weighing the gravity of sins, their multitude, their foulness, the loss of eternal happiness, and the acquisition of eternal damnation—this contrition," he says, "makes a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner," is pronounced "to be false, obstructive to the way of penitence, and not in conformity with the sacred scriptures and the doctrine of the saints." The Sorbonne's judgment on this was later accepted by the Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4 and canon 5, on penitence. But no one can doubt that this contrition causes one to seek peace and tranquility; therefore if this is not free from fault, it makes a man a greater sinner. Finally, the

CHAPTER ONE

sacred pages exhort men to want to see good days, to seek peace, and to pursue it, and yet they do not exhort to evil.

TENTH is contained in these words in that chapter 9, number 6: "In the struggle of flesh and spirit, which precedes the perfect conversion of man to God, if you ask whether anything is meritorious and praiseworthy, I respond, truly. But beware of attributing praise to our infirmity, from which come those frequent lapses and troublesome contradictions. For it is all due to the grace of God, which, etc." He continues, "but is not some operation of ours, and not only of God, here praiseworthy? Truly. But that operation of ours is the very operation of grace, which becomes ours while through it we are gradually drawn back from creatures to God: to which that frequent conversion with a certain inclination to creatures is compared NOT AS A PART, BUT AS AN OBSTACLE."

By this statement two things are not obscurely signified. One is already noted, namely that there are no parts of free will in the conversion of the will to God. For this is the target of what he says, "The operation of grace which is found there becomes ours while through it we are drawn back, etc." As if he were saying it is not ours by reason of the dependence it has on us, but it is ours by reason of the effect which it brings about in us. And then, that frequent conversion, by which the will strives to rise toward God, is not part of the operation of grace: which is to say the will does not cooperate with divine grace in that operation. From this you may understand that nothing was rashly suspected earlier about this man's corrupt opinion.

The other point is that this frequent conversion "ought to be compared to the operation of grace not as a part, but as an obstacle." This opinion is suspect to me on two grounds. First, because it smacks of Pelagianism. Second, because it smacks of Lutheranism.

Indeed, that frequent conversion is nothing other than the frequent effort of the mind striving toward God, which is mixed with the frequent falls of the same mind relapsing toward created things, in that battle which is the prelude to perfect and absolute conversion. But that

CHAPTER ONE

these efforts are merely natural, and so independent of Divine grace that they do not even partly pertain to it, was once asserted by Pelagius, and denied by the Holy Fathers, who fought with him for that same grace. But to add that these same efforts not only are not at least partly from Divine Grace, but moreover place an obstacle to its operation: this finally is to say that they are sins. From which it follows that for a man in that struggle of flesh and spirit to strive toward God is nothing other than to sin. But this savors purely of Luther, whose opinion was struck down by the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 7: "If anyone says that the more vehemently someone strives to dispose himself for grace, the more gravely he sins, let him be anathema."

ELEVENTH. Continuous exercise of Divine love is so necessary that its interruption is excused from sin only by incapacity or inadvertence. Thus in chapter 9, number 5, where he proves that there is no indifference in a standing and upright man to loving God or not loving Him, with this reasoning: "Because man is indeed a wayfarer, a wayfarer in all parts and states of life, OBLIGATED to hasten to his end with restless movement, tolerating no rest in himself or in other creatures. If therefore, BEING ABLE AND AWARE, AND NOT FROM WEAKNESS, he suspends the act of divine love, he must by that very suspension tend to the end. But to what end will he tend? If to God, then he does not suspend but pursues the love of God. For all pure and sincere intention of God is a certain love of God: if to himself, and so that he might be free from God he wishes to be free; this is now to have fallen from rectitude." You see that beyond incapacity and imprudence, no reason occurs to this man by which the love of God can be so suspended that one does not by that very act fall from rectitude. He has the same in chapter 12, number 3, where speaking of man, he says, "It is no more licit for him to abstain from looking back to and seeking his end, than it is possible not to depend on the principle." And later, "if he does not notice what he is doing, that inadvertence excuses from fault: but if he operates knowingly and seeing, and does not refer his works to the Author, he will

CHAPTER ONE

not escape the stain of an ungrateful mind." And at the end of number 4, "Therefore whenever a man acts with deliberation, he ought to tend to the end, and if he does otherwise, he will deprive himself and his act of due perfection, and will sin because he does not follow the rule."

This opinion 1. seems to have some affinity with that of Luther, who finds fault with men because they do not all the time repent of their sins, concerning which the Faculty of Paris pronounces in censure of Luther's propositions, title 8: "To be false, unreasonable, and asserted from an erroneous understanding of scripture."

2. It contradicts all the schools, by which affirmative precepts, as they are called, are distinguished from negative ones in this, that although they always bind, they do not bind for always. And specifically concerning the precept of charity they ask: at what time does the necessity of fulfilling it press? And here indeed one says it presses as soon as the use of reason begins; another, when present is the danger of life; another, when the Sacrament of Baptism is received; someone, on every Lord's day; there is one who thinks also on more prominent feasts; some, when we are tossed by grave temptation; others, when a great benefit has been received; one time is designated by some, another by others; every time by none. But why do you have these quarrels, O Wise Men? The decisive judgment of a recent Doctor is at hand. You all say things both true and false. For in that you signify that the love of God should be exercised at some certain time, it is true; that you exclude another time is false. This is the supreme decision of the controversy, which occurred to none of you.

3. This doctrine is injurious to other virtues. For it manifestly follows from it that their goodness is so slight that neither each one individually, nor all together, suffice to occupy the will honorably; indeed even if they obtain the whole, such that there is no place for an act of Divine love, they introduce the sin of omission. Therefore he who is completely dedicated to exercising faith, from the proper motive of that virtue, sins; he who is full of hope sins; he whom such great sorrow for his sins occupies, conceived from their foulness alone, or even from fear of eternal

CHAPTER ONE

punishments, that there is not yet open an entrance for Divine love, sins; all of these, I say, so sin that only inadvertence excuses them. From which

4. It further follows that what is supposed by the Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4, is in vain: That there is some imperfect contrition, or attrition, which excludes the will to sin. For no contrition is called imperfect except that which is compatible with a defect of actual love; which since it is said to be culpable, unless inadvertence or incapacity excuses, it follows that there is no imperfect contrition which excludes actual fault, that is, the will to sin, if inadvertence and incapacity are absent. But if they are present, the will to sin will no longer be excluded through contrition, as the Council wants, but through these very things. These are the things that justly render the adduced opinion suspect to me.

TWELFTH. Not only is the omission of Divine love culpable, but also of any virtue to which grace from heaven has impelled. This opinion is found in many places: namely whenever the power of suspending the effect of Divine grace is confused with the power of sinning; and therefore the former is denied to pertain to liberty, because the latter does not pertain to it. And he establishes this as almost the sole principle of his entire philosophy, as he indicates both often elsewhere and especially in chapter 31. But in chapter 27, number 3, when it was objected, "It is necessary for the dominion of the will over its acts that it can suspend that to which it is predetermined," he responds by asking, "In what do we wish this dominion to appear? Is it in this, that the will can reject such an act, where the order of the end demands it? Or in this, that it can freely dismiss it, even beyond the demands of the end? If," he says, "they choose the second, let them remember, I ask, that they have already so often confessed that the power of sinning is not liberty, nor part of liberty." You see how he confuses the power of sinning with the power of dismissing or rejecting an act to which someone is predetermined, when the order of the end does not demand that it be dismissed, which is perpetual; for it is repugnant that we should be efficiently predetermined by God to that

CHAPTER ONE

which He finally demands that we omit. Therefore it is perpetual that the power of suppressing an act to which we are moved by God is the power of sinning, and therefore to suppress it is the same as to sin. He has the same in chapter 22, number 4, where he teaches that the Council of Trent, canon 4, session 6, while defining that "Free will can dissent from God calling and exciting," does not include the Blessed Virgin, not the Lord Jesus, whom no pious person would think could have dissented from God moving them and sinned. You see how here too he either confuses or conjoins "to dissent" with "to sin."

But this opinion 1. is suspect. Because it removes from the middle the Catholic doctrine of the distinction of good works, into those which are called of counsel, or supererogation, and those which are of precept. For there is in general no good work (I speak of meritorious ones and those conducive to eternal life) which is done without prior and special motion of God; and therefore that is not of such kind, according to this opinion, that its omission would be a sin. But it is obvious that it is the same thing for the omission of some work to be a sin, and for a precept to perform the same to exist; therefore there will be no good work, of the performance of which a precept does not exist.

From which it will further follow that those which are called counsels are only counsels to obey precepts. For since the counsel of God only aims at this, that men follow the motion of Divine Grace in extraordinary operations of virtues, and they cannot not follow without sin by supposition, it follows that God does nothing else by His counsel than advise men not to sin; but this advising is that they obey the precept. Therefore there are no counsels apart from precepts. And by this same reasoning Moulin attacks that Catholic distinction of works in the first part of his papery Shield, section 69: "But if," he says, "for executing those works of supererogation, God imparts His spirit to men, and is at hand to help, they are therefore constrained by necessary obligation to act, lest they render the grace of God useless, and in this way they will no longer be works of supererogation, since indeed there is an obligation of

CHAPTER ONE

executing them." Hence it is clear that our Author provides weapons to heretics with which to attack the Orthodox.

Pertinent to this is the judgment of the Faculty of Paris in censure of Luther's propositions, title 10, on Evangelical counsels. For when Luther had said that "it is not a counsel but a precept of Christ, 'whoever strikes you on the cheek, etc.' Matthew 5, likewise, 'not defending yourselves, dearest, etc.' Romans 12," "This proposition," says the Sorbonne, "is false, too burdensome to the Christian law, and contrary to the sound understanding of scripture." But this Doctor holds not only about that double act of virtue but in general about every act the eliciting of which God has been the author by His internal inspiration, that no counsel is given by Him, but a precept is imposed, such that to omit is an evil. How much more, therefore, does he burden the Christian law? And what reason will be available for preserving peace, and the internal liberty of the sons of God, if they are forced to fear at each and every instinct which they suspect to be divine, lest they be beaten if they are not obedient to what is said?

But that the same Author elsewhere indicates, as if mitigating this opinion, that not to consent to Divine grace is either a sin or at least a defect and imperfection, such nonetheless that it can fall neither on Christ, nor on the Blessed Virgin, nor on the rest of the Blessed, causes us to say that he, in those places indeed which have been adduced by us, erred; in others, only came very close to error. Then we ask of him to teach us what defect there can be, which indeed falls on the exercise of liberty, and therefore is a moral defect, is also intolerable to the conscience of the saints, and yet cannot deservedly be called a sin.

THIRTEENTH. Divine grace sometimes consumes the power of dissenting, or not consenting, with the liberty of will necessary for acting well and meriting still standing, indeed with the liberty of contradiction standing. Thus in chapter 22, number 1, where he distinguishes two modes of predetermination: he says one is predetermination of faculty, the other of act. Of the former he speaks thus: "The faculty is predeter-

CHAPTER ONE

mined, when it is so affected by God, and placed in such an intrinsic state, that it cannot [do] the opposite of what He Himself has willed." And then, "this whole," he says, "is included in Divine motion, from which, as we suppose, he who receives it can in no way, at least for this time, fail." In number 13, he repeats again: "Predetermination if it is of the power REMOVES THE DEFECT of liberty: and thus opposes the liberty of sinners, which imports THE POWER OF FAILING." But now we have seen that "to fail" is for him the same as to dismiss or reject the act to which someone is impelled by God; from which it is clear that predetermination, which is said to remove the power of failing, from him himself must be said to remove the power of suspending the act toward which it tends. But he says such was the predetermination of the will of Christ the Lord, even while He was a wayfarer, and of all the Blessed reigning in Heaven, and of the Blessed Virgin, and of certain principal saints, to whom he denies pertains what the Council of Trent says, session 6, canon 4, about the power of dissenting from God moving and exciting. Thus in the cited chapter, numbers 1, 4, and 13. Since therefore he admits that in these same ones free will is most free, and most suitable for acting well and meriting, it follows that the liberty of will, and the faculty of acting well and meriting, stand with the impotence of suspending those good and meritorious acts.

But this doctrine is suspect to me. 1. because of its novelty. Because there is not one among Catholic Authors who joins these things together: the liberty of will, and the intrinsic impotence of suspending that one determinate act which is said to be exercised freely, in that concurrence of things and circumstances in which it is said to be exercised. The Thomists certainly, whose interest it was to think so, whenever this or a similar argument was proposed, "What removes the power of dissenting, removes liberty; but predetermination removes the power of dissenting; therefore, etc.," are consistently found to have conceded the Major. The whole force of the disputation was around the minor; while they absolutely deny it, others contend there is no right to deny it. Since there-

CHAPTER ONE

fore they have until now preserved the confines of their doctrine and the Calvinist one distinct by this one line, namely that physical predetermination does not remove the power of dissenting, it is very credible that this Author, having transgressed such a line, labors in a territory foreign to Catholics.

2. It seems to me to be rather confident philosophizing that he holds what has been pronounced by the Council of Trent to be true only for the most part, but false in the most excellent saints, whom it seemed good to Divine goodness to adorn with prerogatives, as he himself says in the cited chapter, number 4. Certainly indeed it follows from this that nothing else was sanctioned by the Council of Trent than that the condition of all who are called to Christ is not one: for some are urged more powerfully, others are led somewhat more gently; to the extraordinary, no opportunity for delay is given, but it is given to the more contemptible; wherefore to those no praise at all is due for not having resisted, for they had no liberty of resisting; but to these who had it, it is due. I fear that these things could have been sanctioned by the Council not only superfluously, but not even with sufficient truth.

3. Unless I am mistaken, this was the aim of the Tridentine Fathers, to bring about by their sanction that the old opinion of free will might be intact; nor would they have retained the power of withholding assent when the grace of God urges in any way other than because they feared that if it were snatched away, liberty too would be lost. But if with such power removed, for that time only when grace presses, the liberty of will is nevertheless safe, along with the faculty of acting well and meriting, and there is place for exhortation, counsel, precepts, and finally reward and crown, there would not have been much cause why they should strive with such zeal to preserve a thing by no means necessary. Therefore they were persuaded that the hazard of both was the same, namely of liberty, which is necessary for honest and meritorious actions, and of the power of restraining affection, to which God impels by His inspiration. From which it follows that this Author, just as he undertakes to teach the

CHAPTER ONE

Thomists a better way of defending physical predeterminations than that which they had used until now, so also wishes to raise up and strengthen the Tridentine Prelates against an empty fear, having removed that timid thought of liberty about to perish, if the power of dissenting perishes, for that time when efficacious grace sits in our wills.

FOURTEENTH. Not only to more excellent saints, but in general to created wills is the power of acting otherwise taken away by the antecedent providence of God. Thus in chapter 8, number 2, where he thinks that St. Augustine in *City of God* 5, chapters 9 and 10, teaches that there is a necessity other than what is called of the composed sense, which stands with liberty, namely that which is born not only from the foreknowledge of future things, but also from providence, which precedes this foreknowledge. "There," he says, designating chapter nine, "he indicates both a necessity and immutability other than that of the composed sense. For providence is prior to foreknowledge, and much more to our wills and actions (there is no discussion with him about conditional foreknowledge, and about the providence which is directed through it) and through it God subjects our wills to Himself and inclines them where He wishes, such that what they are going to do they will absolutely do, nor can the thing happen otherwise, which sounds like immutability, and yet it does not remove the liberty of the will." The question is not only about the liberty which he calls of state, but also about that which is proper to free will, and which pertains indistinctly to good and bad actions, as is clear both from St. Augustine's disputation, and from the beginning of this section which has been cited, which is as follows: "But because the issue is accommodating that second necessity to free will without loss of liberty." From which it is quite clear, from the mind of this Author, that there falls upon free will the necessity of acting, arising from God's providence, antecedently to the absolute foreknowledge of future things, even conditional foreknowledge being excluded; a necessity, I say, of acting such that the thing cannot happen otherwise, not only in the composed sense, but neither, what alone remains, in the divided sense.

CHAPTER ONE

This I hold very suspect. 1. Because he very explicitly affirms what the Council of Trent denies, and moreover rejects that interpretation, by which alone truth and authority seemed to remain with the Council. The Council denies that God so moves the will that it cannot resist, which is, that the thing cannot happen otherwise; this Author affirms this very thing, as we have now seen. But those who have defended physical predeterminations until now have tried to avoid the blow of the Tridentine thunderbolt, either by this one or by another equivalent distinction, when they say, "The thing indeed cannot happen otherwise in the composed sense, but it can in the divided sense." Since this Author now hisses this out, having designated another necessity than what is of the composed sense, I do not know what place remains for the Council.

2. This opinion seems to be the same as that of which St. Thomas speaks in question 6 on evil, article 1: "Some," he says, "have posited that the will of man is moved by necessity to choosing something; and yet they did not posit that the will is coerced. For not everything necessary is violent," he adds. "But this opinion is heretical: For it removes the reason for merit and demerit." You see 1. that St. Thomas is dealing with that necessity which by no means involves coercion of the will. 2. Also with that by which the will is determined to good and honest actions, since it is believed to prevent the reason for merit. From which it follows 3. that he is dealing with that which could be sent by God, because there is no other cause which so impels to acts suitable for meriting. Therefore St. Thomas says that whoever establishes this necessity is a heretic. Let this Author therefore see what needs to be done in order to prove himself a Catholic.

3. Among the articles condemned by anathema in Paris in the year 1270, the third is counted, "That the will of man necessarily wills or chooses," and in the year 1226, "That with the will existing in such a disposition in which it is born to be moved, and with the mover so disposed that it is born to move, it is impossible for the will not to will." Does not one who is so subjected to God's decree in choosing that what he does he

CHAPTER ONE

will absolutely do, nor can the thing happen otherwise, choose out of necessity? And is it not impossible for the will not to will, with God Himself moving it both effectively and finally (which are two modes of moving proper and perpetual to the first cause in this Author's opinion), if He administers His motion with that providence by which it happens, antecedently to all liberty, that the thing cannot happen otherwise?

4. This seems to be the very same opinion of Calvin. For the necessity by which he entangles the wills of men comes from nowhere else than from the providence of God, as is clear from Institutes 1, chapter 16, section 8, where he speaks thus: "We, although we do not quarrel about words, nevertheless do not accept the word fate: both because it is of that kind whose profane novelties Paul teaches us to avoid, and because they try by its odium to burden the truth of God. But the dogma itself is falsely and maliciously objected to us. For we do not devise necessity with the Stoics from the perpetual nexus of causes, and from some implicated series which is contained in nature, but we constitute God as arbiter and moderator of all things, who according to His wisdom has decreed from ultimate eternity what He would do, and now by His power executes what He has decreed." And then in section 9: "Meanwhile, what God has decreed must so necessarily happen, yet it is neither precisely nor by its own nature necessary. A familiar example occurs in the bones of Christ. Since He assumed a body similar to ours, no sane person will deny that His bones were fragile; which nevertheless it was impossible to break." From which again we see that distinctions of necessity according to what, and absolute, likewise of consequent and consequence, etc., were not rashly invented in the Schools. From these two places it is very clear that: 1. The cause of the necessity by which liberty is destroyed by Calvin is placed in the will of God alone. 2. It is denied by him that that necessity is absolute or even such that it prevents what is thus necessary from being said to be *per se* and from its own nature contingent, just as the bones of Christ ought to be thought fragile in themselves, however impossible it was from the supposition of the Divine decree that they be

CHAPTER ONE

broken. But also 3. it is clear that Calvin excluded coercion from this necessity, book 2, chapter 2, section 5.

Since these things are so, two difficulties distress me, and compel me to implore the aid of this Doctor with whom we are dealing. 1. What is the difference between that necessity by which Calvin is believed to have removed liberty for good from us, and that of which he himself offers himself as the asserter? I am speaking of liberty for good, for about that which is for evil, later. But if he contends that nothing was indeed sinned by Calvin in this part, which seems necessary, lest he pronounce a sentence on himself, immediately arises the 2nd difficulty. Whom then does Calvin bark at, and try to bite, as if they were hostile to this doctrine of his? Certainly none other than the Roman Doctors. Therefore he himself, who so notably agrees with Calvin in establishing this necessity, dissents from them.

FIFTEENTH, It pertains to the same issue, but it is worth noting the many ways and places in which he destroys the freedom of the will. Therefore, he asserts that God, by predetermining, in no way leaves in the will the indifference of acting or not acting. Thus in chapter 30, number 4, where he contends that if God could not give the very willing to the Creature except by foreseeing what would happen under a condition, He would merely persuade but not give, which is absurd. He proves this follows because, he says, what God will provide in this case will be nothing other than a pious thought and affection, with which man remains indifferent to acting or not acting. But he who gives the very willing itself (namely by physically pre-moving) does not leave you indifferent: but determines you in a manner accommodated to your condition. I do not want anyone to object that the contrary is indicated by the same Author in other places. For it is not my purpose to maintain that everything said by him is coherent. But however correctly he may think elsewhere, this does not prevent what is badly stated in this passage from being suspect.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Because he proceeds further than Calvin had gone. For the latter, as we noted earlier, believed that it was not prevented that the will, upon which God imposes necessity of action, can be said to be absolutely either indifferent or contingent in acting, or expressed in whatever other way one pleases to convey that internal absence of necessity; in the same way that the bones of Christ the Lord were said to be absolutely breakable, although their breaking was prevented by the eternal decree of God. But now we are commanded to believe that one whom God physically pre-moves is not left indifferent.

2. Since being indifferent in acting and not acting is precisely the same as being contingent or acting or not acting contingently, it follows that it is the same to say that God does not leave indifference to the cause which He pre-moves, and that He does not leave it contingency. And therefore if there is any contingency in its operation, it will by no means be derived from itself, but only from that cause in whose power it was placed to pre-move or not to pre-move. What, therefore, will become of that thought of all mortals, who are indeed considered wise, by which they distinguish contingent effects of created causes from necessary ones, and attribute the former especially to free causes? Why, I ask, is a human choice said to be contingent, except in the way that today's revolution of the sun is contingent, if the freedom of no created cause contributes more to this than to that, so that it exists contingently?

3. Since this indifference encompasses two powers, namely the power to act and the power not to act, it follows that God's predetermination can be considered not to leave it only because one of those powers is not left. But it cannot be said that the power to act is taken away, since rather it is conferred. It remains, therefore, that the power not to act is taken away: and it is the same to say, "he does not leave you indifferent" as to say, "he does not leave you able to suspend action." Therefore, let those of Trent who demand the contrary be concerned. Moreover, that qualification which he tries to add, when he says, "he does not leave you indifferent; but determines you in a manner accommodated to your con-

CHAPTER ONE

dition," is useless, and confuses and complicates the entire statement. For the condition of a free cause requires that it be allowed to remain indifferent when it is applied to action. Therefore, it is the same to say, "God determines you accommodated to your condition" as to say, "God so determines you, that He leaves you indifferent." Hence if such a statement is now completed, and pronounced again in its entirety, it will sound thus: "God does not leave you indifferent: but He so determines you, that He leaves you indifferent." What could be imagined more absurd than this? Nor is it more coherent what is said elsewhere in a similar case, that God's decree preceding all knowledge concerning future contingents, and inflowing necessity of action into human wills, does not hinder liberty, but rather helps it; because God, who by His infinite wisdom knows best what is the manner of preserving freedom, decrees to pre-move free causes in a way He knows to be fitting, so that they act freely. Because for them to act freely, it is fitting that they act without necessity of action, which indeed is not in their power: Therefore whatever decree there is of pre-moving so that freedom is preserved, it must be a decree of pre-moving in such a way that necessity is not imposed. Let that decree therefore be expressed again, by which God is said to inflict necessity of action that is antecedent and independent of us, yet preserving freedom. And it will be this: I will that created will be impelled by necessity of action independent of itself, to that action which ought to be elicited without such necessity.

SIXTEENTH. That the generation of the Son in the divine is an example which shows that the necessity of immutability can be adapted to free will without loss of freedom. Thus, in chapter 8, number 2, where he speaks as follows: "But because when it comes to adapting that second necessity to free will without loss of freedom, St. Augustine takes an example of necessity from the composite sense, saying, 'it is necessary that what we will by will, we will'; someone can object that this is nothing other than what everyone says, and no true immutability appears which agrees with freedom. But I respond, 1. St. Augustine, although he took

CHAPTER ONE

that example which pertains to the composite sense, as more obvious, also took examples in God which in no way pertain to the composite sense, and indicated that the life of God, and the generation of His Son are free actions, even though joined with immutability and necessity." You see that the divine generation is said to be not only a free action, but moreover so free, that it is an example by which it appears that immutability and necessity, that is immutable necessity of action, concord with freedom of will, or are adapted to it without loss of freedom.

But that he attributes that statement to St. Augustine is most false: since in that entire chapter 10, book 5 of *The City of God*, from which he pretends to draw these things, there is no more mention of the generation of the Divine Son than of the generation of Remus and Romulus. And this is the first cause of my suspicion.

The second is that since it is necessary that examples be either of the same things, or of very similar things: after the generation of the Son of God is said to be an example by which it appears that immutable necessity of action can be adapted with free will, without loss of freedom, it is necessary to say one of two things: either that there is such freedom in the eternal production of the Divine Word, as is thought to be in the action of free will, or that there is such necessity in the action of free will as is believed to be in the production of the Divine Word: The first is Arian, the second more than Calvinist. Therefore let him choose which he approves more.

SEVENTEENTH. That the freedom which divine motion leaves us is "whatever kind" and "apparent" freedom. Thus in chapter 22, number 9, when he says: "This same thing, which obviously God can do, not only by way of persuasion, but also by way of supreme power, to incline the will wherever He pleases, even with its 'whatever kind' and 'apparent' freedom untouched, St. Augustine has, etc." He speaks of freedom which has defectibility mixed with it, as when the will is so turned toward good, that it can still withhold assent: and consequently of freedom, of which the Council of Trent also speaks when it defines that free will can resist

CHAPTER ONE

the grace of God, can dissent. He wants this, therefore, to be only a mask of freedom: for this is what "apparent" and "whatever kind" of freedom signifies. But this opinion is suspect to me.

First, because it seems to come very close to what was affirmed by Luther, condemned by the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 5: "If anyone says that man's free will, after Adam's sin, is a thing of title only, or rather a title without a thing, etc., let him be anathema." Second, because there is no Catholic who thinks that enough has been done by Calvin, when in the Institutes 2, chapter 2, convicted by the testimony of the holy Fathers who perpetually preach freedom of will, he thinks they indeed had the word assiduously in their mouth, but at the same time declared how much they valued its use, number 8, which seems to be the same as saying that they wanted to signify by that name a "whatever kind" and "apparent" freedom. And then he concludes, "Therefore if anyone permits the use of this word without perverse understanding, I will not vex him over that matter." And a little before in number 7, when he had reported that free will is called that power of sinning which lacks coercion, even if it does not lack necessity of action; he adds, "That is excellent indeed, but what was the point of marking such a TRIFLING THING with such a distinguished title." Then in chapter 3, number 14, he collects St. Augustine's doctrine, which he had brought forward, into this summary: "In man such free will is left (IF YOU LIKE TO CALL IT THAT) which he writes elsewhere, can neither turn to God, nor persist in God except through grace; from grace it derives whatever power it has." From all these things it is understood that freedom does indeed seem to Calvin to remain in the will, both for good and for evil: but only in appearance, and the truth of which by no means corresponds to such a great name. And what else is this than to be "apparent" and "whatever kind" of freedom?

EIGHTEENTH. There is a certain corollary from what was said before, which is as follows. That Calvin, and Calvinists either committed no sin when they denied freedom of will in works of grace: or only in

CHAPTER ONE

this, because they did not retain a spurious and improper freedom, but a genuine and true one. This moreover is thus demonstrated from the principles of this author.

If there is any fault of Calvin in this matter, it must necessarily be positioned in one of these three: either because he denied there is a thing, which is true and perfect freedom of will; or because although he confessed that thing to exist, he nevertheless thought the name of freedom of will did not befit it; or because although he recognized the name, and was not ignorant that it was called freedom by some, he nevertheless was unwilling to obey custom. None of these can be said in this opinion: therefore in this opinion there is no fault of Calvin concerning the doctrine of freedom of will in good works. I prove the minor, and First, Calvin never denied, indeed never did not assert that there is in the will of those who are efficaciously moved by God's grace, the happy necessity of consenting, and the salutary inability of dissenting; likewise, that through those acts which are then exercised, the will is bound to God as to the first principle of all things, and the ultimate end, and thus led into that amplitude, in which true and proper freedom is said to be positioned: therefore he did not deny there is a thing, which is called by this author true and proper freedom.

Second, there is no fault of Calvin, in that he did not think the name of freedom befitted that thing. Both because he permits it to be so called, as we have seen: and because Catholics themselves judge the same, namely, that the power of consenting to the grace of God, which is joined with necessity, and inability to dissent, however much it binds us to the highest good, is not to be called freedom of will. And it is provided, that it not be counted as a fault for anyone who thinks thus, therefore Calvin is also without fault in this respect. Third, it follows from this that there was also no custom, which would demand of Calvin that he speak with those who call that manner of acting, which we have mentioned, freedom of will. Because there are more who speak otherwise. For even the Thomists themselves are found in this number, while they contend by

CHAPTER ONE

every argument that the power of dissenting stands with their predeterminations. What, therefore, is Calvin's sin? Namely that he ought to have approved that freedom of will which is positioned in the power of consenting, or not consenting to the grace of God. But according to you that is only the freedom of sinners: that imperfect and unworthy of the will of Christ the Lord, the Blessed Virgin, and the more excellent saints: that of "whatever kind" and "apparent" only. But the other, which Calvin defends in reality, seems to deny only in word, is true and genuine and perfect freedom. It remains, therefore, that this is Calvin's only fault, that he recognized true and perfect freedom of will in works of grace; but denied the degenerate and imperfect one. From which it is given to understand that the thunderbolts of the Tridentine Fathers are brutish and the accusations of all the orthodox unjust, when they make him guilty of destroyed freedom, who rather stood forth as the assertor of true and genuine freedom.

But what shall we oppose to the herd of Dordrecht pastors, who do not even deny the name of true freedom to that necessity of acting well? For thus they speak in chapter 3 and 4, article 16: "This grace of divine regeneration does not act in men as in logs and stumps, nor does it take away the will and its properties, or coerce it unwillingly by violence, but spiritually vivifies, heals, corrects, and bends it sweetly and at the same time powerfully: so that where previously the rebellion and resistance of the flesh fully dominated, now prompt and sincere obedience of the spirit begins to reign, in which the true and spiritual restoration and freedom of our will consists." We congratulate this Doctor on the approval of such a Council.

NINETEENTH, He removes from consideration the concept of sufficient grace. This occurs in chapter 27, numbers 6 and 7, where while responding to that objection, how it can happen that the omission of good acts, which God requires of us, is culpable, since the one who omitted lacked the necessary pre-motion: he denies that there is anyone who lacks general pre-motion, which he says is sufficient for every good, the

CHAPTER ONE

omission of which is imputed as fault. Moreover, he says that general pre-motion is the appetite for the highest good which God has so deeply impressed in all of us, that it can indeed be obscured, and diverted elsewhere: but in no way can it be completely abolished. For the immortal desire for the highest good lives in all, even if it sometimes happens that it is badly placed and we recede from the good while we strive to approach it: and not only does it live, but it is the source and origin of all our acts and affections. By it we perform whatever good proceeds from us, by it likewise, when we act badly, and against the law: by it finally when we fall into evil, because we can stand, we are convicted guilty, because "the light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," but we are rebellious to the light. It is doubtful whether by that name of desire for the highest good, he signifies an elicited act of the will: because previously in chapter 20, number 5, he said that the intention of the ultimate end, which he also considers to be pre-motion, is, at least in us considered in the present, transient and lasting for a short time, whereas now he says this desire is perpetual and immortal: but whatever it is, this one thing is established, that such desire is not something superadded to natural benefits, which is, as he thinks, in all men, at all times, the source and origin of all our acts and affections: and specifically of evil ones: finally that it is or follows that light, of which the Prophet speaks when he sings, "the light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," which is the light of natural reason, as is commonly explained: these things, I say, cannot all apply to an elicited and supernatural desire: therefore whatever that power is, it is natural.

Now the author continues, and says in number 7: "And this is sufficient help, I do not say for being able, but for every good, the omission of which is imputed as fault." And again after citing St. Dionysius, "In which place it is useful to observe that the divine light (by which name understand sufficient help for good, the omission of which is turned to us as fault) always shines upon us; but we turn away from it." From which it is clear that desire naturally implanted, is sufficient help for every act, the

CHAPTER ONE

omission of which is imputed as fault: and because the omission of acts of faith, hope, charity, at certain times by certain men is especially imputed as fault: it is necessarily compelled, that such desire is sufficient help for the exercise of those acts. But what he interposed, "I do not say for being able": unless I am mistaken, only pertains to this, that he rejects the distinction of some Thomists, when they say that man not pre-moved, and voluntarily omitting some act has sufficient help for being able, not for operating; he on the contrary seems to want it to be said absolutely sufficient, for every good operation, the omission of which is culpable.

I hold this opinion suspect, because as I have already said it seems to me to oppose the Catholic doctrine of sufficient grace. That this may be clear, it should be noted that what is commonly taught about this grace can be subverted in two ways. 1. If someone denies that, besides that help which is efficacious, there is any which suffices for performing good operations: and in this way Calvin eliminates sufficient grace. 2. If what suffices for those acts, is denied to be grace superadded to nature: and thus Pelagius extinguished it. For he never denied that for the salutary acts of faith, hope, and charity, the grace of creation and conservation is necessary, and if natural providence brings in some other benefit. But he erred in that he thought such aids precisely sufficient, and thus rejected superadded grace. Since therefore it is credible that the Council of Trent wanted to say something more than what the Pelagians had said, when in session 6, canon 3, it pronounces thus: "If anyone says that without the convenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and His help, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as is necessary, that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema": it follows altogether that the necessity of another grace is established by it, than what was not denied by Pelagius, that is, natural grace. Therefore whoever confesses that the natural desire for the highest good suffices for exercising those acts, seems neither to recede from Pelagius, nor to conform himself to Trent. The author with whom we are dealing is thus situated, as is clear from what has been said. And it is surprising how it has hap-

CHAPTER ONE

pened, that Pelagius has smiled upon him in this place, who otherwise used to prefer Calvin. But no doubt he affects freedom of mind positioned in a certain immense Amplitude, in which it is easy to err in every direction.

TWENTIETH. That some immobility with respect to good belongs to a freely created cause, as well as indefectibility, subjection to God, and adherence independent of divine motion. I seem to see a person astonished, exclaiming and attesting that he never thought such a thing: and indeed I admit he did not think it; I say, however, that he taught what he did not think, and at the same time I designate the place where he taught it. It is in chapter 21, numbers 2, 3, and 4. Where, while seeking the reason why God's motion is not received uniformly in all, but in one perfectly and completely, in another imperfectly and diminishingly, he derives it from the proportion between the motion itself and the subject: so that if the movable object is properly disposed to receive the motion by which it is moved by God, it receives that motion perfectly and completely, and a good action follows; but if it falls short of the proper order, it receives the motion diminishingly and not completely, and a disordered action follows. He explains this again as follows: So that if the recipient relates to the motion of the first mover immovably and indefectibly, action follows with indefectibility, and it operates rightly in such a way that it cannot not operate rightly; but if it relates defectibly and changeably, the action also follows contingently and changeably. He continues and says that a free secondary cause, precisely because it is free with a defectible freedom, even if it has not yet suffered any corruption, can receive that motion either completely or diminishingly. For insofar as a secondary cause is subject to and inherent in God, it is compared to a movable object properly disposed to the motion of the first mover; and if it receives the motion as such, it receives it completely. But insofar as a creature is produced from nothing, and is therefore defectible, it is compared to a movable object not existing in the proper disposition to receive

CHAPTER ONE

motion; and if it receives the motion as such, it will not receive it completely but weakly and diminishingly.

You see 1. in this philosophy, the disposition of the will and God's motion are compared as two distinct things; also 2. that disposition is considered the cause why motion is perfectly received in some, and because it is ridiculous to say that what is consequent and dependent on the reception of a form is the cause why it is received, unless we say the philosopher is now inept, it follows that 3. he designates a disposition that is not consequent and dependent on the reception of such motion, 4. It is evident that through that disposition, a free cause is said to relate immovably and indefectibly to divine motion, and again to be subject to and inherent in God: it is therefore clear that immobility and indefectibility from good, as well as subjection and adherence to God, are dispositions of a free cause that are not consequent, and therefore not dependent on the reception of divine motion.

However, this is suspicious to me, as it seems to contradict the doctrine accepted for many centuries regarding the necessity of divine grace, both for avoiding sins and for loving God constantly, since it is manifest that this necessity excludes both indefectibility and subjection to God and adherence that does not depend on the same divine grace, that is, on divine motion. Therefore, here also I suspect something Pelagian.

TWENTY-FIRST. That the inefficacy of grace must be attributed to the divine will. Thus in chapter 20, number 3, where he speaks as follows: This only I say: given that a quite similar grace for conversion is granted to many, sufficient for each: that it is efficacious in some, BUT IN OTHERS NOT AT ALL, must be attributed to the divine will. He also offers a reason from which the same certainly follows, namely, that the inefficacy of premotion does not arise from any dependence on a secondary cause, AS IF IT WERE WAITING FOR ITS CONSENT. Also, that what efficacious grace as efficacious adds to sufficient grace is not necessarily something pertaining to the very entity of grace, but it is enough to have the divine will and intention: for this is like

CHAPTER ONE

the spirit of efficacious grace. If this is so, since the true and proximate cause, indeed the only one per se, why God does not will or does not intend what He can will and intend, is His freedom; it follows that the subtraction of that spirit which constitutes grace lifeless and inefficacious must be attributed to the same [divine will], and by no means to man, inasmuch as God's will and intention, and consequently the efficacy of grace, in no way depends on him.

But this opinion makes me suspicious because of this author's own censure, for in chapter 30, number 5, he speaks thus: To solve this argument, it should be observed that in these questions: why out of two people whose hearts God touches equally, one is converted, the other not at all; and likewise: why of two people vexed by an entirely equal temptation, one yields, the other resists: not all give the same cause for that disparate event. **FOR HERETICS SAY THE CAUSE IS THE DIVINE WILL.** However, some Catholics say it is the human will; but they [the heretics] are certainly inept, and these [Catholics] not sufficiently correct, etc. What is the difference between one who says it must be attributed to the divine will that grace is efficacious in one person, inefficacious in another; and one who says the divine will is the cause why one is converted, another not at all? If those who say the latter are heretics, if inept: You, my Father, who have asserted the former, what do you think of yourself? And it is surprising that in the place where you philosophize so beautifully, you were so displeased with those who contend that the efficacy of divine grace is partly from human freedom, that you almost accused them of impudence. This, you say, is very alien to their mind, thinking too lowly indeed of God, who are not ashamed to attribute the efficacy of grace, that which is most powerful in grace, and as it were its spirit, to a creature, and try to demonstrate this by newly invented devices. Indeed, what you yourself say is very alien to them: but care must be taken lest it be so alien that it becomes familiar to Calvin. And from this follows.

TWENTY-SECOND. That what is imputed to man as guilt must be attributed to the divine will. For we have already shown that this

CHAPTER ONE

author teaches that it is imputed to man as guilt that divine grace does not have its effect, that is, that it is inefficacious—falsely in general, but nevertheless truly when the time comes when the necessity of the precept urges the exercise of virtue. But this very thing is now said to be attributed to the divine will. Therefore, it follows that what is man's sin must be attributed to the divine will. And could one who orders those to blush who think that the will has some part in grace being efficacious, have had an untroubled brow when saying these things?

TWENTY-THIRD. That God alone is the author of those intentions by which wicked men are determined to evil acts. This opinion is contained in these three propositions. The first is: The motion by which God administers a free cause is an actual inclination and tendency toward an end, which by its own and peculiar name is called intention of the end. Thus in these very words in chapter 20, number 5. The second is: God operates in us, without us, this intention or determination to the end. Thus *ibid.* The third is: This motion of God is required for every act that is evil. Thus in chapter 26, number 4, where he speaks as follows: I say fourthly, God moves us to every good that is found in any evil, and therefore moves, indeed premoves, to acts that are evil, insofar as they are acts, and insofar as they are human, etc. Therefore, let us suppose a ruined man who has already conceived adultery in his mind: I ask whether he has been predetermined by God to that physical affection which is sullied by the malice of adultery? It is answered that he has been predetermined to that affection, not only as it is a physical act, but also as it is a human act. Again I ask, what is that predetermination of God? It is answered that it is the intention of the end, by which he is then moved to elicit such a human act. Finally, if I should ask what is the cause of such intention? It is answered that God operates it in us, without us. Which is that God alone is its author. Therefore, God alone is the cause of that intention by which the adulterer is determined to the act of adultery infected with turpitude. I will ask the same about the fornicator, the parricide, the thief, the sacrilegious person; and the same will be answered,

CHAPTER ONE

namely, that God alone is the cause of the intentions by which they are determined to acts corrupted by the wickedness of fornication, patricide, robbery, sacrilege.

This, however, is very suspicious to me. Because either those intentions are sometimes evil, or never: if the first, then God alone is the cause and author of evil intentions; if the second, then there has never existed any thief, any apostate, any pimp, any gladiator, who was impelled by an evil, indeed who was not impelled by a good intention to perpetrate any enormous crimes. But who would not protest against both, except those criminals who have found such a favorable patron and such a legitimate excuse for their crimes?

Moreover, with the adulterer placed before our eyes, for example's sake, I ask what is that intention by which he is said to be determined to elicit an act by which he tends toward adultery, or in what words it could be conveniently expressed? Perhaps these: I want above all to please God? Or rather these: I want to strive for heavenly beatitude? No one, I think, will believe that men are determined to any evil by these affections. What, then, is this intention? Perhaps: I want to be well and avoid evil? But how can it be said that the will is determined by the intention of avoiding evil to an object which it understands to be most evil? Likewise, how is it determined by the intention of being well to lack that which is known to be honest? Therefore, however much you may examine everything, there will be no intention by which that person about whom we are speaking can be deservedly considered to be determined and premeditated, except that which is signified by this expression: I want to fulfill my lust. And similarly, the intention by which a thief is determined will correspond to these words: I want to satisfy Avarice; a murderer to these or similar ones: I want to obey anger, and so on for others. Therefore, if God alone is the author of those intentions by which such men are predetermined, He must be considered the author of these. But whoever asserts this is certainly no more religious than those whom the

CHAPTER ONE

Council of Trent detests in canon 6, session 6, who say that God operates evil works just as good ones.

TWENTY-FOURTH. That God predefines and predetermines that the impious exercise the evil disposition of their mind. Thus in book 2, chapter 25, number 2, where he says that God sometimes lifts the yoke of sin, lest it always and completely oppress us, sometimes allows us to be under the tyranny of sin. But even then, he says, God is predefining acts which men perform from the law and impulse of their own depravation: predefining, I say, and predetermining them, not absolutely and according to their entirety, but according to the order which He gives them for the end of His providence, as if He were saying: I will that this impious person, by that evil disposition of his mind, serve my counsels in this way.

In these words, what is hidden under that phrase "in this way" must first be unpacked, for it means the same as "serve by sinning," "serve by committing adultery, theft, murder." For an evil disposition by itself is useful neither for a good nor for a bad end, but only by its exercise; and so to will that it serve is to will that it serve by some exercise of itself. And it is clear that this is the author's meaning, when he indicates that this decree contains the predefinition and predetermination of acts which the impious perform from the law and impulse of their own depravation. For this shows that the phrase "I will that they serve" is the same as "I will that they serve through such acts."

Now, whoever says, "I will that this means serve this end," either supposes that it already exists absolutely, so that the sense is, "I will that this thing which already exists serve me for this end"; or certainly makes it exist, so that the sense is, "I will that this thing exist, so that it can serve me for this end." In which way, therefore, does God relate to that exercise of the evil disposition of the impious person, which is referred by Him to the end of His counsels? This author pretends to interpret the divine decree according to the former way, for he speaks thus in chapter 14, number 2: You are foolish, I say, from an insane ardor to blaspheme God, if you do not presuppose sin to the divine will, and if you contend that sin is

CHAPTER ONE

born in the creature only from the presupposed will and ordination of God. But in reality, he embraces the second interpretation. First, because in chapter 22, number 16, where he explains in what way the will to permit sin, and to use it well for His glory, presupposes it, he says: Observe that sin can be future in two ways: either absolutely, or insofar as it is from the power of the secondary cause; now permission, just like preservation, presupposes sin as future in this second way; that is, not absolutely. But there he confuses the will to glorify Himself through sin with the will to permit it. Therefore, when God says, "I will that this impious person," etc., He does not suppose, but makes the effect of the evil disposition to be absolutely future, so that it may thus serve divine counsels. Second, given that the operation of that evil disposition exists absolutely, no further premotion or predetermination can be necessary for it to become useful for the end intended by God, because for it to be useful, no further action of the will is expected, but it is for God alone to adapt that very operation which already exists absolutely to whatever use He wishes; and thus predetermination is superfluous, since it has no place except when the creature must act. But predetermination intervenes here, as is clear from the passage already cited, and it is also said a little later that God's motion intervenes, which is received in the will, but imperfectly and not completely. Therefore, again, it is true that the decree by which God wills the act of the depraved will to be useful for certain ends does not presuppose, but infers their absolute existence, although the sole motive by which God wills them to exist is that usefulness.

Hence it is also clear that there is no escape in that quibble by which it can be said that God's decree indeed infers the existence of the depraved act, but only in this way, because God decides not to prevent the will inclined to evil from eliciting it, God knowing that if it is only allowed to go, it will elicit [the act]. This, I say, cannot help at all. First, because it is ridiculous to conceive that God wills absolutely and efficaciously that an act be useful for a good end, and yet does not will that it exist, since it is manifest that this will is necessarily included in that one.

CHAPTER ONE

Second, because it is evasive to say that before God decrees anything, He knows that the will is so inclined to an evil act that it will elicit it, if only it is permitted: on the contrary, this philosophy holds that it will not elicit it unless it is also premove and physically predetermined; wherefore the will to permit alone is vainly pretended, since there is also the will to help positively, not only with simultaneous concurrence, but also with prior concurrence; and not just any kind, but one that premove and predetermines with such necessity of acting imposed that it is impossible to tend to the opposite. What then, has memory forgotten what was produced earlier from the first book, that God's providence subjects our wills to itself, and inclines them where it wills, so that what they are about to do, they will certainly do, nor can things turn out otherwise? Also, that this providence is prior to foreknowledge? Also, that St. Augustine supposes this in *City of God* 5, chapter 10, where he deals with the foreknowledge of future good and evil actions? Also, that God moves, indeed premove to acts that are evil insofar as they are acts and insofar as they are human, as well as insofar as they are means which God uses to execute His counsels? He adds, not however insofar as they are evil: but in vain, as will be evident. Therefore, there should be no place for evasion; let him frankly confess what the matter is: namely, that his genuine opinion is contained in this summary.

God knows that the nature of the sons of Adam is such that, with physical premove and predetermination, operations will follow that have any malice attached to them. He knows, moreover, that those evil operations can be made useful for good ends. Therefore, moved by this usefulness, He decreed by an absolute and efficacious decree to effect, by premove and predetermining, that they exist and serve those ends. And if the conceived words by which that decree is expressed are sought, these will be most apt: I will predetermine and premove this impious person to acts to which he is inclined by the law and impulse of his own depravation, and effect in this way that they exist; not indeed because of their depravity precisely, but because of the usefulness by which even depravity

CHAPTER ONE

itself can conduce to those ends which are prescribed by my counsels. This is the proper and native appearance of the whole opinion, nor can anything in this exposition of it be blamed, except ingenuity and naked faith; nothing can be desired, except artifices and veils.

This, however, is highly suspicious to me, because of the conformity it seems to have with Calvin's theology to the greatest degree.

For that blasphemer did not deserve the flame only because he poured the first evil operation of man back into God's predestination, but he was also impious in this, that he cast back on the same [predestination] works that come from a depraved will. As is clear from Institutes 1, chapter 18, and many other places. And the Council of Trent also deals with these specifically in session 6, canon 6, where it treats of Judas's betrayal. Therefore, what Calvin sinned in that is not contained in the opinion that has now been presented is very difficult to discern. For 1. in his opinion also, before God decrees anything concerning the good use of an evil operation, the will is supposed to be depraved and about to operate badly, especially if the predetermination of evil acts, insofar as they are acts, and insofar as they are human, should be added; and thus that divine will which concerns such operations already presupposes evil proceeding from a secondary cause, in the way that is required by this author; wherefore Calvin knows from this perspective as much as this one desires to know in the place cited above, when he says: You are foolish, I say, etc. Molinaeus too openly professes the same wisdom in section 20 of the *Clypeus*, when he says: Just as water by its nature tends downward, so the impious by themselves are inclined to evil, nor are their wills incited by God, only directed by God to good ends. 2. That God's will is concerned per se with the malice of evil operations, and not only by reason of the use by which they can conduce to executing God's counsels, Calvin not only never indicates in any place, but rather often indicates the contrary. For in Institutes 1, chapter 17, number 6, he speaks thus: And I deny that any excuse is owed to them from their evils. For what? Will they implicate God in the same iniquity with themselves, or will they cover

CHAPTER ONE

their depravity with His justice? They can do neither. Insofar as they might clear themselves, their own conscience refutes them. Insofar as they might accuse God, they find the whole evil in themselves, with Him only the legitimate use of their malice. And a little before, in number 5, he says: And for this reason, by acting badly we serve his just ordination, because in accordance with the immensity of his wisdom, he knows well and properly how to use evil instruments for good. And at the beginning of chapter 18: Because this knot has seemed inextricable to many that Satan and all the impious are so under God's hand and empire that he directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, etc. You see in all these places that Calvin does not say that God's will tends to the malice of human operations in any other way than to direct it to good ends. But, you will say, Calvin often ridicules those who acknowledge only God's permission here. I admit, but we shall see later what you yourself think; meanwhile, I ask you to offer him your formula of permission conceived in these words: I will predetermine this impious person to an operation which is evil, so that by the exercise of his evil disposition he may serve my counsels. Believe me, either he will immediately confess himself to be Roman in this, or you will marvel that you have been Calvinist.

But he contends that God is the author of evil actions. That is true. But since you also contend that God premoves and predetermines impious men to the same actions, both insofar as they are actions, and insofar as they are human, and insofar as they are means which he uses to execute his counsels, do you deny that God is the author of the same under that triple aspect? If you want this to be permissible for you, allow it to be permissible also for Calvin. Prove, moreover, that he said something more monstrous. And because you will not be able to do this, do not condemn my suspicion, which makes either his opinion seem correct or yours perverse.

But, you will say, Calvin thinks that wicked men sin necessarily. But by what necessity, after all? Namely, that which arises both from their evil disposition and from divine predefinition and predetermination. Do

CHAPTER ONE

you therefore deny that? Do you not confess that God predefines an act which is evil, and physically predetermines to it, insofar as it is an act, insofar as it is human, and insofar as it is a means suitable for the divine counsel? Can it therefore not be necessary from that supposition that the will produce such an act under that triple aspect? But if the necessity of producing such an act, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is human, is not denied, how can the necessity of producing it, insofar as it is evil, be denied? The will, according to you, cannot prevent it from being an act, nor from being human, because you say this is absolutely predefined and predetermined; but neither can it prevent it from being prohibited, because prohibition depends on God alone; and yet it can prevent it from being evil? Can an act be human and prohibited and not evil? This indeed is more difficult than can be admitted by wise theologians.

Since, therefore, it is necessary that everything said by Calvin in this cause be reduced to some one form by which the divine decree concerning evil acts is conceived, I make whatever wager anyone wishes, unless the milder Calvinists think that form is harsher, by which we have already shown this author's opinion is comprehended; unless the more austere approve the same as true, embrace it as their own, kiss it as paternal; indeed, unless they receive the Arminians into communion, and confess them to be their true brothers, provided they are willing to conform themselves to this norm.

TWENTY-FIFTH. That God not only permits sins, nor does Scripture say only this; but Scripture also seems to signify that God impels, and indeed God does not only allow man to fall into sins, but also subjects the sinner to sin, so that he commits new sins. Thus in the place already cited, namely, chapter 25, book 2. For he speaks thus in number 6: It should be observed, 4th, in relation to that third observation, what Scripture has about God concerning sin, for it not only says that God permits subsequent sins as punishment for preceding ones, **BUT IT ALSO SEEMS TO SAY THAT GOD IMPELS MEN TO THEM.** Ibid. number 7, he has these [words]: It seems evident that God by His power

CHAPTER ONE

and justice, when the sinful man inclines to new crimes from the depravation which flourishes and dominates in him, **SUBJECTS HIM TO THEM, NOT ONLY WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN PERPETRATED, BUT ALSO WHEN THEY ARE PERPETRATED AND COME INTO BEING. HE NOT ONLY ALLOWS YOU TO FALL INTO THOSE SINS, BUT TRULY SUBJECTS YOU TO THE TYRANNY OF SIN REIGNING IN YOU SO THAT YOU COMMIT NEW SINS.** And in number 13: We have shown, he says, what St. Augustine thinks, namely that God not only allows the wicked in their depraved desires, but delivers them to those desires, and according to the power of His wrath, etc.

You see 1. in these words it is denied that God only allows man to fall into sins. You see 2. it is denied that Scripture only says this. You see 3. additionally affirmed is the active subjection of God, that is, the action subjecting the sinner to sin. You see 4. from this action of God on the sinner, new sins are affirmed to follow, when it is said, so that he commits those new sins. All these things are clear. But they are also deservedly suspicious.

First, because they manifestly contradict the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 6, where those who say that God operates sins not permissively only are condemned. Should those who say that God does not only allow them to happen, and that Scripture says something more, and not only this, therefore be tolerated? Second, this doctrine is suspicious to me of Calvinism. And there is no great need to labor to prove this harmony. I produce the confession of the author himself. For he speaks thus in chapter 23, number 4: How does God relate to evil affections? By permitting, say the Catholics, but if there is someone who does not acknowledge permission in God, but contends that what we call permission is action, what will he say when asked how God relates to any evil, even to evil motions of the mind? He will respond: by operating. **SUCH IS CALVIN.** Those who are asked how God relates to evil affections respond, you say, Catholics, by permitting? Who then are those who re-

CHAPTER ONE

spond, not only by allowing? And those who contend that what is called permission is action, to the one asking how God relates to evil, should they respond, by operating? What then will those respond who call what is called permission active subjection? Such, you say, is Calvin? But you, my Doctor, what kind are you, and how far are you from Calvin, when you too think that Scripture favors him, and Augustine? Thus, in this place my mind is struck not only by suspicion of error but also of failing reason, when I see affirmation and negation of the same thing placed so close together.

Moreover, the excuse he indicates in that chapter 25, number 8, is futile, when he says that Calvin speaks of the first sin, which certainly presupposes neither a depraved will nor an evil merit yet. Because we have already shown, and indeed it is most certain, that Calvin neither speaks only of the first [sin], nor errs only concerning it. Hence, equally futile is what is said: This is not sins happening with God willing, but only punishments and penalties of sins in sins. Because if the sense is that God does not will, speaking per se, that sins happen, but only because of the use they can have either for punishment or for other good ends, this very thing is what we have already seen Calvin preach. But if the sense is that God does not will under any aspect at all that sins exist, why is it denied that He only allows them to be? Why is it asserted that Scripture does not only say they are permitted? Why is it added to permission that God subjects the sinner to sin not only when it has been perpetrated, but also when it is perpetrated? Why is He said to subject in such a way that new sins are committed? Who does not understand that these new sins are presented to that divine subjecting will, and follow from it? Therefore, what he adds must be rejected: that God then wills the punishment in iniquity, not the iniquity itself, as, he says, heretics impiously profess. But as certain as it is that heretics are impious in this contention, it is just as certain that their impiety is not situated in the fact that they think God wills that iniquity exist absolutely, but because of the aspect of punishment it can have, or any other good use. For Calvin celebrates this, as we

CHAPTER ONE

have seen. And it can still be confirmed from Institutes 1, chapter 18, number 4, where he denies that in the defection of the Jews from the house of David to Jeroboam God willed perfidy: we see therefore, he says, that God, while not willing perfidy, nevertheless justly wills defection for another end. And a little before, he says that the tongue of Shimei, while he was reviling David, was God's just scourge. See how he distinguishes, and ascribes punishment to God, malefaction and injury to the sinner. But all doubt on this matter is resolved by what Molinaeus inscribed in his Clypeus, section 20: There are two kinds of evils, he says: one is the evil of guilt, the other is the evil of punishment. The first is from man, the second from God. Again. God often uses the evil of guilt for punishment: when, etc. And then the evil of guilt which serves for punishment is not from God, insofar as it is the evil of guilt, or insofar as it is sin, but God only uses it for punishment. And a little after, he speaks again thus: God loosens the reins to Satan and the wicked, to execute iniquitous counsels, which arise from themselves, not from God; nevertheless, whatever they do will be of use to God's counsel. Therefore, heretics are not to be called impious because they think that God wills iniquity absolutely, and not punishment in iniquity itself. For this crime is proved to be false, and it is not at all expedient for the accused of so many impieties to be charged on the basis of a name by which they will prove themselves to be innocent, since there is a danger that innocence vindicated from suppositious charges may remove faith from true and just accusations. What, then, is their sin? Certainly no other than that they say the divine will is concerned antecedently with sin under the aspect of punishment, or a means useful for good ends—antecedently, I say, so that new sins follow thereafter. Allow them to continue to affirm this, and consider them your own. Why indeed should you not allow it, when you yourself say that God wills punishment in iniquity, not only when iniquity has been perpetrated but also when it is perpetrated, and not with just any will, but with that which subjects the sinner to sin, and not subjecting in just any way, but so that he commits new sins? Can there not be the

CHAPTER ONE

will of God concerning sin viewed under the aspect of punishment? Can it not be antecedent and prior, from which those new sins follow? But how do you want God to will punishment in iniquity? For we do not will punishment in the abstract, as they say, but we will a thing that punishes someone, insofar as it punishes. What then will it be, that God wills punishment in iniquity? Indeed, this will be that God wills iniquity, which also punishes another iniquity, insofar as it punishes it. It remains, therefore, that you say heretics sin in this one thing, because they agree with you.

TWENTY-SIXTH. He confirms what was stated above, which is found in chapter 24 of the same book 2, number 5. "If you ask," he says, "what is the object of that permitting will, or of that will, which in God is the glorification of Himself through the defect of the creature, I will say that it is evil itself, insofar as, by way of means, it becomes good, or it is the very glory of God as it is to be illustrated and manifested by the very defect of the creature." Shortly before, he had stated that the divine will is positively engaged concerning the permission of evil, but he had denied that there exists a positive act concerning evil that emerges; he had rejected Calvin's opposition. And immediately, as if what was still almost remaining in his mouth had slipped from memory, he revokes his excellent opinion and, in favor of Calvin, pronounces that the object of God's positive will is evil, insofar as by way of means it is good. It cannot be denied that this will is directed toward its object, and therefore, since its object is evil insofar as it is a means to good, it must be conceded that God's positive act is directed toward evil under the aspect of a means to good. Likewise, that act is a certain "I will" of God; when its object is said to be evil, if the proposition which must express it is conceived, it will be this: "I will evil insofar as it is useful for good." I believe, moreover, that I have demonstrated that Calvin wanted nothing else, nor do those who stand with him in this controversy now want anything else. Nor does this Author deny it, as is evident from chapter 23, number 2, and there is furthermore a clear testimony of this matter in their own confession of faith

CHAPTER ONE

in article 8, where after they have professed that God rules and constitutes all things, they add furthermore: "Not that He is the author of evil, or that blame can be imputed to Him: since His will is the supreme and infallible rule of rectitude and equity; but He has admirable reasons for using demons and the wicked in such a way that He knows how to convert the evil they do, and of which they are the cause, into good." Nothing more explicit can be brought forward to establish that the will of God, according to the opinion of heretics, is not otherwise directed toward evil than as it is viewed under the aspect of good. Wherefore, either they must be said to be orthodox in this, or it must be feared that those who teach that the object of the divine will is evil, insofar as by way of means it becomes good, are no more Catholic; or as is said in another place, evil as "to be bonified" by God's direction toward good, chapter 22, book 2, where forgiveness is vainly sought for the word, since the barbarism of the opinion is greater.

And hence it is clear that this will is vainly called a permitting will, since it is also a pursuing will. Indeed, since the will to permit is nothing other than the will not to impede, one should not have answered the questioner what its object would be by saying it is evil, but that it is the negation of an impediment prohibiting sin; and then not the sin itself is "bonified," but only that subtraction of the impeding grace. But now, when evil is assigned to the divine will as an object, and it is necessary that this very thing is said to be willed, which is its object (if indeed it is prosecutive, as this is), the consequence is that God's will is said to will evil, and thus what is called the will permitting evil is in reality the will pursuing it.

TWENTY-SEVENTH. That it is by divine ordination that sin is committed. Thus in chapter 25, number 11, where he speaks as follows: "I respond directly, according to the third observation, that the aforementioned testimonies prove only that God punishes sin with sin, and brings it about that one sin is the punishment of another. For in that sense He is said to harden and blind, which never happens except by merit of pre-

CHAPTER ONE

ceding sins, the divine justice **ORDAINING** that he who refused to obey the truth should follow falsehood." And a little before, in number 8, what had been said, that God subjects the sinner to sin, so that he commits new sins, he says happens, "divine justice both decreeing this, and, etc." Therefore, divine justice decrees that the sinner is to be subjected to sin in such a way that he commits new sins.

That Calvin also holds the same opinion, which can be shown copiously, but that opinion is made suspect to me by the judgment of the author himself. For in that place which we designated before from chapter 24, number 2, "You are insane," he says, "from a mad ardor to blaspheme God, if you do not presuppose sin to the divine will, and if you contend that sin is born in the creature only from the presupposed will and ordination of God." Present, my Father, the wisdom which you demand from others, and do not wish to incur the same mark which you have often and deservedly branded on Calvin in chapter 23, when he said that it happens by God's ordination that men sin. For what does he say less, who says that it happens by God's decree and ordination that someone follows falsehood? That he is subjected to sin? That he commits new sins?

TWENTY-EIGHTH. That God not only decrees that new sins are committed but also works to that end. Thus in that chapter 25, number 8 cited, where, dealing with that subjection of the sinner to sin, whereby it happens that new sins are committed, he says it happens "with divine justice both decreeing this and power **WORKING**." Therefore, God works the subjection of the sinner to sin, and works in such a way that new sins are committed. This, however, is suspect, and the cause of suspicion is the same as a little before. Namely, this same author attacks Calvin in chapter 23, numbers 3 and 4, because he is unwilling to admit the distinction of permitting and operating will in God, when it concerns the sins of men. Likewise, because what we call permission, he contends is action. But you err greatly, my Doctor. For what we call permission, he never calls action; otherwise our disagreement with him would be only

CHAPTER ONE

about words. But what he calls action, you contend is permission. Whence you also oppose him verbally, and you oppose him unsuccessfully, because you seem to be conquered, when you are finally led to the point where you also imitate his way of speaking, when you pronounce that divine power works the subjection of the sinner to sin, so that new sins occur.

But when he appeals to St. Augustine in these and similar pronouncements, he labors in vain, because it is clearer than the midday sun that he both speaks and thinks very differently. Namely, when the Pelagians denied that any grace was necessary to avoid sins, they consequently rejected what had been said by Augustine, that sin is the punishment of another sin; nor could it be, unless the grace that would prevent the second sin were withdrawn as punishment for the first, which grace they did not acknowledge. Therefore, they held that God was only an idle spectator of that connection of sins from sins, as of a matter in no way pertaining to His providence, and that He has a patient goodness concerning this, but not an operating power. St. Augustine, on the contrary, who perpetually defended that necessity of grace, contends that God is in this matter not only a spectator but also a judge; and that in it is discerned not only His patient goodness, but also His avenging providence and punishing justice; namely, insofar as in punishment for preceding sins, the grace required for avoiding subsequent ones is not conferred. And because the subtraction of a benefit following from a certain and determined counsel of a judge, looking to the crime of the one whom he deprives, is a certain operation of judicial power, therefore Augustine here acknowledges an operating power as well. This, therefore, he thinks God decrees, this He ordains, this He operates, not that anyone should commit new sins, but that he should be allowed to commit them; not that he should follow falsehood, but that he should not be prohibited from following it; not that he should be impelled to crimes, which seems to this Author to be signified by Scripture, but that being impelled by his own accord and rushing in, he should not be restrained. That this is the mind

CHAPTER ONE

of St. Augustine in book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, and on Grace and Free Will, chapter 21, is clear both from the very nature of the controversy, as I said, and from the fact that in that chapter 3 against Julian, he expressly denies that God makes evil wills, but only uses them; and from many other places in which he makes his mind clear. In Psalm 68, he says that God places iniquity upon iniquity, not by wounding, but by not healing. In the Enchiridion to Laurentius, he thus explains what he had said, that the impious do what God wills, namely because He allows them to act badly and willingly allows it. In book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, "God's hardening," he says, "is His not willing to have mercy; nothing is inflicted by Him whereby man is made worse, but only that whereby he is not made better is not inflicted." What could be clearer? The same is inculcated in the book on predestination and grace.

TWENTY-NINTH. It is contained in the same chapter 25, number 10, in these words: "What, therefore, God wills, and wills well in the selling of Joseph, in the death of His Son, and in similar cases, He fulfills through men, either by INFUSING in them the thought and will to do those same things, which if they received with a mind well disposed to God, they would be sanctified by the very deed; or at least by using their evil will well according to His kindness and wisdom."

It is approved, as you see, a twofold way of understanding how God conducted Himself regarding Judas in the betrayal of Christ the Lord, regarding the brothers of Joseph in his sale, and regarding criminals of the same note, such as Cain in the fratricide, Herod in the infanticide, and so on with others. The first way is that God is thought to have infused in those abominable men the thought and will to do what they did. The second is that He is thought at least to have used their evil will well.

The proposition and approval of the first way is very suspect to me. First, because it attributes to God that which God Himself indicates is proper to the Devil. For it is God who speaks through the Evangelist in John 13: "When the devil had already put it into the heart of Judas to

CHAPTER ONE

betray Him." And now I am given the option to say that that thought and will was infused by God. 2. The opinion of Molinæus seems to be milder, who says in the place cited before that God never inserts evil wills into the hearts of men.

But what he adds, according to that way of thinking, if Judas, for example, were to receive that thought and will with a mind well disposed toward God, he would be sanctified by the very deed: it seems to agree with what Calvin teaches in book 1, chapter 17, section 5. For when he had raised the question, why a thief who robbed someone whom God wanted to chastise with poverty should be punished, why a murderer who killed someone whose life the Lord had ended—if all such persons serve God's will, why should they be punished?—he answers: "But I deny that they serve God's will. For we will not say that one who is carried by an evil mind provides ministry to God who commands. You see that for this reason alone Judas seems to him inexcusable, because he obeyed with an evil mind God who was instigating him to conspire against Christ. And again, he thus objects and responds: "But unless He willed it, we would not do it; I concede. But do we do evil for this end, that we may render obedience to Him? But He by no means commands these things to us, rather we rush in, not thinking what He wills, but raging with the intemperance of our lust, so that we strive against Him by deliberate counsel." Calvin, as you see, only requires good intention, that is, a mind well disposed toward God, so that it is permissible to perform all those things which are charged as crimes.

Indeed, I myself also confess that whatever is conceived with a mind well disposed toward God is harmless; but that the thought and will to do those things which are known to be perverse can be received with a well-disposed mind is a matter worthy both of the laughter of fools and the indignation of all wise men. For what else is that will infused by God into Judas, for example, than an evil affection, since it is an affection for doing what is simultaneously understood to be abominable beyond all other crimes? How, therefore, do you want an affection that is the worst

CHAPTER ONE

of all to be received with a well-disposed mind? Come, I say, penetrate the mind of Judas, compose his thoughts, and administer all the movements of his will. What will you do so that the thought he has of going to the enemies of Christ and those who plot against His life may avail for sanctity? Will you prevent him from knowing that He is his Lord and Teacher, about whose betrayal it is a matter? Will you obtain that he considers Him criminal and worthy of extreme punishment? Will you abolish the memory of all the arguments by which he has become aware of His divinity and divine motion? Will you prove to him that the counsel of the Jews about immolating Him is just? How then will that mind become well disposed toward God, so that by the very deed, that is, by the most monstrous sacrilege, it is sanctified?

You will perhaps say that he could have been so disposed as to believe that the thought and will to cooperate with the chief priests had been infused in him by God, and that in this way he was released from all duty toward Christ by Him who has power over His life and death, and both has it Himself and can give it to whom He pleases, and when He pleases; therefore he could then, out of great love for God and zeal for obedience, will to promote the counsels of the Jews. But it is manifest that men are thus taught a way by which religious crimes may occur, and the stench of all foulness may be changed into an odor of sweetness. For thus also a thief will be able to think that the thought and will to despoil this merchant has been infused in him from heaven, as God wishes to punish his immoderate avarice. Thus also a murderer that he is divinely impelled to deprive of life one whom God desires to be maturely presented at His judgment. Thus also an adulterer that it is a heavenly inspiration by which he feels concupiscence stirred by desire for another's wife, God inflicting this punishment on the unbridled lust of the husband. Let us therefore take possession of his goods; we shall render obedience to God who freely makes provision for this matter. Let us strangle another, with our mind intent on God, it will be a sacrifice. Indeed, let us rush into that one's bed, but with our eyes raised to heaven, we shall be sanctified by the

CHAPTER ONE

very deed. O sweetest doctrine, and most efficacious for persuading all criminals of innocence without anyone's tergiversation!

THIRTIETH. That God neither wills evil nor does not will it. Thus in chapter 24, number 2, where he speaks as follows: "I confess that God willingly permits evil and that the divine will is positively engaged concerning the permission of evil; but that there is any positive act of the divine will concerning evil that emerges, and that God either DOES NOT WILL it or wills it, I deny altogether. If He did not will it, it would not happen; if He willed it, etc." How true it is in his opinion that God does not will evil has been shown before. But now that he also altogether denies that God does not will evil makes me suspect, because the same man teaches in chapter 25, number 10, that there are very clear testimonies of Scripture, by which it is attested that God not only does not will, but hates evil. To hate is a certain act of the will, and therefore a certain willing or not willing; since, therefore, to hate evil is not to will evil, it remains that it is to not will evil. Therefore, very clear testimonies of Scripture convict of error one who denies that God does not will evil. He should have said that God does not will the evil that free causes perpetrate, and indeed efficaciously does not will, as much as is in Him, but not absolutely, because He wills the effect of His non-volition to depend on the will of men.

THIRTY-FIRST. It will be a corollary from the above, which is as follows: That God is the author of sin. For that Author, in book 2, chapter 23, numbers 2 and 3, infers that this is Calvin's opinion, from the fact that he taught that sin occurs with God not only permitting, but willing, ordaining, predestining, operating. But it has now been shown that he himself says the same things; therefore, he himself also constitutes God as the author of sin. The minor premise is clear. For in chapter 25, he twice denies that the sins of depraved men occur with God only allowing them, and he even fortifies himself with the testimony of Scripture, which he denies only says that God permits sins. Therefore, these sins do not occur with God only permitting. But to permission alone that some-

CHAPTER ONE

thing may be, nothing can be added except the will that it be; and therefore when God is denied to permit only, the consequence is that He is conceded to will sin. And indeed he seems to concede this in chapter 24, number 5, when to that will, which in appearance is permitting, when in reality it is pursuing, the object assigned is evil insofar as by way of means it becomes good, for this, as we have shown, is the same as God willing evil under the aspect of a means to a good end. Moreover, he said that it happens with divine justice ordaining that he follows falsehood who did not want to obey the truth, in that chapter 25, number 11, and in number 8, with divine justice decreeing that a sinner is subjected to sin, so that he commits new sins. Therefore, sin is committed with God ordaining it, according to the opinion of this author. Again, in the same chapter 25, number 3, we saw God predefining and predetermining acts which the impious perform from the law and impulse of their own depravity, by this decree: "I will that this impious person serve my counsels with that depraved disposition of his mind." This predefinition cannot but be a certain predestination of those acts which are evil. The same in book 1, chapter 8, and chapter 26. But the excuse which is offered, that God does not predefine those acts insofar as they are evil, we have shown to be the same as Calvin's and the Calvinists'. The words of Calvin are in the book on the eternal predestination of God: "Indeed, **INSOFAR AS THEY ARE EVIL**, what men perpetrate with an evil mind, I confess by no means please God." He does not want, therefore, there to be a predestination of evil acts insofar as they are evil. Grant that there is a predestination of those which are evil, and which are known to be evil, both by God predestining and by man perpetrating; grant that there is a predestination whereby it happens that they exist, that they are human, that they are means suitable for divine counsels, and this in that array of circumstances from which it is impossible for malice to be absent; may I be safe unless Calvin attests with an oath that he never believed there to be any other predestination of evil acts. But you grant all these things, as is clear from what has been said; therefore, you confess that evils happen

CHAPTER ONE

with God thus predestining in the way Calvin thought to predestine, and the Calvinists think today. Finally, this Doctor has also introduced God as operating the subjection of the sinner to sin in such a way that new sins follow from it, in the same chapter 25, number 8. Therefore, these new sins are committed with God operating; therefore, this same Doctor thinks that sins occur with God not only permitting, but also willing, ordaining, predestining, operating. Since this is sufficient, with Calvin as author, for God to be the author of sin, why not also, with this Theologian as author? Calvin adds that the necessity of sinning is injected by God. But neither is this required for Him to be considered the author of sin, since among men also one is the author of another's sinning, with no necessity imposed; nor, if it were required, would this be lacking here, as we have already shown, because if it is necessary from the supposition of divine predestination, and premotion, and predetermination, that an act occur which is known to be prohibited, and that it occur in a human way, that is, freely, what can the created will do so that it is not evil? Moreover, that the doctrine contained in the above seven or eight opinions has been condemned by the Sorbonne faculty, one will easily conjecture who reads the errors of John of Mercuria added to the Master of Sentences.

THIRTY-SECOND. That God is not the cause of the evil of punishment, as it is evil, not even accidentally. Thus in chapter 19, number 6, "I add," he says, "what especially commends divine goodness, that God is not even an accidental cause of what they call the evil of punishment insofar as it is evil. Note what I say, not insofar as it is punishment, but insofar as it is evil. For these two differ greatly, in the evil of punishment to be evil and to be punishment, and it is one thing to consider evil in punishment, another to consider punishment in evil." Afterward he adds that God is the cause of punishment in evil, not of evil in punishment.

This doctrine does not please me, because by it the absolutely stated proposition, "God is the cause of the evil of punishment," seems to be corrected in a way, while this one is excused, "God is not the cause of

CHAPTER ONE

the evil of punishment." But the Sorbonne pronounces the first to be Catholic, the second heretical, following Isidore in book 8 of *Etymologies*, chapter 5, and St. Augustine to *Quodvultdeus*, heresies 65 and 66, where, having reviewed the error of the Coluthians who denied that God makes evils, he thinks they were no less heretical than the Florinians who affirmed that He makes evil things. "For God creates evils," he says, "by inflicting most just punishments, which Coluthus did not see; but not by creating evil natures and substances insofar as they are natures and substances, where Florinus erred." Do you see how St. Augustine thinks the doctrine of faith contrary to the error of the Coluthians is contained in that absolute proposition, "God creates evils, by inflicting most just punishments"? St. Anselm holds the same in the book on concord, and almost all the Scholastics with St. Thomas in question 1, part 49, article 2, where he speaks thus: "To the order of the universe pertains the order of justice, which requires that punishment be inflicted on sinners. And according to this, God is the author of evil which is punishment, but not of evil which is fault." Certainly the expressions of Scripture are absolute and round. "I am the Lord creating evil," Ezekiel 48, and Amos 3, "Shall there be evil in a city which the Lord has not done?" What, therefore, is this confidence, that a man both single and private, should think his providence necessary for Theology, and fear, after the declaration of the Church, after the suffrages of the Holy Fathers, after the examinations of the Scholastics, that what everyone says, that God is the cause of the evil of punishment, might sound bad, unless he himself applies that temperament, "not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it is punishment," or this subtle interpretation, "not to be the cause of evil in punishment, but to be the cause of punishment in evil"? For what he says that St. Thomas, 22, question 164, article 1, denies that death is from God according to what is a certain evil of human nature, would help, if this were to deny that death is from God, insofar as it is an evil of the sinner. But neither does he say this, nor St. Augustine, who is also vainly adduced, since he cannot benefit this opinion unless he harms his own.

CHAPTER ONE

But that subtlety, "not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it is punishment," likewise "punishment in evil, not evil in punishment," is more diluted than befits a philosopher. For it dispels reasons necessarily intertwined with each other. The proper and genuine reason of punishment is, "To be an evil of the delinquent to be inflicted by a judge"; just as the proper and genuine reason of reward is, "To be a good of one acting rightly to be rendered by the same judge." Therefore, it cannot happen that a judge wills punishment as punishment, without willing punishment as it is an evil of him who transgresses. Just as it cannot happen that he wills reward as reward, without willing reward as it is a good of him who acts rightly. But nothing moves me more in this place than the religion of that Doctor, who, as I said, to commend divine goodness to the utmost, as he himself says, by attributing to it no evil effect, introduced that memorable distinction of evil in punishment and punishment in evil, lest God should be said absolutely to be the cause of the evil of punishment; although nevertheless he is so close to those who ascribe to Him the evil of fault. He trembles where others are eager; he laughs where others are terrified. That God predefines acts which the impious perform from the law and impulse of their depravity; absolutely wills that the impious serve His counsel by exercising their own impiety; works the subjection of the sinner to sin, when he perpetrates it, so that he commits new sins; ordains that he who did not want to obey the truth should follow falsehood; wills the evil of fault insofar as by way of means it becomes good; finally, pre-moves and predetermines to evil acts in a triple aspect, insofar as they are acts, insofar as they are human, and insofar as they are means apt for divine counsels; to the rest of theologians everywhere these are horrid monsters, which nevertheless this one man has so tamed that they are pleasing to him. That God is the cause of the evil of punishment, which does not trouble the rest at all; by a certain superstition of philosophizing, seemed so crude to him that he could not swallow it, unless he first diluted it with the seasoning of that distinguished distinction, evil in punishment, punishment in evil.

CHAPTER ONE

THIRTY-THIRD, found in the same book 2, chapter 25, number 2, where discussing predestination, he says that both [predestination and reprobation] presuppose the mass infected by Adam's sin, and that predestination is separation from that mass, while reprobation is abandonment. God, therefore, selects some from the mass of perdition in which all are entangled, while seeing others and leaving them in sin. Nevertheless, he wills that these serve his glory, and therefore partly gives them good works to be done well, partly good works to be done according to substance, partly, etc. You see reprobation is universally said to be abandonment in the mass infected by Adam's sin; thus even those to whom God gives good works to be done well are considered abandoned, so that the reprobate who are called to faith and who sometimes live well according to its direction seem to be included. To say, however, that their reprobation is abandonment in the mass infected by Adam's sin does not seem orthodox, because it follows from this that they remain in such a mass and are never truly cleansed from the stain of original sin, contrary to the manifest decree of the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 5, where it defines that in those who are properly baptized, everything that has the true and proper nature of sin is removed. And in session 6, canon 17, those who say that the grace of justification pertains only to those predestined to eternal life are condemned. In both places, Lutheran and Calvinist heretics are indicated. But it is evident that all these thunderbolts are ineffective if it is true that all the reprobate without exception are left in the mass infected by Adam's sin. For how are those left in it who are truly justified from sin, that is, who are purged from that filth and transferred to a state of holiness and innocence?

THIRTY-FOURTH is still contained in the same place, where it is said: "Nevertheless God wills that those whom he leaves in this mass serve his glory; and therefore partly gives them good works to be done well, partly, etc." By these words, as it appears, it is signified that God, although he does not wish to extract certain reprobates from the mass of perdition, nor therefore wishes to give them good works for the purpose

CHAPTER ONE

that they might emerge from it; nevertheless gives these [works], because he knows by some other means than through their salvation, they can serve his glory. I would not wish to affirm this completely; but nevertheless it is likely from the inspection of the passage itself that this is its genuine meaning. This is suspicious to me, however, because it follows from it that there is not a true and sincere will in God to save those reprobates who are so often invited to receive divine grace and to persevere in it once received. For who can conceive that he truly wishes to save them, if he willingly leaves them in destruction, and directs the benefits of the Redeemer which he confers on them to something other than their happiness? Therefore they are mocked whenever those testimonies of the Holy Spirit are applied to them, by which God seems to give hope of attaining salvation, by the signification of his desire and love; and they are deceived if they think that he is touched by any affection that regards their eternal life, or if they infer anything else from such a great manifestation of benevolence than that it is indeed signified, but does not exist. And what does one who persuades himself of this have by which to distinguish God from a swindler and broker?

THIRTY-FIFTH pertains to the same reprobates, and universally to all men, about whom he speaks thus in the same place: "So that the reprobate should be considered in that mass as most depraved men, prone to every crime, little different from the damned and the demons; and this indeed by the merit of original sin, which so violently and intimately corrupted nature that, unless the grace of the Redeemer is present, not only would we do nothing good, but daily we would be carried with full force into new crimes, etc."

Calvin exaggerates original corruption no more, as is evident from Institutes 2, chapters 1 and 3. By such amplification, that opinion is supported which says that all works of unbelievers are sins, which extinguishes the freedom of the will, which gives man the capacity for evil alone. For if there can be some work that is not evil without the grace of the Redeemer, why not also in an unbeliever? If there cannot be, and

CHAPTER ONE

there is such great obstinacy toward evil that it rivals the demons, why is the will called free with Catholics, and not rather enslaved with Lutherans? Finally, from where is that conjecture drawn that no action would ever be forthcoming except a disgraceful one, without Christ's grace, if the will of fallen humans retained the faculty of anything other than evil alone? But if it retained only that, what do we condemn in article 9 of the confession of our heretics, where the liberty which original corruption left is depressed below the power of good, [but] is not prevented from ranging about evils? Molinaeus seems to have been somewhat more moderate in this part. For he does not extend the depravity of man so far as not to think that freedom for good and honest actions with a certain civil honesty is left, even for the political observance of ecclesiastical discipline, in which the very principle of piety does not consist. This is far from the unbridled inclination to every crime and perpetual hatred of good works, which our Author thinks is restrained only by the grace of Redemption.

Furthermore, Catholic doctrine holds that human freedom is so corrupted by original contagion that, unless God, in view of the merits of Christ, comes to its aid with some special assistance, it can do nothing that conduces to salvation, such as meriting, obtaining, or in some other way moving divine mercy to favor human efforts, except those which the same [divine mercy] has anticipated. But in those things which pertain only to this life, and cannot be the beginning of salvation, not only are we not taught that we can do nothing without Christ's grace except evil; but even those who have seemed to think so have been condemned. For among the propositions of Michael Baius, which Pius V and Gregory XIII condemned, are these: 28. "Free will without the help of God's grace is of value only for sinning." 29. "It is a Pelagian error to say that free will is of value for avoiding any sin." 36. "Natural love which arises from the powers of nature is defended by some Doctors out of the presumption of human pride with injury to the Cross of Christ." 37. "He who acknowledges any natural good, that is, what draws its origin from

CHAPTER ONE

the powers of nature alone, agrees with Pelagius." 38. "All love of a rational creature is either vicious cupidity by which the world is loved, which is forbidden by John, or that praiseworthy charity by which, diffused in the heart through the Holy Spirit, God is loved." 65. "Only by Pelagian error can any good or non-evil use of free will be admitted; and he who thinks and teaches thus does injury to the grace of Christ." All such assertions, which the supreme Pontiffs, along with many others, have condemned in the rigor and proper sense of the words as intended by their assertors as heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears, seem to be comprehended in a certain compendium by him who said the reprobate in the mass of original sin should be considered as most depraved men, prone to every crime, little different from the damned and demons, and human nature so corrupted by the merit of that sin that, unless the grace of the Redeemer is present, not only will it do nothing good, but it will rush daily with full force into new crimes.

From what has been said so far, it is clearly evident that what this Author said in the dedicatory Epistle cannot be true, that he received this doctrine from the most illustrious Cardinal Berulle. Because if this were so, the faith of that man could be suspect, whose sanctity is not even doubtful. Nor should it be ignored that when a cause is prepared concerning someone to be included in the list of saints, the first question concerns his correct faith in God.

THIRTY-SIXTH place, there seems to be a kind of prayer and pious aspiration to God, a specimen of which the Author produced in book 1, chapter 23, number 9. Where after a sharp rebuke against those who think that conditional knowledge is of use to God in decreeing the operations of free causes, he turns his prayer to God and pours his zealous mind into divine ears. "Those who think thus about you, O Lord my God, that they wish to be attended to before you establish anything concerning them, even good, do not wish their good ways to be entirely yours. They attribute to themselves the beginning of their salvation, and after the heresy of the Pelagians and their remnants, severely condemned

CHAPTER ONE

by the judgment of your Church... Love of their own excellence, and the insane ardor of attributing something to themselves, has retreated into this place as into a most safe asylum." And then: "Far be it from me, O Lord, far be it, to think thus about you, to presume thus about myself." This Doctor wished, as I believe, to propose to the Reader some example of his familiar conversation with God, so that we might know what his mind is accustomed to revolve when, having imposed silence on other thoughts, it is open only to heaven and those above. Therefore he chooses a subject matter especially suitable, the doctrine of the use of conditional knowledge, the unworthiness of which supplies a most abundant crop of pious complaints. For that he agrees with Calvin in denying the freedom of the will concerning the act of conversion, and any other act which indeed tends directly to God; that he acquiesces to the same in approving the necessity of sinning divinely imposed through the predefinition and predetermination of those acts which the impious perform from the law and impulse of their own depravity; that the same risk is undergone with him in constituting God as the Author of sin; in a word, that a just occasion is given to today's heretics to accuse the judgments of the Tridentine Fathers as unjust, since these constrain those who feel nothing different from those who are called Catholics—this is the sort of thing for which not even a hand should be turned. But indeed for there to be someone who thinks that God, before he predefines the good act of man, knows that he does not lack multiple means for procuring it, both fallible and infallible, according to the nature of the created will, and that he who predefines uses this knowledge for the free exercise of such acts (which is the sum and as it were the marrow of the whole doctrine of middle knowledge)—this, I say, is so monstrous that human benches are inadequate for such a crime; the accusation must be drawn to God himself. But now, because it is the mark of an ineloquent accuser to expose the naked crime and not to investigate the causes from which its wickedness increases, the religious Doctor thought it to be part of his piety to commemorate what origin and what birth the opinion about the use of hypo-

CHAPTER ONE

thetical knowledge has. But this was briefly and clearly established by him in those words: "Love of their own excellence, and the insane ardor of attributing something to themselves, etc." By which he briefly touches on three light sins of the asserters of that knowledge: ambition, insanity, arrogance. And because innocence and hatred especially of those vices which he attacks in others makes an orator commendable, he does not omit this part either, and therefore adds: "Far be it from me, O Lord, far be it, to think thus about you, to presume thus about myself." But notwithstanding these things, this type of prayer is suspect to me. First, because to confess to God the sins of others while praying, and to narrate one's own virtues, is perverse and disapproved by God himself in that man who said, "Lord, I thank you that I am not like the rest of men, robbers, etc." Second, because those offenses which this Author recounts are either entirely false, or at least uncertain to him. For who opened to him the mind of the Theologians whom he accuses, so that he could read in it the love of their own excellence and the insane ardor of attributing something to themselves, from which conditional knowledge would take its cradle? But to blow lies and livid suspicions of others' vices into God is a kind of irreverence not to be borne. Nor should it be ignored what God is accustomed to answer to those who, sitting against their brothers, speak, and think their words are approved by him: "You thought unjustly that I would be like you; I will rebuke you and set [your sins] before your face."

IN THE LAST PLACE I will put the judgment about the causes by which recent Theologians have been led to oppose physical predeterminations, an inquiry in which he is occupied throughout the whole of chapter 36, book 1. And of all the things he says, this is the sum: Those who contradict the predeterminants are "Lovers of themselves, lazy, slothful in overcoming the difficulties of studies; they have not sufficiently embraced self-denial in their mind; they desire a dissolute, vagrant freedom, inexperienced of the bridle, impatient of subjection to God; they do not strive for solidity of doctrine, but for facility; they seek applause

CHAPTER ONE

and the breath of the people, and from that end they measure the truth of their dogmas; they use a dangerous method, even in those things which pertain to salvation, by which it happens that they bring into danger of eternal life those who entrust themselves to their instruction; they build on a ruinous foundation, because they do not accommodate themselves to Scripture and the Fathers, that is, to the supreme rules of faith, but rather bend those to their own senses; they guard themselves only from the cruder errors; they prefer to resist the truth showing itself with unveiled face, than to confess their lapses, which is the obstinacy of heretics, and one of those nefarious and never to be remitted sins which are said to fight against the holy spirit; finally, they do not know the humility of St. Augustine retracting what he had formerly believed badly." Come, my Father, notice, I ask, what spirit agitates you? Who would believe that under that profession of virtue of yours, under that sweetness of speech, under those eyes breathing mere sweetness, under that modesty and appearance of sanctity, there could be so venomous a soul? But lest the counsel of Augustinian humility be weak, the good Doctor confirms it by his own example, for he confesses that he is one of those very rare ones who imitate the supreme humility of St. Augustine: namely, it once happened to him that he ardently embraced the opinion which he now attacks.

But whatever may be the case with this humility, which I would not wish to call into doubt after he has made me more certain of it by his own testimony, the judgment concerning the causes which, as he says, either impelled so many Theologians into that opinion from which he now so greatly shrinks, or perhaps keeps them impelled in the same, is very suspect to me. First, because he traces such causes to hidden vices, and thus opposes the edict of Christ the Lord: "Do not judge, and you will not be judged." Second, because it does not befit a Catholic Doctor to sharpen his pen against those by whom, as far as I know, he has never been injured by any word. Third, because although this is always unbecoming, much more so in that work which is first published, which ought

CHAPTER ONE

to offer to God and men the pure first fruits of his studies. Fourth, because this seems especially shameful for a Priest, in whose mouth even jokes turn into blasphemies; what will become of calumnies? Fifth, because since that Author does not live for himself, but is a member of that congregation which both professes and exhibits piety with doctrine, he ought to have wished to consult not only for his own name, but also for that of the congregation; but to this it mattered very much that there should not seem to be any place in it for spite. Sixth, the same Author administers the primary house of that family; and the thing itself demanded that he should give his associates an example of charity and solid modesty. But that this example has done harm is proved by what came forth the day before yesterday, *Selected Philosophical Questions*. Seventh, he could not be ignorant that among those who philosophize without physical predeterminations, very many are conspicuous for the celebrity of their name, and for that fame which exquisite virtue, distinguished erudition, and the highest dignity have widely dispersed. If I wished to count those who have been Patrons of that opinion in France alone, a numerous band of Illustrious Bishops will be led by Most Eminent Cardinals who have both already completed a most glorious life, and still, and would that it were for a long time, are living. Therefore he ought to have spared their Purple, and not to have sprinkled the same ink on everyone: Laziness, Sloth, Self-love, Pride, Insanity, Obstinacy in defending error, etc. Eighth, initiated in the rites of the Sorbonne, he ought to have had this honor for the most noble Academy and parent of Catholic Schools, since he knew that most of the most skilled Masters of Theology in it avoid physical predeterminations. Peter of St. Joseph, a Cistercian, excepts no one: tract. on grace, disp. 7, and the Author added a likeness of truth to his testimony, when from the very bosom of the Parisian faculty he was forced to go to Louvain, that at least in Spanish lands he might find one Theologian to whom that doctrine was approved. Ninth, he should at least have excepted from the same calumny Philip Gamachaeus, the most splendid light of the Sorbonne, his Preceptor, to

CHAPTER ONE

whom he professes that he owes very much, chapter 33, number 13. For his published works clearly show that he too is opposed to prelections. Did he therefore use a dangerous method in learning and teaching Theology? Did he take the beginning of his opinions from his own intellect, when he ought rather to have taken them from divine oracles? Was he either so obtuse that he did not see very many things completely absurd, not to say worse, which followed from his opinion; or so headstrong that he wished to hold truth in chains, with error set free? Was he soft and effeminate in removing obstacles which besiege the seat of truth? Was he a slave of popular favor, while he preferred the plausibility of doctrine to solidity? See, my Father, what you repay to that man to whom you profess that you owe very much. Tenth, something should have been given to the pious memory of the Most Illustrious Cardinal Berulle, the best Parent, whom this Author confesses to have greatly approved the cultivators of that opinion, whose virtue he now obscures and whose erudition he depreciates. Eleventh, the name of the same man should also have been consulted in this matter, whom fame, confirmed by clear arguments, reports to have been an excellent master of virtue and spiritual things, which the morals of the disciple should have proved. Finally, no one would hope that the praise which the fury of the most savage enemies had left remaining to those who especially resist the preachers of human acts, would be reaped by that Author, concerning whose equitable mind toward all there ought to have been no suspicion. For we know that when in our memory certain sycophants attacked their fame by word and pen, and left nothing intact in their life, morals, or doctrine, they nevertheless specifically excepted Theology; and did not dare to lie in this matter as they were accustomed to in others, thinking that if they did otherwise, they would be refuted by common opinion. What did they sin subsequently, that they should seem unworthy even of the remnants left by cruel enemies? For if they are lazy and slothful in overcoming the labors of studies; if they compose their opinions according to the applause of men rather than the rule of truth; if they are so perverse in philosophiz-

CHAPTER ONE

ing that their first care is to sacrifice to their own thoughts, the later to go to God and the wise, if perchance they can be induced to serve the established opinion; who would suffer there to be any place for this kind of men in the assembly of Theologians?

Nor indeed should what he says in chapter 36, already cited, number 2, be passed over, while he reports the second cause of aversion to prelections. For he says that it is the same as that which those who complain that letters are perishing recount among many others in a similar matter. By these words, I know not what evil omen he seems to sound for the studies of Theology, if those whom he attacks continue to teach, and the torpid ranks of Theologians are not strengthened by a recent accession. But far be it that such envy should occupy anyone that he should think a private name should be preferred to common utility, or that he should prefer to be singular and exceptional, than that others should grow up, by whom what has been sinned by him, especially in this prince of sciences, might be corrected. Indeed, I congratulate the literary Republic from my heart for its continual new supplements. And would that God might wish their impulses to be so fortunate that the errors of others henceforth could be a fraud to no one. But to say what the matter is, if the universal judgment is to be formed from the work *On the Liberty of God and the Creature*, it is necessary for us to be of less hope for that matter than desire.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF A CONTEMPORARY DETERMINIST

From what we have thus far discussed, it is abundantly clear that this recent advocate of pre-determinations does not sufficiently agree with common and sound doctrine. But why is this surprising, when it is also manifest that he does not even agree with himself? It is incredible how many contradictory opinions he has scattered throughout all parts of his work. Thus, there is minimal effort required to produce arguments suitable for refuting his novel opinions, since it is evident that he has not established any notable position without immediately erecting some mechanism to undermine it. Whether this is a result of his intellectual fortune, or whether he wished to embark upon a new method of philosophizing and despised the humble and timid methodology of others, who always attend to the connections and junctions of antecedents and consequents, examining all their statements, and as if they were moving through a labyrinth, attempting to hold a continuous thread at each step. He, whose purpose is to lead the mind out of these narrow confines into the greatest breadth, seems to have contemplated something loftier, and has conceived his work in the manner of the universe, from contraries and contradictions, as will soon become clear.

I. This Author throughout his entire work attacks those who deny the predetermination of free causes, and professes that he agrees with the Thomists: and yet he himself acknowledges no other predetermination

CHAPTER TWO

than that which no Thomist has ever been content with, and which no one else has ever denied, namely the Intention of the end. Thus in book 1, chapter 19, number 3, and chapter 20, number 5, which makes it appear that he wishes to philosophize in favor of those from whom he actually dissents, and to dissent from those with whom he actually philosophizes.

II. He considers necessary a premotion which, as the name itself indicates, is something presupposed for the operation of the secondary cause, chapter 18, number 1, something impressed upon the cause, and not only upon the effect, *ibid.* number 2, which holds itself on the part of the secondary cause and is received in it, which is as it were the complement of the created agent. *Ibid.* number 4, which is distinct from simultaneous concurrence. *Ibid.* number 1 and chapter 19, number 5. And in chapter 16, number 5, he says that he has demonstrated with most valid reasons that the motion of God is received in the moveable, that it is prior to the act, and that it is not the same as simultaneous concurrence.

And yet the same author admits that the Intention of the end, which is motion and premotion, as has just been said, is sometimes identical with election, which is, as he thinks, the first exercise of the free agent. Thus chapter 28, number 3.

But how can it be that what is identified with the effect and not with the cause, is something truly and actually presupposed for the production of the effect? Is something impressed on the cause and not only on the effect? Does it hold itself on the part of the cause rather than on the part of the effect? Is it the complement of the cause, etc.? How, I ask, can it be that the production of that which is identical with the effect of the free cause, is not also identical with the action of the same free cause, and therefore is not itself identical with simultaneous concurrence?

III. In chapter 1, number 1, he places the liberty of which he speaks in adherence to God, and in that Amplitude which follows such adherence, and in the same place says that the liberty of which he speaks is that very liberty which is required even for evil merit and without

CHAPTER TWO

which no sin is committed. Does this not imply a contradiction, to require adherence to God so that one can adhere to the devil? That is, that the love of God is necessary so that one can hate Him?

IV. This author in the very preface of book 1 vehemently disapproves of the doctrine of recent scholars who deny that there is liberty in the blessed. He repeats this again in book 2, chapter 27. But there are no recent scholars who deny the liberty of other acts in the blessed, except those of beatific love and joy or fruition. Again, he says that the Scholastics, especially the more recent ones, when they dispute about liberty, should be understood as referring to the liberty of exercise, thus at the end of chapter two of book 1. Therefore, recent scholars deny no other liberty to those acts of the blessed than the liberty of exercise. Finally, he himself acknowledges in those acts the liberty which he calls only according to state: but he denies that which is according to exercise. Thus chapter 9, numbers 3 and 5, chapter 10, number 1, and clearly in book 2, chapter 3, number 6. Why, therefore, does he take offense at the opinion of those by whom his own is confirmed? Let him, I ask, permit others to agree with him.

V. In book 1, chapter 3, number 1, he teaches that Christ the Lord, in John 8, when he says, "Then you will be truly free," etc., is speaking of liberty not opposed to necessity and immutability: and in the very same place he teaches that the liberty of which Christ speaks is liberty from necessity. If it is liberty from necessity, it is opposed to it. Therefore, Christ speaks of liberty which is opposed to necessity.

VI. The same author teaches in chapter 6, number 7, from Gandavensis, that Liberty conjoined with immutable necessity is different from the liberty of choice and superior to it. And then in chapter 8, number 1, he teaches from Augustine that the Liberty of choice is not destroyed but established by immutability, and is not universally opposed to necessity. It follows, therefore, that liberty, which is compatible with immutable necessity, both is and is not different from the liberty of choice.

CHAPTER TWO

VII. He teaches in chapter 6, number 12, that we are not bound to our operations, but to things: Therefore he pronounces that Vasquez spoke incorrectly when he said that a person is free who is not bound to his operation. And yet in chapter 7, number 2, when he explains liberty from necessity, he says that it is that By which we are exempt from being bound to our operation. Therefore, it is he himself who either speaks incorrectly, or incorrectly criticizes Vasquez.

VIII. In chapter 7, number 1, he denies that man can be said to be his own master, because mastery is towards another. And in chapter 10, numbers 1 and 2, he concedes that man, by the liberty which is according to exercise, is his own master, and in chapter 34, number 8, he says that a free person is the master both of others and of himself. Therefore he denies that he himself thinks and speaks well, and he destroys what he had said, that mastery is towards another.

IX. What he says in chapter 9, number 4, that the will does not extend more broadly than liberty, completely conflicts with what he repeatedly emphasizes and extensively proves in chapter 31, that the power to sin is not liberty nor a part of it; and in book 2, chapters 27 and 28, that there is no liberty in demons and the damned. Does he really deny that there is will in them? And will the power to sin, which he wants to exclude from liberty, also be excluded from the will?

X. In the same chapter 9, number 8, this author teaches that the liberty of exercise is distinguished against the liberty of state, which he had also done in chapter 2. Again, he says that the liberty of exercise is convertible with the liberty of contradiction: therefore, the liberty of contradiction does not extend more broadly than the liberty of exercise. It is therefore false what he previously reported from Augustine in chapter 4, number 4, that there is in the blessed Angels a liberty of contradiction which is also a liberty according to state. Either it is true that there is a liberty of exercise which is also a liberty according to state, and consequently it is false that the liberty of exercise is distinguished against the liberty of state.

CHAPTER TWO

XI. He says in the same chapter 9, number 6, that one who in deliberation about the state of life concludes in favor of God rather than the world, is not without fault, because he sets himself as his own end. But this implies, as they say, a contradiction. For if he sets himself as his own end, he concludes for himself, and not for God. And can it possibly happen that someone actually concludes both for sin and for God?

XII. In the same chapter 9, numbers 5 and 6, he says that in interior occupation with God, man merits and is worthy of praise, although in it there is no liberty of contradiction, and consequently no liberty of exercise, which is convertible with the liberty of contradiction, as has already been seen. Therefore, for one to merit and be worthy of praise, the liberty of state, as he calls it, is sufficient.

Again, the same author in the same chapter 9, number 8, denies that our conversion to God, insofar as it precisely tends towards God, is meritorious as our act, or that we properly merit through it, because the liberty which belongs to it under that aspect is only the inchoate liberty of state. Therefore, the inchoate liberty of state both is and is not sufficient for our merit.

XIII. In the cited passage, he denies that the act of our conversion as it precisely tends towards God is meritorious as our act, because it is God who moves us towards Him, not we ourselves. And yet later in chapter 14, number 6, and earlier in chapter 1, number 7, he says that although we are moved by God, we should nevertheless be considered to move ourselves. Why, therefore, are we not considered to merit as if through our own act? And if we are considered to move ourselves, although we are moved by God, why are we denied to move ourselves, when God moves us?

XIV. That method of philosophizing collapses, by which, in the place just cited, he thinks there should be distinguished in our conversion a twofold aspect, namely the precise aspect of conversion to God, and the aspect of aversion from creatures: and this aversion from creatures, insofar as it relies on God as our end to whom we adhere, is meritorious as

CHAPTER TWO

our act; but the aspect of conversion precisely is not meritorious as our act. This, I say, collapses of itself. For what, I ask, is it for aversion from creatures to rely on God as our end, if not that aversion from creatures includes being conversion to God?

Therefore, when it is said to be meritorious as our act under the aspect in which it relies on God as our end, it is the same as saying that it is meritorious as our act under that aspect in which it either includes or is formally conversion to God: that is, under that aspect in which it should not be distinguished from conversion. Therefore, it was ridiculous to distinguish that double aspect of aversion and conversion, and to assign to aversion thus distinguished a merit that is ours, when it has none except insofar as it is not distinguished from conversion.

XV. Also collapses what he says in the same place, that the formal aspect of our conversion to God is not meritorious as our act, but as God's work through Christ in us. Because it is manifestly a contradiction for some work to be meritorious under that aspect in which it is the work of a cause that cannot merit: and God cannot merit, as is known from the understanding of the terms. Therefore, it is a contradiction for conversion to be meritorious insofar as it is God's work. And do not say that God can merit through Christ, because this also implies just as much of a contradiction as saying that God through Christ knows, walks, etc. (nor does the doctrine of the communication of idioms pertain here). I add that Christ no longer merits anything. Therefore, either there is no merit in man's conversion to God, or it is the merit of man himself.

XVI. In chapter 14, numbers 1 and 2, he refutes those who say that the ultimate End does not move the will so sufficiently in its proper genus, that it is not necessary for the will itself also to contribute to that motion, and he says that this sounds bad, and in number 3 he contends that it cannot be said that man is not sufficiently determined by the end, unless the determination of the will is added, even by way of an active principle. This, besides being false, also conflicts with the Author himself. For he wants the end to be sufficient to determine the will only in its

CHAPTER TWO

proper genus, and in number 1 he explicitly pronounces it true that the end does not determine finally and effectively at the same time. From this it evidently follows that, although it is said that the highest principle (whether it is the will or not) should be joined to the end for actually bringing about the determination of the will, nothing is said that harms the sufficiency of the end, and which is not true. Therefore, when it is said that the will is not to be added, even by way of an active principle, because in that way the sufficiency of the end is destroyed, something false is said. This is confirmed because when the ultimate end moves to the election of means, it either moves sufficiently in its proper genus, or it does not. If you say the second, you do not harmonize well, because according to you this sounds bad. If you say the first, then it stands that the ultimate end does not so sufficiently move the will in its proper genus, that it does not need the will freely consenting and cooperating by way of an active principle. Otherwise, the motion of election would not be free to it, contrary to what you think.

XVII. In chapter 14, number 4, to prove that the ultimate end is most sufficient for determining the will, without its own determination also needing to be added, he says that he supposes that intention or conversion, which is the causality and motion of the end in the order of grace, to be perfect and efficacious. But earlier in chapter 9, number 6, he asserted that before the conversion which follows the internal struggle of man striving for better things, which alone is undoubtedly perfect and efficacious, there is some merit of ours, and an operation suitable for meriting, and a grace from which both follow. From this you may clearly infer that before there is that which is grace and motion, and causality of the ultimate end, there is grace and motion, and causality of the same end.

XVIII. In chapter 18, number 8, he teaches that God gives consent to the will independently of its future consent under the condition before it would be given, or would be determined to be given. The meaning of this proposition can only be that God gives that consent without it

CHAPTER TWO

being necessary to presuppose that it would be future from the hypothesis which God uses and from which He draws it out, or without it being necessary for this to be known by God. But this implies a contradiction, as is self-evident. Because after the consent truly follows from such a hypothesis, it is impossible that it would not have followed from the same if it were posited; and similarly, it is impossible for this not to be known by God, after it is true, and that before any free decree about absolutely positing the hypothesis, and consequently about absolutely procuring the future consent. Because prior in reason than there would be such a decree, it was true that if the hypothesis were made, the effect would follow.

XIX. In chapter 19, number 2, he says, For a free agent to operate freely, two things must be understood. The first is that the agent is of itself indifferent to acting and not acting; the other he adds, That it be determined, not to the end, nor to the means, but to the end through the means. I pass over the tenuous and complicated meaning of these words. The Author's aim, I believe, is this: It is proper to a free agent both to be indifferent to acting and not acting, and at the same time also to be determined; indifferent indeed of itself, but determined (namely by antecedent determination) through the intention of the end to the election of things useful to the end. This opinion, I say, conflicts with itself.

For I argue thus: When you say that a free agent ought to be indifferent of itself, either by that of itself you abstract the free agent from the supposition of those things which are necessary to it, so that it is ready and proximately fit and prepared for action; or you do not abstract, but take it in conjunction with such a supposition. If the first, the sense is that a free agent can act provided that the supposition of those things which are necessary for acting is added to it, and it can not act provided that supposition is removed; and thus it is of itself indifferent to acting and not acting, insofar as it is indifferent to having or not having that supposition. And in this sense you conflict with yourself, when you propose that indifference as a proper and necessary condition for a free agent, since indeed it is fitting also to a non-free agent. For since some

CHAPTER TWO

supposition is also necessary for this, by which it becomes proximately and immediately fit to act, it is truly said of it that it can act, provided that supposition comes, and it can not act provided it does not come. A dog, I say, truly can lap up food if it senses it is tepid, and not lap it up if it experiences it as hot; and a Demon, whom you think no more free than a dog, or certainly a hare, can fly to tempt a man, or recede from him, according as he understands that he is more or less offending God in this, according to your doctrine. Therefore, a dog is of itself indifferent to lapping up or not lapping up food, and a Demon to tempting or not tempting man. This, therefore, does not properly pertain to a free cause. If the second, the sense is that a free agent, as already completed through the supposition of things necessary for acting, or that principle which is formed and created from such a conjunction, is of itself indifferent to acting and not acting. And in this sense a manifest contradiction is implied, when it is said that an antecedent supposition, which must be joined to a free agent so that it is entirely complete for action, is a determination to acting. For this is to say that from a free agent and determination, something indifferent to acting is created, which is the same as saying that from the conjunction of air and light, something dark is created.

XX. In chapter 20, number 3, he teaches that motion is rendered inefficacious from the part of the subject, when God sends a motion of itself destined for man's conversion, but which is imperfectly received, and because of the weakness or depravity of the subject, is prevented from reaching its goal. Therefore, the depravity and weakness of the subject hinder that in which the efficacy of grace consists.

Again, in the same place he indicates that that in which the efficacy of grace consists is the divine will and intention that the effect should follow, for that is as it were the spirit of grace. From which he inveighs against those who attribute to the creature what is most powerful in grace and as it were its spirit, namely efficacy. From these statements I argue thus:

CHAPTER TWO

If the efficacy of grace consists in that divine intention, it is manifest that only that which prevents that intention prevents grace from being efficacious; but it is also manifest that the depravity and weakness of the subject do not prevent that intention of God from existing, because that is not something that needs to be received in the subject. Therefore, the depravity of the subject does not prevent the efficacy of grace.

You might say that the depravity of the subject deserves that God should not have such an intention. On the contrary, if it includes sin, so be it; but this Author thinks the same about a subject having no sin, as Adam was in the state of innocence, and the Angels before the fall, chapter 21, number 4, in whom only weakness without depravity can be imagined; likewise concerning depravity which means only an inclination to sin, without any evil merit, such as that of a man already justified. These, therefore, cannot deserve the withdrawal of any good, and consequently cannot prevent the intention which renders grace efficacious.

This contradiction is explained differently. The weakness of a subject about to receive some form cannot prevent anything other than what pertains to the entity of the form to be received, as immediately appears by itself; and consequently the weakness of a subject about to receive grace cannot prevent anything other than what pertains to the entity of the grace to be received. But the efficacy of grace does not pertain to the entity of the grace to be received, as the same author admits in the cited place. Therefore, the weakness of the subject about to receive grace cannot prevent its efficacy. It is necessary, therefore, that he deny one or the other: either that the weakness of the subject and also its depravity prevent grace from being efficacious, or that its efficacy is to be sought from the intention of God.

XXI. In the same chapter, number 5, he says that man through the intention of the end moves himself, only as receiving. Which is to move himself insofar as another only moves him; or to act insofar as he only suffers. But this is to move himself insofar as he does not move himself, to act insofar as he does not act. What could be imagined more con-

CHAPTER TWO

tradictory than this? Would it not have been better to candidly deny what nevertheless all affirm, that man moves himself entirely towards the end?

XXII. In chapter 21, number 7, he says, God offers to man the motion by which he may transfer himself to Him as the ultimate end; but he, perversely disposed, receives that motion according to his own mode, most imperfectly and tenuously, receiving nothing of it except that by which he is more tightly bound to himself. But this conflicts with what was said in chapter 20, number 3: That grace is inefficacious does not arise from any dependence on the secondary cause, as if it were expecting its consent. Because it is manifest that God actually gives whatever He offers, unless the subject to whom He offers it is free in receiving. For if it is not free, what prevents something from being given to it also prevents it from being offered. Unless perhaps we think that God offers a rational soul to a horse's body, and wings to an Elephant for flying. Now, it is clear that man does not actually receive that perfect motion, as the Author also admits in the same place. Therefore, he must be free in its reception. Therefore, the existence of perfect motion depends on man's free acceptance. But this is also denied, as has been shown. Let the author, therefore, choose which he prefers to retract.

XXIII. In chapter 22, number 1, he says that he takes predetermination strictly as being the same as efficacious premotion. And in the same place he says that predetermination, thus taken, is twofold: one of faculty, which is, he says, either for the whole time of life, or for that small part of time for which it is predetermined for such an act; the other is the predetermination of the act, number 2. But these conflict with each other, because if predetermination is nothing other than efficacious premotion, it is evident that there can be predetermination only of that of which there can be premotion. But it is also manifest that there can be no premotion except of the faculty, if indeed the act itself precisely is only the terminus to which there is premotion. Therefore, there is no predetermination except of the faculty. Therefore, there is no distinction be-

CHAPTER TWO

tween the predetermination of the faculty which is said to be only for a small part of time, and the predetermination of the act itself.

XXIV. In the same place he teaches that the predetermination of faculty, even that which is only for a small part of time, does not leave in the faculty the power of suspending the act. The faculty is predetermined, he says, when it is so affected by God, and placed in such an intrinsic state, that it cannot convert itself to the opposite of what He has willed. And a little later: Whoever shall have held himself thus towards God, since he cannot defect from the order of God either absolutely or at least for that time, also cannot not be converted to that to which God's motion applies him. In this way he thinks that all the Blessed in heaven are predetermined, and once also Christ the Lord on earth. But the predetermination of the act also imports, he says, something intrinsic in the will, at least by way of something transient; but not such that it entirely penetrates and possesses it, and which it cannot resist. And this is the common mode by which God has been accustomed to govern men. He adds in the same chapter, number 8, that with the predetermination of the act, the resistance of the will cannot be composed. But these things conflict with each other.

For that the predetermination of faculty removes the power towards the opposite cannot be true, except only in the composite sense; namely that it is such that the suspension of the act to which one is predetermined cannot coexist or be composed with it; since it has been previously shown, even from the opinion of this author, that a free faculty ought to be of itself, that is at least in the divided sense or dividing from predetermination, indifferent to acting or not acting.

But the predetermination of the act is also such that the suspension of the act cannot coexist or be composed with it, as has been shown. Therefore, the predetermination of the act is incorrectly distinguished on this basis from the predetermination of faculty, at least that which is for a small part of time. Moreover, what is further added by the Author, that one does not so penetrate and pervade the faculty as the other, these are

CHAPTER TWO

words which the unskilled will not understand, and the skilled will scoff at. For is there some surface of the soul which the predetermination of faculty crosses over, to which the predetermination of the act adheres? Is there some depth from which one is excluded and the other admitted? Let him confess, therefore, that this distinction of predetermination is either badly posited or badly explained.

XXV. Here the Author speaks in chapter 30, number 4, about the pre-determination commonly given to travelers, that is, about the predetermination of action. Therefore, what he says should be interpreted as meaning that he who not only persuades, but moreover gives the very will, namely through this predetermination, does not leave man indifferent to acting or not acting.

However, it cannot be said that it does not leave him indifferent because it removes the power of acting, since rather it helps that power. Therefore, it must remove the power of not acting. But he also denies removing this in the cited chapter 22, number 2, where he says the predetermined will, predetermined by the predetermination of the act, elicits the act **WITH THE POWER OF BEHAVING OTHERWISE**, and in number 3, that it is not such that the will cannot resist it. Therefore, this author contradicts himself.

XXVI. There is again another contradiction in the same chapter 22 between two propositions already brought forward. The first is that the will predetermined by common predetermination can nevertheless resist it. The second is that it is impossible, for thus he speaks in number 8, for such resistance to be composed, or to exist simultaneously with such predetermination.

I argue thus therefore: If it is impossible for the resistance of the will to be composed with predetermination, it must necessarily be admitted that predetermination is an efficacious and insurmountable impediment to resistance. But the first is true; therefore also the second. Again: If predetermination is an efficacious and insurmountable impediment to resistance, it is evident that for the will to be predetermined is the same as

CHAPTER TWO

for the will to be efficaciously and insurmountably impeded from resisting. But the first is true, therefore also the second.

Now, to say that the will is efficaciously and insurmountably impeded from resisting, yet can nevertheless resist, is this not a matter worthy to be met with the laughter of all who can laugh?

XXVII. This author in the same chapter 22, number 6, resolves the question which asks how it can happen that the same act proceeds both contingently and immutably from a will predetermined by the common predetermination which is called "of the act," with roughly this reasoning: Namely, that there are two things, the will and predetermination; and therefore the act that is elicited can be conceived both as arising from the will precisely, and under that aspect to be elicited contingently; and as arising from predetermination, and under that aspect not to be elicited contingently, but immutably. But are not the will and that special predetermination, which is called "of the faculty," and exists for only a short time, two things equally distinct? Cannot the act therefore be similarly conceived both as proceeding from the will precisely, and as proceeding from that predetermination? Again, if it is conceived as proceeding from the will precisely, is there reason why it should be said to proceed immutably and not rather contingently? Therefore, he strives in vain when he tries to prove to others his invention about the distinction of a twofold predetermination, since from this perspective no difference between the two can be deduced.

XXVIII. In the same chapter 22, number 7, he teaches that since man can by way of persuasion draw another man wherever he wishes, God can do this much more. And then, in number 11, he says that the way of Supreme power, which he distinguishes from the way of persuasion, is not only suitable for perfect conversion, but is the only suitable way, and he denies that the way of persuasion is suitable for this. If God can by way of persuasion lead man wherever He wishes, how can He not also lead him to perfect conversion? Or if He cannot lead him to perfect conversion, how is He said to be able to lead him wherever He wishes?

CHAPTER TWO

XXIX. In the same chapter 22, number 7, he says that God can persuade any man, at any time, and under any circumstances in which he is placed; also a man however hardened, also a mind however ill-disposed, corrupt, and abandoned.

And yet soon in number 10, he thinks the use of that mode is less worthy of God, because it supposes man to be affected in such a way, and builds on that foundation the reasons for choosing, and in number 11, that God does not change the heart immediately, in this way by Himself, but through man whom He finds thus affected for the end, and upon whose disposition He builds. O marvelous inconsistency in speaking! How does God suppose man to be disposed in such a way, in order to draw him by way of persuasion, if He can draw him however ill-disposed, corrupt, and abandoned?

XXX. In the same chapter 22, and in the same number 11, the same Author indicates that the mode of leading men efficaciously to good, which is by way of persuasion, is more common than the other, which is by way of power. And yet in chapter 30, number 4, he denies that it is Sufficient to say that God only persuades good will, but further it must be said that He gives it. If it cannot be said that God only persuades good will, how can it be said that He uses only the way of persuasion to procure it? Or if when He is said to use the way of persuasion only, it is not excluded that He is considered to give good will, how is that excluded if He is believed only to persuade it? Are not persuading and using the way of persuasion the same? Certainly this Author seems to be in this part somewhat more powerful than God, as one who by way of persuasion admits such absurd and complicated things into his mind.

XXXI. There is also another contradiction in the distinction of that double mode by which the will can be drawn by God to good work, according to the exposition of this Author. Indeed, when God efficaciously uses the way of persuasion, predetermination or intention cannot be excluded, and indeed efficacious intention, as is clear from chapter 22, number 11, without which nothing ever happens. Again, neither can the

CHAPTER TWO

divine decree be excluded, or the will that there be an effect, since efficacy is to be sought from there. Thus, following the way of persuasion, all these things are necessary: pious thoughts alluring the will to good work, intention of the end, and the Divine decree, absolute and efficacious, concerning the work.

But I am ignorant of what the use of the other mode, which is by way of power, excludes from these, or what it adds. For since it does not lead the will to the unknown, it must be admitted that it includes thoughts illuminating the will concerning the good to be desired; it does not exclude efficacious intention, as being God's proper causality according to the doctrine of this Author; nor consequently the decree which is the spirit of this intention. Besides these, what can it add that is not superfluous to procuring consent? Therefore, the way of power coincides with the way of persuasion, and vice versa. Therefore, the thought in which one seemed to be more common than the other was false in number 11.

XXXII. This Author teaches that not to consent to Divine grace by which one is incited to good is either a sin, or certainly a defect of such a kind that it cannot befall the will of the Blessed or of the Blessed Virgin, or of Christ the Lord while they were on the way. So in this chapter 22, number 4, and before, in chapter 1, number 3, and in book 2, chapter 27, number 3. Much less, therefore, can that defect be attributed to God. Again, he teaches in chapter 20, number 3, that the fact that grace is inefficacious in some is to be ascribed to the divine will. But it cannot be ascribed to Him that grace is inefficacious without also ascribing to Him that there is no effect. Why, therefore, is that defect believed to be so great that it cannot be ascribed even to the least of the blessed humans? Or why is God the Author of that defect, which the conscience of the Blessed cannot tolerate?

XXXIII. In number 12 of the same chapter 22, he distinguishes two freedoms: One which is pure and consists in indifference to acting and not acting while preserving the order of the end; Another which is

CHAPTER TWO

impure and imports a power to act well and badly. And then he adds, if we wish to know what is found concerning true freedom in this second member of this division, we must look only at the faculty of acting or not acting while preserving the order of the end.

But this faculty cannot be considered in the second freedom unless it is included in it. But if it is included, that in which, according to you, the prior freedom is placed is included: and consequently the prior freedom is included in the posterior. But a division in which one member is included in the other is the mistake of a three-day-old dialectician. Therefore, you must necessarily confess that either that division of freedom was badly established or badly explained by you.

XXXIV. There is also another contradiction in the same place. Indeed, he joins the power of sinning only to the second freedom, which he calls impure, from which he indicates the prior and pure freedom to be free. And at the same time he confesses that prior and pure freedom was in Adam in the state of innocence. But was not the power of sinning also in him? Why, therefore, do you separate pure freedom from the power of sinning, or why do you confess that it was in Adam, since this power was also in him?

XXXV. In chapter 23, number 6, he teaches that St. Augustine, although he was not unaware of middle knowledge, never resorted to it, namely in the question of efficacious grace. And a little before, in number 2, he proves that St. Augustine recognized middle knowledge from what is held in question 2 of book 1 to Simplician: "Therefore God fruitlessly shows mercy to no one, because He so calls him of whom He has mercy, as He knows to be suitable for him so that he does not reject the caller."

But it is manifest that St. Augustine explains there the efficacy of grace. Therefore, these are simultaneously true: that St. Augustine never resorts to middle knowledge in explaining the efficacy of grace, and that the knowledge to which he resorts when explaining the efficacy of grace is middle knowledge.

CHAPTER TWO

XXXVI. In the same chapter 23, number 3, he teaches that God sees conditional future events as they are in their causes as only probable, that is, He sees only their probability. And in number 4, he says that if God does not append His decree to the object of conditional knowledge, at least by hypothesis, He sees nothing certain, but sees only the probable connection of such a cause with such an event.

Again, the same author, as we have already seen in chapter 20, number 3, teaches that the divine will and intention are as it were the spirit of efficacious premotion, so that the same entity of premotion, unchanged in itself, from the supposition of the divine will and intention concerning the effect, becomes efficacious, and lacking this becomes inefficacious.

But if this is true, it clearly follows that God, who knows certainly and evidently that He does not have the will and intention that the effect which is said to be conditionally future should follow, also knows certainly and evidently that such an effect will not be future. How, therefore, is it true that if God does not append His decree to the object of conditional knowledge, He knows only that it is probably future, when He certainly and evidently knows it will not be future? Likewise, since that non-existence of the effect under supposition is something contingent and future under condition, and is known by God evidently and certainly, how is God said in general to know only the probability of future events under condition?

XXXVII. In chapter 23, number 8, he attacks the usefulness of middle knowledge with this principle: That there is no state, no dispositions in which God cannot recall the creature from sin and lead it back to the way of salvation if He wishes; and thus vainly and to the discredit of Divine Omnipotence are certain circumstances devised in which alone He can do this. But he should have known that the state in which God is denied by defenders of middle knowledge to bring about the creature's consent to His grace, contains this hypothesis: If the creature is placed in those circumstances, and divine grace is offered to it, leaving the option

CHAPTER TWO

of using or not using at its disposal, it will not consent. This being granted, I ask the Adversary what is meant by that "if He wishes." Is the sense: If God wishes with an absolute and efficacious will and one entirely determined to procure consent, the creature will always consent? But it is contradictory for God to have this will in the given hypothesis, since it involves the contrary, as has been said. Is the sense therefore: If God wishes as far as depends on Him, and provided that the creature in its freedom does not suspend the effect of this will? But in this way, not only is the principle begged, but furthermore, that is assumed which is proved false by the almost hourly experience of nearly all mortals. For whatever good is freely omitted anywhere, is omitted with God willing that it not be omitted.

XXXVIII. Similarly, it is contradictory what he says in the same number 8 and 9, when he reasons thus: If the creature, he says, were differently disposed than it is under these circumstances (namely, in which it is foreknown not to consent), it would consent, as these authors confess; but God can excite that disposition in it; therefore, in whatever state, He can bring about that the sinner consents. O sluggish thought! Do you not see that with another disposition excited, another state is also constituted, and thus it is false that in whatever state consent is elicited from the will, since the one in which it is elicited is different from the one in which it was said not to be elicited?

XXXIX. It is contradictory what he teaches in chapter 24, number 1, that cause is rightly divided into necessary, contingent, and free; the necessary being that which is determined from itself to its work; the contingent, that which is impediabile or defectible; the free, indeed, that lofty and noble one which feeds in amplitude.

But I argue in this way: Either you take the cause which you divide according to itself, and precisely from all circumstances prerequisite for acting, or not. If the first, the division fails, because there is no necessary cause distinct from contingent; for none is thus taken which is not impediabile and therefore contingent. If the second, the division fails

CHAPTER TWO

again, because there is no contingent cause distinct from free, since there is none which, with all prerequisites for acting having been posited, is impediabale from acting except the free cause. For this alone can then sustain itself, and prevent itself from acting. Wherefore, whichever way you turn, either you divide badly, or you explain badly what you have divided.

XL. Again, this Author contradicts himself in the same place, number 3, where, having rejected others' manner of speaking about the understanding of the composite and divided sense, he adds boastfully: "But we, far stronger for truth and freedom, maintain from the principles already laid down that the necessity of the composite sense coheres best with freedom because, etc., placing freedom not in absolute indifference to acts, but in indifference to objects." And soon, while he explains this indifference of his: "Indifference to acts while preserving the order of the end," he says, "endures even when we act: and for this reason he thinks freedom endures." Where you see him now denying, now supposing, that the indifference in which freedom is placed is indifference to acts.

XLI. What he teaches there in number 4, that the necessity of acting which arises from some supposition both antecedent and independent of our freedom does not remove freedom: **AND THAT SUCH A SUPPOSITION IS THE ULTIMATE END INTENDED BY HIM WHO ACTS**; Destroys what he had said in chapter 22, number 2, that with the predetermination of the act supposed, that is, in his opinion, with the efficacious intention of the ultimate end supposed, **THE POWER OF BEHAVING OTHERWISE** is nevertheless retained by the will. For I argue thus:

Just as what is said to exist necessarily does not have the power not to exist, so it is manifest that what is said to act necessarily does not have the power not to act. Because necessary in general is said to be only that which cannot be otherwise. But from the supposition of the efficacious intention of the ultimate end, it follows that it is necessary for the will to act, according to you, when you say that such a supposition is the ultimate end intended, etc. Therefore, from the same supposition it fol-

CHAPTER TWO

lows that it cannot not act, or that it does not have the power of not acting. Therefore, from the same supposition it both has and does not have that power, which is contradictory.

XLII. It is also contradictory what he says in chapter 25, number 1, that sin is known by God to be future in the definition of God, and in the determination received weakly and imperfectly by the second cause. For either he confuses that determination with the definition, which is the decree of the divine will, or he takes it distinctly for that intention of the end of the created will. If the first, it is contradictory for the future to be known in it as weakly received, because the divine decree is not something received in the second cause either strongly or weakly. If the second, it is similarly contradictory for the future to be known in it, because thus God would derive His knowledge from something created, namely because it would be for Him a medium for knowing, which greatly displeases this Author in chapter 18, number 5.

XLIII. This Author from chapter 15 to 21 perpetually both teaches and supposes that the determination and premotion of God is necessary for any second cause for any positive effect; and yet then in chapter 26, number 2, he concludes that God does not move to the material of sin, and when he explains what finally is that material, he says among other things that it consists of the first movements of vengeance, concupiscence, vainglory, etc. I pass over that it is entirely new and unusual to call this the material of sin; nor is it right that anyone should be permitted, without reason, without proof, without the example or authority of anyone, to embark on a way of teaching contrary to others, and to order that those who wish to follow him must unlearn the rest. I ask only whether those movements are something positive in the nature of things? Whether they have an efficient cause? Whether created? Whether either the will itself if they are spiritual, or appetite if they are corporeal? None of these can be denied, except by one who has never greeted the threshold of philosophy: therefore, for the production of those movements, the motion of God is necessary, and consequently there both is and is not,

CHAPTER TWO

from the principles of this Author, a created cause producing a positive effect without the prior motion of God. From which it follows:

XLIV. A contradiction, which is the repugnance of that opinion with what was related from chapter 18, number 5, that God knows future events only in the definition of His will, not in any created reason which is for Him a motive of knowledge. Because now it is denied that there is any definition of the divine will concerning the material of sin, and yet it cannot be said that it is not known by God to be future. Therefore, the definition of the divine will both is and is not the adequate reason for knowing future events.

XLV. It is also repugnant what he says in the same chapter 26, number 2, that God by His motion cannot dispose us to that which He prohibits, and from which He turns us away, with what he adds there in number 14, that God moves us and premoves us to the act which is evil. For it is clear that not only the malice of the act is prohibited, but also the very act to which malice is conjoined. It is not only prohibited that the act of hatred of God be evil, but absolutely that it be at all. Therefore, God who premoves to it, since He premoves to every act which is evil, premoves to that which He prohibits.

XLVI. It is repugnant what he says there in number 6, that it happens by the creature's fault that the determination of God to acts which are evil is not perfect, with what was said in chapter 24, number 4, that the efficacious intention of the ultimate end, which with respect to good acts is the very perfect determination, as we have often reminded, is an antecedent supposition to the use of freedom, and which is not in our power. For I argue thus:

It is manifest that nothing can be attributed either to praise or to blame except what is in one's power; but that the perfect determination is or is not, is not in the power of the creature; therefore, that the perfect determination is or is not, can be attributed neither to the praise nor to the blame of the creature. Therefore, either it was badly asserted that it happens by the creature's fault that the determination is not perfect, or

CHAPTER TWO

that this determination is an antecedent supposition and is not in our power.

XLVII. It is contradictory what he says in chapter 28, number 2, that the intention which is the determination of the free cause presupposes a nature not at all determined, but indifferent to all created things, not truly to the end itself, and what he adds, that intention does not determine to means, but to the end through means. For I argue thus:

Intention must be said absolutely to determine nature to those things to which nature itself is said to be absolutely indifferent from itself, as is clear. But nature in the former place is said to be absolutely indifferent from itself to all created things, which are means, but not to the end itself. Therefore, intention must be said absolutely to determine nature to all created things, that is, to means, not to the end. What, therefore, do those verbal quibbles in the latter place mean, or what substance do they contain: "Intention does not determine to means, but to the end through means"? number 5.

XLVIII. What he teaches there in number 4, that therefore the determination of the will which would be made by a created cause, as for example by a natural habit, would harm freedom, because it binds to a particular good, but the determination of God does not harm it, because it never binds to a particular and created good, but always allows us to move in the greatest amplitude: This, I say, conflicts with what was said, that God moves us, indeed both premoves and predetermines us to acts which are evil.

For I take one of these acts, for example, that to which the malice of adultery is conjoined, and I ask what is its object? It would be surprising if he thinks adulterers are such out of love of God, and not rather out of affection for pleasure. How, therefore, can it happen that man's will is predetermined by God to that act in particular, and is not predetermined to that pleasure in particular? And in what sense, therefore, is it denied to be predetermined to a particular and created good? And how will the

CHAPTER TWO

distinction brought forward stand, between determination which is from God, and determination which is from habit?

Likewise, I ask whether that singular predetermination concerns rather the act to which the malice of adultery is conjoined than the act to which the honesty of virginity is conjoined? If the first, to say that a man affected by such predetermination, and thus already ordered, and looking only at the object of adultery, is nevertheless released from all created good, and moves in the highest amplitude by benefit of predetermination, is this not at length to trifle most amply? If the second, is it not wrongly said to be a predetermination to the act to which the malice of adultery is conjoined? For just as the very nature of the will, because it is in itself capable of either adultery or chastity, cannot be said to be determined in itself to adultery: So if that predetermination of which there is question is in itself capable of being conjoined either with a vow of chastity or with an act of adultery, it is most ineptly said to be a predetermination to the act to which the malice of adultery is conjoined.

XLIX. What he concedes in chapter 29, number 6, that the freedom of contradiction is required for good and bad merit, most manifestly conflicts with what was said in chapter 9, number 5 and 6, that pious men through interior occupation with God merit and are worthy of praise, and yet in this there is no indifference, or freedom of contradiction.

L. What he says in chapter 30, number 2, that St. Augustine in book 1 to Simplician, question 2, when he says, "Him of whom God has mercy, He so calls as He knows to be suitable for him so that he does not reject the caller," speaks of the knowledge of suitability and proportion which is in man with respect to future consent; but not of the knowledge of consent itself; openly destroys what was said in chapter 23, number 2, that Saint Augustine speaks there of middle knowledge. Because middle knowledge is knowledge of the effect of a second cause future under condition, not of the disposition of the cause itself, which is the effect of God alone. Therefore, either he is not to be understood as speaking of

CHAPTER TWO

middle knowledge, or he is to be understood as speaking of knowledge, or notice of future consent. And yet both are contrary to this Author.

LI. What he says in the same chapter 30, number 7, that we do not relate passively to divine determination, because through it we are raised above inferior things, besides being based on an absurd reason, completely conflicts with what was said before in chapter 20, number 5, that man relates only passively to the intention of the end, and a little before in number 1, that our relation to the ultimate end is passive, not active.

LII. In the same place, number 8, to the testimony of St. Anselm concerning necessity which arises from an antecedent supposition, he responds first by conceding that such necessity removes freedom, which was the major premise of the proposed argument, and by denying that such is the necessity which arises from divine premotion, which was the minor premise. This solution he thinks is that of St. Thomas, and most apposite and to the mind of St. Anselm. And yet a little before in chapter 24, number 4, "From what has been said," he says, "it is evidently established that not every antecedent supposition harms freedom" (he calls an antecedent supposition one which is not in our power, indeed which anticipates our power). And soon he adds that this is so clear that no one can oppose it, and he says that such a supposition is the ultimate end intended namely by us, and thus premoving us.

Therefore, this Author thinks it so clear that necessity arising from divine premotion is necessity from an antecedent supposition and independent of our freedom, and yet does not remove freedom, that there is no one who can oppose it. And at the same time he thinks that solution by which someone thus opposes it, by conceding that an antecedent supposition removes freedom, and denying that the supposition of divine premotion is such, is most apposite and to the mind of Saint Anselm and St. Thomas. Who would not admire a man so strong that he himself does what he proclaims cannot be done by anyone?

CHAPTER TWO

LIII. What he teaches in chapter 31, number 5, that Leonard Lessius and Gabriel Vasquez were the first after the memory of men who dared to violate the sanctity of that doctrine by which it is established that the power of sinning is neither freedom nor part of freedom, is destroyed by what he adds a little after in number 9, that the objection against that doctrine taken from St. Dionysius chapter 9 of Celestial Hierarchy, cannot be made by any author, as one about to defend his opinion, **FOR THERE IS NO ONE WHO OPENLY DEFENDS** that the power of sinning pertains to freedom. If no one openly defends this, what then is the sacrilege of Vasquez and Lessius? But if they do, why cannot that objection be made by them, as ones about to defend their opinion?

LIV. In chapter 32, numbers 9 and 10, he rejects that common definition of free power, which is said to be, "with all prerequisites for acting having been posited, to be able to act, or not to act," chiefly on the grounds that these particles are lacking: "while preserving the order of the end." But this is destroyed afterward in chapter 35, number 1, where both is referred to and approved the description of freedom received by the unanimous consent of philosophers, when freedom is said to be "the faculty by which you can be turned to either part of contradiction." For since it is as necessary to add to this definition the particles "while preserving the order of the end" as to the former, it is evident either that this should not be admitted, or that should not be repudiated.

LV. What he says in the same chapter 35, number 6—that Intention is a movement of the will that is freer than Election, and that this freedom pertains to a state—is self-contradictory. First, because it involves a contradiction in terms to say that movement pertains to a state; this is equivalent to saying that blindness pertains to sight. Second, because it cannot be denied, except by someone to whom the language of philosophers is foreign, that intention is a vital act, which by its very nature requires that it be produced by a created vital power. It is therefore an exercise of the will, and elsewhere is said to be free: thus it is a free exercise. But does not free exercise oppose a free state in this man's opinion?

CHAPTER TWO

LVI. What he says in the last chapter, number 4—that it once happened to him that he ardently embraced the opinion he now attacks—clearly proves that what he states in the preface of book 1 is fictitious and affected, not from an internal sense of the mind. Namely, that when he had conceived in his mind a certain most noble species of liberty, one which Christ himself, the Apostle, and the Holy Fathers had zealously commended, he happened upon books of certain recent authors, by whom that sublime doctrine seemed to be obscured and diminished; then indeed he was astonished, and turning to the older theologians, he discovered that their opinion had been different. There was, therefore, in the mind of this Author a succession of various seasons, as it were. First, there was a time when he allowed himself to be deceived, having accepted a false and unworthy opinion of liberty. Then came a time when he conceived in his mind the genuine image of liberty, illuminated by clear testimonies of Christ the Lord, the Apostles, and the Fathers. Third, he understood that there were certain recent authors who thought differently about liberty than was fitting for the dignity of that species which had already adhered to his mind. But how could it happen that he only now understood this, when at first he had held the same views as these recent authors? Fourth, astonishment followed, and deservedly so; for the matter appeared new, although he had been accustomed to it from the beginning. Finally, turning to the ancient luminaries of the Parisian school, he discovered that their doctrine had been different. "Which I observed," he says, "was finally the view of those whom I used as teachers successfully in the same school." A late observation, immortal God, which should have been made when he was hearing those teachers. Nor would they have taught successfully if they had not been understood for such a long time. And if this was the opinion of the Teachers, who then are those who initially led him into error?

LVII. In the same chapter, number 6, he says it is wrong to resist divine grace for the sake of defending liberty. No sane person would deny this. But unless I am greatly mistaken, he attributes both merit and praise

CHAPTER TWO

to this wrongful act. For when in chapter 9, number 6, he affirms that in that struggle between flesh and spirit which precedes a person's perfect conversion to God, some operation of ours is interjected that is both meritorious and praiseworthy, I do not see what this could be other than some effort of the will striving toward God, which the Author frequently designates by the name of imperfect conversion. Yet concerning that very imperfect conversion, he pronounces that it stands in relation to the operation of grace more as an obstacle than as a component. Therefore, whoever places that obstacle, and thus resists divine grace, which is wrong, nevertheless merits praise.

LVIII. In the same chapter, number 2, he contends at length that the opinion he opposes—that is, the one contrary to physical predeterminations—should not be embraced, even though it has remarkable simplicity. This thought collapses of its own accord. For since no opinion is simple unless it can be reconciled with little difficulty both with divine testimony, with the authority of those who have the right to judge, and with the natural light of reason (for whatever opposes any of these creates difficulty), to refuse to follow a simple opinion while philosophizing, what is this other than to choose to be difficult toward God, toward men, and finally toward reason itself—that is, to become obstinate?

I know that there are certain propositions that are difficult and yet must be believed; but once these are to be believed, I say that their contraries are more difficult. For example, it is difficult to believe the distinction of divine persons with the identity of nature, because it seems to conflict with natural reason; but the contrary conflicts with divine testimony, the weight of which, being incomparably greater, thus presses more strongly and inflicts a greater difficulty on the one who denies it. Therefore, one who says that the opinion which eliminates physical predeterminations is wonderfully simple, and yet should not be followed, must either be in error or be exhorting to obstinacy.

Again, I know that an opinion sometimes has an apparent simplicity but a true difficulty; but just as what has only the appearance of

CHAPTER TWO

gold but the nature of brass is called not gold but brass, so neither should that opinion be called simple, but absolutely difficult. I add that it cannot deceive any but the crude and inexperienced, since the Author does not deny, nor indeed can he deny, that those who are captivated by the simplicity of the opinion contrary to predeterminations are, as they are very many in number, so also distinguished in erudition.

LIX. In book 2, chapter 3, number 5, the Author responds to a certain argument of Vasquez that "the truly free is opposed to the bound, and liberty to obligation and subjection; but to adhere to the highest is not obligation and subjection." But this destroys what was said in book 1, chapter 1, number 2: "Liberty implies an intrinsic and essential order to the end, and a binding to it," and soon after, "liberty consists in an order of immediate subjection to the ultimate end." And in chapter 22, number 13: "True liberty is not diminished by however great a binding to God, but is increased and made more illustrious."

LX. In the same book 2, chapter 25, number 16, he says: "God in no way determines the will to kill taken in the moral genus, except in one to whom he has also given the power to kill." But this destroys what was said in book 1, chapter 24, number 4: "God moves, indeed even premoves, to acts that are evil, insofar as they are BOTH ACTS AND HUMAN." For it is known even among novices in theology that a human act is called human for no other reason than because it is subject to morality, as they say, so that it is entirely the same thing to be determined to some act qua human, and to be determined to an act taken in the moral genus.

LXI. In book 2, chapter 24, number 2, he asserts that the Divine will is positively concerned with the permission of sin, but "that there is a positive act concerning the emerging evil, I utterly deny," he says. But this is destroyed in the following number, where he says: "If you ask what the object of that permitting will is, I will say it is the evil itself, insofar as it serves as a means to good." If that permitting will is positive; if its object is evil; how do you deny that there is a positive act in God concerning

CHAPTER TWO

evil? And just as it cannot be denied that a will whose object is health, insofar as it serves the divine glory, is considered to be concerned with health; and one whose object is theft as necessary for giving alms, to be concerned with theft; why will it be denied that one whose object is evil insofar as it is useful for the end of divine providence, is concerned with evil? Therefore, it should rather have been said that since willing to permit sin is nothing other than not willing to prevent it, the object of that willing is nothing other than the object of that not willing, namely, the negation of grace that would prevent sin, not the sin itself.

LXII. This very assertion that the Divine will is positively concerned only with the permission of sin is again destroyed in the following chapter 25, number 7, when he says: "God not only allows you to fall into new sins, but also subjects you to the tyranny of sin, so that you commit new sins." If He does not only allow, how does He only permit? And if He does not only permit, how is His will said to be concerned only with permission?

LXIII. In the same way, what was said in that chapter 24, number 2, that "There is no positive act concerning the evil emerging from permission," is later destroyed in chapter 25, number 2, where the divine decree concerning evil acts is conceived in this manner: "I will that this impious one, with that depraved disposition of his mind, should serve my counsels in this way." For if what is hidden under that phrase "serve in this way" is uncovered, nothing else will appear than "serve by sinning." But what is this other than to will positively that sin should occur, in order that it may serve the divine counsel?

LXIV. Also in chapter 24, number 2, he says: "When you consider God as dealing with the permission of evil, you already presuppose the evil proceeding from a secondary cause; and if you think otherwise, you are being foolish. You are being foolish, I say, if you do not presuppose sin to the divine will, and if you contend that sin is born in the creature only from the presupposed will and ordination of God." I indeed will take care not to be foolish, as the matter requires; but meanwhile I mar-

CHAPTER TWO

vel how this Author so quickly ceased to be wise. Indeed, immediately in chapter 25, number 2, he says: "God predefines and predetermines the acts which reprobate men perform by the law and impulse of their own depravity." Tell me, please, my Father, explain to us how it can happen that sin is presupposed to this divine will that predefines and predetermines the evil act. Can malice be presupposed to an act that is evil? And can an act that is evil be presupposed to the will by which it is predefined? How, therefore, is malice or evil presupposed to the same will? Again, I ask you to teach us, what is the order between the will predefining an evil act, and the will permitting evil? Is it prior for God to will to permit evil, than to predefine the act that is evil? It thus involves a contradiction what you say when the permission of evil is supposed to presuppose evil already proceeding from a secondary cause: because it is impossible to presuppose evil proceeding from a secondary cause prior in reason than the act which is evil is understood to proceed from it; and this is not understood except after predefinition, if there is any. Are God's willing to permit evil and predefining the act that is evil simultaneous? Again, a contradiction: because just as the evil act is posterior to predefinition, it will also be posterior to permission, and thus evil, which by no reasoning can be pre-understood to the evil act, will also not be able to be pre-understood either to predefinition or to permission, contrary to what you wish. Say then that predefinition of the evil act is prior, and permission of evil posterior: But that permission is for that reason superfluous, and even inappropriate. For after you have predefined that there should be an evil act, it is ridiculous to give the faculty for it to be after you have also predefined that there should be an act, to permit that it should be evil, is similarly inappropriate, for it cannot be except evil, from the supposition that it is both prohibited and yet predefined, even under the aspect of free and human: so that permission is therefore superfluous and redundant. Wherefore, whichever way you turn, you disagree with yourself.

CHAPTER TWO

LXV. Again, this Author seems to cross the line of wisdom posited by himself in the place already cited from chapter 24, book 2, number 2, when he says: "You are being foolish, I say, if you contend that sin is born in the creature only from the presupposed will and ordination of God." For he soon adds in chapter 25, number 1: "In blindness and hardening, divine justice **ORDAINS** that he who refused to obey the truth should follow falsehood."

If it is true that it happens by the ordination of divine justice that he who refused to obey the truth follows falsehood, why can it not be said without foolishness that it happens only by the ordination of divine justice that that miserable person follows falsehood, and consequently that it happens only by the ordination of divine justice that someone follows sin? And if he who says this is foolish, how can he be so closely and similarly like the one who thinks himself wise?

LXVI. Chapter 22, book 2, number 15. When it is asked whether the permission of evil is prior in God, or the intention of glorifying Himself through the good that arises from evil, he answers: "The permission of sin taken as it should be for the will of permitting, coincides with the will of glorifying himself," and he again insinuates the same in chapter 24, number 4, where he says that the will of glorifying Himself either is presupposed by the will of permitting sin, or is that very will. This doctrine fights admirably with what is immediately added in this latter place: "Sin is not understood as a kind of means in the hand of God, unless it is understood to be permitted, or unless we understand God not to will to prevent it. **BUT SUPPOSING THAT IT IS PERMITTED**, we acknowledge the positive will of God, but not concerning sin itself, but concerning the glory of God as to be promoted and increased by sin that is not prevented."

Come now, my Doctor, God's will of glorifying Himself coincides with the will of permitting sin, with the order of prior and posterior removed; and yet it presupposes the same? What is this thing, "The will of glorifying Himself either is presupposed or is the very will of permitting

CHAPTER TWO

sin," And, "supposing that sin is permitted, there is in God the will of glorifying Himself"?

LXVII. Chapter 22, number 16. He speaks thus: "Observe that sin is future in two ways, either absolutely, or as far as is from the power of the secondary cause. Permission, moreover, just like preservation, presupposes sin as future in this second way." And soon after, "As for sin future in the first way, namely absolutely, it presupposes that God has not willed to prohibit the creature from falling, which is to have permitted." He adds that it follows from this that "neither would man sin unless God permitted, nor would God permit unless man were going to sin."

By which doctrine none could have been more productive of suitable reasons for confuting the Author himself. For the genuine and necessary sense is that God neither wills to permit sin, nor wills to preserve from it, except as knowing sin itself to be future, knowing, I say, not absolutely, but conditionally; so that the object of that knowledge is that such is the propensity of the secondary cause to sin, that if it is permitted to sin, it will sin. This, I say, is both the genuine and necessary opinion of the Author, if his words are understood.

From which it is clear first that that knowledge, which is necessarily presupposed both to the will of permitting and to the will of preserving from sin, is conditioned knowledge, since its object is sin as future on the supposition that it is permitted. What, therefore, is the meaning of that discourse which this man has in book 1, chapters 18 and 23, where he so vehemently inveighs against those who say that the utility or necessity of this knowledge is something, since he too is finally forced to confess both that there is that knowledge and that it is necessary both to the will of preserving from sin and to the will of permitting it? And if it must be said that there is some use for the knowledge by which evil is understood to be future under a condition, in those decrees which pertain to the order of grace; with what verisimilitude can it be denied that there is also some use for the same knowledge, by which good as future in the same way is touched?

CHAPTER TWO

Second, if the supposition from which it follows that sin is conditionally future involves its permission to be conditionally posited, so that what is known is, "If God permits, such a secondary cause will sin"; And if the supposition from which it follows that sin is absolutely future involves the permission of God as absolutely posited, so that what is known is, "After God has decreed absolutely to permit sin, it is absolutely future": if the matter, I say, is so, as it is gathered from the sayings of this Author, and truth itself also bears, to what do those words which were related before, from chapter 24, number 2, pertain, or what solid thought do they contain, "When you consider God as dealing with the permission of evil, you already presuppose the evil proceeding from a secondary cause, and if you think otherwise, you are being foolish, you are being foolish, I say, if you do not presuppose sin to the divine will"? Sin is not conditionally future except on the supposition of permission to be conditionally posited; nor is it absolutely future except on the supposition of permission absolutely posited: and in whatever way it is understood to be future, in the same way permission is understood to be presupposed, from these principles, indeed even from true ones. And yet, he says, to pre-understand the permitting will to future sin is to be foolish. What place, therefore, is left for wisdom? But if this Author intends nothing else than that the absolute permission of future sin presupposes that it would be future on the hypothesis that it were permitted, he speaks of a great matter, and heaps an immense benefit on the commonwealth of theologians by announcing such a mystery. As if indeed anyone could be ignorant of this, or it could help in any way, so that sin as future could be imputed less to God.

Third, when he supposes that God permitting sin to be absolutely, foreknows sin to be conditionally future, that is, as far as is from the power of the secondary cause, and on the hypothesis that it is allowed to sin; either he supposes that God foreknows sin to be certainly future, or that there is only some probability of that matter: if the first, therefore it is false what was said in book 1, chapter 23, that "God certainly knows

CHAPTER TWO

nothing else about conditional futures than the probability, so to speak, of their futurity." If the second, therefore it is false what he says here, chapter 24, number 5, that "with permission posited, sin is understood as a certain means in the hand of God." For it is not to be thought that God's hand takes means whose existence is only probable.

LXVIII. What he says in chapter 25, number 7—"God not only allows you to fall into those sins, but also subjects you to the tyranny of sin reigning in you, **SO THAT YOU COMMIT THOSE NEW SINS**"—conflicts with what he adds shortly afterward, that God makes a vessel for dishonor "by subjecting the sinner to the vileness of sin **IN WHICH HE FINDS HIM, NOT CONSTITUTES HIM,**" number 9. For I argue thus:

That active subjection by God does not find the sinner constituted in those sins which follow from it: But new sins follow from it according to you, when you say that the sinner is so subjected to sin that he commits new sins. Therefore, it does not find the sinner constituted in those new sins. Therefore, God subjects even to sins in which He does not find the sinner. Therefore, it is empty what you say that God subjects the sinner to sin in which He finds him, not constitutes him.

Moreover, for God to subject a man to sin in which He finds him but does not constitute him, is only to allow him to commit sin and to be involved in it: But God does not only allow, according to you. Therefore, He does not only subject to sin in which He finds the sinner, but also in which by subjecting He constitutes him.

LXIX. In the same chapter 25, number 9, against those who say that God creates men for certain destruction, you think the words of the Apostle should be opposed, "God wills all men to be saved." But I ask how he interprets the Apostle concerning which will of God? Is it concerning a simple and inefficacious will? Or concerning an efficacious will, by which God seriously does not wish it to depend on Himself that all men are not saved? If the first, it is false that those words should be opposed to those saying that God creates men for certain destruction, be-

CHAPTER TWO

cause they will not resist their opinion. For an absolute decree of destroying someone can stand with a simple will of saving the same person, as in Christ, the absolute will of offering Himself to death, with the simple will of retaining life. If the second, it is false what is added afterward, that "God from the mass of Adam, when all were in it, chose some, rejected others." For how does He reject any, if He seriously wishes to help them so that they may be led out from there and be saved?

LXX. While doing something else, this contradiction also presented itself to me, to be numbered last. This Author says in book 2, chapter 4, number 1, that "God in the eternal processions is so free, that it is not free for Him to communicate or pour Himself out through them, because this would imply that He is indifferent, either to communicate Himself through them or to contain them." The sense is that the Eternal Father in generating the Eternal Son, for example, is free; but nevertheless that generation of the Son is not free for the Father. Which doctrine I say first of all conflicts with itself. Because it is most certain and explored by all that these things are said convertibly, that any principle is free in producing, and that its production is free to it; nor is a production being free to some principle anything other than the principle being free concerning it.

Second, I say this doctrine conflicts with that which is taught in book 1, chapters 22 and 33. Namely, that the predetermination by which the will of Christ the Lord, and of the Blessed Virgin, and of the more excellent Saints on the way, was prevented, did not leave the faculty of abstaining from the act to which they were predetermined, which is to have taken away the indifference of eliciting or not eliciting such an act, and yet did not obstruct the exercise of virtue from being most free in them. From which I argue thus: Although it was free for Christ to obey the command of the Father, it does not follow, however, that He was indifferent either to contain His obedience or to exhibit it, according to you. Therefore, although the Eternal Father may be said to be free to beget the Son, it will not follow that He is indifferent either to communi-

CHAPTER TWO

cate Himself through generation or to contain it, contrary to what you assert here. Or, if being free for the Father to beget the Son implies that He is indifferent either to communicate Himself through generation or to contain it, it follows by parity, since obeying the Father was free for Christ, that Christ was indifferent either to obey or not to obey, which however was denied before.

These are the points I had to note of the disagreements in this Author's opinions from the first book of his work, and only one or two chapters of the second. The abundance and wealth of material, together with my proposed brevity, prohibited me from extending the labor further. And already the fruit of this labor has exceeded my expectation. For I thought I would be gathering ears of grain; as you see, it was a harvest.

CHAPTER THREE

ON THE MISREPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITIES

If anyone has time to test the credibility of this Author with whom we are disputing, there will likely be in this part also much that can rightfully be doubted. Whether he represents the opinions of other writers to lend authority to his own position, or whether he recounts the doctrine of those whom he has set out to attack, with great facility he claims that some affirm what they do not affirm, and that others deny what they do not deny; indeed, sometimes he claims they affirm what they deny, and deny what they affirm. He also sometimes truncates and omits parts of statements which, if included, would present a very different form of the opinion to the minds of readers. Whether this is done through some deliberate skill and industry, or through the habit of a mind already occupied with a preconceived opinion, which both desires and believes that everything conforms to its view. Therefore, this Author, at the end of Book 1, as if fulfilling a promise made in his preface, objects to his adversaries that there are many whom they either lead or follow. "First," he says, "we must exclude from that number those whom we have praised above as supporting our position: the leaders of scholastic Theology, St. Thomas, Scotus, St. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, and philosophers of greater renown—Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Seneca, Boethius; and among the Church Fathers, the one who could stand for all others, especially in this matter of grace and free will, St. Augustine. To

CHAPTER THREE

these add, in our century, Cardinal Contarini, and all the disciples of St. Thomas." Here you see, Excellent Reader, that from the entire republic of theologians he has selected for himself exactly five men on whose testimony he relies; likewise five from all the families of philosophers; from the ancient Fathers, one; one also from recent times; and finally, all the disciples of St. Thomas. I do not wish to argue against this number in favor of a greater one; I gladly permit it to seem sufficient for passing judgment on those who resist this Author, with all others being unable to help in any way.

§ I. PHILOSOPHERS

BUT to begin with the philosophers, it is clear that of those five, Plato, Epictetus, and Seneca were each produced only once, at most twice, throughout the entire progression of his book, and this only to confirm this one proposition: "Liberty consists in Amplitude," about which there had been no controversy. Aristotle and Boethius are named somewhat more frequently, but almost always in the discussion of questions that do not pertain to this dispute. For when it concerns the necessity of physical motion, which precedes the action of a free agent; Which supervenes upon its power; Which presupposes other necessary conditions of cognition, habit, and whatever else is customarily required; Which is independent of liberty; Which nevertheless so subdues it that there is a necessity of acting, and indeed an inescapable one, because it implies that the resistance of the will cannot be reconciled with it—then indeed not a single word is heard from those witnesses. It is therefore evident that irrelevant testimonies are being substituted for those that are proper to this case.

If circumstances permitted a full recitation of those opinions by which the same Authors indicate that the free will of the will is free from physical predeterminations, it would be easy to refute the Adversary with his own witnesses. What would he respond, for example, to Boethius, who

CHAPTER THREE

is known to defend liberty on no other grounds than by rejecting all necessity that precedes its use, and therefore all predetermination that brings about such necessity? What to Aristotle, who for this reason denies the determined foreknowledge of future contingents, because he fears that the necessity which follows from it would destroy the contingency and liberty of human actions? What when he requires, for something to be considered within our power, that there must be a power of not doing it, that is, an absence of necessity to do it? What when he distinguishes a free cause from a non-free one in that, although the latter is duly applied to its patient, the former can still do two things at the same time—namely, act or not act—while the latter can do only one thing, namely act? There was, therefore, no reason why this Author should include those philosophers in his triumph, unless perhaps he wished to assign them a place in this procession among those with whom he had fought.

§ II. SCHOLASTICS: ST. BONAVENTURE, HENRY, DURANDUS

NO MORE FAITHFULLY were the Scholastics called to this judgment. For first, of those five whom he praises, St. Bonaventure, Henry, and Durandus spoke on only one or two occasions across all the questions that were agitated throughout the entire course of the dispute. Henry and Durandus in chapter 6, to confirm that liberty is to be placed in Amplitude. St. Bonaventure, both in this latter place and in chapter 31, to deny that the power to sin is either liberty or part of liberty. Now since this controversy contains a thousand points, is it not simply deceiving people to celebrate those who give testimony to only one or two conclusions about which there is minimal controversy, as if they were the authors of the entire doctrine? For regarding Amplitude, whether the essence of liberty should be placed in it, such a dispute has not yet been initiated, nor, I believe, will it be initiated in the future. Not because this mode of philosophizing is approved by anyone, but because after some-

CHAPTER THREE

one has seen fit to feed his thoughts with empty images, without applying the rigor of the schools, and to be deluded by certain phantoms of Platonic philosophy—let him be safe (for who would wish to trouble him?). Thus there is no doubt that this Doctor has found a secure position in that Amplitude, as if in some region of imaginary space. For just as no one will follow him there to join him, neither will anyone seek him out to fight with him.

Concerning the end, whether there is any liberty regarding it—if the question is not about the liberty of the will, we do not dispute it, and thus the theologians adduced do not oppose us; but if it is about that liberty, we say there is some in wayfarers, none in the comprehensors with respect to beatific acts; and in this we follow those theologians, while he alone abandons them with respect to the acts of wayfarers.

To what, therefore, does that speech in chapter 9, number 3 pertain? "If you ask for authorities whose testimony confirms this doctrine, behold St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Henry, and Durandus, the brightest stars of Scholastic Theology, who, etc." But I, my Doctor, ask for no authority to confirm with his testimony that we have some liberty regarding the end; nor am I so importunate as to wish this to be proven to me, of which I have no doubt. But since that question is completely foreign to our present one, I ask you not to bend the straight rays of these brightest stars in an oblique direction, nor to try to transfer testimonies that favor one opinion to confirm another.

Let the same judgment be made concerning the power to sin; for even if you deny that it is liberty or part of liberty, nothing will be conceded to the Adversary that is useful to him in the case being treated. But if he contends that given any of these three—that Liberty is placed in amplitude, that True liberty exists in us regarding the end, that the Power to sin is neither liberty nor part of it—the rest follows, which is necessary for ending this controversy, he errs greatly; nor will he ever obtain permission to draw a continuous thread from those principles to his conclusions. From these things, therefore, it is clear that, of those five Scholas-

CHAPTER THREE

tics, three must be subtracted as falsely presented. It would be easy, moreover, to bring them back and oppose them to the predeterminists, if that were our present task. For what would they say to St. Bonaventure when he affirms that the will is not free if it is confined to good, in 2 dist. 24, doubt 3? That it cannot be determined to one thing in such a way that it does not have power over its opposite, *ibid.* art. 2, quest. 3? That in this the dominion of a power with respect to an act is discerned in that the power can both be in act and cease from it, according to its own command and according to its own motion, *ibid.* dist. 25, quest. 32? That predestination, insofar as it is a cause, does not necessarily produce its effect, even if it necessarily infers it, 1 dist. 40, art. 5, quest. 1? What would they say to Durandus who says that liberty is a property of the will which it has with respect to those things **TO WHICH IT IS NOT NECESSITATED**, 2 dist. 24, quest. 1, num. 7, and quest. 3, num. 15? That the liberty of the will is a faculty for opposites, without necessary determination to either? But one or two testimonies of Henry must be transcribed: both because no one could ever speak more effectively and clearly against physical premotions, and because they are contained in the same passages that were cited by the Author to confirm his own opinion, so that from this one example it can be understood that he had no certain use or knowledge of the Authors he named, but rashly and by chance drew upon some illustrious names to inscribe on his own work. Thus, therefore, Henry speaks, *Quodlibet* 3, quest. 12: "But if free will is considered in its second respect (that is, if it is compared with operations and with objects), thus I say that the will is called free because it is indifferent to various contraries **WITHOUT ANY DETERMINATION RESTRICTING IT TO ONE OF THEM.**" So again, *Quodlibet* 12, quest. 26: "Therefore the will, by itself and through itself, proceeds to the act of willing, both the end and those things that are to the end, without any other disposition or motion existing or preceding in it. For it does not require such a disposition or motion in order to proceed to the act of willing, neither from itself as agent, nor from any other agent, **NOR EVEN**

CHAPTER THREE

FROM GOD." These are the brightest rays from the star of the Parisian School, by whose splendor the necessity of premotions shone forth to our Author.

The passage of Durandus which is cited in chapter 6, number 8, has been corrupted. But he [says] that we, having conclusive judgment or choice, do not necessarily tend toward their objects, **SPEAKING OF ABSOLUTE NECESSITY**. These last words were expunged lest they harm this interpretation. "Which is," says the Author, "that even in the composite sense and supposing the choice of some means to an intended end, we are free regarding such a means."

§ III. BL. SCOTUS

BL. SCOTUS FOLLOWS, of whom exactly three testimonies are employed to approve premotions: but what is remarkable to say, the first one utterly destroys them. For thus are the words reported from him in *Quodlibet*, quest. 16, in Book 1, chapter 6, number 6: "Since liberty is compatible with necessity, necessity falls under the will, so that the will, because of the firmness of its liberty, **IMPOSES NECESSITY ON ITSELF**, both in eliciting an act and in persevering or fixing itself in it." From this I argue as follows: The necessity that liberty tolerates falls under the will, as Scotus believes; The necessity that predetermination brings about does not fall under the will, as the doctrine of our adversaries holds; Therefore, the necessity that predetermination brings about is not the necessity that liberty tolerates, according to Scotus's mind. Similarly, the will imposes on itself that necessity which is reconciled with its liberty, according to Scotus; the will does not impose on itself that necessity which follows from predetermination, since it is said to be from God alone; Therefore, the necessity which follows from predetermination is not the necessity which, according to Scotus, is reconciled with liberty.

Here, however, our Doctor's solution occurs: God is all things to all; thus, to the Saints He is a form and act more intimate to them than

CHAPTER THREE

their own intimate self, and their most proper good; therefore, whatever necessity they receive from Him, they should be regarded as imposing on themselves. This means that when the will is fixed in act by God, it should be regarded as fixing itself—which is the one thing Scotus requires so that liberty is not violated by necessity. But this manner of speaking would be tolerable if it were used in a sermon to nuns; in the School, however, addressing theological men seriously intent on explaining a most difficult question, it should not even be brought forward.

And from this it follows that not even the other pronouncement of the Subtle Doctor, which alone can be proposed in this matter, is at all harmful. It is that by which the determination of the divine will is said to be the unique reason for the divine intellect to foreknow future events. For since it is evident from what has been said that no necessity of acting is to be admitted by Scotus in free will unless it is subject to liberty, it must be acknowledged that the determination of the divine will must not be interpreted in such a way that it tends efficaciously, absolutely, antecedently, and immediately to the very position of a future contingent. How, then, you will ask, does it tend? I do not care now how it tends, provided I know how it does not tend; namely, in such a way that a necessity of acting independent of liberty follows from it. For Scotus's words are clear. *Quodlibet*, quest. 16: "If there were a necessity prior to the will, and the will were understood to fall under necessity **AS IMPELLING IT TO ACT AND FIXING IT IN ACT**, the will would be acted upon and would not act, **NOR WOULD LIBERTY REMAIN IN THE ACT.**" What could be said more clearly against every premotion that brings necessity to the will independent of itself?

Moreover, in reporting that testimony of Scotus, the Adversary's faithfulness either deceives or is deceived. For thus he speaks in chapter 18, number 5: "Scotus also professes the same doctrine in various places, in 2 dist. 87, which almost entirely, as William Estius, a most fierce champion and defender of the same opinion, rightly observes, supposes as an admitted and undoubted fact that the created will is determined by the

CHAPTER THREE

divine will, and he solves arguments that could be adduced to the contrary, and shows the absurdities into which defenders of the opposite opinion fall, which he reduces chiefly to two heads, namely, that unless God determines our wills, He would be neither Omniscient nor Omnipotent, etc."

Whether this error belongs to Estius or to the Adversary is unclear, but it is certain that what is attributed to Scotus is supposititious. And to omit mentioning that he cites distinction 87, which is 43 places after the last one, and should rather have been numbered 37, as far as can be conjectured from those two arguments about Omniscience and Omnipotence—First, it is false that Scotus supposes in almost the entire distinction that the created will is determined by the divine. For he supposes this in no part of it, let alone in almost all of it. Second, it is false that he solves arguments that could be adduced to the contrary, because he solves none; and he does not even raise that question. Third, it is false that Scotus deduces from the contrary opinion that God would be neither Omniscient nor Omnipotent. Because he deduces this only from that opinion which asserts that the created will is the total cause of that act which underlies sin, and denies that God cooperates immediately; which is also the only opinion he refutes. From this it follows that, to that great light of our century, as this Doctor calls him—namely Estius, whose interpretation this is said to be—Scotus was obscure; that is, he was the author of his own name [a pun, as "Scotus" means "dark" or "obscure"].

The third testimony of Scotus is presented in chapter 18 cited above, number 9, in this manner. "The same Scotus," he says, "in 4 dist. 49, quest. 6, doubt 1, affirms that it would be against the nature and liberty of the created will if it were determined by a habit inherent in itself, but not if it were determined by a prior and superior cause, such as the divine will; And there he teaches that, granted that a superior cause, namely the divine will, determines our wills, they nevertheless will equally remain contingent causes."

CHAPTER THREE

In reporting this testimony, many errors are committed. For first, it is clear that Scotus is dealing with that determination of the will which the Blessed experience regarding the perpetual love of God and their beatitude, which he considers can stand with the liberty of contradiction and exercise—with not only those who reject physical predeterminations opposing this, but also all Thomists, and this very Author who objects with Scotus. Hence one must note his truly witty observation when he adds, "Where note what he [Scotus] says, that [created causes] will remain contingent causes and therefore free with the liberty of wayfarers, which has defectibility mixed in." As if he were saying, "Note here that Scotus says what I do not believe, indeed what I contend is false, yet which I wish to use as a truthful testimony." But by what right, my Doctor, do you demand that we give place to an authority to which you yourself leave none? Second, let it be granted, however, that faith should be placed in Scotus, for it should not easily be denied to so great a man. Nevertheless, since that determination of the will by a superior cause, with which he thinks the liberty of the will can be retained, is said by you to be such that, with it posited, the created will will equally remain a contingent cause—this does not inconvenience our opinion; nor does it help yours. For if it is true that the created will, with such determination posited, is a contingent cause, it is also true that from the supposition of such determination it does not contract a necessity of acting, since it is clear that nothing is more adverse to the contingency of an agent than the necessity of acting. But if a necessity of acting does not arise from it, it follows that this kind of determination is neither that which we oppose, nor that which you intend. Third, but not even this itself is true, that Scotus teaches that, granted that the divine will determines our wills, they will equally remain contingent causes. For he teaches only that some contingency still remains; and a little before he taught that a second cause, anticipated by a superior cause acting toward one of the opposites, can never, by proximate power, go forth into the other opposite. But if the second cause, under that antecedent determination of God, and independent of

CHAPTER THREE

the will, is not proximately able to tend to the opposite of that to which it is determined, consequently it is not proximately contingent in acting. Therefore, the contingency of its acting, and consequently its liberty, is only remote. Therefore, it is not equally contingent as if there were no such determination, as the Author wished. Fourth, Scotus clearly indicates that this manner of philosophizing does not sufficiently explain how liberty of love stands in the blessed with determination to love, and therefore he immediately adds another solution, saying, "Alternatively, it can be said, etc." And he uses this latter way of speaking as more probable in the following doubt. Therefore, an ambiguous testimony has been presented as certain. I add that another opinion of Scotus was egregiously corrupted by him in chapter 28, book 1, number 5, when he says that Scotus's view in 4 Sent. dist. 49, doubt 1, where he considers it harmful to liberty if the will is determined by a superior cause, should be understood of acquired and natural habits, but not of supernatural and infused ones. Yet it is manifest that Scotus is speaking chiefly of the latter. For both the question demands it, which is only about the liberty which he thinks belongs to beatific love; and after teaching that from the habit of glory there arises in the blessed a necessity *secundum quid*, but not from the habit of charity, he finally concludes: "It is not, therefore, against its nature (i.e., of the free will) that it be determined by a superior cause," that is, that it not be against its nature to act oppositely; "but it would be against its nature to be determined by a habit or by an inferior nature." As if he were saying, the determination of the first cause can stand with liberty because no necessity of acting is inferred from it; but the determination from a habit, even an infused one, cannot so stand, for the contrary reason.

From these things it is clear that there has been both futile effort and less than sincere fidelity in laboring to draw Scotus to the side of the predeterminists, since it is clear that he did not even stand in the middle of this dispute. For first, we have already heard him decree that no necessity of acting should be imposed on a free agent which is not in the power

CHAPTER THREE

of the will. Second, with God determining to one of the opposites—absolutely, of course, and merely antecedently and efficaciously—the proximate power of not acting is removed. Third, in 2 Sent. dist. 37, quest. on, § to the solution of these, speaking of the concurrence of the first cause with the second, he admits that they have an order according to more perfect and less perfect causation, but not priority of nature in causing; and he uses this principle to deny that God is the cause of sin. What, then, will become of the prior influx into the second cause? Fourth, he denies, *ibid.*, that in the sin of omission any withdrawal of a prior cause can be understood, due to the defect of which the will cannot act rightly. Therefore, predetermination is no more withdrawn from one who omits an act which he ought to elicit, than from one who does not omit; and consequently is no more in one than in the other. Fifth, see how Scotus overthrows all predetermination of a free agent, 2 Sent. dist. 25, quest. on, § I say therefore to the question, where he says: "It is necessary that what happens contingently and avoidably should happen from a cause undetermined to either of the opposites. For if it is determined, the effect cannot for that instant in which it is so determined happen contingently." To the same point belongs what he states in 1 Sent. dist. 39, § As to the first, "The power of a free cause is to the opposite of what it causes **WITHOUT SUCCESSION.**" And, "The first act considered in that instant in which it is naturally prior to the second act, so places that [second act] in being as its contingent effect, that as naturally prior it could equally place another opposite in being." In the contrary opinion, for a free power to be able to do the opposite of what it causes, must not predetermination succeed predetermination? And consequently, can it cause the opposite without succession? And, if the first act as prior to the second act can equally produce the opposite of what it causes, can it include any predetermination with which either an act or non-act cannot be reconciled? Since, therefore, these are the principal knots of the entire controversy, which being loosened, no altercation can remain thereafter, it is clear that if there is any authority of Scotus in this judgment, as certainly

CHAPTER THREE

there ought to be very great authority, the case is adjudicated in our favor. But if I were to run through many other principles proper to this Doctor but adverse to Scotus, such as the doctrine of indifferent acts, of whether the power to sin is from God, of whether the same is part of liberty, of the liberty of the intention of the end, of the concept of liberty explained by mere indifference to acting and not acting, etc., there would be no obscure suspicion to fear that Scotus was known to the recent defender of promotions by name only, when he committed the approval of his entire doctrine to his judgment. But St. Thomas tugs at our ear.

§ IV. ST. THOMAS

In investigating St. Thomas's opinion concerning the necessity of physical premotion, one must only fear prolixity. I would be repeating what has already been done if I were to labor on this work, since recently published commentaries of those who have fully satisfied this duty are readily available. I note only three things.

First, St. Thomas never once named physical premotion or pre-determination. The entire dispute is reduced to consequences drawn from certain principles of his. In these, if you observe more closely, you will find that from an indefinite antecedent, a certain and determined consequent is deduced. For example, St. Thomas says: "A secondary cause, even a free one, does not act unless moved by the first cause." Therefore, they say, one must admit a special motion, superadded to both the production and conservation of active power, as well as to its placement in all circumstances required for action. I deny the consequence. Likewise: Therefore, one must admit a motion that is prior to and really distinct from the operation of the secondary cause. Again, I deny this. Likewise: Therefore, one must admit that motion by which the created will is subjected and impelled to act in such a way that it minimally depends on the will whether the motion exists or whether it is infallibly efficacious. Again, I deny this. Likewise: Therefore, one must admit that mo-

CHAPTER THREE

tion by which such and so great a necessity of acting is introduced that it becomes impossible for the will to bring about the non-action simultaneously with it. I consistently deny this. And not only the necessity but even the mere plausibility of these and similar inferences has long been awaited and will still be awaited in the future.

Second, there are many opinions of St. Thomas that must necessarily be either evaded, disregarded, or rejected in the contrary position. First, St. Thomas in the First Part, question 14, article 13, in response to the second objection, says that it is necessary that if God knew something would happen, it will happen, because everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be. This means St. Thomas believes that necessity arises only from a supposition consequent to the thing's existence, or as he himself states in his commentaries on Boethius, it is a necessity that the presence of the thing itself creates. On the contrary, the predeterminists say this necessity follows from a supposition antecedent to the thing's existence, namely from predetermination. Second, in the same work, question 19, article 8, St. Thomas concludes that the divine will imposes necessity on certain things willed, but not on all, namely those that proceed from free secondary causes. But necessity is imposed by God even on these causes if there is any predetermination. The response that this is necessity from supposition, not absolute necessity, is not satisfactory. For they either understand a supposition that is antecedent and dependent on God, or one that is consequent and dependent on the liberty of the secondary cause. If the former, then the same reasoning applies to necessity imposed on necessary causes and on free causes, since that which is imposed on necessary causes depends on the supposition of the divine will. If the latter, then according to St. Thomas, the divine will does not determine antecedently to every use of liberty. In the same way, the response of others is rejected when they say that the necessity imposed on the will through predetermination is only conditional. Because they either understand a condition dependent on the will or one dependent on God alone. If the former, then some use of liberty is prior to the existence of predetermi-

CHAPTER THREE

nation; if the latter, then this necessity is similar to that imposed on natural causes and should be called absolute rather than conditional with respect to the will. Others say this is only a necessity of infallibility and therefore does not obstruct liberty. This is as if they were to say it is green and not scarlet, and therefore compatible with liberty. For what help are these distinctions if the necessity is both insurmountable and independent of the will? Others say this is a necessity that impels the will to act in accordance with its nature, that is, to act freely. Which is to say, it is a necessity that impels one to act without the impulse of necessity, which is contradictory.

Third, St. Thomas in the First Part, question 42, article 2, teaches that "In voluntary agents, the effect is posterior to its principle, not because something necessary for action is lacking, nor because the effect is successive, but because of election: for as it chooses the effect, so it chooses the time in which to place it. But the Word is not generated from the Father in this way." In the contrary position, it is manifest that the effect of a voluntary agent is never suspended, and consequently never posterior to such an agent, unless predetermination is lacking—and consequently unless something necessary for producing such an effect is lacking, contrary to St. Thomas. Likewise, since "not acting" cannot be composed with "the agent being predetermined," it is impossible for these two not to be always simultaneous in time: a voluntary agent being predetermined to act, and its effect existing—whereas St. Thomas says it is possible for the effect to be temporally posterior. And from this follows something else that is very worthy of note. Namely, when St. Thomas proposes this as the first difference of a voluntary agent (that is, a free agent): that although nothing necessary for action is lacking, it can still be temporally prior to the effect; if someone defines that agent thus: "A free agent is that which, even if it has all things required for action, can nevertheless act or not act," it follows, I say, that they are offering the very definition of St. Thomas. But in what way does this differ from this other definition: "A free agent is that which, when all things necessary for action are posit-

CHAPTER THREE

ed, can act or not act," which this author ridicules and calls practically the worst of all possible definitions? Fourth, the holy Doctor in the First Part of the Second Part, question 10, article 4, speaks thus: "Because the will is an active principle, not determined to one thing, but indifferently relating to many things, God moves it in such a way that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its motion remains contingent and not necessary." Come now, does not God, in the contrary position, so move the will that He also determines it? Is it not contradictory for the will to be determined to both opposites? And therefore does He not determine it to only one? And does He not determine it to that one with such necessity that it is impossible for the will to combine the alternative with that necessity? Is not the motion of the will said to become necessary from the supposition of predetermination? How, then, does it remain contingent? And what justification for preserving the authority of St. Thomas for those who philosophize sincerely? The same is in question 3 on power, article 7, reply to objection 13, and in the Second Book of Sentences, distinction 25, question 1, reply to the third objection.

Fifth, in the third book against the Gentiles, chapter 73, St. Thomas teaches that while in other things contingency arises from imperfection and defect, in the will it comes from perfection and the power it has to produce this or that effect. The meaning is that while the fact that fire, for example, does not always do what it sometimes does arises from its imperfection and some defect in what is necessary for action, the fact that man does not always do what he sometimes does does not necessarily arise from any defect, but from his perfection and power, which he has to choose either option. But does not this also arise from a defect of predetermination according to the contrary doctrine?

Sixth, in his commentaries on the first book of *On Interpretation*, chapter 9, he indicates that the necessity by which a contingent thing is said to be necessarily when it exists is founded only on this principle: "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be simultaneously." But there is also another principle on which it is founded, unless

CHAPTER THREE

the contrary position is false, namely: "It is impossible for the negation or non-existence of an effect to coexist with predetermination to that effect." These and many other similar passages occur in St. Thomas, which convince us that he stands entirely with us in this dispute.

Third, what I note is that St. Thomas has been cited with insufficient sincerity by the defender of premissions. First, in chapter 6, number 2, he misuses the proposition stated in the First Part, question 82, article 1, that natural necessity does not remove liberty. It is adduced for the purpose of arguing that neither the Blessed should be denied freedom in loving, however much they cannot suspend the exercise of love, nor wayfarers, even if they labor under the same inability, as he thinks. But what was said by St. Thomas can be well or poorly understood, as Cajetan says in that passage: poorly, if the sense is that necessity of exercise does not remove liberty; well, if this is understood of the necessity of specification. And thus nothing follows from it, either for the liberty of the Blessed in loving God or for the liberty of wayfarers, unless the necessity of continually exercising love is rejected. Second, in the same place, number 5, another passage of St. Thomas from the First Part of the Second Part, question 13, article 1, reply to the second objection, is distorted, where he says that the principles from which conclusions about contingent things that can be done by us are deduced are not absolutely necessary, but only conditionally necessary, as "if he runs, he moves," which is a consequent necessity. And therefore he holds that election is free, because even when only one eligible means occurs, the principle from which it necessarily follows that this means should be chosen is necessary only with that necessity. St. Thomas means that only from the supposition that some end is intended is it necessary to choose this means, which is the only one; and because it is free to intend the end, it is therefore not necessary to choose this means, except by a necessity consequent to the use of liberty. This is St. Thomas's genuine and most true opinion, which this author, without any other reason but because it pleases him and is convenient, interprets to say that the conditionally necessary principle from which election is

CHAPTER THREE

necessarily deduced is this: "What God has decreed must happen." This principle, he says, is necessary only from the supposition of divine ordination. Here you see that what was said by St. Thomas about necessity dependent on our liberty is transferred to that necessity which depends on God alone, and a consequent supposition, like "if he runs, he moves," is changed into an antecedent one: "if God has decreed this, it is necessary to do it." Third, in chapter nine, number 7, St. Thomas is attributed with having expressly taught that our conversion is effected by God in us without us. We have already shown that the contrary is expressly taught by St. Thomas in that very passage which is designated by the adversary.

Fourth, in chapter 16, number 3, he says: "God wills for us the good simply, which is Himself; from this arises in us the desire for God, as an impression from the first willer, as the holy Doctor holds in the First Part, question 103, article 3, and in the third book against the Gentiles, chapter 67." This author reads his own thoughts everywhere. There is no mention anywhere in St. Thomas of that desire for God.

Fifth, in chapter 17, number 2, he says that St. Thomas, in the third book against the Gentiles, chapter 66, in the fourth argument, distinguishes the complement of virtue from the virtue of the secondary agent and suggests that a creature then receives the complement of virtue when it acts in the virtue of the first agent. There is not even a hint of this in St. Thomas. Also, in number 3, he affirms that St. Thomas teaches in the same place that secondary causes do not bring their effects into being except as they are determined and moved to it by God. Again, this is false. There is not a word about this. Indeed, in the third argument, he says that secondary causes determine and particularize the action of the first agent. Sixth, in the same chapter 17, number 6, after reporting St. Thomas's statement in the third book against the Gentiles, chapter 88, where he says that our will can be moved efficiently without violence only by Him who created it, he adds: "Whence it follows that if I move myself, that motion will be somewhat violent." But this is clearly to abuse the testimony of St. Thomas, who in that passage excludes from the motion of

CHAPTER THREE

the will only all extrinsic agents except God, as is evident even from the argument of the chapter itself, which is as follows: "That created separate substances cannot be the direct cause of our will's choices." What St. Thomas concludes, therefore, is that God alone, of all extrinsic causes, can cause our choices without violence; this author presents it as if included among those causes that cannot cause without violence were also the will itself, or the man whose will it is. This is extremely perverse. But to cover this deceit, he calls upon Plato as usual for support, citing the statement that "man viewed in God is himself, but in himself, is another self." But these and similar Platonic mystifications are suitable for suspending the minds of the inexperienced, but not for educating them.

Seventh, in chapter 19, number 1, to prove the necessity of pre-motion, he presents an argument which he says is entirely from St. Thomas's work on created beings, question 3, article 7. The major premise of this argument is that no agent can constitute its effect in a certain species unless **REMOVED** by a cause that extends to the whole species, nor in a certain ratio of being unless **PREVENTED** and **REMOVED** by a cause that is the fountain and origin of all being. But it is clear that in St. Thomas there is no mention of prevention or pre-motion.

Eighth, in chapter 21, number 1, he says that St. Thomas, in *On Evil*, question 3, article 2, states that the motion of a free and rational cause, which is called pre-motion, which precedes our deliberation and does not follow but precedes and brings about the determination of the will, is unequally received according to the unequal disposition of the secondary cause. But this is false; there is no indication that St. Thomas is speaking of that motion which is called pre-motion and which precedes, etc. On the contrary, he rather indicates that he is speaking of a motion identified with the motion by which the secondary cause itself moves itself. First, because he compares it with the motion that is caused by the heavens in animated bodies, which also move themselves. Second, because he adds after that comparison: "So therefore it must be said that since God is the first principle of motion of all things, some are so moved

CHAPTER THREE

by Him that they also move themselves, as those things that have free will." Note, "they are so moved that they also move themselves." For this means, they are so moved that God is not the total and adequate principle of motion to the exclusion of their cooperation. I omit many other things. For from these it is sufficiently clear that we need not fear that this author suffers from a lack of proofs, since it is evident that testimonies by which he confirms his opinion are easily either found or fabricated by him in the best authors.

§ V. *THOMISTS*

After St. Thomas, this author also flatters himself with the support, as he thinks, of all his disciples. In chapter 36, number 3, "There is no doubt," he says, "that the common opinions of such a great and learned family are and should be greatly valued." I am persuaded, however, that his hope is vain, and that no approval can be expected from this quarter. First, because this has already been indicated by some Thomists, and indeed by lovers of physical premotions, to whom this whole new manner of philosophizing is displeasing. Second, because although he seems to gratify them by assuming the patronage of premotions, in reality he corrupts the grace of his benefit by recalling the entire question to certain principles of his own, and thus by tacit judgment indicates that until now the Thomists have been ignorant of what was the legitimate way of reconciling liberty with divine motions. When will he secure that these pronouncements be accepted in that school? That amplitude is, as it were, the proper character of liberty, and nothing impedes us from being free except what impedes us from existing in the highest amplitude. That there is no other predetermination of a free cause than the intention of the end. That the will is only passive with respect to such an intention. That this premotion is sometimes inefficacious. That it is sometimes equal in entity in those two persons of whom one consents and the other does not consent. That predetermination properly taken is distin-

CHAPTER THREE

guished from premotion. That the same sometimes consumes the power of not consenting, while preserving the liberty of choice. That in explaining such liberty, it is enough if for that time when something is in the order of the end, there is a power of pursuing it, and only for another time when the same will be outside that order, is there a power of rejecting it. That after the day of judgment there will be no liberty of exercise in the blessed. That we are not properly masters of our acts, but rather of objects; therefore, of which objects we do not have mastery, neither do we have mastery of the acts by which they are attained; therefore, love of God is not subject to the mastery of liberty, nor indeed is God Himself. That the material of sin consists in the first movements of concupiscence, vengeance, and the like, but not in the act which is evil. There are hundreds of other similar statements scattered throughout. When, I ask, will he obtain that all disciples of St. Thomas admit one who philosophizes in such a way? Third, how can it be that all Thomists approve the opinion of this Doctor, when not even all of them have one opinion? For it is easy to prove that the older ones thought and taught things that cannot stand with physical predeterminations. Certainly Dominic Banez, in his commentary on the First Part, question 19, article 9, cannot dissimulate his pain when he sees Cardinal Cajetan, easily the prince of Thomists, repudiate those predeterminations in his commentary on article 8 of that question. For his opinion is most clear that what is said—that a secondary cause is moved by the first—should be understood **NOT OF A PRIOR MOTION**, but of a motion intrinsically cooperative with the proper action. And the sense would be puerile if anyone thought that there is some duration of nature, in whose first instant the first cause regards the effect, and in the second, the secondary cause. Therefore, what is said about the first cause acting first should be interpreted **ONLY AS TO INDEPENDENCE AND INTIMACY**. What could be said more clearly against physical premotions? Similar things are read in Capreolus, Conrad, Soncinas, and others. The history of the Council reports in book 2 that Dominic Soto opposed the predeterminists in the Council of Trent. Al-

CHAPTER THREE

though the author of this history is of twisted faith, those who knew the man will never be induced to believe that he wanted to gain favor with the Jesuits. Dominic Banez and Diego Alvarez ardently fight for prede-terminations, and no one with greater spirit has swallowed all the difficulties that follow from that doctrine. But their austerity has displeased other theologians of the same school, who cannot approve what has been said by them concerning the predefinition and predetermination of evil acts. Thus Gonzales, in the First Part, disputation 39, section 2, where he indicates that in this matter the Most Reverend Alvarez is less approved by him; and Nazarius, in the same work, question 22, article 4, controversy 3, says that those who philosophize in this way seem to him to think less worthily of God. And in previous years, when this question was debated at Toulouse in the general assembly of the Order of St. Dominic, and the authority of Banez and Diego was alleged for predetermination to evil acts, it was indicated by those who were defending positions on this matter that this opinion did not seem suitable to this time. Again, while others everywhere teach that this premotion is necessary at least for exercising good acts, Blaise Verdun, in a rereading of *Auxiliis*, conclusion 12, considers it more probable that a morally good work of the natural order can be done without a special prior determination, but that a general simultaneous concurrence is sufficient, and thus his master thought. Finally, certain Thomists of Salamanca, whom Gonzales attacks in the cited place, disputation 58, section 2, and disputation 75, section 3, deny that predetermination to supernatural acts is so antecedent as to be entirely independent of liberty, as had been believed until now, but they think that the consent of the will should be compared with it in the same way as, in the same school, the act of contrition is compared with the habit of grace when someone is justified from sin outside the Sacrament. I add that in our memory, theses have been defended at Avignon which denied physical premotions of free causes, and this before the Provincial and the Inquisitor of the faith and the Chapter of the whole Province.

CHAPTER THREE

Since these things are so, I do not see what the wish of this Theologian means, which is expressed in his letter to the Supreme Pontiff, "that under his Presidency and Mastership of the Church, this truth may become clear." For if he desires his doctrine to be sanctioned by Pontifical authority, he asks a great thing, since it would be necessary to attack with the same thunderbolt both Thomists and Jesuits, and all schools of the Catholic Church already devoted to either party. But if he wishes a sentence to be pronounced in favor of the Thomists, he prays ill for himself, since because of the diversity of opinions, their approval would be his condemnation. Add that it is already clear from what has been said that nothing can be defined in this controversy in favor of promotions without also striking some Thomists.

§ VI. *SORBONNE SCHOLARS*

Finally, in the preface to book 1 on the consensus of the Paris school, he glories. For in it, he says, very many even now show themselves to be most keen vindicators of the same doctrine, so that to settle this dispute, it is by no means necessary to go beyond the boundaries of this Academy. There truth becomes white, there its most delightful splendor shines forth. If these things were written in Constantinople or Alexandria in Egypt, they could somehow be tolerated; but now who can bear that they have been published in Paris, where everyone experiences them to be false? For what Joseph of St. Joseph, a Cistercian, wrote some years ago—that all Sorbonne Professors are averse to physical predeterminations—continues to be so true that of the six who teach daily at the Sorbonne, none approves that opinion. And in the previous year, when more than forty were preparing for the bachelor's cap, only two were found who would take up the cause of the predeterminists. Behold where promotions become white for this Doctor, where their most delightful splendor shines forth. From this it is apparent that he suffers from a disease of the eyes, and indeed a dangerous one. This is also clear because, when in

CHAPTER THREE

the cited place among the Sorbonne Doctors whose support he pretends to have, he especially commends those Masters whom he glories in having happily used, and again in chapter 36, number 3, he names Philip Gamache "the most splendid light of the Sorbonne, his Teacher, to whom he owes much," it is nevertheless clear from the published works of this Doctor that he too is hostile to predeterminations. Nor could it be otherwise for the Sorbonne to be consistent with itself and for the present to agree with the past. Since it once defined things that cannot stand with physical premotions, as anyone will easily discover who examines what has been added to the fourth book of Sentences. It is therefore our own and particular glory in this dispute that we follow the Sorbonne, the parent of other schools.

§ VII. ST. AUGUSTINE AND CONTARINI

NO MORE TRUE are the testimonies he boasts from St. Augustine and Cardinal Contarini. And to begin with the latter, who is closer to our time, I cannot sufficiently marvel at how he thought he could cover his entire doctrine with this Cardinal's purple, when he could never even name him except when approving that liberty consists in Amplitude. Is this, then, maintaining the liberty of exercise together with antecedent necessity? Is this claiming that the faculty's predetermination abolishes the power to dissent while freedom remains unharmed? Is this asserting that wicked men are moved by God to commit acts that are detestable to heaven and earth, insofar as they are acts, insofar as they are free, and insofar as they are human? Is this holding that the will aroused by efficacious grace cannot join its resistance and dissent with that grace? Did anyone who said that liberty denotes some kind of amplitude think this way? O what remarkable amplitude of mind that finds room for such absurdities!

It remains for us to say something about St. Augustine, concerning whose authority whatever this Doctor has pronounced, if it was in-

CHAPTER THREE

tended to commend the name of so great a man, it was inadequate; but if it was meant to seek support for physical premotion, it was futile. For those who are better versed in this doctrine, and who are familiar with St. Augustine, could never be induced to suspect that such ideas ever came into his mind, not even while dreaming. For this reason, I do not at all approve the opinion held by certain distinguished men that St. Augustine, while vehemently pursuing the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian heretics, withdrew from their positions with such force that it was difficult for his discourse to always maintain equilibrium, but that he sometimes seems rather unfair to free will. This was suggested by two of the greatest ornaments of the Gallican Church in the previous century: Gilbert Genebrard, Archbishop of Aix, in his Epistle to Charles IX prefaced to the 1574 edition of Origen, and Claude de Xaintes, Bishop of Evreux, in his booklet on Calvin's Atheisms. Similarly by another light of the Portuguese Church, Jerome Osorius, Bishop of Silves, in Book 9 on Justice. Again by another from the Italian Church, Cornelius Mussus, Bishop of Bitonto, in chapter 5 of the Epistle to the Romans. So too by a bulwark of the German Church, Albert Pighius, in Book 3 on Free Will. Finally by a prince of the Roman Church, an ornament of the Dominican Order, and an eagle among St. Thomas's disciples, Cardinal Cajetan in his commentary on the first part, question 70, article 3; and Erasmus, in his preface to St. Hilary, teaches that this was the opinion of those who ruled in the theological schools of his time; and the Parisian Doctors who prepared the 1571 edition of St. Augustine's works from Guillaume Merlin and Sebastian Nivelles concur. This view, I say, I do not approve, nor do I use the liberty implied by Pope Celestine in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, to depart from Augustine in certain more profound and difficult questions, as Baronius says in the year 431, number 185, such as the question of predestination, because in these matters whichever position one follows, one will concede nothing to Pelagius, always maintaining the necessity of internal grace for all works of salvation. I submit to the law laid down by Suarez in volume 1 on Grace, prologue 6, chapter 8, where

CHAPTER THREE

he judges that "a prudent theologian should embrace whatever Augustine affirmed in this matter as certain and pertaining to the dogmas of faith." I will not merely permit, but will even request that the entire dispute be decided by the judgment of this Holy Father. Certainly, once you have admitted the necessity of divine grace moving interiorly for absolutely all works that positively lead to eternal life, and likewise the infallibility of what is called efficacious grace in eliciting the consent of the will, known to God himself before he decrees anything concerning us, there will be nothing more that St. Augustine would require.

Nor do the testimonies usually cited from him signify anything else; but they are distorted by a certain art and industry of our adversaries into arguments for physical predeterminations, and thus they become counterfeit. Examples can easily be drawn from those passages from which this Doctor attempted to derive the foundations of his opinion; for he never derived anything else from them than what I have already said, as anyone who wishes to examine chapters 22 and 23 of book 1 more diligently will easily experience. But I cannot help pointing out some instances where St. Augustine's authority could have been treated with more reverence. First, that statement which is found in Epistle 89, and which is turned over on almost every page by this Author, should never have been proposed by him, since besides himself, there is no one else who opposes its truth. It reads as follows: "The free will is the more free, the more healthy it is; and the more healthy, the more subject to divine grace and mercy." It is proposed, therefore, in order to establish on Augustine's authority that there is no necessity of adhering to God that suppresses the freedom of the will.

But I ask, concerning which liberty does he wish to interpret Augustine? Is it about that which he calls liberty of state, or about that which properly constitutes free choice? If the first, it is irrelevant to this matter, because none of us is disputing about it; nor indeed is Augustine, seeing that in that passage he is pressing the Pelagians who oppose the freedom of choice alone to the necessity of divine grace. If the second,

CHAPTER THREE

why does he himself resist this testimony, when not only in heaven, where the will of the Blessed is most subject to divine grace, but also here, where one approaches most closely to that subjection through the internal occupation of travelers with God, he alone denies that there is any freedom of choice or of contradiction?

Second, it is close to a joke what he infers in chapter 4, number 3, from two passages of St. Augustine, in which he seeks evidence for both kinds of liberty—the good, by which one is said to be free from sin and a servant of justice, and the bad, by which one becomes free from justice and a slave to sin—from the delight that accompanies both good and bad operations. He says that from this it is deduced that the freedom of the soul consists in the amplitude of the will. This is deduced very well indeed; and see how apt and coherent this consequence is: Delight is evidence of freedom; therefore, freedom consists in amplitude. Yet he proves this by assuming the principle that delight is an indication of a certain amplitude and immensity, which principle is clearly most false in brutes, which are sometimes titillated by the greatest delights.

Third, the same fault is found in what he infers in the same place, number 4, from book 3 on Free Will, chapter 5, where he teaches that the blessed angels have freedom to choose either option, though it is established that they cannot sin. He infers, however, that this freedom is placed in amplitude, in the Amplitude, I say, of the divine majesty. What will be difficult to prove for this Doctor who infers such things from such premises?

Fourth, what is cited in the same chapter 4 from the book on Correction and Grace, chapter 11, from the *Enchiridion*, chapter 105, and from book 22 of *The City of God*, chapter 30, opposes the opinion of this Author. For it is most certain that in these passages, the freedom of choice properly so called is discussed, and it is asserted that it will remain in the state of beatitude with the inability to sin, which this Theologian denies in this very place, number 4. To use Scholastic terms, St. Augustine in those places thinks that with necessity as to specification, which

CHAPTER THREE

excludes the power to act badly, there remains freedom as to exercise, which includes only the power to suspend any good act; and in this way he thinks the choice of the Blessed will be free, which this Author denies when he says, "The indifference of acting and not acting, even preserving the order of the end, will not be perpetual, as is seen in the blessed."

There is also another deception in the use of these passages, because what St. Augustine indicates—that the freedom of choice will persevere with the immutability of state and necessity—is understood as if it could persevere with the immutability and necessity of individual acts, which is quite alien to St. Augustine's mind.

Fifth. In Chapter 8, that doctrine is cited which St. Augustine teaches in book 5 of *The City of God*, chapter 10, whose entirely genuine understanding seems to be this, if one examines it a little more diligently. The Holy Doctor asks whether any necessity dominates human wills, and he responds that necessity is twofold. The first is "that which is not in our power, and subjects us even against our resistance, as is the necessity of dying." The second is whatever else according to which we say "it is necessary that this be or be done." The first removes freedom; the second, "there is no reason to fear," he says, "that it also removes it." Not because universally every necessity of this kind is compatible with freedom, otherwise the appetite of brutes would be free, but because not every necessity opposes it, or is such that what is said to be necessary in this way should also be said to be subject to necessity. This he shows by two examples. The first is taken from the life and foreknowledge of God, which although it is necessary that they exist, are not therefore placed under necessity. There is, then, here necessity without subjection, but it does not immediately follow that it exists with freedom. The second example is taken from our wills. For although we truly say, "it is necessary that when we will, we will with free choice," we do not thereby subject free choice itself to a necessity that removes freedom. Thus, here is found necessity, both without subjection as in the first example, and additionally with freedom. From these he concludes that the necessity which arises

CHAPTER THREE

from the foreknowledge of future events does not remove freedom, since it is not otherwise necessary that what is foreknown to be future should happen, than in the way it is necessary that when we will, we will with free choice. For a man does not sin because God foreknew he would sin, but because God foreknew not fate, not fortune, not something else from which might follow the necessity of sinning, but that he himself would sin. And this is the summary of the doctrine that is taught in that entire chapter.

In reporting and interpreting this doctrine, this Theologian has erred five times. First, because he supposes, as if from the mind of St. Augustine, that every second necessity universally is joined with freedom, and therefore he thinks that God's life is free. Second, because he defines that this same necessity should be called "the necessity of immutability." "The other necessity," he says, "which he himself does not name (as if indeed he had named the first), we can call the necessity of immutability." But by what authority, my Father, and by what right? Indeed, I intercede and do not wish it to be lawful for you to call it so. Was it necessary, then, to use this artifice, so that it might be believed as if from Augustine that there is some necessity of immutability which indeed falls on the very act of the will, and yet can stand together with the freedom of choice? Third, he nevertheless continues, and from that passage recites these words: "God is not therefore less free, indeed more free, if he cannot not foreknow all things and always live." These words are no more found in Augustine than they are in Hesiod. Fourth, among the actions which he says St. Augustine indicated are free with the necessity of immutability, he counts the generation of the Eternal Son, which is not even named in that entire discussion. Fifth, he asserts that St. Augustine in that entire chapter and the preceding one teaches that foreknowledge does not hinder freedom, and that by the name of foreknowledge is not understood mere foreknowledge, but also providence prior to foreknowledge; and not just any providence, but that "Through which God subjects our wills to himself and inclines them where he wants, so that what they are going to

CHAPTER THREE

do, they will certainly do, nor can things happen otherwise," which signifies immutability, "and yet does not remove freedom, but rather gives it." Most excellent Reader, I appeal to your good faith! It would have been a great enough sin to attribute such doctrine to the silent Augustine, what if he even pronounces contrary things? If he were speaking about foreknowledge that involves such providence, would he deny that a man sins because God foreknew that he would sin? Would he assert that he sins because God foreknew not fate, not fortune, not something else, but that he himself would sin? Did he not foreknow something else from which the foreknowledge of sin would follow, if he foreknew that providence of his by which he would subject our wills to himself and incline them where he wants, so that things cannot happen otherwise? Again I ask you, my dear Doctor, do you still persist in that opinion and think absolutely that providence, by which God inclines the will of the sinner where he wants, is prior to the foreknowledge of future sin? If God inclines the will of the sinner where he wants, so that things cannot happen otherwise, how will you make it so that the sin was in the power of the one who committed it? If he does not foreknow the future except that to which you first inclined by providence, how will you deny having inclined toward the sin that was foreknown? And to whom could the blasphemies of Luther and Calvin be displeasing, if this doctrine pleased him?

Sixth. In Chapter 30, numbers 5 and 6, he denies that St. Augustine in book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 6, where he asks whence it happens that of two men equally tempted and equally aided by God to resist temptation, one consents and the other does not consent, solves the entire question, or even proposes it; he does indeed ask the cause why one succumbs and gives it, when he says that he is overcome because he wanted to fail in chastity; "But," he says, "the cause why this one did not want to fail, he does not explain in this place, where he was not dealing with that, but was inquiring into the cause of evil." Let us see, then, whether St. Augustine inquires only into the cause of evil. And first indeed, the argument of the chapter appears at the beginning inscribed in

CHAPTER THREE

this way: "What is the cause of the blessedness of the blessed Angels, and what is the cause of the misery of the evil Angels." See how he inquires only into the cause of evil. Second, having proposed those two equally affected, aided, tempted, "What," he says, "do we think is the cause why in the one there is, IN THE OTHER THERE IS NOT an evil will," which is to inquire into the cause of good. And he solves the question, all things considered, in this way: "What else appears than that one wanted, (the Adversary would wish Augustine to stop here, but he continues) the other did not want to fail from chastity?" With these words he most clearly teaches that both the fall of the former and the perseverance in chastity of the latter should be ascribed to free choice, yet not in such a way that the more powerful role does not belong to divine grace. But it was necessary to use some kind of artifice of this sort, lest it be necessary to confess that physical predetermination was unknown to St. Augustine, when he posited that both the one who fails and the one who perseveres are equally aided.

§ VIII. ADVERSARIES

IN PROPOSING the opinions of those who reject physical pre-motion, he who has undertaken to defend them proceeds with the same tenor of faith as in asserting the testimonies of his own Authors.

First, he is accustomed to take what appears to follow from their principles as if they were conceded absurdities. And then, inflamed with zeal for truth, he presses opportunely, importunately, argues, implores, rebukes; in short, whatever are the Apostle's aspirations and duties as Bishop. In the preface to book 1, he says that we have invented that freedom which almost opposes God, as if disdaining His yoke. A freedom that is not compatible with grace? A freedom that can hardly be understood without sin? A freedom by which Christ, in order to be free, must be less subject to the Father? A thin and emaciated freedom? A jejune and vapid power to wander, as chance might have it, into those things that are not

CHAPTER THREE

contained in God's order? And finally, a freedom which, when it is brought back to God through glory, vanishes and becomes nothing. "Indeed," he says, "I was astounded that such wise and learned men spoke so magnificently and so diligently about NOTHING, NOTHING." See something similar in chapter 1, number 5, where he also exhorts to virtue. "Let them hear," he says, "and with the most profound humility listen to Him who alone is our Master, Christ," etc. Likewise in chapter 18, where he discusses middle knowledge, number 7: "I pray," he says, "let them note that they speak about God in the same way as they would about a human being of finite and limited power." Again in chapter 23, where he discusses middle knowledge once more. And at this point, he deploys all the weapons of rhetoricians against those who think that God uses this knowledge in governing human beings. "Who are you," he says, "who judge God? Do you set limits for Him which He cannot exceed? To whom have you likened the Most High, or to whom have you equated Him?" etc. Again in the final chapter, number 4: "Nor could they have failed to notice that in their opinion, grace—to which the utmost attention should have been paid—is subordinated to nature rather than placed before it, to no small injury of the Creator," etc. And then in number 6: "What could be more absurd than to oppose grace to freedom because it subjects us to God; and therefore if we wish to preserve freedom as is right, we must resist grace, which is wrong? What could be more paradoxical than that freedom alone perishes in our return to God, and that no freedom remains for the Blessed in heaven? What could be more ridiculous than that freedom exists only for future acts as long as they are future, and that when we act freely, we are devoid of all freedom? What could be more intolerable than that God can indeed persuade us to do those good works which He commands or counsels, but cannot truly give them? He is the Persuader and Ordainer and Rewarder of good works; but if we follow these Doctors, He is not their Author, nor can He be." My Father, you seem to me to create monsters so that you can play Hercules. Those errors which you deduce from the doctrine you attack have

CHAPTER THREE

never been admitted as connected by those who defend it, nor will you ever prove them to be so. And to be stirred up about sins that perhaps will never happen, when you are besieged by so many present ones—is this more worthy of laughter or pity?

SECONDLY, a specific inquiry arises concerning the description of free will, which he claims was provided by St. Thomas in Part 1, question 62, article 8, in the reply to the third objection, regarding the elimination of those qualifiers "while preserving the order of the end," namely when they say absolutely that free will is the power to act and not to act, or that the freedom of choice consists in indifference toward acting and not acting. For he wishes that in both cases the phrase "while preserving the order of the end" be added. "And I marvel," he says in chapter 12, number 1, "that recent theologians have either not observed this or, if they have observed it, have cared so little about it—indeed, that they have so studiously removed that qualification from the definition of free will." And in chapter 1, number 5: "I cannot sufficiently marvel that certain recent theologians take such offense at that subjection to God in the description of our freedom, and try to remove it by whatever arts they can. Hence their complaints that a freedom is introduced by us which almost opposes God, indignant at His yoke; which cannot bear God's dominion; which cannot be preserved unless it resists divine grace, etc." It is difficult to enumerate how greatly this theologian errs in his critical observation.

First, he establishes as if a necessary foundation that the description of free will commonly employed by recent theologians is taken from St. Thomas. For this he has no evidence. Why not from Aristotle in *Ethics* 3, chapters 5 and 9, *Metaphysics*, text 10, where he indicates absolutely that freedom is the power to act and not to act? Why not from St. John Damascene in *On the Orthodox Faith*, book 2, chapter 26, where he defines: "Those things are in our power of which we have obtained the free faculty to do and not to do, such as to lie and not to lie, to rejoice in what is appropriate and not to rejoice, similarly also in what is least becoming"? For he adds these examples among others, and thus removes

CHAPTER THREE

the limitation concerning preserving the order of the end. Why not from the Master of Theologians in Sentences 2, distinction 24, where he provides a similarly unlimited definition of freedom when he says, "Free will is called free with respect to the will, which can be turned to either alternative"? I pass over both of St. Thomas's teachers, Albert the Great in Part 2, question 91, member 1, and Alexander of Hales in Part 1, question 26, member 4, article 3. I pass over his fellow student St. Bonaventure in Sentences 2, distinction 25, question 3, and countless others who offer a definition of freedom free from that restriction "while preserving the order of the end." And I ask this theologian, why does he insist that what was available from so many sources, we must have taken only from the workshop of St. Thomas?

Second. Suppose the description of freedom should be taken from St. Thomas. But why rather from the place already designated where this is not the subject—since the question there concerns only whether the blessed angel can sin—than from question 6 on evil, which is about human choice, where in the body of the article he plainly states that "the will is undetermined with respect to many things, and is moved by God not out of necessity"? For this is to say absolutely that freedom is the power toward either alternative, namely to act or not to act. Why prefer that passage rather than from question 83, part 1, which is about free will, where in article 1 he places human freedom in the fact that "man, from his own mode of knowing, is capable of being directed toward diverse particular operations"? Or from article 2, where he teaches precisely that "free will is indifferently related to choosing well or badly"? Or from article 3, where he similarly places the freedom of choice only in the fact that "we can accept one thing while refusing another"? Why prefer that passage rather than from the first part of the second part, question 13, article 6, whose title is "Whether man chooses by necessity or freely?" And he answers that man does not choose by necessity, the reason being "that it is possible for him to choose or not to choose," and this is possible because "man can will and not will, act and not act, will this or that"?

CHAPTER THREE

Why, I ask, does this doctor think that the definition of freedom is hidden away in that one corner of article 8, question 62, first part, which is only about the perfection of angels in the state of grace and glory, as if in some repository, rather than being explained in other places where the question was directly addressed? As if it would be a perversion not to always employ those qualifications "while preserving the order of the end," which were used only once by St. Thomas and omitted a hundred times? Is it fair to reproach those who prefer to take as their example of philosophizing what is found to have been frequently practiced by the holy doctor, rather than what was used by him only once, and that not in its proper place?

Third. But let it be granted. Let us concede that the concept of freedom must be extracted from that place alone. But why from the solution to the third objection rather than from the solution to the second? It is worthwhile to compare one place with the other. To the second, he speaks thus: "Rational powers are related to opposites in those things to which they are not naturally ordered." The sense is, as is clear from the body of the article, that rational powers can elicit opposite acts concerning any object except God clearly seen and the common notion of good. To the third: "That free will can choose diverse things, while preserving the order of the end, pertains to the perfection of freedom; but that it choose something by turning away from the order of the end, this pertains to a defect of freedom." Here, you say, free will is defined; rather, I say, there. And see if I do not have a greater right to think so. For definitions concern universal things, which are abstracted from any particular state, and thus both from the perfection and from the defect which arises from there. No one would think that the nature of an animal was defined by someone who said, "That an animal can use five senses pertains to its perfection, but that it uses only two pertains to its defect." Freedom is therefore not defined where it was said that it pertains to its perfection that it cannot turn away from the order of the end, as in the blessed, but to its defect that it can, as in wayfarers. For freedom elevated to the state

CHAPTER THREE

of beatitude is most perfect; short of that state, less perfect. How therefore will you define it insofar as it is common to both states? Certainly in such a way that in its definition neither that perfection which belongs to it when joined with beatitude, nor that defect which follows it when separated, is assumed. But this, I say, was done rather in the solution to the second than to the third, as is clear.

Fourth. This author does not deny that free will exists in God; he also admits that his power is not then limited by that condition "while preserving the order of the end" (chapter 1, number 5, and often elsewhere). Finally, he indicates that he recognizes a common concept of freedom which applies both to God and to creatures (chapter 6, number 11, and chapter 7, numbers 4 and 5). Let him define, then, what after all is the notion of free will common to created and uncreated being. And when he has turned himself in all directions, nothing will occur to him except "Free will is precisely the power to act and not to act." For if he added "while preserving the order of the end," it would not apply to God, as he himself concedes; if he should say it is a power absolute from all subordination, it would not apply to creatures. From where, then, did he learn that recent theologians who define the freedom of choice are not defining that common notion? And why does he criticize what he himself is forced to imitate?

Fifth. While he makes certain recent theologians guilty of corrupting the description of free will, he is twice mistaken: 1. Because he accuses only certain ones, when he should accuse all; 2. Because he accuses only recent ones, when the older ones are also guilty of the same crime. For I deny that he can prove, even with one example, that the freedom of choice in general, whether in middle or in earliest times, was ever explained in such a way that mention was made of preserving the order of the end. Since this judgment also includes the disciples and interpreters of St. Thomas, it is clear that no one believed that the description of freedom was assigned in that place which is designated by this author. Therefore, he has exercised an untimely criticism against recent

CHAPTER THREE

theologians and has presented as an exceptional observation that which only contempt for all others makes singular.

Sixth. While he interprets that fictitious crime of recent theologians as having been committed in contempt of divine dominion and supreme power, as if they loved a freedom almost opposing God, indignant at his yoke, not subject to principle and end, etc.—while, I say, he allows himself to be troubled by such suspicions, he strays very widely. None of those whom this calumny targets has ever doubted that the precept and obligation to always remain within the order of the end is perpetual. But they think that with the necessity of the precept, which is only moral, is joined in wayfarers the physical power of transgressing; and there is both freedom and merit in one who could have transgressed and did not transgress, God Himself being the author. In the blessed, they recognize both necessities of not turning away from the order of the end; but they think it happens that each of their acts, with only one or two exceptions, is so performed that neither of those necessities prevents them from being able to be suspended, and thus they say they are free. And this is what St. Thomas expressed in part 1, question 19, article 10, when he says: "It is impossible for God to will the evil of fault; and yet He is related to opposites, insofar as He can will this to be or not to be, just as we, without sinning, can will to sit and not to sit." Do you see how he recognizes the freedom to do this or that, along with the complete necessity of not sinning? This is precisely what those think whom this author praises in chapter 33, book 1, number 13. Therefore, a most correct doctrine, and that most common, but not sufficiently comprehended in mind, gave the whole cause for an unjust suspicion.

THIRD. In that question which is treated in chapter 13, "Whether there exists an indifferent act in the individual," first, he attributes the affirmative opinion only to recent theologians. Yet this is also the opinion of St. Bonaventure and Scotus, whom this author promises to follow and boasts of having followed. It is also the opinion of Ockham, Gabriel, Almain, Angest, and many others, as those to whom these au-

CHAPTER THREE

thors are familiar know. Second, he uses a certain circumlocution of words as if he were about to announce some impiety. "Certain recent theologians," he says, "PROFESSING WISDOM AND PIETY, think they can undermine this doctrine of St. Thomas, which flows most clearly from the very fountains of wisdom and agrees so wonderfully with PIETY, by applying this battering ram, WHICH IS TRULY MADE OF STRAW, etc." And soon after, "Is this argumentation of such importance that the VENERABLE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS MUST BE ABANDONED because of it?" Is your reverence for the saints of such importance, my Father, that you dare to attack St. Bonaventure for the sake of St. Thomas, as if he had not maintained the wisdom and piety which he professed? Third, from the principles of this opinion he imagines people so disposed that they say, "I see, O God, that it is from you that I cover my body with clothes, that I drive away cold by approaching the fire, that I eat, that I drink, and other such supports and comforts of life: yet I do not dedicate these to you, but indulge myself, etc." Then indeed: "What sufficiently strong barrier can they place against this, so to speak, TORRENT OF ABSURDITIES?" You call it a torrent, my Doctor; see that they are only drops, which do not even moisten mediocre minds. Perhaps you are even confusing the elements, and calling wind what is water. None of those whom you attack detains God with such impolite and inept narration; since even among men themselves, with one from whom you have received very many benefits, it would be discourteous and untimely to mention those things which you need not or do not wish to render to him. Do you wish, then, to hear what those for whom this opinion seemed more probable say to God? They speak in this manner: "I see, O God, that you have such great power over me and over all created things, that you even have the right to command whatever pleases you, and there is a necessity incumbent upon us to fulfill in deed whatever has been commanded by you. But such is your goodness that, although you could forbid any free movement of our will that is not directed toward a good either divine or at least virtuous, you nevertheless

CHAPTER THREE

concede this to human weakness, that there can be some movement that stops at natural advantage, when it is not base." What, I ask, in such a prayer occurs that is unworthy of those men who have professed wisdom and piety? Moreover, the fact that he calls a straw battering ram that by which the contrary opinion is attacked, shows that his walls were made of reeds; for from that solution which he explains from number 7, there is understood to have been such a great shattering that it would have been more glorious for him to call it iron than straw.

FOURTH. In the controversy concerning the necessity of middle knowledge which is treated in chapters 18 and 23, he first represents the opinion which he refutes with language by which God is understood to pass from privation, as they say, of that knowledge to possession. For he attributes to his adversaries that they believe "it necessary that God explore and consult his creature, that he scrutinize and investigate the recesses of the human heart, that he examine men and their fibers," and other things of this kind, which properly fit only those who learn something in time and by their own labor are transferred from the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge. A man of ancient simplicity would briefly say that this opinion is contained in these propositions: God necessarily has knowledge of all truth. Given the supposition that a free agent placed in these circumstances will consent to divine grace, and given the supposition that placed in other circumstances he will not consent to the same, these are certain truths, as is manifest from the outcome. Therefore, it is necessary that God know this, and know it as soon as God exists; and this is middle knowledge.

Second, he imagines that no other cause of that necessity is assigned by them than that it seems to be required for the predefinitions of free acts and of all those things which God wishes to depend on created freedom. Again, he is mistaken. The first and principal reason why it is fitting that such knowledge be in God is this: Because God is God, possessing an infinitely perfect power of understanding, from which therefore no truth can be hidden. Just as infinite power, which is necessary to

CHAPTER THREE

God primarily because he is God, is consequently also necessary for him to create and govern the universe, so also this knowledge is consequently said to be necessary for him to govern the free creature.

Third, he similarly imagines that middle knowledge, according to that view, is acquired through a certain effort and care of the divine will, when he says that God is bound by the same solicitude to which is bound "either a man who calculates the expenses that are necessary to complete a tower which he wishes to build, or a king who considers whether with ten thousand he can meet him who comes to him with twenty thousand." Thus in chapter 22, number 7. Likewise, God does this "distrusting his omnipotence." Ibid., number 9. Likewise, "zealously and diligently examining the fibers of men, etc." But from these delusions even the sleep of those who are accused is innocent. Middle knowledge is the fruit of no effort: it is possessed by the same right and acquired with the same ease as divinity itself, nor does it demand any other care of the divine will.

Fourth, "Note," he says in chapter 18, number 7, "that that consent which is conditionally future does not depend on God." But this admonition is either ridiculous or false. For if he bids us to note that there absolutely does not exist any operation of God through which what is conditionally future comes to be thus future, it is ridiculous, since this is the same as warning us to note that the defenders of middle knowledge are not inept, but philosophize consistently. But if he thinks that the condition which is supposed through middle knowledge so that the future may be foreknown is not also the condition of divine cooperation, and therefore that divine cooperation is not necessary as conditionally to be provided, he speaks falsely. For God to know that something is conditionally future is nothing other than to know that, on the hypothesis that divine cooperation is offered to a free agent existing under these circumstances, it will be accepted, and the agent will act; but to know that something is not future, although contingently, is to know that, on the hypothesis that divine cooperation is similarly offered to the same agent, it will not be accepted, nor will the agent act. And thus concerning whatever

CHAPTER THREE

thing it is conditionally said that it will be, the sense is that it will be dependent on divine cooperation. This is even more manifest in the works of grace, in which not only the simultaneous concurrence is supposed, but also the prior or prevenient help of God.

Fifth, what is said by those who defend the use of middle knowledge, that without it there can be no predefinitions of future things, otherwise there would be a danger lest the will of God be in vain, he interprets as if they thought this could happen, and therefore he frequently attributes to them fear of this thing. Indeed, he even tries to raise their hope and strengthen it with these words in chapter 22, number 9: "Why do you fear, why do you tremble, lest the human heart be closed to him, etc." But this exhortation cannot but be very pleasant. Not that anyone needs it, but because it is a kind of recreation to see a man occupied and bustling about to drive away a disease from one who is healthy. Do you wish to know, my Doctor, what is feared by those men to whom you give courage? I will not say lest heaven fall, which was once the fear of the ancient Gauls, but lest God cease to be God. As great as is the security of this matter, so great also is the infallibility and certainty of divine predefinitions. What is said, therefore, that if God without foreknowledge of future things from a hypothesis were to decree something concerning the use of freedom, there would be a danger lest he not obtain what he desired, is to be interpreted simply thus: If it could happen that God did not foreknow what free causes would do, given the supposition of whatever circumstances in which freedom must be exercised, either he could not predefine anything certain, or his intention could be frustrated. What, I ask, does this opinion sound harsher than this one: If it could happen that God would approve what is intrinsically evil, he would both be deceived and sin?

Sixth, from the same doctrine he says: "God seeks outside himself, distrusting his omnipotence, suitable means for fulfilling his will, and thus subjects himself to human weakness." These things seem so absurd that he is compelled to give free rein to his mind in indignation; and as if

CHAPTER THREE

he were disputing with certain earth-born creatures, he asks, "And who are you who judge God, etc."

But it is clear that that entire accusation either supposes falsehood for truth or truth for falsehood and absurdity. For that by which he thinks God is represented by that opinion as distrusting his omnipotence and subject to human weakness is false. That seeking outside himself, that is, besides himself, causes and circumstances suitable for executing divine predefinitions concerning free acts, is so far from being false or absurd that it is even most evident from the mere notion. For an act of a creature to be predefined as free is the same as its being predefined that, besides God, some other cause in certain circumstances freely cooperate with God. Therefore, it is impossible for the divine predefinition to obtain its effect unless both a cause besides God and circumstances are sought in which it will freely cooperate. And therefore he asks without merit, "And who are you?" Unless perhaps he wished to say that those who spoke true, necessary, and clear things were unknown to him.

Seventh, he also imputes this to the authors of that knowledge, that they attribute to themselves the beginning of salvation after the condemned remnants of the Pelagians, chapter 23, number 9. But let him remember that it never came into the mind of any wise person to suspect that the beginning of a thing which either is or will be absolutely, such as the salvation of the soul, must be sought from that which absolutely neither is, nor was, nor ever will be, such as the object of middle knowledge before any free decree of God. And to say it in a word, it has long been known that no other beginning of salvation was obstinately insisted upon by the Semi-Pelagians than that to which the beginning of divine grace commonly given was owed, so that it could be said that the first help of divine grace is given according to merits. But of that thing whose existence is suspended on some condition, it is clear that every right and merit is also suspended, and thus does not impede that, if something is given, it is thought to be given beyond all debt. Therefore, the grace by which salvation is begun and completed is entirely unowed, although it was first

CHAPTER THREE

conditionally foreknown that its use would be good, before it was given. And hence it is evident that the adversary of middle knowledge has imposed on it an ugly mask, fearing lest it please if it were produced naked.

FIFTH. Concerning the power to sin, whether it is freedom or part of freedom, he supposes many things erroneously, and attempts to stir up resentment against Vasquez and Lessius specifically, in chapter 31, from number 5. First, he claims that the doctrine that the power to sin is neither freedom nor part of freedom is most clear and most certain, and that **NO ONE UNTIL NOW HAS DARED TO CALL IT INTO DOUBT**. He says that only certain contemporary writers, especially Gabriel Vasquez and Leonard Lessius, **HAVE NOT HESITATED TO VIOLATE ITS SANCTITY**. See how brazenly he speaks on a matter in which it was necessary to admonish a man with the most intimate awareness either of failing faith or modest learning! You say that until now no one has dared to call this doctrine into doubt? Listen to Gabriel Biel, in the second book, distinction 44, last question, article 2, where he proves his first conclusion thus: "All freedom is bestowed upon creatures by God: **ALL POWER TO SIN IS FREEDOM**: Therefore, etc." Again, in proving the third conclusion: "Even the power to sin is freedom of the will." And a little before in article 1: "The power to sin is not an integral part of the concept of freedom: It is nonetheless a subjective part." Listen to Durandus, one of those leading authorities whom you wished to be judges of your controversies, in the third book, distinction 44, question 1, number 12: "To the second it must be said that the power to sin **IS THE POWER OF FREE CHOICE**." Listen to Scotus, another judge appealed to by yourself. In his commentary on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 34, question 1, where he says: "And thus I say that the created will by its specific difference is the proximate contingent basis for both good and evil acts." Do you see how he attributes the power for evil acts to the specific difference of the created will? Indeed, this coincides with Gabriel's position when he says that the power to sin is a subjective part of freedom. Again, in distinction 34, question 1, he teaches that the

CHAPTER THREE

will insofar as it is defectible is nothing other than the will insofar as it is free. Go now, and proclaim that in the mouth of Vasquez and Lessius was first born that crime of violated sanctity, whereby the power to sin is said to be freedom.

Secondly. In the same place, number 7, he reports that Lessius, in his work on predestination, section two, reason eight, holds that not only is he praiseworthy who does not transgress when he could, which is what Scripture testifies, but that the very ability to transgress is itself worthy of praise. But this too is contrary to the truth. Lessius's words are clear: "The praise and glory of the Saints lies in this, that they absolutely could have transgressed and omitted the good which they did, and yet they did not transgress." See how he seeks the praise of the Saints from the power to transgress, not alone, but joined with the exercise of doing good and not transgressing.

Thirdly. Even this itself seems absurd to him, in the same place, number 8: that the power to sin contributes to the praise of the Saints, and that it is little praise if someone acts well when he cannot act badly. "What outstanding praise," he says, "and what ample harvest of glory, that a man can do that by which he would become worthy only of blame and dishonor." Here I ask two things. First, that when it is said that the praise is small, he should interpret it as being less, other things being equal. For it is in this sense that Lessius speaks. Second, that he may ridicule that position so explained as much as he wishes, but not assert that Lessius is the first author of it, since it is also from the Holy Spirit, who commends the man "who could transgress and did not transgress." What great desire could there be to disparage the Jesuits that would involve the Holy Spirit in the same reproach as Vasquez and Lessius?

SIXTH. He again treats Vasquez cruelly in chapter 32, number 14, because he said that the power to sin is from God. "He knows," he says, "that St. Thomas, St. Bernard, Richard, Capreolus, and many others have followed the contrary opinion, always religiously teaching that the power [to sin] is not from God." He adds in the margin that Vasquez

CHAPTER THREE

himself reports them, and continues: "BUT HAVING CONTEMPT FOR THEIR AUTHORITY, IN A MATTER IN WHICH EVEN THE VERY WORDS AND MANNER OF SPEAKING ALMOST CAUSE HORROR, he preferred to ascribe the power to sin to God, following, as it seems to him, the Master, but in reality his own mind, not the Master's."

Here I first complain that this Author usurps the supreme power of the Church, while he removes Cardinals from their place and changes them into mere Abbots. Vasquez nowhere mentions St. Bernard, but only St. Bonaventure. The good Doctor, I believe deceived by the similarity of initial letters, converts them, and creates a Cistercian from a Franciscan.

Second, while he pretends to shudder at the words and manner of speaking of Vasquez, he also makes Scotus horrible, who in that distinction 44 of the second book of the Sentences says the same things as Vasquez. Durandus must also be horrible, in the same place, question 1, number 10, when he says: "The third defect is regarding the main conclusion, because they posit that the power to sin, as regards defectibility, is not from God. THIS IS NOT TRUE, which is evident thus, etc." He concludes afterward: "Therefore, the possibility of deficiency in choosing will be from God." Who would believe that the recently illustrious stars of the Parisian School, in whose radiance he pretended to want to bask while philosophizing, now shine horribly for him? I pass over Gabriel, whose conclusion on the same distinction, single question, is this: "Regarding the second article, the first and responsive conclusion is: THE POWER TO SIN HAS BEEN CONFERRED BY GOD ON THE RATIONAL CREATURE." There are also many others whom I pass over. And is it a monster, horrible, immense, enormous, that Vasquez followed in the footsteps of so many highly learned men? Let him who objects to these things see whether by his horror he proves that the groves of ancient Doctors are inaccessible to him.

Third, nor is it true what he says, that Vasquez condemns the authority of St. Thomas and others, since he professes not to disagree with

CHAPTER THREE

them at all. For it can happen, due to a different way of interpreting this question, that both those who deny and those who affirm are unanimous. Nor is there lacking here the suffrage of St. Thomas, and indeed a clear one. In the second book of the Sentences, distinction 44, question 1, article 1, to the second objection, he says: "An evil act is more perfect in malice than an evil power: because in an evil act there is malice simply, but in the power for evil there is malice in a qualified sense, and therefore an evil act is simply not said to be from God, but in a qualified sense. **BUT THE POWER FOR EVIL IS SAID TO BE SIMPLY FROM GOD.**" Are you still turning to stone, my Doctor, struck with horror by Vasquez?

Fourth, he denies that the Master in that distinction 44 is the authority for Vasquez's opinion; for he deals there with the power to harm, not with the power to turn toward something illicit. But why does he not also apply to Vasquez that pious interpretation, so as to say that he spoke only of the power to harm? You will say that his words cannot bear it. Then neither can the Master's, for both say the same things. The cited distinction of the Master bears this inscribed question: "On the power to sin, whether it is to man or to the Devil from God." Vasquez prefaces chapter 10, disputation 129, in the first part of the second part with this argument: "That God is the cause of the power to sin." The former proposes the opposite opinion thus: "Some think that the power to act rightly is to us from God, but the power to sin is not from God, but from us or from the Devil, etc." Vasquez thus: "Some Theologians here labor not a little on this question, whether God is the cause of the power to sin, which is in free choice." The Master solves the question in this way: "But by many testimonies of the Saints it is shown indubitably that **THE POWER OF EVIL IS FROM GOD.**" Vasquez's manner of speaking is still milder: "Others contend with the Master that God is the Author of the power which can sin: which opinion, rightly understood, I approve." Who would not now abundantly laugh, seeing the man gentle toward the Master at this point, but harsh toward Vasquez, as if the former would speak pearls, but the latter would vomit serpents?

CHAPTER THREE

SEVENTH. Once again Vasquez receives a beating from this Author concerning that question of what is, or whence is, the moral or the free aspect in the act of the will, in chapter 32, number 13. "Some recent writers," he says, "seem to want to acknowledge the consequence, when they say that the freedom which is in human acts is not from God, raising up from a most evident absurdity A NEW DOGMA, LITTLE CONSONANT WITH PIETY, COMPLETELY DISSONANT FROM TRUTH. In this they have even progressed to such an extent that some, speaking of God, have said that He has nothing to do with the moral entity: namely, establishing the rational creature as independent from God. LET THIS BE OF THE ANIMAL CREATURE, BUT NOT OF THE RATIONAL, etc." And soon: "Among those Authors Gabriel Vasquez stands out." And a little after: "A doctrine similar to a prodigy." The adversary's trustworthiness fails: 1. Because he establishes the recent writers, and especially Vasquez, as authors of that doctrine which they prove they have drawn from older writers. Vasquez reports as agreeing on the same point St. Bonaventure, Alexander, Antisidorensis, and both Cano and Soto who are Thomists. But he preferred to pass over them in silence, lest he be unable to chastise Vasquez, when he sees such men implicated in the same censure.

Secondly, he imputes an error to Vasquez and his associates from which they prove themselves most pure to all who approach them for the purpose of reading or hearing them: namely, that they establish the rational creature as independent from God. Not even a suspicion of something so absurd ever occurred to them.

Thirdly, those words of Vasquez are suppressed, which if heard would immediately show that the doctrine which this Author execrates and denounces as impious is most innocent. For he speaks thus in the cited place: "I suppose then that this relation of congruity and incongruity, and the relation of the free which is as it were the foundation of both, CONSISTS ONLY IN A RELATION OF REASON." And then: "The relation or denomination of freedom in a human act IS NOT SOME-

CHAPTER THREE

THING REAL AND PHYSICAL: But it is only a certain extrinsic denomination, which one may call a moral entity." Do you see how Vasquez subtracts nothing real, nothing physical from the first cause? Do you see how that which he does not attribute to God is only a relation of reason? What then is that dogma little consonant with piety, completely dissonant from truth? What so great a crime worthy of that dire imprecation, "let this be of the animal creature, but not of the rational"? Vasquez has said something monstrous. What finally? He has defiled the pious ears of all good men. By what nefarious speech? He has opened his mouth against heaven. What is his blasphemy? He denied, forsooth, that some being of reason is from God. O doctrine similar to a prodigy! He was unwilling to attribute to God that which he thought to be neither real nor physical: that is, he was unwilling for God to be the cause of nothing, although he said that He is the cause of the power which can sin. O horrible words and manner of speaking! But, I say, O absurd piety, and hatreds sought by study and artifice against men worthy of love!

But to assist the philosophy of this Author, let him know that those who seek the cause of some extrinsic denomination, as they say, seek nothing other than the form from which the appellation comes proximately to that which is said to be denominated. And so when they ask by whom and from whom an image is seen, they by no means recur to God, but to the seeing eye. Not to affirm that it could have been seen with God helping not at all, but to deny that from the way in which God relates Himself to vision, the image is said to be seen by Him. And in this way the seen-ness in the image is not from God, but from the vision or the seeing eye. In the same way, although whatever reality there is in the work of art is produced by its instruments, either cooperating by innate power or by adventitious power, and is also produced by God as by the First Agent, yet the character of an artifact is attributed to neither, because it is a mere denomination from the special condition and mode of operating of the Artificer himself, whence also it is said to be an artifact as such only by him. Therefore Vasquez likewise wanted nothing of reality to be

CHAPTER THREE

in the act of the will which God does not make, which habit also does not make, yet the character of Free and Moral to be a mere appellation given to the act from the fact only that it is from the will eliciting it in such a way that it can suppress it, not however from the way in which God concurs with it, and thus it happens that the Free and the Moral in the act of the will is not from God. But because thoughts of this kind do not easily occur to those men who, placed far from the tumult of the Schools, live in the greatest amplification, as soon as it sounded that the character of Moral or Free is not in the act from God, but from the will, God seemed to be endangered; and nothing occurred more suitable for confirming His supreme dominion over all things than if Vasquez, who was threatening heaven with that opinion of his, should be deleted from the number of rational beings, and henceforth be counted among mere animals.

EIGHTH. In chapter 23, number 9, he speaks thus: "What is the spirit in grace, and as it were the grace of grace and its glory, namely energy and efficacy, they are not ashamed to attribute not to your (he addresses God as if he were telling the truth) calling or gratuitous election, but to man himself." Who among those who deny physical predeterminations has ever thus ascribed the efficacy of grace to man, so as to exclude either God or the power of grace itself? Indeed, who has not with the most willing mind always confessed that Divine grace is what supplies strength to man in every salvific act from beginning to end? Who ever even wanted to say that the roles are reciprocal, and that grace indeed gives strength, but also receives it? What then is the cause of such an unfair expostulation? And what is the liberty of a man imposing a crime neither proven nor probable? Perhaps he wants to force us to say that the works of salvation are to be ascribed to God alone, with the exclusion of men freely cooperating; and this should be granted to him and to Calvin, were it not that the Apostle prohibits it, who joins himself as a cooperator with the grace of God; were it not also Augustine, who teaches that God willed the good work to be both His and ours: His by calling, ours by following.

CHAPTER THREE

NINTH. He declares the same things about the adversaries of predeterminations saying that our very acting is not from God. Thus in chapter 26, number 10: "To those authors," he says, "with whom we are dealing, it has not seemed good to think thus, but they say that the secondary free agent acts and moves itself so purely **THAT IT DOES NOT RECEIVE ITS ACT OF ACTING FROM ELSEWHERE**; the power of acting well indeed, **BUT NOT THE ACTING ITSELF**, etc." And in the last chapter, last number: "Where it comes to execution, man after receiving pious thought, add also pious affection of the heart, with both of which he is fully indifferent, he alone is the one who moves himself, as they philosophize, he himself who applies himself, he himself who determines himself, **BUT GOD NOT AT ALL**." I would say that this man is dealing with enemies yet to be born, if in the last place he did not name Suarez. First, therefore, he relates falsely, when he says that they think that of whom there is not one who does not with an inclined mind and extended discourse both assert, and prove, and defend the contrary, namely that God, after having created the free cause, and continuously preserving it, having also equipped it with every virtue necessary for acting, add also having placed it in all circumstances required for acting, and indeed having pre-empted it with special help and excited it internally to all works of salvation, furthermore co-acts immediately, so that its acting is also identically, intrinsically, and essentially the acting of God Himself.

Secondly, what Suarez said indefinitely, that the created will in order to determine itself to this act does not need another determining it actively, he reports as said universally, and applies to supernatural acts, about which Suarez was not even thinking, since he considers them also to be predefined by God.

Thirdly, this, that the will does not need another determining it actively, he interprets as if it had been said that it does not need another cooperating or co-effecting. Which is far from the mind of Suarez, who intends nothing other than that although God intimately and immediately attains whatever reality there is in the effect and action of the sec-

CHAPTER THREE

ondary free cause, nevertheless because He relates Himself in this matter in such a way that He gives it the power either to use or not to use His cooperation, it happens that He indeed has the character of a principle operating per se and principally, when the action follows, yet not of a principle determining that there be action rather than non-action, because it has pleased Him to permit this to the free choice of the cause. Which must be admitted in all acts at least which are evil, since it is most absurd to think that God determines that there be an action which is called theft, rather than its negation. And from this it is clear what the standing should be of that doctrine, into which it was necessary for the Censor to infer what he condemned.

EPILOGUE. TO THE AUTHOR OF THE WORK ON THE FREEDOM OF GOD AND THE CREATURE.

MY FATHER. Although up to this point we have labored in this exercise without breaking a sweat, and there is no shortage of material for extending the work further, nevertheless, since what we have said is abundantly sufficient both for your instruction, and for my defense of those who have been treated rather dishonorably by you, and for everyone to form a fair judgment concerning the entire controversy, I bring my writing to an end. But first, I will present to you a kind of compendium of the entire work, encompassed in these few points.

First is that it is most unbecoming for men of our calling, that is, yours and mine, to be concerned with gathering fame for our doctrine, but if anyone is touched by concern for such a matter, each one ought to strive for glory through his own virtue, not to advance violently through contemptuous insult of others.

Second. In the examination of truth, the mind must be free, both from every other disturbance, and especially from emulation and envy; because it usually happens that while we begrudge our vote to rivals, we deny it to truth.

Third. New ideas should be held back until they have matured, and we should not be eager for those things that oppose common opinions to enjoy public exposure. For just as with premature fruits, taste is offended by those opinions that have not been cooked by the meditation

EPILOGUE

of many years, the testing of various seasons, and the heat of frequent disputations. Thus it happens that while we too eagerly seek a name for ourselves, we find only ridicule.

Fourth. That question which someone wishes to judge of their own accord ought to be perceived and comprehended in the mind. For there is a danger that those who do otherwise will pronounce judgment easily, and as if about another's craft. And the dense crowd will raise laughter with impunity.

If you observe these things in the disputation on grace which you promise, that work will find favor with fair estimators of matters. Farewell, and pray well for those who love you. For this matters greatly to me.

APPENDIX TO CAMERARIUS

The importunity of friends made it so that I could not leave this philosopher unaddressed. In the second part of his Selected Philosophical Questions, in the ninth question, which concerns physical predetermination, he closely followed the path of the one from whom we have already departed, and was driven by the same winds to philosophize, which seemed favorable to him, but they are winds nonetheless.

FIRST, The futility of Suárez's argument, Suárez's ridiculous solution, The inept objection of opponents, Middle knowledge or Molinist science, Molina's novel invention, The Irish Morisan, and other such verbal mockeries are the gems with which he has adorned his dissertation. What of the fact that he rejects a certain solution of Morisan on the grounds that it was handed down by Jesuits? "Secondly," he says on page 90, just before the middle, "this response of his comes from a Jesuit whose writings on this matter he published under his own name, etc." Suppose it even came from a Scythian, what then? Does the name of the authors prejudice the probability of an opinion? What, therefore, can be expected from those who bring minds occupied with such prejudices to the investigation of truth? To this most illiberal man, I offer these three points: 1. That modesty in disputants defending a good cause can in no way be harmful, nor does truth need the patronage of impudence. 2. That the authors whom he attacks, especially in this controversy, have always been more moderate in their speech, and he does not act wisely who allows himself to be overcome in virtue by those whom he wishes to appear superior to in doctrine. 3. Although I do not well know this man's circum-

APPENDIX

stances and personal affairs, nor what he owes to those whom he attacks (since he himself never mentions the benefits he has received), nevertheless, when I hear that he is Scottish by nationality, educated in the Scottish seminary in Rome, having also completed a three-year course in philosophy, and furthermore having completed the final trial of public disputations, I suspect that he was the pupil and disciple of those against whom he now kicks. If this is so, what benefit has travel through Italy and France, the most cultured nations and most studious of civility, brought to this Scottish man?

SECOND. No one has ever been more fortunate than this Camerarius in collecting the opinions of others. The opinion which he defends is, he says, "that of all the ancients" in doubt 1. "All the old Scotists follow it, along with William of Rubio. Likewise, St. Bonaventure and other ancients. Among the more recent, Jansenius" (he means of Ghent), "Vega, Driedo, Ruard, Carthagera, Puteanus, Toledo, Henriquez, Pererius—who not?" But I first ask him that, by right of the connection and association begun with his leader, he not contradict him. We have already seen that when he had selected only five scholastic authors from all antiquity for his opinion, he found so little support among the more recent ones that he posed the wondering question in book 1, chapter 36: "Why is this doctrine less common?" And, "From what causes has the contrary opinion gained so much strength?" You would think the man was discussing some unusual flooding of waters or an earthquake.

Secondly, I also ask that he conceive the state of this question distinctly. For not just any motion or premotion of a secondary cause by the first cause falls under debate. Rather, the question is whether, after the secondary cause has been created and continuously preserved, and furnished with all requisite power, and placed in circumstances necessary for action, and assisted by cooperation and simultaneous concurrence, it is furthermore necessary for it to be physically precluded by the impression of a certain entity that is Unnamed, and Ineffable, and Wonderful, and Marvelous, as Francisco Zumel states in volume 2, discourse 5, sec-

APPENDIX

tion 2, which comes with the action and flies away with it. Likewise, the question is whether, in free agents, that premotion is of such a nature that, while itself independent of freedom, nevertheless so necessarily brings about the action that it is impossible for non-action to coexist with it. This is the point at which both opinions terminate. This is the Lydian stone by which alone it is determined who follows the Thomists and who prefers the Jesuits. From all those whom Camerarius either names or passes over in silence (I always except the more recent Thomists and a few others who agree with them), I deny that there is any who was ever moved by suspicion of this premotion, nor does he either prove this or can he prove it. Let the Irish Morisan return, then, whom this Scot, forgetful of his neighborhood, ordered to leave when he objected to something of this sort. And this is that common distinction between some premotion which is sometimes insinuated by authors, and that proper predetermination which is discussed today, which Suárez wanted to be made explicit, where this Sesqui-philosopher pronounced the solution of a man worth three obols to be ridiculous in doubt 2, page 87.

Thirdly, not only does that physical premotion nowhere appear among the ancients and those more recent authors Driedo, Ruard, Vega, Jansenius, etc., but moreover, statements about the freedom of created causes are read throughout their writings which no one could reconcile with it. Evidence of this will be provided by what others, but especially Diego Ruiz, have collected in his work *On the Knowledge of God*.

Fourthly, an imposition is made on Toledo in that commentary on chapter 17 of St. John, for he has nothing that favors the predeterminists. The mind of Pererius is concealed, which he immediately reveals in *Physics* 8, chapter 9, when he denies that the will is necessarily moved to act; likewise, that a free cause, given all the requirements for acting on the part of the object, so that nothing is lacking and nothing hinders, can THEN act or not act; likewise, do what is proposed or its opposite. What Henriquez teaches in chapter 14, number 9 is hidden: that it is not contradictory, speaking speculatively, that of two men entirely equal in nat-

APPENDIX

ural goods, in habits, and in the concurrence of causes, both moved also by entirely equal assistance on the part of the object and potency, one operates and is converted, while the other is not converted. But in practice, the one who is converted always has something more moral of prevenient assistance. If the grace of him who is converted adds to that by which another is not converted only something moral; if speaking speculatively it can happen that it does not even add this, where is the necessity and use of physical predetermination? The doctrine of Puteanus is truncated at *Prima Secundae*, question 111, article 1, doubt 4. Because after that conclusion in which he states that God sometimes predetermines the will without injury to freedom, he posits another in which he pronounces that God ordinarily does not use this sort of predetermination, but this is to deny its necessity, which is like the first principle of the opposing opinion. He also sets forth this reason for the conclusion: "The conclusion," he says, "is proved by certain reasons. The first reason is that physical predetermination takes away freedom." By this reasoning, the former conclusion is also radically overturned. And whatever contradiction of opinions may be there, the final definition is mine.

THIRD, From these things it is clear that the account given in doubt 1 must be recast. "Some from the Society," he says, "removed determination from consideration in public disputations at Salamanca as repugnant to freedom, in the year 48 or 49 before this one. Bañez, observing that they were teaching new and previously unheard-of things, boldly and generously opposed himself to them. Molina came to the aid of his own, and when the matter was brought to Clement VIII in the year 1597, and disputed for a long time in his presence, he proposed to define the opinion that admits predetermination, but until his death, that is for about eight years, he was hindered by various and very great affairs." First of all, I would like to know where this Scottish man was when these things were first carried out in Salamanca and later in Rome. Has anyone deposited with him public records of the events? Who, finally, hired him to compose such a history? "I," you will say, "received it

APPENDIX

thus." But this is the very excuse of those who spend counterfeit money. This alone I think cleverly done by him, that to this section in which no question is treated, but only this history I have mentioned is related, he prefixed the title, "First Doubt." For what could be said more aptly? Unless perhaps someone thinks it should have been inscribed, "a lie." "Some," he says, "from the Society removed predetermination from consideration." But who had introduced it before that age? "Bañez saw them teaching new and previously unheard-of things." No doubt before that time no one had denied the antecedent necessity of acting in free causes that is independent of freedom; no one had denied absolute and efficacious predefinitions of free acts; no one had denied predestination prior to the knowledge of merits; no one had said that efficacious and sufficient grace are ever physically equal; no one had explained that efficacy through the mere congruity of thought; no one had distinguished a free cause from a necessary one in this, that a free cause can join either alternative—namely, to act or not to act—with all the requisites for acting. And can someone who says any of these things not remove predetermination from consideration?

But, you will say, authors of the same family as Molina say that this opinion was born from his genius, as is evident from the life of Bellarmine. Certainly, because what almost all supposed, he set aside for discussion, expressed more clearly, explained more fully, confirmed more strongly, and reduced to use for reconciling divine grace with the freedom of the creature. But if in addition he mixed in something of his own (nor could a man of such keen intelligence do otherwise, especially in so long a disputation), nevertheless, no one who was knowledgeable about questions of this sort ever asserted that this, which is the head of the whole controversy—namely, that there is no physical predetermination of free agents with which the restraint of a free act cannot be composed for their freedom—was Molina's invention.

And this was the single cause which was sought in vain in the last chapter of book 1 on The Freedom of God and the Creature, why the

APPENDIX

opinion opposed to predeterminations had so greatly prevailed. Namely, because it was widely understood that Molina and his Associates had by no means toiled on their own initiative, but had undertaken to work out and fortify what was common to all. Whence it happened that by following this, no one believed himself to be bound to one man or family, but by common right to occupy what was public. Otherwise, neither would so many follow one man, nor would those studious of the ancients follow a recent author, nor Frenchmen a Spaniard, nor Sorbonnists a Jesuit. From this you may understand how untimely is that declamation of that author against Molina which is found in doubt 4. Molina had indicated that if the method of reconciling human freedom with divine grace, which is sought from the use of middle knowledge, had always been so distinctly expounded as it is now, it could have helped those who fought both against the Pelagians in former times, and recently against the Lutherans. That author interprets this statement as made in contempt of St. Augustine and the Council of Trent, and finally of the universal Church. As if it were wrong to believe that some light could be brought to what the Holy Fathers handed down, and as if the splendor of the Church did not increase to the perfect day, while from time to time something is uncovered that was indeed handed down before, but not so thoroughly explained.

Moreover, this accusation is absurd because those who indict Molina are held by exactly the same crime. Indeed, that method too of composing efficacious grace with free will which is handed down by them, and is said by this author to be the most probable of all in doubt 3, number 3, and by him who preceded, is new, in the Letter to the Supreme Pontiff. Where this was also added, that by this way which he himself first fortified, "more odious offenses are avoided, which have turned away writers of this age to other paths, and scruples injected from elsewhere are cast off." And although it is said to flow from the Ancient Fathers, this is nevertheless so explained in chapter 36, book 1, number 7, "that what LAY HIDDEN, implicit and involved in their principles, has

APPENDIX

now been explained and developed and brought to light." Why then do they now disparage Molina? "Who," says Camerarius, "will believe that the way of reconciling freedom with divine providence was hidden from the Church of God until the time of Molina?" But why could not one believe this who believes that that way remained hidden even until the time of Gibieuf? He continues, "Who will believe that Molina was sent by God so that after one thousand five hundred and so many years, he might reveal that way to the Church, which is the pillar and foundation of truth?" But who would not believe this who can believe that Gibieuf was sent even after one thousand six hundred and more, so that he might explain, develop, and bring to light that same way to the same Church? I am exceedingly eager to know what they will say so as not to confess that they have been caught in this place.

Finally, what he reports, that Clement VIII had proposed in his mind to render a judgment in favor of the predeterminists, but was prevented from doing so by affairs, is somewhat different. For if that was entirely decided, what affairs could have prevented the Pontiff from pronouncing from the year 1597, when this controversy began to be agitated in Rome, to the year 1605, when he departed this life? What occupation could have been so great that in about eight years space was not granted for the three words which were enough to settle the matter? Why not rather believe that, although he was rather averse to Molina's doctrine, he was nevertheless hindered both by the success of the disputations, and by the counsel of great men, and by the hidden providence of the Holy Spirit, which never abandons the Vicar of Christ, lest he should precipitate a judgment? It is especially memorable that that great interpreter of the ancient Church and defender of the present one, the Most Illustrious Cardinal du Perron, when he was in Rome at that time, told the Supreme Pontiff that he would ensure, if he defined what he was contemplating, that the Sectaries of Germany and France would subscribe to his decree and confess that their doctrine had been sanctioned. There was already no obscure report of this matter; but lest anyone in the future should

APPENDIX

think it uncertain, I have a witness present, one who by the authority of a Bishop, or by the name of a most learned man, or by the merit of the Best and Most Pious, is above all exception: the Most Reverend Lord Habert, Prelate of the Church of Cahors, in whose eyes these things are published, and who testifies that he received this from the mouth of Cardinal du Perron himself. Here belongs what this author relates in doubt 4 from the life of Bellarmine: that he constantly denied that Clement VIII would ever define what he had determined, and if he intended to define it, life would sooner be abandoned. This he thinks is proclaimed as a kind of prophecy of Bellarmine, and doubts whether the writer who committed it to writing did well or ill. But concerning the prophecy which he mentions, he is mistaken; for prophecy does not concern consequences. Bellarmine had a double conviction: one regarded the supreme authority of the Supreme Pontiff, the other the doctrine of the Jesuits. Since, therefore, he did not doubt both that the Pope is infallible in defining controversies of faith, and that efficacious grace does not include physical pre-determination, he both saw and pronounced that if the Pontiff should undertake to define the contrary, he would end his life before he would be permitted to complete the business. Now to doubt whether he who relates these things did well or ill is the mark of a suspicious man. For what evil does this narration contain? Is it trivial? Is it foreign to the life of Bellarmine? Is it condemned in Rome, where it was published with the usual faculty and approval? Is it uncertain, which Cardinal de Monte confirmed with an oath and wished to have attested by a public instrument after the death of Bellarmine? Indeed, whatever in any way is inconvenient for his adversaries, that is all evil to this author.

FOURTH, To sample something from those things by which he has demonstrated his erudition and intellect in this controversy: this can be affirmed generally, that his method of defending physical premotion is the same as the one we refuted a little earlier, to the extent that he sometimes verbatim repeats what we had already heard from the other, as is especially evident from doubt 3. Therefore, whatever objections we pre-

APPENDIX

vously raised against that philosophy equally apply here. But if you seek something specific, Reader, let me show you how much this author has been able to help the cause of prelections.

First. This is the principal difficulty in this controversy: how freedom is not destroyed by predetermination, since it makes it impossible for the will not to produce the act for which it is predetermined. This is proposed in doubt 2, number 1, where he rejects whatever has been customarily answered by Thomists until now, especially the claim that a predetermined will can refrain from acting in the divided sense, though it cannot in the composite sense. "It is certain," he says, "that this definition (by which a free cause is said to act when all requisites are in place, etc.) **MUST BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE COMPOSITE SENSE,**" and he proves this in various ways and instances.

But later in doubt 5, where he addresses that objection through many pages, he himself, willingly or unwillingly, falls back on the same solution. For he responds on page 113 that because predetermination binds the will to the end only, and to means only insofar as it is necessary to strive toward the end through them, it follows that "just as when the order of the end requires me to approach means and use them, so when the order of the end no longer requires, or even demands the opposite, I abstain from their assistance and use." As if he were saying, granted that for the supposition where some means is required for the end, the will cannot fail to embrace such means in the composite sense, by making these two things simultaneous—that the means are placed in the order of the end, or what is the same, that there is predetermination to it, and that its use is omitted; nevertheless, for another supposition where that means is not required, with God not predetermining its use—that is, in the divided sense—it can.

He adds on page 114 that humans can generally fail from the order of the end, and thus not embrace some means even when the order of the end demands its use. This is because "predetermination does not so change the potency that it does not leave it in its defectibility and de-

APPENDIX

pravity." But this too cannot be defended other than through the distinction already brought forward. For I ask: is the predetermined will so defective that it can cause the coexistence and simultaneous composition of non-action with predetermination, or not? If he says it can, he concedes it can fail in the composite sense and thus surrenders and abandons the Thomist position; if he says it cannot, then it can only fail in the divided sense. What will he oppose to this, unless perhaps he denies having disapproved of that distinction? Why then does he nowhere solve the arguments he brought forward to disprove it? And what good is a new way and the most probable method of all, if it leaves us stuck in the old difficulties? For there always remains that great knot: To dissent from God moving is to combine dissent with motion, or what is the same, to dissent in the composite sense: The will can dissent from God moving: Therefore, it can combine dissent with motion and dissent in the composite sense. The minor premise is from the Council of Trent. The major seems clearly evident from the terms. For to dissent means to place dissent, and this is not to place dissent before God moves, which would be like fighting an adversary not yet born; nor after He has ceased to move, which would be like fighting the dead. It remains, therefore, that to dissent is to place dissent at the same time when God is moving, which is to make dissent and motion coexist and be composed together. And do not say that to prevent God from moving is to dissent, because it is universally impossible for God to be prevented from moving, and because this would not be dissenting from God moving, but from God about to move, and because finally it would follow that the existence of motion depends on the freedom of the recipient.

Second. There is also this fundamental difficulty in this matter: that according to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, freedom cannot suffer antecedent necessity of acting, which nevertheless is introduced through physical predetermination. He responds in doubt 5, section 1, page 122, by absolutely denying that any antecedent necessity removes freedom, and that the Holy Fathers should be understood as referring "to that ne-

APPENDIX

cessity which comes from intrinsic predetermination, which is from the nature of the thing limiting and determining something to some determined effect from intrinsic principles; but not about that which comes from determination arising from the end or from the first agent." And later he adds, as if from St. Thomas, that this necessity is not absolute but conditional. Here again I ask what scruples are removed, what offenses are avoided by this new way and most probable method of all? For I recall having read that entire solution long ago in Diego Alvarez, disp. 22. Indeed, even in Calvin, Institutes, Book 1, chapter 16, section 9. See if he has not expressed the same distinction aptly enough in these words: "Meanwhile what God has decreed must so necessarily happen that it is nevertheless NEITHER PRECISELY NOR BY ITS OWN NATURE necessary. A familiar example occurs in Christ's bones. Since he took on a body like ours, no sane person will deny that his bones were fragile, yet it was impossible for them to be broken. Whence again we see that distinctions about necessity according to what and ABSOLUTE necessity, likewise consequent and consequence, were not invented in the schools without reason." Do you not see that he excludes from the will, which he denies is free, absolute necessity of acting, and that which by its own nature belongs to it, that is, which comes from intrinsic principles, as you yourself say? How then do you differ from him? And how do you remove the scruple that remains from that? For precisely because of this, antecedent necessity hinders freedom, because it is both necessity and independent of freedom, regardless of where it comes from. For what benefit is there, I ask, in not being bound by necessity of acting from myself, if I am equally bound by another? Indeed, if one of these could be reconciled with freedom, who does not see that it would be more agreeable to be bound by oneself and from within than by another? Who does not know that what impels from without approaches more closely the nature of violence than what moves from within? And if someone were to offer this reply to a person claiming to have been driven to some crime by necessity: "You were not driven by yourself and from within, but were driven

APPENDIX

from elsewhere and from without, and therefore you will be punished"—would that not seem absurd?

Another scruple also remained. Because the reason given by the Holy Fathers why God's providence and foreknowledge do not impede freedom—namely, that they do not impose necessity of acting—would have to be interpreted according to this solution to mean that providence does not hinder freedom because it does not impose necessity arising from the will intrinsically, but only that which arises from providence itself extrinsically. This means that providence does not impose any necessity other than that which it itself imposes—what could be more empty than this fiction? What then will become of St. Dionysius, who in chapter 8 of *On Divine Names* especially forbids *προκίνησιν ἀνάγκην* [compulsive necessity] from the will?

What is added about conditional necessity is illusory. For they do not understand it to be conditional in the sense that the condition depends on the freedom of the created will, which is what St. Thomas intends; but rather that it depends solely on God's good pleasure, and that antecedent one at that, which helps not at all, as is evident. These are the scruples left by the Thomists' solution that the new way does not at all remove.

But he adds another which, in my judgment, is inappropriate. It was objected that the motion of the predetermined will is not natural because it is from an extrinsic principle. This author responds in the cited place, page 124, four lines before the bottom, that to be moved by God is not to be moved by another, much less by something extrinsic. "Because God is my laudable being, as the Platonists say, He is αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό, the self itself, He is more intimate to me than my inmost self, etc." When the necessity that God imposes by predetermining is objected to, it is denied that it comes from intrinsic principles, as we saw a little earlier; and when it is opposed that to be moved in this way is not natural, it is denied that this motion is from extrinsic causes. What could be found sufficiently worthy of such coherent and connected philosophy?

APPENDIX

Third. A difficulty that is both common and serious is this: if predetermination is necessary, those who sin by omitting a good act lack sufficient grace, since they lack predetermination, and thus cannot even sin. He responds that no one lacks predetermination. Very well, he now removes the scruple. But immediately he places a millstone around his neck. "Since application and predetermination," he says, "is love and desire for the end or the highest good, nevertheless this desire perseveres continually in all; for all desire happiness and act from that desire." From this he finally concludes: "hence it is clear how ineptly our adversaries object that not all are given sufficient help if predetermination is required for action."

But I ask: 1. How can that desire for the highest good, which is naturally implanted, complete the faculty of a supernatural act, the omission of which is a sin? 2. How can the same desire, even if it were supernatural, be called sufficient help when it does not have joined to it God's intention, that is, the absolute and antecedent decree by which it is necessary for it to become efficacious, according to page 114, fourth line after the first? 3. In what sense, moreover, is this desire, which is believed to be the application and predetermination itself, said to persevere continually in all, when it was said earlier in doubt 1, section 3, page 100, that it does not have firm and permanent being? "If you ask," he says, "whether this kind of premotion has firm and permanent being or not, I respond from St. Thomas that it does not have firm and permanent being." He adds that it has flowing being, of the kind that is impressed force in projectiles, color in the air, the skill of the craftsman in the instrument of art. Hey, my Doctor, that which is neither firm nor permanent, which is compared to the most fleeting and mobile things of all—this perseveres continually in all? And where you yourself philosophize so aptly, do you dare to call the objection of the Adversaries inept?

Fourth. That famous difficulty about predetermination to acts that are evil, which has so troubled the Adversaries that it has driven them in different directions, with some approving and others angrily re-

APPENDIX

jecting such predetermination, is resolved by this philosopher by admitting that God moves to an act that is even intrinsically evil, insofar as it is an act, thus on page 115, to the second argument. And on page 121, after the middle, he concedes that "God moves to all circumstances of sin according to what they have of being." But to the argument that from this it would follow that God is the Author and cause of sin, he responds by denying the inference, for God does not predetermine to an evil act as it is evil, or insofar as it underlies deformity, thus on page 118. But what less had the asserters of predeterminations to evil acts said before, not to mention the Calvinists? For those words seem to be taken from Molinaeus's *Shield*, section 20, proposition 11. In what way, therefore, will the scruples that still remain be expelled? And first: Since man is himself the cause of sin both for himself and for another, although he determines neither himself nor another to the act as it is evil, because that evil is beyond intention and accidental, as St. Thomas says in the First Part of the Second Part, question 75, article 1, in the body, but only from the fact that he determines to an act which he knows is prohibited and evil, why would this not suffice for God to be the cause and Author of sin? Second: Since the entity of an evil act derives its evil precisely from the fact that it follows from a defectible secondary cause, and it is now said that God through His predetermination is the cause why it follows from there, how can it be denied that He is the cause why it contracts evil from there? For thus we also say that although man's vision, for example, is not vital to God Himself, but has this from its relation to the created eye, nevertheless God, who is the cause why it is ordered to that eye, is the cause why it is vital to it. Third: Can God be conceived to command someone or give counsel, not indeed to sin by lying, but nevertheless to freely will to utter what he knows to be a lie, evil, and forbidden when he knows it? Can He, I ask, persuade this without being thought to be the Author of lying? And yet He does more by predetermining to that individual will to lie. Fourth: God does not prohibit only the moral evil of an act, but also its very entity, especially with the circumstance of freedom. For what do you think—

APPENDIX

does God permit someone to freely hate Him, but only prohibit him from hating badly? But this implies a contradiction. Therefore, if He predetermines to the entity of the act, even as free, He is the cause for the predetermined will to do what He prohibits. But if the conjunction of evil does not allow God to permit man to freely do what is natural in the act, will it allow Him to predetermine and predefine that the same be freely done by him? Fifth: Who then will be the Author of sin? For the man who is said to sin will not be, because he will not even sin. For what do you want him to do in order not to sin? Can he prevent evil from being contracted by the act on the supposition that it is free, and is known to be evil and prohibited when it is done? But this is contradictory. Can he then cause the entity of the act, or freedom, or awareness of the prohibition not to be? But besides the fact that this also is contradictory, it is moreover absurd given predetermination, since that would ultimately be to strive against God Himself. What then can God be imagined to require from one who sins, having been predetermined to an act which is evil, according to every aspect of its being and all its circumstances?

These are a few of the many scruples of the contrary opinion, which certainly are not so trivial that they are not also troublesome. Yet this Author neither felt their annoyance, nor, if perhaps some did feel it, did he bring anything by which they could be alleviated. For what he adds at the beginning of page 120—that we are predetermined only to the end, and through the end to the means, but not to what turns away from the end; likewise, that premotion conforms to the divine precept, and other similar verbal cymbals—contains an inexplicable meaning when applied to that one individual act by which someone chooses an evil means, theft or adultery for example, that it may be well with him. For either the intention by which one who steals is said to be premoved by God regards determinately this means which is to be stolen, or it does not. If the first, how is it said to draw back from evil? If the second, how can it be predetermination to this particular act?

APPENDIX

Fifth. He resolves on page 120 the usual objection that this opinion coincides with that of heretics. But how empty the solution is will be easily understood from what we said earlier in chapter 1, propositions 17, 18, 24, and so on. The essence of the difficulty consists in this: Calvin does not err merely by uttering those words, "God is the Author of sin," or "Man is not free," but by conceiving in God a certain way of relating to the evil act to which that statement applies, that He is called the Author of sin; and in man a certain way of operating to which it also applies that he is not free. We ask, however, what does Calvin conceive either in God regarding the evil act, or in man regarding good and evil, that is not also conceived by those with whom we are disputing? Not only do we ask this, but we demonstrate by suitable testimonies that the thought of both is the same. For concerning man's way of operating, Calvin confesses that he truly acts even in good works, in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 3, section 14, and chapter 5, sections 14 and 15. Likewise, he confesses that he acts without coercion, in the same book, chapter 2, section 5, and chapter 3, section 5. Likewise, that he is affected from the heart to act, in the same book, chapter 3, section 14. Likewise, that he does not act necessarily by absolute necessity, but only by necessity according to what, in book 1, chapter 16, section 9. Likewise, that this necessity does not arise from intrinsic principles, but from divine predefinition, for he constantly supposes this. But if someone contends that this suffices for man to be said to act freely, "As far as I am concerned, let them say so," says Calvin in the same book 2, chapter 2, section 8. Let the Adversaries say what they themselves think beyond or less than this.

Regarding the way God relates to the evil act, Calvin believes that He predefines such an act; but that He predefines it as evil, so that evil applies to the act insofar as it is from God, and not only insofar as it is from man, is not only nowhere asserted by him, but is indeed openly denied, both elsewhere and especially in book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 17, section 6, where he asserts that "The whole evil is found in men; with God there is nothing but the legitimate use of evil," and a little before,

APPENDIX

that "God only uses evil instruments well." Molinaeus, learned in the mysteries of the Calvinists both by his own judgment and by the suffrage of others, speaks thus in his *Anatomy of Arminianism*, chapter 3, number 5: "Just as in the generation of an embryo, the sun and man act together, and if a monster is generated, this is not ascribed to the sun but to man. Indeed, a monster is born because the universal acting cause is drawn away from its accustomed course by defect of organs or bad disposition of matter. So God and the human will concur for human actions, and if there is any depravity in the action, **IT SHOULD NOT BE ASCRIBED TO GOD**, but to the disposition of the human will." And in number 15, he says: "God, efficaciously influencing the creature, does not take away from it the free contribution of its power. In human action, if anything is sinned, it is from man; **GOD'S CONCURRENCE IS NATURAL, BUT THE CREATURE'S IS MORAL**. What was natural in the eating of that forbidden fruit was from God; what was moral and deviant from the path of justice was from man. Just as God gives to a limping animal the power to walk, etc."

Here now I ask the Adversaries what they think worthy of reprehension in such doctrine, besides this one thing that was added by Molinaeus in the place just cited: that God efficaciously influences the creature while it sins; that its act is defined by God; that it is certainly preordained, chapter 6, number 9; that although it is free and most free, as he says in chapter 31, number 15, nevertheless it is necessary, as he adds immediately in number 16, and in chapter 35, where he says in number 8 that "only necessity of coercion, or even physical necessity, determined to one, such as is the inclination of heavy objects to the center, excuses from sin." Nothing else, I say, occurs in the books of Heretics from which we might conjecture that they make God the Author of sin. But these very things are asserted by the Adversaries. From which it seems to follow that they must either absolve them or confess themselves to be guilty.

Nor does anything occur here that they might respond, unless perhaps what Camerarius hints at on page 121: that Heretics, although

APPENDIX

they speak as we have said, nevertheless really think differently. But this is to expose the Church, which has condemned them, to ridicule, since it would be proper to that judgment that no one could rightly condemn except one who confesses guilt. There will also perhaps be someone who will add this: that Molinaeus, being cunning and of a mobile intellect and waxen faith that is ductile for the uses of the times, has amended the opinion of the Calvinists and composed it to the form of orthodoxy. But let those who say this see, in their wisdom which is very great, whether they think it sufficiently becoming for them to agree with that man whom even the Arminians abominate in this controversy about the Author of sin, as sacrilegious and blasphemous. I am entirely certain that he does not depart even a nail's breadth from the opinion of the Pontificals, whom Molinaeus in chapter 35 indicates are contrary to his doctrine.

Thus far Camerarius might have seemed to share a common difficulty with many; but to make clear how brave and strong he is, he added a statement full of horror: "That there is no act of sin which God cannot perform in us without us, as punishment for sin." These are his words on page 117, five lines before the bottom: "It is confirmed," he says, "because there is no act of sin which cannot BE IN US WITHOUT US FROM GOD AS PUNISHMENT FOR SIN. From which I argue thus: That act so considered will be entirely from God, and if it afterward becomes ours, it will be because we fall away from the rule and turn ourselves to creatures; therefore there is no difficulty in premotion to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, even by the admission of the Adversaries. The consequence is evident, etc. The antecedent is certain. And indeed, etc." Here I do not marvel at the man's confidence, who proves an unheard-of thing no differently than because it is certain. Nor do I even press this point, that he differs from himself when on page 120 he thinks Calvin is forced to make God the cause of evil, even as it is evil, because he says we concur only spontaneously to the evil act. His words are a little before the end: "Heretics affirm that God necessitates our wills to evil both as to the substance of the act and as to its mode, since they say we

APPENDIX

concur to both only spontaneously or passively. From which it clearly follows that if God produces in us the evil act by which another sin is punished, without us—that is, either with us in no way, or at least not freely but only spontaneously or passively concurring to its entity, and consequent to its evil—it follows, I say, that God is the cause of that act, not only as to its substance, but also as to its mode," which was attributed to heretics. But I omit these things and consider only this, in which Calvin might seem to be surpassed by this Author: that it could have happened that God excited in Judas the traitor, in the Deicide Jews, in the Impious Herod, and in other such criminals, those detestable affections by which their prior sins were punished, without them.

The anathema of the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 6, against those who say that God works evil works in us just as good ones, is not relevant here, for this Author professes that the manner of operating is different, since he believes it can also happen that God operates evil more than good. For He does not operate good without us, since it is defined that we freely concur to them. But these things pertain rather to those to whose office is joined the care of preserving the Catholic faith. I hope they will not allow their providence in this matter to be found wanting.

Sixth. Finally, this seems to be granted to this philosopher, that we might hear an argument which he thinks is insoluble for those who deny physical premotions. It is that which he begins to explain in doubt 2, page 93. And the difficulty is placed in this, that God cannot agree with a creature to concur simultaneously unless He predetermines that concurrence, and therefore the cause itself, which he extensively proves by running through various ways in which that could be explained. But lest he be troubled, I will tell him how this can be understood. Place two men in the same circumstances, one of whom freely elicits a certain act, love of pleasure for example, while the other freely does not elicit it. I say that God antecedently, by one and the same decree, anticipates both, which decree is expressed in these or similar words: "I will so assist this man that

APPENDIX

it will be in his power to love that object here and now, or not to love it according to his freedom. I will so assist the other as well." And if it helps to agree with those who think the determination of acts as to their individual difference is from God, that decree should be conceived thus: "I will so assist this man that it will be in his power to elicit here and now, regarding such an object, this particular love from among infinitely many entirely similar ones, or none according to his freedom. I will so assist the other as well." By virtue of such a decree precisely and without any other, I say that the divine concurrence is exhibited in reality to one of those men, and his action becomes identically and essentially the action of God. This does not happen in reality with the other, according to their freedom. Likewise, by virtue of that decree precisely, I say it happens that God is the cause why he who operates produces this particular love rather than another from among infinitely many entirely similar ones; but man is not such a cause, but is only a cause without which this would not happen. Conversely, from this it happens that man is the cause why love is produced rather than not-love, but God is not such a cause, but is only a cause without which this would not happen. I am speaking precisely of the free act, not of the good and supernatural act which God persuades and loves and desires and with that intention concurs to its production, also aiding the weakness of the potency by which it is produced beyond and above its exigency, so that therefore He can deservedly be said to be the cause why such an act exists. Although God is not the cause why love is produced rather than not-love, nevertheless there is nothing physical in the produced love, nothing real, which does not intimately and essentially depend on God, according to every positive aspect which it includes in any way, much more than it depends on the created cause, because it is caused both in a nobler way and more necessarily by Him than by this.

Here now I ask, what is that insoluble argument? You say that indigence and potentiality are placed in God. On the contrary, the highest perfection and actuality are placed in Him, because such and so great power and jurisdiction are attributed to Him that, although He Himself

APPENDIX

is subject to no lord, He can nevertheless have a free agent subject to Himself as lord of its own operation. Subject, I say, since no dominion of His can exist unless it had been first established by that antecedent decree. And therefore that decree is the proper and most perfect act determining that virtue and power of God by which He can subject free causes to Himself. You say God will wait for the concurrence of the will as antecedent in the genus of secondary cause, from which follow I know not how many absurdities. You are mistaken, for there is no such antecedence, because it is repugnant that the cause why something is should produce it before the cause without which it cannot be produced. You insist that God will not be pure act. O how subtle you are! What can some extrinsic something-or-other, which does not enter into composition with Him, harm the purity of God's act? You continue: How will God know His concurrence to be absolutely future? In the same way, I say, that He knows other future contingent things. But this is for another time. For it is now evident what should be thought about the other arguments, after the one that was thought to be insoluble was twisted from such a tenuous thread. Farewell to this Philosopher, may he flourish, may he triumph; but as befits a Christian, with the splendor of virtue, modesty of mind, innocence of speech, maturity of judgments, religiousness of opinions, and finally with a sincere zeal for truth.

L.D.

Francisco Annato, S.J.